REGIONALISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN PAKISTAN:

A Case Study in Political Geography

by

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ABSTRACT

Political Geography recognises the importance of the State as a politico-territorial unit and several approaches to the study of its internal and external relationships have been advanced. One such approach put forward by Hartshorne (A.A.A.G., Vol.XL, 1950, No.2, June, 95-130) proposed a functional study examining the various influences that favour or work against the evolution of homogeneity within the State. It is the balance between these two sets of influences, 'centripetal' and 'centrifugal' forces, that may usefully be examined in any assessment of the viability of the State.

This study of Pakistan is in the spirit of Hartshorne's ideas and concentrates on the internal aspects of the state, only referring to some external influences. Culturally, the population of Pakistan remains deeply divided by the traditional linguistic boundaries. In the economic field, while on the one hand it has made some impressive progress, on the other the persisting inter-regional disparities in the levels of development have created bitter differences between the provinces. Politically, it has tried two constitutions and failed; it is now trying to frame yet another. These differences have further been confounded by the territorial fragmentation into the two wings separated by a thousand miles of alien territory. All these differences in the cultural, economic and political distributions exert their centrifugal influence on the state in varying degrees, sometimes in the form of a relatively mild provincialism, sometimes as outright separatism. 'Regionalism' in this study covers all such influences.

Opposed to 'Regionalism' are the influences that favour a more positive unity between the various constituent areas of the state. 'Political Integration' represents these 'centripetal' forces which work for homogeneity and cohesiveness. Despite the secular outlook of the educated elite, Islam is

still the most important uniting influence in Pakistan. Apart from the common religion there are indications that certain other centripetal influences have also developed during the course of the past twenty-three years.

Whereas it is highly speculative to predict which of the two, Regionalism or Political Integration, will triumph, an attempt has been made in this study to examine the nature and extent of these two sets of influences to demonstrate the complex interplay of the cultural, economic and political forces which will shape the future of Pakistan.

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PART I INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

THEORY AND METHOD

Although the origin of political geography is often dated to Sir William Petty in the seventeenth century or even to the Greek period, and despite its more or less continuous development since Ratzel in the late nineteenth century (Goblet 1955), it is still considered to be a relatively young and less developed branch of human geography (Hartshorne 1954). It was thrown into disrepute by its corruption into 'geopolitik' during the inter-war period in Germany and, while on the one hand this unfortunate stage in its development did much harm to its growth, on the other it forced geographers, particularly in America, to give it more vigorous attention and redefine its proper academic standing. This process of defining the scope and aims of political geography still goes on and nearly all works on political geography contain definitions of the subject. Some of the definitions are too vague to be of much help, as for example: "Political geography can be described as that discipline which treats political phenomena geographically" (Cohen 1964, p.iv); "...as the study of political phenomena in their areal context" (Jackson 1964, p.1); and "...the study of political regions as features of the earth's surface" (Alexander 1963, p.1). Because of the highly confusing state through which political geography has been passing the more specific definitions are still quite broad and general: "...as the analysis of inter-state relationships and of internal adaptations to

environmental conditions" (Moodie 1959, p.18); "...the study of the variations of political phenomena from place to place in inter-connection with variations in other features of the earth as the home of man" (Hartshorne 1960, p.52); and "Political geography is concerned with politically organized areas, their resources and extent, and the reasons for the particular geographical forms which they assume" (Pounds 1963, p.1).

The only thing in common with all the definitions is the recognition that man's political activity expressed territorially is the main focus of study in political geography. Here it differs distinctly from political science which also deals with man's political activity but focuses on the institutional expression of that activity. However, it is by no means easy to demarcate sharply the spheres of political geography and political science, nor indeed of history, international relations and in fact of all social sciences, because there is so much overlapping along the borders of all these disciplines. Perhaps there is relatively more overlapping in political geography not only in relation to other social sciences but also with other branches of human geography, and probably for this reason it has proved more difficult to define its scope and aims and to establish a distinct method of study. This confusion over content is reflected in many published works, for example Hartshorne (1950) and Jackson (1958). It is unfortunate that at a time when most other disciplines, having settled their scope and aims, have been engaged in refining

and developing their methodologies, political geography had to remain occupied with finding its own identity. The development of 'geopolitik' was indeed an unfortunate episode but, perhaps, there has been a certain amount of over-reaction towards its influence on political geography. The science of genetics was equally, or probably more, used by the German national socialists to justify their theories of Teutonic superiority and of territorial expansion, but genetics is now a vigorously growing field of the biological sciences. In political geography, on the other hand, one can still feel some persisting caution against saying anything which may have even a remote possibility of being used as another 'geopolitik'.

However, all this does not mean that political geography has remained stagnant, though its development has relatively lagged behind that of some other branches of geography. Important contributions have been made over the past four or five decades by scholars like Whittlesey, Hartshorne, Jones, Gottman and many others on both sides of the Atlantic. Their main concern has been, as said earlier, to define political geography and settle on what is to be included in politico-geographical studies. Although there is still a variety of opinion on these issues, it seems that there is an agreement on man's "political activity in its areal context" as being the centre of study. The areal context of such activity is undoubtedly the territorial organization.

Political organization of territory by people can have many forms and levels ranging from small local administrative

units to states and supra- and international organizations. All organizations above the level of the state do not have sovereignty except such as their member states may voluntarily concede, and even then any member state may withdraw from such an organization at any time. Below the state level too the units are not sovereign, and although their rights and powers differ widely according to the constitutions of their states, they are always subordinate to the state of which they are the components. The state is the most important political area, characterized by its sovereignty and commanding the supreme loyalty of its inhabitants. Even where the component units have considerable autonomy the loyalties of their populations to them are subordinate to the overall loyalty to the state. Where this does not happen it is a matter of considerable weakness for the state. Any loyalty to an ultra-state organization is derived through its member states and not directly. Although political geography is interested in all these levels of organization, it is particularly "concerned with that most significant of all such areas, the state. ... States are part of a hierarchy of politically organized areas, though unquestionably the most important level in this hierarchy" (Pounds op.cit. p.1-3). "The phenomena called the state has been accepted by geographers generally as the formal or central subject matter of political geography" (Jackson op.cit. p.178). Hartshorne has also emphasized the importance of the state as the centre of study in political geography though there is, according to him, "a place for the geographic study of politically organized areas

of lower levels - the subdivisions of states" (1950, p.101). Yet in many ways the state is probably the most ignored area of study in the substantive literature of political geography. A great deal of material has been written on the global level in power analyses and studies of international relations. The sub-state level too has received relatively more attention, e.g. in boundary studies. A boundary is important only insofar as it bounds a state, and the need to study power or interstate relations arises only because there are different politico-territorial organizations in the form of states. If the surface of the earth was not divided into the various political units none of these problems would have arisen and there would have been no political geography. Yet the published material on the regional geographies of different countries commonly contains very little on their political geographies. There is a definite two-way relationship between geography and politics because geography, in all its physical, social and economic aspects, influences the internal and external relationships of the state, and political decisions in turn affect human activity in all spheres (Wooldrige & East, 1951). The importance of political geography was very ably stressed by Whittlesey (1935) in his article 'The Impress of the Effective Central Authority upon the Landscape'. He observed: "Phenomena engendered by political forces should have a recognized place as elements in the geographic structure of every region" (ibid. p.97). Perhaps, as pointed out earlier, one can feel a fear of 'geopolitik' which has kept geographers wary of political

geography at the state level because of its possible identification with any particular nationalistic ideas. However, there does not now seem to be any disagreement among political geographers that the state is the main focus of study because all substate political areas are only its components and all ultra-state organizations are voluntary associations of different states (Hartshorne op.cit.). The only notable exception is that of Jones (Jackson op.cit.) who considers all 'political areas' as being equally important and who is against putting the state in such a central position.

The second problem in political geography, after that of its definition and scope, has been that of method and approach. Because of a lack of clearly defined aims and of a body of theory, Hartshorne in 1950, while surveying the literature produced in political geography, "found the greatest variety of methods, and the use of almost every kind of material conceivable" in the writings of political geographers; there was "no indication of common purpose or objective" (op.cit. p.96). Similar observations have also been made by Jackson (1958), in his highly critical essay, 'Whither Political Geography?' Nevertheless, out of this confusion of method and material political geographers, like Hartshorne (1950, 1954), Cohen (1964), Alexander (op.cit.), have recognised four distinct approaches employed in politico-geographical studies. These are: 1) Power Analysis; 2) Historical; 3) Morphological; and 4) Functional.

The first approach, that of power analysis, looks at the state mainly as an instrument of power, and tries to assess the power potential of states in relation to each other on the basis of their geography - i.e. physical features, climate, population, economic resources, etc. It looks at geography as a determinant of power, a result of the philosophy of geographic determinism. Hartshorne rejected this approach as not being a "technique of analysis" (op.cit. 1950 p.97).

The historical approach concentrates on the present-day state as a result of a long historical process of evolution, and although useful in understanding the historical background of the present political pattern, it does not explain the existing internal or external state relationships. It may ascribe the same deterministic role to history as the first one does to geography. In fact it has been called "another form of geographic determinism" (Hartshorne *ibid.* p.97). This approach, moreover, has been considered to be properly a part of historical rather than political geography (Moodie op.cit.), but, of course, there cannot be a sharp division between the two branches. Historical studies of the genesis of the state are sometimes useful in understanding the present political geography, for example Whittlesey's study of France (1939), but to use genetic studies as a basis for "projecting the political roles and activities of states today can prove fruitless and even misleading" (Cohen op.cit. p.13).

The third, or morphological, approach focuses on "the present state-area as a geographic phenomenon" (Hartshorne

1950, p.99) and includes the size, shape, location and boundaries of a state, its natural and cultural regions and the location of its capital. Hartshorne considered this to be "almost pure morphology, and therefore static and dull" (ibid. p.99). Morphology was important, as he thought, only in its effects on the functioning of the state-area. By itself it did not serve any purpose as, for example, the curious shape of a state-area may look very interesting on a map but it is meaningless unless related to the actual functions of that state.

The fourth approach, functional, was introduced by Hartshorne (ibid.) in his presidential address to the Association of American Geographers. He considered the state as established primarily to bring about homogeneity in an area heterogeneous in physical and human distributions. He proposed to study the state from the angle of its functions regarding the primary objective of achieving homogeneity. The state, to him, was an area "homogeneous in political organization; heterogeneous in other respects", and was subject to two sets of forces, centripetal and centrifugal, which respectively aided or hindered the cohesiveness for which the state strives. Every state has a 'state-idea', its 'raison d'etre', distinct from those of other states, and as a first measure of homogeneity it was useful to find out the degree of correspondence between the 'state-idea' and the state-area. Any parts of a state where the state-idea was not fully accepted constituted an important centrifugal force. And so by assessing all the physical and

human elements which work for and against homogeneity he hoped to measure the viability and the strength of the state. This approach is his major contribution to the methodology of political geography but there are some practical difficulties in the application of his ideas.

Firstly, it may be extremely difficult to define the state-idea of a particular state, especially if the state is old-established, because it might have undergone many changes and modifications since its origin. Even in the case of some young states the state-idea may not exist in a definite and well expressed form, and thus it may not be possible to discern it. It is very likely that the idea may be present only in a vague form in the minds of the people, and not clearly embodied in the constitution as a 'national' objective.

Secondly, in order to find out the state-idea of a particular state one may have to dip back into history to see how that idea originated and led to the emergence of the present state. Apparently there seems to be a slight contradiction here in his ideas because, in his discussion of the historical approach, he says that he does not consider that "historical studies of genesis are essential for every study in political geography" (ibid. p.98); yet an examination of at least some historical material is necessary to study the emergence of every state-idea.

Thirdly, even where one can pinpoint the contemporary state-idea of a present-day state, there are no means available to a single research worker to measure its acceptance in

different parts of that state. Even if one had the resources to conduct a state-wide survey the government might not allow it to be carried out for political reasons. Therefore one has to depend upon one's subjective judgement which may not be very accurate. The problem of the lack of proper data also besets the assessment of other centripetal and centrifugal forces though, as has been attempted in this study, the usual census material is of considerable help.

Two other notable contributions to the methodology since the last war have been made by Gottman (1952) and Jones (1954). Gottman saw the political processes as an interplay of two factors: a) 'circulation' or the 'movement factor' which includes all forms of movement whether of people, goods or ideas; and b) 'iconography', a system of symbols in which a people believes. There is a struggle between these two factors "which oppose one another in the play of forces constantly shaping and reshaping the political map" (Gottman, op.cit.).

Jones' contribution, made in the form of his 'A Unified Field Theory of Political Geography' (op.cit.), takes the two words which make Hartshorne's 'state-idea' as the two end links of a chain with three links between them instead of the hyphen: Political Idea - Decision - Movement - Field - Political Area. It means that a political idea is born which leads to a decision creating a movement in a field which results in a political area, a state or any other. The theory uses both Hartshorne's 'state-idea' and Gottman's 'circulation', though the former becomes a 'political-idea' which according to Jones means "any

political idea", and the latter is simply 'movement'. The flow in this chain-reaction is not one way, i.e. idea to area, but the links are rather similar to five basins interconnected at the same level "so that whatever enters one will spread to all the others" (ibid. p.115). In other words the chain, once it has formed, is a continuous circular system rather than being open-ended.

In at least one respect these ideas, of Gottman and Jones, are similar to those of Hartshorne in that they also involve a study of the historical past as the origins of 'state-idea', 'political idea' and 'iconography' must necessarily lie in the past, and the older a state gets the more distant this past will be. However, these three contributions greatly differ from the historical approach because of their emphasis on the present-day political processes of the state. Hartshorne's functional approach seems to be more straightforward as it involves a study of the balance between the converging and diverging interests within a state and herein, in fact, lies the whole strength, economic and political, of the state. This marks the major difference, and a deep one, between this approach and that of power analysis. While the latter looks at the state mainly as an instrument of power in conflict with other states, the former sees the politico-territorial organization as established mainly to bring about internal cohesion. A state may be weak relative to other states and yet may have a high degree of internal cohesion and strength. A lack of internal cohesion has been, perhaps, the greatest weakness of empires, as for example of

Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the earlier Muslim Caliphates.

Another important methodological contribution has come from Deutsch (1953), a political scientist. In his search for a theory of nationalism and the reasons why nationalism has succeeded in some areas and failed in others, he developed the idea of 'social communication'. In his opinion the cohesiveness of a community lies mainly in the effectiveness of its social communication. He proposed a quantitative method of studying such effectiveness and his ideas have proved to be of much interest to political geographers though, however, the absence of proper data remains the major problem in applying those ideas.

With the recent advances in quantitative techniques and their increasing use in geographic research there are possibilities of employing them in politico-geographical research, as for example Minghi (1962). However, there is much in political geography which will remain of empirical nature because: "It is difficult to enumerate and impossible to measure the intangibles that make a nation" (Pounds op.cit. p.8). And, "...there are many problems in political geography that are not capable of solution through such detailed work. But political geography, no less than other areas of geography, can and does lend itself to quantitative approaches" (de Blij 1967, p.158). The fact that at least one recent important work on quantitative techniques contains a short section on political geography (Cole and King 1968) is indicative of the future trend in research. However, as Pounds, Moodie and de Blij have observed, political geography

will have to depend mainly on empirical research because of the very nature of the complex human problems involved in it. Another work worth mentioning is a study of modernization in Kenya (Soja 1968) which indicates that, if proper data is made available, modern quantitative methods may prove useful in some politico-geographical problems. Whereas one can look forward excitingly to these new methods one should, however, remember that: "So complicated and intangible are the forces at work that they are not reducible to fixed laws. There are certain common measures within groups of States, but these are ill defined, arising as they do of subjective rather than objective conditions. Any branch of study, therefore, which is primarily concerned with States and their relationships cannot be an exact science" (Moodie op.cit. p.164).

This particular study, as it is explicit in its title, is about the state of Pakistan. It is one of the older of the new generation of states which came into being as a result of post-war decolonization. Its short but eventful history is apparently not of particular interest as it falls within the general pattern of political instability and coups which most of these states have experienced in their post-independence years. However, for a political geographer Pakistan is a unique case if only because of its territorial fragmentation on a scale never seen before. It came into being amidst so much bitterness and hostility that millions of people were forced to leave their homes and migrate; hundreds of thousands died. The British Indian Empire was divided into two independent

states, Pakistan and India. Pakistan started almost from scratch; it had neither a state capital nor the machinery of a central government. Gradually the whole governmental machinery was built up for a state with over eighty million inhabitants. Despite all the handicaps and problems it has survived for twenty three years.

Survived it certainly has, but is it any closer to the cohesiveness and homogeneity, in which lies the strength of a state, than it was in 1947? During these past twenty three years it has experienced two Martial Laws and three constitutions; it is preparing for the fourth one at present. To outsiders it has appeared at times to be a model for all the developing states, on other occasions it has seemed to be on the verge of collapse. A considerable body of material has been written about the problems and prospects of Pakistan, and it is generally well known to all who have some acquaintance with it that the main problems lie in the unequal distributions of area, population and resources between its two widely separated parts, or 'wings' as they are popularly called, East and West Pakistan, and also in the cultural heterogeneity reflected in the variety of languages spoken by its population. A common religion apparently still remains an important force to keep these two wings together. However, no attempt has been made, as far as the writer is aware, to study these problems systematically. This study, therefore, is an attempt to look into the nature and extent of the forces of 'national' divergence and convergence in the light of the various governmental policies regarding an

effective integration of the components into a cohesive whole. So, it is in the spirit of Hartshorne's ideas that this study is undertaken.

During the past years one of the main issues in the political controversies in Pakistan has been that of the division of powers between the central and provincial governments. While all the proponents of a strong centralized system have considered the demands of provinces for more autonomy as something disastrous for the state, the provinces have been asking for more powers as a matter of right. Behind all these differences, which have often resulted in violence, have been the complex economic and cultural differences. Although the causes and the circumstances are different, this struggle between the centre and the provinces has some resemblance to the States' Rights controversy in America during the pre-Civil War period. During the past twenty three years these differences and controversies, mainly between the wings but also within West Pakistan, have deepened instead of having been resolved. On the other hand there are the more hopeful signs of the development of thinking among certain sections of the population on the state level rather than on the provincial level. Although no area has yet demanded separation, separatism is a potential threat. The term 'regionalism' has been used in this study not in any geographic meaning but as a substitute for the provincial tendencies for autonomy as opposed to a strong centralized system. It is used in terms of being a 'centrifugal force' opposed to the idea of a strong centre, but not

necessarily in terms of separatism. Perhaps the use of provincialism, or 'localism' (East & Spate 1966), or of 'particularism' (Spate 1956) would have been more appropriate but 'regionalism' is a term commonly used in Pakistan for these specific meanings, and for this reason it has been selected.

'Political Integration' is also a little confusing because in a sense all states, irrespective of their internal relationships, are politically integrated inasmuch as they provide a common political framework for all their component parts. In this study, however, political integration has been taken as exactly opposite to regionalism. All the provinces and other areas, of course, share a common political framework provided by the state but political integration here means more than the sharing of common international boundaries. It is difficult to define exactly but political integration has been taken to mean some common acceptance of objectives, a system of social and economic values, and of political institutions. In short 'regionalism' implies the same meanings as Hartshorne's 'centrifugal forces', and 'political integration' is a substitute for what he considers that states strive for, cohesiveness.

In political geography the state has a dual role; as a sovereign territorial unit and as a part of the larger world political pattern. Its internal relationships are of as much interest as are its relations with other states. These two sets of relationships are themselves linked to each other because a state's attitude towards other states depends on the conditions within her boundaries. Similarly its internal

relationships are affected by its relations with other states. It is not always easy to separate these two sets of relationships though for convenience it is often done (Hartshorne 1950; Moodie op.cit), because "for the sake of analysis, it is helpful to examine the politico-geographical conditions of the State from each of the two aspects" (ibid. p.34). Exactly for this reason, to keep the study manageable, only the internal aspects have been included here, though in places it has been necessary to refer to some external aspects.

This work has been divided into five parts. Part I includes, besides this chapter, a brief introduction to Pakistan. The second Part, Cultural Distributions, deals with such characteristics of the population as religion, literacy and education, urban and rural population, and migration. Part III, Economic Distributions, is concerned with agriculture, industries, transport and communications, and trade and commerce. Parts II and III both conclude with chapters which sum up and integrate all the chapters in each part respectively. The emphasis is on finding out the differences and similarities between the provinces in the various distributions considered. Part IV, Political Distributions, takes up the pattern of administration, political institutions and constitutional changes, and the two-way relationship between the socio-economic realities and politics. The nature and extent of 'regionalism' is then considered on the basis of the evidence available. Part V is the Conclusion.

The choice of the topics discussed in the chapters has been determined to a considerable degree by the availability of data. The main sources are the censuses of population and other official published material. Apart from the inadequacy of the available data, which has been frequently pointed out in the text, discrepancies in the figures have been a constant problem. All possible care has been taken in the choice of statistics but the writer does not take any responsibility for their accuracy. Their sources, however, have been appropriately mentioned. Pakistan has had two censuses, in 1951 and 1961, and the quality and quantity of the data in them differs widely. Different definitions used in the two censuses have rendered some of the figures incapable of comparison. It is hoped that in the next census, due in 1971, while still improving the standard, comparability with the 1961 material will be kept in mind.

The division of the chapters into social and economic is to some degree arbitrary because in the case of some topics it is difficult to draw a sharp line. For example, transport and communications have both social and economic implications. Instead of splitting this topic into the two categories, and thus involving much repetition, it has been put under the Economic Part. So, no rigid basis for this division is being offered here; the arrangement is simply for the sake of convenience.

The writer has tried to follow the advice given by Moodie that "if false deductions are to be avoided, the study of

Political Geography also requires a high degree of objectivity and detachment; in short, it requires a scientific attitude of mind on the part of its exponents, who must weigh carefully the available evidence and avoid rash generalizations ... Objectivity should be the guiding light of the political geographer. There is no easy road to the solutions of problems of the State, neither within its internal political framework nor in inter-State relations" (ibid. pp.14-15). However, being himself a Pakistani, certain deep rooted opinions and prejudices of the writer might have inadvertently crept in here and there, because some of the issues involved are highly emotive. Any such subjective errors the reader may pick out and discard.



Fig. 1. Pakistan and surrounding states.

Source: The American University, Area Handbook of Pakistan, 1962.

CHAPTER 2

PAKISTAN: AN INTRODUCTION

Pakistan as an independent state came into being on 14th August, 1947, when at the time of British withdrawal the sub-continent was partitioned. Before that date it had never existed in a tangible form but only as a vague idea in the minds of the Muslim population of the subcontinent. The word 'Pakistan' was coined only in 1933, but the socio-religious differences which were the basis of the partition and the creation of Pakistan had their roots in the history of past centuries. The unique and curious nature of the territorial morphology of Pakistan, consisting as it does of two widely separated parts, raised doubts even in the minds of its supporters as to the possibility of running it as a unitary state. The demand for Pakistan, as formally expressed in the famous Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League on 23rd March, 1940, was put forward thus:

> "Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the Northwestern and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign" (Binder 1963, p.62).

One can only be amazed at the vagueness of the Resolution. It used six different words as measures of territorial units: "geographically contiguous units"; "regions"; "areas"; "zones"; "Independent States"; and "Constituent Units". It did not mention anywhere the existing administrative units - provinces, divisions, districts etc. The part of the Resolution most difficult to understand is this: "...Independent States in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign". It did not explain how the constituent units of an independent state could be autonomous and sovereign. However, one thing which is clear from the Resolution is that at that time among the leaders of the League there was no concept of a unitary state consisting of the widely separated "Northwestern and Eastern zones of India". Perhaps the idea was to have a loose federation, or rather a confederation, of the Muslim majority areas with the provinces having a high degree of autonomy. There is no indication as to where the sovereignty would have rested,* because it is one thing that cannot be divided between the different levels of government. If it was to be vested in the "Constituent Units", as said in the Resolution, then certainly there was going to be more than one 'state', perhaps as many as the number of provinces. They could, of course, have an

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* Both the Constitutions of Pakistan, of 1956 and 1962, affirmed that sovereignty over the entire Universe rested with Allah (God), but this certainly was not in the minds of those who passed the Resolution in 1940. Otherwise no unit could have 'autonomy' and 'sovereignty'.

economic, and possibly political, union but such an arrangement would have been on an international basis.

Notwithstanding its vagueness and ambiguity the Resolution is indicative of four things: a) that the Muslims of the sub-continent were determined to be independent of Hindu India once the power had been transferred by the British; b) that the cultural heterogeneity of the Muslim majority areas was recognized, hence the emphasis on the autonomy of the constituent units and the absence of the word Pakistan; c) that there was a lack of any real effort to understand the problems which were bound to arise after independence; and d) an absence of any mention of establishing an Islamic state. So, this means that the state-idea, or perhaps state-ideas, of the Muslim League at that time was based on a not too distinct sense of religious unity and on a more definite alarm occasioned by the numerical superiority of the Hindu population. In the general election of 1946 the League emerged with an overwhelming support for its policy by a large majority of the Muslim population. What happened after independence is discussed in Part IV as this chapter is meant to be only a general introduction to Pakistan as it was finally born twenty three years ago.

A detailed chapter on the physical geography is not included in this study because, firstly, it has been thoroughly dealt with in the various regional and economic texts that have been published (e.g. Spate & Learmonth 1967; Ahmad 1964; Ahmad 1968). Secondly, physical features, climate, etc., do not have any direct importance in politico-geographical studies like this one;


Height Above sea-level
in feet.
over 10,000
1,500 - 10,000
below 1,500
WEST
PAKISTAN
R. Kabul
R. Jhelum
R. Chenab
R. Ravi
R. Sutlej
R. Indus
EAST
PAKISTAN
R. Ganges
R. Jamuna
R. Meghna
R. Kar
0 100
Miles
Source: Census 1961.

Fig. 2. Relief.

they are of interest only in their relation to cultural and economic distributions.

> "In the organization of diverse areas into a unit, regional differences in climate, landforms, water resources or minerals no doubt raise complications for central governments, but rarely are these more than minor difficulties in themselves.
>
> "regional heterogeneity creating difficulty for political organization of area is solely that of cultural heterogeneity" (Hartshorne 1968, p.29).

In a state in which the two parts are separated from each other by about one thousand miles, with a total area of over 300,000 square miles, regional differences in the physical environment are only to be expected, but they are probably not so drastic as one would tend to think. In landforms the main difference between the wings is that the eastern one is for the most part a flat deltaic plain, while in the western one a large part is plateau and mountain country (Fig.2). In climate the more important difference is in the amount of rainfall (Fig.3). A very large part of West Pakistan is arid or semi-arid; in East Pakistan the annual rainfall is nowhere less than 50 inches. Apart from some winter rains in West Pakistan, the general seasonal distribution in the two wings is similar. Both the wings are also characterized by hot summers and mild winters, though the latter in West Pakistan are much cooler in the plains and very cold in the higher areas. These salient differences in the climate have resulted in different vegetation, both natural and cultivated. Rice and jute are the main crops in East, and wheat and cotton in West Pakistan; rice is important



Fig. 3. Climate.

in some areas of the latter but under irrigation. However, as pointed out earlier, the differences which are more important in political geography are cultural and economic, and they have been dealt with in the next two Parts.

Territory: Except for minor boundary adjustments with India and Iran, and the return to Pakistan of the small port of Gwadur on the Baluchistan coast by Oman, there have been no territorial changes since independence. The total area of the state* is 365,529 square miles, out of which 310,403 sq.m., or 85 percent of the total, is in West Pakistan, and 55,126 sq.m. in East Pakistan. East Pakistan is almost entirely surrounded by India on the west, north and east. To the south is the Bay of Bengal and in the southeast there is some common border with Burma. West Pakistan has its common boundaries with India on the east, Iran and Afghanistan in the west, Kashmir and Gilgit in the north, and the Arabian Sea is in the south. In the extreme north a narrow salient of the Afghan territory separates it from the U.S.S.R.

At the time of independence the whole territory was divided into several administrative areas, which were:

1. Five provinces: East Bengal (East Pakistan); West Punjab; North West Frontier Province (NWFP); Sind; Baluchistan.
2. Princely states, all in the western wing; Bahawalpur (Punjab); Khairpur (Sind); Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela (Baluchistan); Chitral, Swat, Dir and Amb (NWFP).

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* Gilgit, Baltistan and the part of Kashmir controlled by Pakistan do not form a part of this study because of their disputed status. All the following figures are from the Census of Population, 1961.

3. Tribal areas divided into six Tribal Agencies: Malakand, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North and South Waziristan (NWFP). In addition to these there were some other tribal areas attached to administered districts.

After independence Karachi district was enlarged and brought under the jurisdiction of the central government because it was selected as the state capital. The provinces were divided into districts, roughly equivalent to counties in Britain, which had further subdivisions, called Talukas or Tehsils in West Pakistan and Thanas in East Pakistan.* Two or more districts were grouped together to form a Division. In the princely states administrative divisions corresponded to either districts or tehsils. Tribal Agencies were directly under the central government and the administrative control over them was extremely rudimentary. The main administrative divisions are shown in Fig.4.

This territorial pattern of administration continued more or less unchanged till 1955 when the provinces of West Pakistan were abolished and the whole wing was reconstituted as a single province of West Pakistan. Princely states in Baluchistan and Sind were incorporated as individual districts, that of Bahawalpur in the form of three districts but those of the NWFP continued to function as before. The status of Tribal Agencies also remained unchanged. In spite of all these changes the basic pattern of districts, except for some local adjustments and their regrouping into Divisions, did not alter very much.

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* Thana is also an administrative unit in West Pakistan, below the level of the Tehsil, and means a Police Station, or its jurisdiction.



Source: Tayyeb 1966.

Fig 4. Administrative divisions, 1947-55.

Fig.5 shows the administrative structure as it existed in 1961. In fact this map is almost up to date till 30th March, 1970, when the present government ordered the disintegration of West Pakistan into the former provinces. This reorganization is at the moment going on and also involves some more changes particularly regarding the incorporation of the princely states of the NWFP as regular districts. There are, however, no plans to alter the status of Tribal Agencies.

The district is the most important level of local administration and it is at this level that most of the census data in this study has been analyzed. The total number of administrative districts in Pakistan, before the new reorganization, was 62, and on the basis of former or new provinces they were distributed thus:

East Pakistan	17
NWFP	6
Punjab	19
Sind	11
Baluchistan	9
Total	62

The area of these districts ranges between 30,931 sq.m. for the largest (Kalat) to 1211 sq.m. for the smallest (Mardan). All the tribal agencies also fall within this range except two which have 855 sq.m. (Malakand) and 995 sq.m. (Khyber). As can be seen from Appx. I there is relatively less variation of area in East Pakistan where the largest and the smallest districts have 6361 sq.m. (Mymensingh) and 1371 sq.m. (Kushtia) respectively. In West Pakistan there are 12 districts which have more area than that of the largest in the eastern wing.



Source: Census 1961.

Fig. 5. Administrative Districts, 1961.

Population: The estimated population of Pakistan at the time of independence was a little over 70 million. In the 1951 census it was recorded at 75.7 million and at 93.7 million in 1961, a decennial increase of about 24 per cent. During this inter-censal period the population grew at a faster rate in West than in East Pakistan, 27.0 and 21.2 percent respectively. The most important feature of the population distribution is that a majority lives in the eastern wing. In 1951 East Pakistan had 55.4 percent of the total, and although because of its lower growth rate its share had been falling, it was still 54.2 percent in 1961. This distribution of population between the wings has important economic and political implications which are discussed under the appropriate chapters. Because of the unequal distribution of area and population between East and West Pakistan the two wings differ greatly in population density which in 1961 was 922 and 138 persons per sq.m. respectively (Fig.6). The area, population and density of all districts is given in Appendix I. The share of the provinces in the total population is given in Table 1.

Table 1 Distribution of Population, 1961.

Province	Population	Percent of Total (in thousands)
East Pakistan	50841	54.2
NWFP	7578	8.1
Punjab	25582	27.3
Sind	8469	9.0
Baluchistan	1252	1.3

(Census, 1961)



Fig. 6. Density of population (Districts), 1961.

The distribution within West Pakistan may also be kept in mind because, as will be seen, it has played an important part in the various constitutional and economic issues. The particular thing to be remembered is that the Punjab has about 60 percent of the total population of West Pakistan.

Fig.7 shows topologically the distribution of population in both the wings on the district level in 1961. It is a much better picture, than that provided by conventional maps, of the relative position of different areas in terms of absolute numbers of population. As can be seen from this map (and also in Appx. I) the district population varies between about 7 million (Mymensingh) and 0.04 million (Chagai). Unlike the distribution of area, there are 9 districts in East Pakistan, each having more population than that of the largest in the western wing. Generally the range of difference in the district population, if the relatively sparsely populated Chittagong Hill Tracts is excluded, is smaller in East than in West Pakistan.

Because of the differentials in the size of areas and populations of the districts, the area/population relationships in the two wings are also different. In East Pakistan there is some direct relationship between the two and the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient for the area and population of the 17 districts is +0.5; it is +0.7 if the Chittagong Hill Tracts districts is excluded. In West Pakistan, on the other hand, the relationship is, if anything, inverse, i.e. some of the districts that have a high ranking in area are low in population. The Correlation Coefficient is -0.4. This means that while in



Fig. 7. A topological representation of

Source: Census 1961.



population (Districts), 1961.

East Pakistan population densities are relatively more uniform between the districts - with the exception, as already pointed out, of Chittagong Hill Tracts - there is a wide range in the western wing, from 1506 persons/sq.m. in Karachi to 2 persons/sq.m. in Chagai. On the whole the densities are higher in the central and eastern districts of the Punjab and are low in the trans-Indus area. Provincial metropolitan districts are all the most densely populated in their respective provinces. Karachi, of course, has the highest density in West Pakistan and matches those of the highest of East Pakistani districts. However, the important difference lies in the fact that while Karachi's high density is due to urban growth, that of East Pakistani districts is largely rural.

Since the administrative reorganization of West Pakistan in 1955, when the old provinces were merged to form a single province, till March, 1970, Pakistan had only two provinces, East and West Pakistan. However, in this study the word 'province' has been used only in reference to the former five provinces which have emerged again as a result of the recent break-up of the one unit of West Pakistan. For East and West Pakistan the word 'wing' has been used throughout. Most of the data has either been available at the level of the wings or that of the districts. At the time of the last census in 1961 the provinces did not exist as administrative units, therefore in the census and other reports there is no reference to them at all. An attempt has been made, as far as possible, to rearrange the data on the provincial level but in some cases it

has not been possible. Figs. 4 and 5 should be used as reference to the names and location of the various administrative areas and cities. From much of the study the Frontier States and Tribal Agencies had to be excluded because the census information about them is scanty.

Another important administrative change which should be kept in mind is that of the state capital. Karachi was the provincial capital of Sind before independence. It was selected as the state capital of Pakistan at the time of independence, and the provincial capital of Sind was shifted to Hyderabad. In 1960 the state capital was transferred temporarily to Rawalpindi pending its reshifting to Islamabad, a new city just north of the interim capital. Islamabad is now the seat of the central government. When Karachi no longer remained the capital it was handed over to the jurisdiction of the provincial administration of West Pakistan, and since 1960 it has not been the capital of any unit, except as a Divisional headquarters. Now, with the re-emergence of the provinces it may once again become the provincial capital of Sind.

In the next two parts various socio-economic distributions have been examined and, wherever possible, the main changes that have taken place in those distributions since independence have been discussed. Politics is a result of society and the socio-economic nature of society has a direct relationship with the political organization of the area over which a society extends. As has been explained in the succeeding chapters the various provinces of Pakistan are not just administrative

divisions, but differ markedly from each other in various ways. These provinces have existed as political units for a longer time than the state of which they are now parts. Under the British the circumstances were different, as, because of the presence of an impartial alien rule, there was relatively little inter-provincial conflict. After independence, however, when these culturally diverse areas became equal partners in the affairs of an independent state, their differences came to be reflected in the political field. For the new state of Pakistan the major task since independence has been to create a feeling of 'national' identity to which the provinces may subscribe more fully than to their own separate cultural identities; in other words to create a new loyalty transcending the various provincial and local loyalties which have had the benefit of historical continuity. This is a difficult task especially in view of the fact that the demand for Pakistan affirmed that such continuity would be maintained after independence. So, in the forthcoming pages an attempt has been made to distinguish the provincial differences in social and economic distributions, their role in politics, and what the state has done to transcend these differences.

PART II CULTURAL DISTRIBUTIONS

CHAPTER 3

RELIGION

Pakistan was demanded on the basis of religion and the entire case of the Muslim League, the political party representing the Muslims of the sub-continent, rested on the theory that the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent constituted a separate 'nation' with a right to live in a separate state of their own. These Muslims, it was claimed, not only shared Islam, which is a complete way of life, but also a common historical experience. However, the distribution of Muslims in British India was such that they consisted of several groups with considerable cultural differences. Their main concentrations were in the north-western and eastern parts of the sub-continent, a fact which was later to become the main political problem for the new state of Pakistan. There is no need here to discuss the requirements which are necessary to make a nation, and some of the arguments against the 'Two Nations' theory of the League could be used, with greater force, against the idea that India was one nation. There is also no need to go into the validity of these arguments from different angles, but if the simple criterion that "...if a sufficient number of people are determined to be a nation, then practically they are one" (Spate and Learmonth 1967, p.17) is acceptable, the Muslim League had shown by 1946 that it had the support of a great majority of the hundred million Muslims in demanding partition of the sub-continent. During the elections of that year the League had won all of the thirty Muslim seats

in the Central Legislative Assembly and 446 out of 495 Muslim seats in all the provincial assemblies (Symonds 1950). Thus on 14th August, 1947, Pakistan came into being composed of areas of Muslim concentration in the northwest and east of the sub-continent, with a thousand miles of alien territory between the two. West Pakistan inherited the provinces of Sind, North West Frontier (N.W.F.P.) and the western half of Punjab, Baluchistan and the Baluchistan States, the states of Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Swat, Chitral, Dir and Amb, and various tribal areas. East Pakistan consisted of the eastern half of Bengal province and one district of Assam. This chapter looks mainly into the spatial distribution of religions in Pakistan and the changes that have taken place in those distributions since independence.

In 1941, according to the Census of India, Muslims comprised 24.3% of the total population of the sub-continent as against 69.5% Hindus. Though Muslims were concentrated in certain areas which later formed Pakistan, there were no areas in which they were completely absent. Nor was there a single district where Muslims formed 100% of the population. This meant that any plan for partition could not possibly eliminate religious minorities from the new successor states. In other words whatever the boundaries of Pakistan she was bound to have some non-Muslim population and a proportion of Muslims was bound to be left outside the new state. As a consequence the new state of Pakistan, with the partition boundaries as delimited by the Boundary Commission headed by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, acquired 53.8 million Muslims, or 57% of all the total in the sub-continent

(Davis 1951). This means that at the time of independence 76.7% of the total population of Pakistan was Muslim, which is a considerable degree of religious homogeneity. West Pakistan acquired all the Muslim majority areas of northwest India except Kashmir, whose status is still under dispute, and parts of some districts in the central Punjab which were awarded to India (Spate 1947). In East Pakistan all the Muslim majority areas of Bengal with one district of Assam (Sylhet) went to Pakistan and in addition two non-Muslim majority districts, of Khulna and Chittagong Hill Tracts, were also awarded to Pakistan. Thus the shortfall of the League's demand in the Punjab was counterbalanced by the restriction of the Congress demand in Bengal (Tayyeb 1966).

The partition, and later its plan and execution, did not envisage any transfer of population between the successor states in order to eliminate or reduce minorities. Had there been any such proposal it would have been opposed by the League because such a transfer of population would certainly have been against the interests of Pakistan as delimited by the Commission. At the time of independence the number of non-Muslims left in Pakistan was about 20 million while about 38 million Muslims were left out of Pakistan and were scattered all over India. So, an exchange of 20 million Hindus, Sikhs etc. for 38 million Muslims would leave Pakistan with 18 million additional population, certainly too high a price for complete homogeneity. Pakistan could not pay this price in 1947 nor indeed at any time since then (Davis op.cit.).

Many outsiders, especially Europeans, have failed to understand the differences between Islamic and Hindu ways of life. To them all 'Indians', whether Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, or even Christian, have seemed the same, at best only minor variants of one 'Indian' culture. Those who have spent some time in the sub-continent know what distinguishes and differentiates between Muslims and Hindus. In doctrine and practice no two religions could be more different not only in worship but in almost all aspects of daily life (Stephens 1964). It is true that Islam and Hinduism coexisted in the peninsula for centuries and the two borrowed at least a little from each other, yet the two religions have remained inimical to each other (Spear 1965), and it was these differences of spiritual and social outlook, strengthened further by complex historical-economic causes, which made the partition of the sub-continent inevitable. The geographical distributions of these two major religions in India had confounded the issue still further so as to make either one or the other group a minority religion in practically all districts. Muslims and Hindus had reacted in different ways to the British colonial rule, and in early years the British rulers' attitude had definitely been more favourable to Hindus (Hunter 1884). The British probably saw in Muslims the main opponents to their future empire in India because it was the Muslim Mogul empire that they replaced in the sub-continent; for Hindus it was just a change of masters, a change which certainly proved to their advantage. This differential treatment by the new rulers combined with all the differences

of their creeds further widened the gulf between the two major religious communities in India. Of course one can find examples of Hindu-Muslim unity at certain times, e.g. Gandhi's support of the Khilafat Movement to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate, but there was never a possibility of binding these two groups into one nation. On the contrary one finds Hindu-Muslim clashes often with violence resulting in riots and deaths to be a more common feature in the present century than their united efforts to fight the colonial power. At least the Muslims by 1940, when the League formally demanded partition, had become undoubtedly convinced that they were not prepared to live in an independent united India where Hindus would always remain in numerical and economic superiority. After that year all attempts to bring these two communities together were predetermined to failure.

The partition of the sub-continent brought in its wake something for which the British government were surprisingly not prepared. There was a complete breakdown of law and order as violence suddenly erupted on both sides of the proposed new boundary. Religious groups who found themselves on the wrong side of the new partition boundary were set upon, murdered or forced to leave their homes leaving all their assets behind. Although nearly all parts of India experienced these violent outbreaks, Punjab was the province that suffered most. There are no exact figures available about the number of people who migrated to either of the two new states and those who were killed en route, but according to one estimate about one million

persons died, Pakistan received about 6 million Muslims from India and between 5 and 6 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan for India (Davis op.cit.). Most of this exchange took place in a matter of a few months and was mainly between West Pakistan and India. Although about an equal number of persons crossed the boundary in each direction, the problems for Pakistan were by far greater. This two-way migration altered the pattern of spatial distribution of religions in both the states, more so in Pakistan, particularly in the western wing, because of the greater proportion of displaced persons in relation to the total population. For Pakistan one result of this migration in religious terms was a greater homogeneity because, whereas on the basis of 1941 census, areas comprising Pakistan had 76.7% Muslim population, by 1951 the proportion had increased to about 85%. As has been said earlier, West Pakistan experienced a greater change as a result of the migrations: in 1951 about 97% of the total population of West Pakistan was Muslim while in East Pakistan it was nearly 77%. Compared to West Pakistan, it is estimated, a lesser number of non-Muslims left East Pakistan and even fewer Muslims from India entered that wing. Between the two censuses of 1941 and 1951 the population of West Pakistan showed an increase of 16.2%, that of East Pakistan only 0.1%. Admittedly there are other causes of this extremely low increase in the eastern wing during that decade, but a net loss as a result of partition seems to be a major reason. Within West Pakistan it was the partitioned half of the Punjab where the communal distribution

underwent a radical change. The undivided Punjab had just over 55% of the population as Muslim and the proportion varied in the western half from 60% for one district to 90% in another. The proportion in 1951 had become 97% with no district below 95% and Christians had now replaced Hindus and Sikhs as the main religious minority. The proportion of Muslim population in other provinces of West Pakistan in 1951 was: N.W.F.P. 99.9%, Sind (excluding Karachi) 90.5%, Baluchistan 98.4%, Karachi 96.1%. These areas had already high Muslim population before partition and since they were not affected by partition there was relatively less communal trouble. This is also reflected in the composition of religious minorities in these provinces. In Sind and Baluchistan Hindus are still the principal minorities. However, even from these areas there was an exodus of Hindus and Sikhs to India and an influx of some Muslim refugees from across the boundary.

In East Pakistan the general trend was the same - Hindus leaving for India and Muslim refugees coming into it - but the overall changes in the communal picture were less drastic. In Bengal province as a whole the Muslims were about 55% of the total population and 60.7% in Sylhet district of Assam. In the Muslim majority districts of the province Muslim proportion ranged between 56.6% in Murshidabad to 84% in Bogra. Here too, as in the Punjab, the partition boundary did not follow district boundaries, and consequently some Muslim majority areas were awarded to India, but, unlike the Punjab, East Pakistan received Khulna district, where Muslim proportion was 49.3%, and

Chittagong Hill Tracts with only 3% Muslim population. In the latter district with low total population the majority was, as it still is, of tribal animists. By 1951 the share of the Muslim population in East Pakistan was 77% and the only significant change since partition was that Khulna had now acquired a Muslim majority. In 1951 about 20% of the population of the wing was Hindu i.e. nearly 10 million strong, and they were about equally distributed all over the province.

The 1961 census showed a communal picture substantially the same as in 1951. The general trend towards an increasing proportion of Muslim population continued but this time with more obvious changes in East Pakistan where the Muslim share had increased from 76.8% to 80.4%. This was a result of non-Muslims who continued to trickle out of East Pakistan and vice versa. West Pakistan, however, showed a steady position, or rather in fact some districts showed a slight decrease in Muslim proportion. In Hyderabad division the Hindu population had increased by 22% during the ten years from 1951 to 1961. Christians in the whole of West Pakistan had shown a rise of nearly 35%, partly because of conversions of Scheduled Castes (out-caste Hindus) who probably considered it more convenient to change their religion, which in any case had kept them to the lowest rung of the social ladder, rather than to migrate to India. The increase in Muslim population was nearly 30%, well above the average for the whole country, which was partly because of some conversions and the fact that Muslims had, in general, higher fertility (Davis op.cit.), but also undoubtedly



Fig.8 Distribution of religions, Divisions, 1961.

Source: Census 1961

due to the fact that a steady, though diminishing, stream of refugees continued to come in during those years. There is considerable evidence that after 1951 very few, if any, of the Hindus from West Pakistan left for India because their total numbers registered an increase of over 17% between the last two decennial censuses. That their proportion should have decreased is only to be expected in view of the lower natural increase among Hindus compared to Muslim population (Davis op. cit.).

In East Pakistan the position was different; while the Muslim population had increased by 26.8%, the Hindus gained only about 1.5%. This was a direct result of the outflow of Hindus from the delta districts to India which resulted in only a very slight increase in their absolute numbers and a decreased proportion within the total population. Fig.8 shows the distribution of Muslims and non-Muslims by divisions in both the wings. It shows the greater homogeneity of West Pakistan in religious terms compared to East Pakistan. Only in Hyderabad division of Sind province is there a sizeable religious minority. The composition of religious minorities is shown in Fig.9 which illustrates also the regional differences in the complexion of minorities. In East Pakistan and the former provinces of Sind and Baluchistan, except Quetta division, Hindus and Scheduled Castes are the major minority groups. The Punjab, i.e. Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sargodha and Multan divisions, has now very few Hindus and the only minority group is Christian. In the former Frontier Province the



Fig. 9. Composition of Religious minorities (Divisions), 1961.

minorities, whose total number is very small, are comprised of both Hindus and Christians. The greatest change in the religious complexion of the population, greater even than in the Punjab, took place in Karachi. Before independence Karachi was a relatively minor port, compared to Calcutta and Bombay, situated rather marginally in relation to the rest of the sub-continent. Though it was the provincial headquarters of Sind, an overwhelmingly Muslim province, its Muslim population was in a minority, Parsi (Zoroastrians) and Hindu commercial classes forming a majority. Independence brought a sudden change in the status of the city; almost overnight it became the state capital of Pakistan and the major port of an independent country. The central government and their thousands of employees in addition to a large influx of refugees from India and an outflow of Hindus rendered the city 96% Muslim by 1951. This proportion, in keeping with the general trend in the rest of the country, increased to 97% by 1961. This increase in the Muslim share after 1951 does not appear to have been at the cost of minorities, who together marked an increase of 23.8%. Hindus of all castes gained only 3.3% but this does not mean that after 1951 Hindus had been leaving the city in any great numbers. Figures for the Caste groups show a rather contrary trend. The population of caste Hindus from 1951 to 1961 swelled by about 137%, no doubt largely because of the movement of Hindus from up-country towns and rural areas to the relative safety of the metropolis. However, the very fact that these people decided to move into Karachi rather than to India shows

that Sind had remained comparatively free from communal trouble at the time of the partition. The numbers of Scheduled Castes decreased during the two censuses by 46.3%, a fact which partly explains the increase of 73.2% in Christian population of the city during the same period. Other religions in the city, which include mainly Parsis, showed a steady population during that period though in the whole of West Pakistan they registered an increase of 28.5%. This is certainly because of the movement of these people from Karachi to other towns and cities of the province to fill the vacuum created in business and commerce by the departure of Hindus, who had dominated these spheres of life before independence.

Fig.10 shows the religious composition of population in all cities of Pakistan with over 100,000 inhabitants in 1961. It shows the same trend i.e. a substantial minority in all the cities of East Pakistan who are mostly Hindus, relatively small minorities in West Pakistan, Christian in central and northern areas, Hindu in the lower Indus valley, and Karachi with a mixed minority but mostly Christian.

Besides these regional differences in the religious composition of population there are some further characteristics of the minorities in different areas. These characteristics are not so obvious from census data but are of a more fundamental nature. An analysis of the same data on which Figs.8-10 are based suggests that, whereas in West Pakistan religious minorities tend to concentrate in urban areas, in East Pakistan they are more numerous in small towns and rural areas. In 1961

the percentage of the total population that lived in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants in West Pakistan was 13.3; the comparable figure for East Pakistan was 2.4. However, while 14.7% of all the minorities in West Pakistan lived in such cities, only 1.8% of East Pakistani minorities were recorded in those cities. In other words West Pakistani cities recorded 3.2% of their population as non-Muslim when in the whole of the wing the ratio was 2.9%; minority proportion in the whole of East Pakistan was 19.6% but in the cities 14.7%. This shows that in East Pakistan minorities, mostly Hindu, are less numerous in cities, contrary to what is the case in West Pakistan.

The situation in West Pakistan is far from uniform and there are regional differences. Table 2 gives comparable figures for the different areas of West Pakistan which show that within the province there are differences similar to those that exist between the two wings.

Table 2 shows that there is a tendency for minorities to concentrate in urban areas in the former provinces of the Punjab, N.W.F. and Baluchistan. This tendency is much more marked in Quetta and Kalat Divisions where the only city of over 100,000 inhabitants, Quetta, has only 9.2% of the total population of the area but contains 29.5% of the minorities. In Sind the position is different. Here, as in East Pakistan, cities do not show a concentration of minorities; instead they are less numerous in large cities than elsewhere in the province. Cities account for only 2.6% of the total minorities when their total population is 10.4% of that of the province. To sum up, there

Table 2

Religious Minorities in Cities (by Provinces), 1961

Provinces	1	2	3	4
Punjab	11.4	16.6	2.2	3.2
N.W.F.P.	2.9	5.3	1.1	2.1
Sind (excluding Karachi)	10.4	2.6	8.7	2.2
Baluchistan	9.2	29.5	1.3	4.1

(Source: Census 1961)

1. City population (of cities over 100,000 persons) as % of total population of area.
2. City minorities (of cities over 100,000 persons) as % of total minorities in areas.
3. Total minorities as % of total population of areas.
4. City minorities (of cities over 100,000 persons) as % of total city population.

are differences in the religious composition and distribution of population not only between East and West Pakistan but also within West Pakistan where the lower Indus valley, i.e. Sind province, is different in this regard from the rest of the wing. On the whole the trend during the past years has been that of increasing religious homogeneity though minorities, after the initial setback to Hindus especially in West Pakistan, have been holding their own. The increase in the proportion of minorities at some places can, however, be explained by conversion, movement from other areas as in Karachi, and also by the assumption that in 1951 some people, especially Hindus, might not have declared their true religion because of fear but did register their true faith in 1961 when things had become more settled.

So much for the religious distributions in Pakistan, and now the much more complex issue of the relationships, social as well as political, between different religious communities and the importance of religion in the short but eventful history of the state. The rise of Muslim 'nationalism' in the sub-continent and later the demand for Pakistan elicited different reactions from different quarters. To all those steeped in the modern ideals of secular democracy the very idea of Pakistan appeared repugnant. The leaders of the Muslim League were dubbed as anachronistic reactionaries who were trying to set up a regressive, intolerant theocracy in the middle of the twentieth century. This was the general opinion of the Congress leaders and of many foreign observers as well. But to anyone who looked at the Muslim League leadership more carefully it would have been clear that the truth was different. Unlike the impression which some people tried to create, the leaders of the League were not orthodox religious people, but, like the Congress leaders, were modern progressive men educated at Oxford and Cambridge and at Inns of Law rather than in traditional 'madrassahs'.* It seems rather strange how some people missed the fact that almost all the orthodox religious leaders not only did not join the League but actively opposed it till the very last when the League succeeded in winning the support of only a few of them. The rest continued to oppose the idea of Pakistan - the reasons will be explored shortly -

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* Madrassah is a traditional Islamic school often attached to a mosque.

and did in fact ally themselves with the Congress (Binder op. cit.). It seems rather groundless to assert that the League was trying to set up a theocratic state in view of the above, and also the fact that after independence it was demonstrated at a number of times that neither the League nor the religious leaders had any idea what an Islamic state meant and how it was to be achieved. The nationalism of the League was based on religion because somehow religion had coincided with other important economic and social factors. Many independent writers (e.g. Myrdal 1968) have stressed the secular training and outlook of the League leaders, for which they were often condemned by some religious leaders. The desire of the Bengali Muslims to be free of the control of Calcutta's Hindu industrialists, or that of the Punjabi peasants to get rid of the local Hindu moneylender, found a common expression in the demand of the League to have a separate state, a desire so strong that even the opposition of their own religious leaders could not keep the Muslims from throwing their full weight behind the League. The coincidence that the people who felt oppressed in Bengal and those in the Punjab who wanted to be free of Hindu domination, were Muslim was not by chance but had historical and social reasons. The fact that these widely separated people joined in a common struggle does mean that religious unity was a bond of considerable strength, at least during that period. Nevertheless, however strong the bonds of a common faith might have been, the political unity of the Muslims was in fact based essentially on the negative tie of a

common fear of Hindu dominance, a fear grown stronger, with considerable justification, during the last years of British rule in India (Stephens 1964 & 1968). However, this chapter is concerned more with the conditions after independence and there is no need to go into the details of what happened before 1947. It should, however, be kept in mind that the bulk of Muslim religious opinion had taken no part in the struggle for Pakistan - it in fact had opposed it.

Since common religion was the only ground on which the Muslim League's case was based it was inevitable that the issue of religion should come to the forefront of politics once Pakistan had come into being. Islam was certainly going to be the main driving force in the new state, as Muslims had shown overwhelmingly their belief in this state-idea during the 1946 elections. However, the Muslim League had no intention of setting up a theocracy. At least the League leadership was not trained to take up such a job. Jinnah, the leader of the League and the first Governor-General of Pakistan, while addressing the Constituent Assembly on 20th August, 1947, said:

> "Now, I think that we should keep that in front of us our ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State" (Constituent Assembly, Debates, vol.I, Aug.11, 1947, p.20).

Yet his trusted lieutenant and the first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, had this to say to the same Assembly in 1949:

> "Pakistan was founded because the Muslims of this Sub-Continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teaching and traditions of Islam, because they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea to the many diseases which have crept into the life of humanity today" (ibid. vol.V, March 7, 1949, p.2).

Herein lay the basic contradiction which frustrated all efforts to find a workable constitution commonly agreed upon. It was a formidable task to remove the scars of partition in relation to Muslims and Hindus, it was well nigh impossible to reconcile the two ideas of western style parliamentary democracy and an Islamic state, the latter concept being subject to various rather nebulous interpretations by different groups and individuals. So far the religious leaders have been referred to as one body of opinion, and although they shared a common opposition to the idea of Pakistan, there were deep differences among them, often more fundamental than those between them and the League. However, one other respect in which they agreed among themselves was the role of minorities in an Islamic state. Islam does not deprive non-Muslims of all their democratic rights but instead Muslims are ordered "...to tolerate and to protect non-Muslims and to allow them to continue to practice their religion provided they undertook no activities inimical to the welfare of the State and the millat" (Callard 1957).

> "Unto each nation have We given sacred rites which they are to perform; so let them not dispute with thee of the matter, but summon thou unto thy Lord. Lo! thou indeed followest right guidance.
>
> "And if they wrangle with thee, say: Allah is best aware of what ye do.

> "Allah will judge between you on the Day of Resurrection concerning that wherein ye used to differ" (Quran, Surah XXII).

This also does not mean that non-Muslims have absolutely equal rights in an Islamic state. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, a religious scholar and a League supporter, voiced a common opinion when he addressed the Assembly in these words:

> "The Islamic State means a State which is run on the exalted and excellent principles of Islam. It is evident that a State which is founded on some principles, be it religious or secular (like the U.S.S.R.), can be run only by those who believe in those principles. The services of such persons as do not subscribe to those ideas may be utilized in the administrative machinery of the State but they cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of framing the general policy of the State or dealing with matters vital to its safety and integrity" (Constituent Assembly, Debates, Vol.V, March 9, 1949, p.45).

Thus Jinnah's secularism was in conflict with the requirements of an Islamic state as put forth by the religious leaders. In the latter the non-Muslims were going to have their rights but not equal to those of Muslims. At least the minorities were to be excluded from the processes of law-making and policy decisions. All these words were spoken to an Assembly which also contained non-Muslim members representing minorities.

Religious leaders were divided among themselves, as has been said before, but their common opposition to the Muslim League was based on the principle of the unity of the believers (millat) and according to them in Islam there was no place for petty nationalisms based on territorial units. The leader of

the Jammat-i-Islami, a politico-religious party, Maulana Maududi, rejected nationalism in these words:

> "These satanic principles [of nationalism] have stood as formidable obstacles and powerful adversaries against the moral and spiritual teachings embodied in the heavenly books and against the law of God" (Maududi 1947, p.25).

He goes on to condemn all forms of nationalist ideas:

> "From the Islamic viewpoint both these types of nationalists [Indian and Muslim] are equally misled, for Islam enjoins faith in truth only; it does not permit any kind of nation-worshipping at all" (ibid. p.25).

All this does not mean that various viewpoints among Muslim scholars do not find any place for territorial nationalism, for example Ibn-Khaldun, a fourteenth-century Muslim historian, in his 'Muqaddimah' (1958) not only finds nationalism and Islam compatible but also considers the former to be a natural development of society. Unfortunately the work and ideas of this great scholar had equally been ignored by the religious and the League leaders. As a matter of fact Muslim League leaders did not pay any attention to this issue before independence either because of a lack of will to do so or because they were so much occupied to fight against the Congress and the British Government to get their demands fulfilled that they had no time to engage in controversies among themselves.

> "The failure of the intelligentsia of Pakistan is owing in part to various insuperable political and economic problems, but also to the nearly complete lack of any intellectual effort on the problem of Islamic government before partition" (Binder op. cit. p.5).

This discussion about the religion in politics is left here and will be taken up again in Part IV to trace in great detail the influence of these controversies on the political life of the country. One final remark, however, needs to be made. The role of minorities in these controversies has been minimal because of the fact that the bulk of the minorities consist of Hindus who have been on the defensive because of their fear of being identified with the interests of India, whose relations with Pakistan have been far from normal.

CHAPTER 4

LANGUAGE

The importance of language in the social, economic and political life of a state cannot be overemphasized. Though each state has its own particular circumstances, it is fair to say that linguistic unity among the people of a state is generally a source of strength while bi- or multi-lingual states have to face some problems, which may vary in time and space, in bringing about homogeneity within their borders. The rise of nation-states in Europe during the last two centuries was often based on the idea that language and nation are coincident and that state boundaries should conform to linguistic boundaries. This, however, has not been universally achieved. In the case of Arab Nationalism, for example, linguistic unity has not been able to overcome other differences. Nevertheless, it is a fact that unilingual states do not have to face the difficulty of choosing national and official languages, a difficulty which besets those where two or more languages are spoken by considerable proportions of their populations. Apart from the political problems, bi- or multi-lingualism also involves an increased cost in education, administration, business, and so on, and a decreased efficiency in communication. Recent history of some states has shown that this problem is by no means easy to solve and that governments often run into conflict when some inhabitants feel that their language has not received proper recognition or that some other language has been imposed on them.

Yet some solution has to be sought to decide in which language the inhabitants of a state are going to communicate with each other in their economic and social relationships, in which language they are to receive education, in which language the business of the government and courts is to be carried on, and so forth. That people generally resist when they think their language is not getting a fair deal is natural because language is often the most tangible characteristic distinguishing cultural groups. Physical racial differences, especially when they are apparent like skin colour, may prove more important, as for example in the United States and South Africa, but in the Indian sub-continent where racial stocks are so mixed and difficult to trace, language is the most differentiating feature of the population. As will be seen, linguistic heterogeneity is one of the major problems in Pakistan and in order to evolve a homogeneous nation the state has to find some measure by which to enable inhabitants from different parts to communicate and share their experiences more freely. In this context some of the ideas of Karl Deutsch's theory of social communication will be employed in Chapter 7 to assess the magnitude of the linguistic problem in Pakistan.

The Indian sub-continent has been called a 'cul-de-sac' (Spate 1956, p.481; and Toynbee 1961, p.2) where, over a period of centuries, different races entered only to lose their identity, but in so doing so left their imprint on the then existing fabric of life to create the highly complex social and cultural pattern which exists today. Numerous races have

inter-mixed over a period of centuries and language now, perhaps, remains the only indicator of the past ethnic origins. This generalization cannot, however, be taken too seriously because over this very long period of racial mixing languages have evolved across ethnic boundaries which themselves have all but vanished. The whole linguistic pattern has further been confounded by the rise within the sub-continent, or arrival from outside, of different religio-social systems giving rise to dialects within the main languages by contributing different vocabulary and script. This has resulted in a wide variety of languages and their innumerable dialects, some of which are mutually unintelligible. In view of this it is no wonder that for many centuries before independence the sub-continent's official languages have been two foreign languages - Persian under the Muslims and later English under the British. Each of them was the lingua franca of the elite in their respective periods. Under the Moguls a new language, Urdu, did evolve by the fusion of Sanskrit and Persian, but it had to wait till 1947 before it could become an official language, though it was in use on the lowest administrative level under the British. As long as the British remained in the sub-continent the linguistic differences remained buried under the overall superiority of English as the language of the government and of higher education, but once independence was achieved these differences came to the surface when the question of replacing English was raised. It was then that in both India and Pakistan different languages started to vie with each other and the

political controversies over language brought about some bloody incidents. India, with its greater area and a wider variety of languages, has experienced greater violence, but Pakistan too has had its share. There is an old Punjabi proverb that language changes after every eighteen miles, and this is literally true in some parts of the sub-continent, which illustrates how serious this problem is in evolving a nation in its true meaning.

However, some figures overstate the case of linguistic diversity, as for example the 1931 Census of India which listed as many as 225 languages as spoken in the sub-continent. Most of these are undoubtedly tribal variants of a smaller number of languages, and a great majority of these account for only a small proportion of the total population. India's 1951 Census goes even further to list 720 languages and dialects with less than 100,000 speakers each, and out of these 73 as having only a single speaker each (Spate and Learmonth 1967). The 1961 Census of Pakistan records 24 languages with numerous dialects. The classification of languages followed by the Census Commission of Pakistan is based on Sir George Grierson's monumental work 'Linguistic Survey of India' and is given in Appendix IV. Many out of these 24 are spoken by a relatively very small number of persons, however important they may be from a philologist's point of view. Seven languages - Bengali, Punjabi, Pushto, Sindhi, Baluchi, Brahui and Urdu - account for about 98.2% of the total population. Six out of these seven, excepting Brahui, belong to the Indo-European family. Brahui

is a curious outlier of the Dravidian family which, but for Brahui, is confined to South India. All of these languages are indigenous except Urdu which is the mother tongue of some of those who migrated to Pakistan after partition, mostly from the United Provinces and Bihar in India. As these people have not spread evenly over the country Urdu too has now assumed particular local importance in certain areas. Fig. 11 shows the general distribution of these languages on the district level. In this chapter the languages have been studied both as mother tongues and as spoken languages and also their spatial relationships in order to prepare for a study of cultural diffusion and its political implications in a later chapter.

Mother Tongues: The provinces, or parts of the provinces, which Pakistan inherited from British India, very roughly coincided with linguistic boundaries although with many exceptions in detail. Though political divisions could have been brought more in line with cultural distributions, an exact correspondence between the two was impossible because of the complexity of the latter and the frequent overlapping of linguistic regions. Moreover, the political divisions were created from the view of administrative convenience which is reflected in the fact that the former North West Frontier was separated from the Punjab in 1901, and Sind remained a part of Bombay province till as recently as 1935. The division of Bengal into two provinces, East and West, in 1905, which was hailed by the Bengali muslims, was annulled in 1911. However, as a result of the partition in 1947 Pakistan experienced



Fig. 11. Distribution of major languages (mother tongues), Districts, 1961.

Table 3

Mother Tongues as per cent of total population, 1961

	Beng.	Punj.	Push.	Sind.	Urdu	Balu.	Brah.	Eng.	Others
Pakistan	55.48	29.01	3.70	5.51	3.65	1.09	0.41	0.02	1.12
West Pakistan	0.12	66.39	8.47	12.59	7.57	2.49	0.93	0.04	1.40
East Pakistan	98.42	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.61	-	-	0.01	0.92

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

of the total population had Bengali as their mother tongue and in 14 out of the total 17 districts its percentage is over 97; in two others between 96 and 97; even in Chittagong Hill Tracts where there is a large proportion of tribal people, it is claimed by more than 91 per cent. The percentage of people in East Pakistan having West Pakistani languages as their mother tongues is just about 0.04 which means that the largest language minority group in East Pakistan is Urdu speaking but having a percentage of only 0.61. Their greatest concentration is in Dacca district - 2.17 per cent - and they are least numerous in Bakerganj with only 0.02. Thus East Pakistan enjoys a remarkable linguistic unity which has been little disturbed by the population transfers as a consequence of partition in 1947.

Unlike religious distributions, in which West Pakistan has a great homogeneity than the eastern wing, languages show an opposite picture. There are seven major languages, including Urdu, spoken as mother tongues and in many areas they overlap each other so as to make it impossible for administrative boundaries to correspond with linguistic districts. In fact

there are no linear linguistic boundaries, except locally at some places, and there is usually a wide transitional zone between two linguistic regions. In some areas two or more languages have co-existed for a long period and no single language has a majority. Moreover, the post-partition migration has changed the linguistic pattern drastically in some areas. Appendix V gives the percentages of the total population of the districts of different mother tongues in all districts of Pakistan. Only 0.12 per cent of the total population in West Pakistan have Bengali as their mother tongue, many of them presumably central government employees from East Pakistan. In 1961 over 56 per cent of them were living in Karachi. So, Bengali as a mother tongue in West Pakistan is as relatively unimportant as West Pakistani languages are in the eastern wing.

To analyse the relative position of major mother tongues in West Pakistan, i.e. Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto, Baluchi, Brahui, each of them has been dealt with separately.

(a) Punjabi. In terms of numbers who speak it Punjabi is the second language in the whole of the state and first in West Pakistan. In the last census more than 26 million persons claimed it as their mother tongue, making 66.4 per cent of the population of West Pakistan. The distribution of Punjabi-speaking population in the former provinces of West Pakistan and Karachi district is given in Table 4.

It is the predominant mother tongue in the Punjab claiming 92.8 per cent of the total population with only one district, Lahore, having a percentage of less than 90. Even there about

Table 4

Percentage distribution of Punjabi in West Pakistan, 1961

Punjab	92.3
N.W.F.P.	5.1
Sind	1.2
Karachi	1.0
Baluchistan	0.4

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

98 per cent of the people could speak it. Outside the Punjab it is also the majority mother tongue in two of the districts in the former N.W.F.P., Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan, where it was claimed by 86.3 and 73.9 per cent respectively. So this is one area where the provincial boundaries have cut across linguistic distributions. Besides these areas, Punjabi claimed considerable proportions in many other districts, for example in the Loralai and Quetta districts of Baluchistan - 26.4 and 17.7 per cent respectively; in Sind the districts of Nawabshah and Khairpur - 10.4 and 10.2; Heshawar in the N.W.F.P. - 11.2; and Karachi - 12.8. The presence of Punjabi population in these districts has been a result of different reasons such as the opening up of new irrigation schemes, trade, industries etc. Thus it is important to note that Punjabi as a mother tongue is present in all districts of West Pakistan in varying degrees. If the two Punjabi majority districts of Hazara and D.I.Khan, which together account for 4.4 per cent of total Punjabi speakers in West Pakistan, are excluded the rest of the N.W.F.P. is left with only 0.7 per cent of Punjabi speakers, less than

in Sind and Karachi. This means that of all the persons speaking Punjabi as their mother tongue 7.7 per cent are outside the Punjab and only 3.3 per cent in districts where speakers of other languages are in a majority.

Before concluding this account of the Punjabi mother tongue it should, however, be made clear that the Census does not record persons speaking different dialects. Thus Punjabi includes all its dialects as listed in Appendix IV, and, though of the same language, the dialects have considerable variations from area to area. Punjabi does not have a script of its own and can be written in any of the three scripts, Arabic, Nagari or Gurmukhi. The latter is used exclusively by Sikhs, who all migrated to India after partition. Muslims, because of their associations with Arabic, use the first script which has been modified to meet the phonetic needs of the language. However, Punjabi is primarily a spoken language and as a medium of instruction its importance has been minimum. Punjabis have been using Urdu as a language of literacy as will be seen in the next Chapter. It does not have any notable literary tradition, with a few exceptions, and therefore has not been able to claim any position as a language of literacy and education. This does not mean that Punjabi speaking people are not very much concerned with the language controversy and some groups have lately been trying to advance the cause of Punjabi but as a reaction to similar demands from other regions.

(b) Pushto. Pushto is the language spoken in the northwestern parts of West Pakistan and also by the people immediately on

the other side of the boundary with Afghanistan. Like Punjabi it is also mainly a spoken language with a poor literary tradition. It also uses a modified Arabic script but has a vocabulary different from that of Urdu or Punjabi. During recent years a consciousness on the part of its speakers has led to an attempt to extend its use in education but in the absence of a substantial literature such attempts have not proved very successful. It too contains some dialects but apparently there is much in common between them. The differences are of accent rather than of vocabulary.

About 3.5 million people claimed it as their mother tongue in 1961, 8.5 per cent of the population of West Pakistan. The distribution of these people in different areas is given in Table 5 as the percentage of its total speakers.

Table 5

Percentage distribution of Pushto in West Pakistan, 1961

Punjab	3.7
N.W.F.P.	82.8
Sind	1.2
Karachi	2.9
Baluchistan	9.4

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961

Pushto is the main mother tongue in the former Frontier province though, compared to Punjabi, a greater percentage of its speakers are outside the N.W.F.P. If the two Punjabi majority districts, Hazara and D.I.Khan, are excluded the rest of the province is left with 76.9 per cent of the total persons having

Pushto as their mother tongue. On the other hand there are three districts in adjoining Baluchistan where Pushto is the main mother tongue. They are Zhob, Quetta and Loralai - 95.8, 61.4, 61.1 percent Pushto-speaking respectively - together having 8.6 percent of all Pushto speakers. The inclusion of these districts, and the exclusion of two Punjabi majority districts of the N.W.F.P., means that all Pushto majority districts contain 85.5 per cent of all speakers of this language as mother tongue, a percentage less than that in the Punjabi speaking districts where 96.7 per cent of all Punjabi speakers live. The most homogeneous Pushto speaking district is Bannu where 96.5 per cent of the inhabitants speak the language as their mother tongue; in the Punjab there are five districts with a higher percentage of Punjabi speakers. This means that a greater proportion of Pushto speakers live outside the main Pushto area compared to Punjabi. However, their actual number is relatively small because of their lower overall population.

(c) Sindhi. Sindhi is the main language in the lower Indus valley which is the former Sind province, and also of some adjoining parts of Baluchistan. It uses a script derived from Arabic, like Urdu, but is so modified that it is not understood by people literate in Urdu, Punjabi or Pushto. It has a comparatively rich literary tradition of which its speakers are proud. Because of its literature and a suitably adopted script it has been in use as a medium of instruction in schools. This has resulted in opposition to the introduction of Urdu as the official language and the language issue has played an important part in local politics.

The number of persons claiming Sindhi as their mother tongue in 1961 was about 5 million, forming 12.6 per cent of the total population of West Pakistan, making it the second language in the western wing in terms of the numbers speaking it. Table 6 shows its relative distribution in different parts of West Pakistan.

Table 6

Percentage distribution of Sindhi in West Pakistan, 1961

Punjab	0.5
N.W.F.P.	0.2
Sind	93.2
Karachi	3.0
Baluchistan	3.1

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

Of all the Sindhi speakers 93.2 per cent are in the former Sind province. By the inclusion of Karachi, the percentage goes up to 96.2. Besides being the main language in all districts of Sind, excluding Karachi, it is also the major language of Lasbela district, Baluchistan, where it is spoken by 66.6 per cent of the inhabitants. The adjoining Kalat district of Baluchistan has 24.7 per cent of its inhabitants Sindhi speaking. So, Sind, Karachi, Lasbela and Kalat together hold over 99 per cent of all Sindhi speakers in West Pakistan. However, within Sind the position of the Sindhi speaking population is not as strong as that of Punjabi speaking in the Punjab or of Pushto speaking in N.W.F.P. There is only one district, Sanghar, over 90 per cent Sindhi speaking; all the

rest are below 80 per cent. Out of a total of eleven, four districts are under 70 per cent Sindhi.

Sindh, as has been seen from the above figures, is different from the Punjab and N.W.F.P. in terms of the distribution of mother tongues. Firstly because very few Sindhi speaking people have moved out of their native areas, and, secondly, Sindhi speakers, rather paradoxically, do not enjoy so overwhelming a majority even in their native areas as do the Punjabi or Pushto speakers. There are many reasons for this curious situation which will be explained later. The only observation which can be made here is that the greater proportion made up of 'outsiders' who have come into these Sindhi areas has had important political repercussions and has been one of the reasons for the reassertion of the provincial basis.

(d) Baluchi. Baluchi, the main language of former Baluchistan, belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European languages, as does Pushto, but is vastly different in vocabulary from the latter though it uses the same type of script. The mutual intelligibility of the two is very low. Unlike Pushto it derives the bulk of its vocabulary from Persian, to which it is much closer than it is to any other language. Though it is the major tongue of Baluchistan, this province is much more linguistically heterogeneous than even Sind. In fact in absolute numbers there are more Baluchi speakers in Sind than in Baluchistan. The latter in 1961 had about 420,000 persons speaking Baluchi as their mother tongue. They formed 33.5 per cent of the total population of Baluchistan but were only 42.7 per cent

of the total Baluchi speakers in West Pakistan. Table 7 gives their distribution in all the areas.

Table 7

Percentage distribution of Baluchi in West Pakistan, 1961

Punjab	2.7
N.W.F.P.	-
Sind	43.6
Baluchistan	42.7
Karachi	11.0

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

In only four districts, all in Baluchistan province, has Baluchi a majority. They are Sibi, Chagai, Mekran, and Kharan. Though a greater portion of Baluchi speakers is in Sind, in no district of that province are they in a majority. In Jacobabad they form 31.5 per cent of the population, in all the rest under 11 per cent. Only 2.7 per cent of their total number is located in the Punjab, while in N.W.F.P. they are practically absent. Baluchistan, Sind and Karachi together contain 97.3 per cent of all Baluchi speakers. It should, however, be kept in mind that they are only 2.5 per cent of the whole population of West Pakistan. Because of the low numbers with Baluchi as their mother tongue, and their more scattered distribution, Baluchi has not been of any great importance, except locally, in the politics of language and, therefore, has not been a basis of any strong Baluchi regionalism.

(e) Brahui. Brahui belongs to the Dravidian family, one of the older groups of languages. It is spoken mainly in parts of the former Baluchistan and surrounding areas and is a mystery from the historical and philological points of view because all the other Dravidian languages are confined to South India where they were pushed back before the successive incursions of peoples from the northwest. Brahui has the smallest number of mother tongue speakers - a little over 452000 persons in 1961 or about 0.4 per cent of the whole population of Pakistan. Their distribution as per cent of the total speakers is given in Table 8.

Table 8

Percentage distribution of Brahui in West Pakistan, 1961

Punjab	0.3
N.W.F.P.	-
Sind	40.1
Baluchistan	54.1
Karachi	5.5

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

The distribution of Brahui shows a pattern similar to that of Baluchi except that a majority of the Brahui speakers live in Baluchistan. However, in none of the districts do its speakers form a majority. Their highest percentage is in Kalat district where they form 39.4 per cent of the population of the district.

(f) Urdu. Urdu is not an indigenous tongue of any of the areas in Pakistan. Almost all its speakers as mother tongue migrated to Pakistan after independence. It originated during the Mogul period as a "... lingua franca developed by the Mogul soldiery in contact with the Hindu inhabitants" (Census 1961, Vol.I, Part IV, p.30). It was basically a mixture of Persian and Sanskrit and the religious differences split its growth into two branches, Urdu and Hindi. The former, using Perso-Arabic script with some additional characters to meet the phonetic demands of Sanskrit words and with a large Persian vocabulary, became mainly a language of the Muslims. Hindi remained a language of the Hindus using a vocabulary and script both derived from Sanskrit. A colloquial form of Hindi spoken in the bazaar, with various regional variants, is classed as Hindustani, again with two branches depending on whether the speaker is a Muslim or a Hindu. Hindi, and also the Hindu form of Hindustani, have practically no speakers left in Pakistan. The language of those Hindus who are still in Pakistan is Bengali because most of them reside in East Pakistan.

Though the speakers of Urdu came into Pakistan after its creation, Urdu as a language of literacy and official business at lower levels had been in existence for a long time. It has a rich literary tradition and Muslims generally have an attachment to it, not ~~particularly~~ so much in East Pakistan, with nostalgic memories of the days when they were the rulers in India. Its importance as a spoken language will be seen shortly but first a look at its distribution as a mother tongue, which is given in Table 9 as per cent of the total speakers.

Table 9

Percentage distribution of Urdu in Pakistan, 1961

East Pakistan	9.4
West Pakistan	90.6
Punjab	33.3
N.W.F.P.	3.4
Sind	19.8
Baluchistan	0.7
Karachi	33.4

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

The main features of the distribution of Urdu as a mother tongue seem to be that it is spread over all of the state in varying degrees, and that a third of its speakers are concentrated in Karachi alone forming the majority tongue - 53.9 per cent - in that district. Another third is located in the Punjab where its percentage varies between 9.3 in Multan to 1.2 in Campbellpur. About one fifth of the total speakers are in Sind; they form 24.1 per cent of the district population in Hyderabad and the district with their lowest percentage is Larkana - 4.4. The whole of East Pakistan contains only 9.4 per cent of the total Urdu speakers as mother tongue and there the percentage ranges between 2.2 per cent of the district population in Dacca to 0.1 per cent in Faridpur. The role of this Urdu speaking element in the population of Pakistan has been very important because much controversy arose as a reaction against the adoption of Urdu as a national or official language. To sum up, Table 10 gives the composition of mother tongues in all the provinces.

Table 10

Mother Tongues as Per Cent of the Population of each area, 1961

Area	Beng.	Punj.	Push.	Sind.	Urdu	Balu.	Brah.
E. Pakistan	98.4	0.01	0.01	-	0.61	-	-
W. Pakistan	0.1	66.4	8.5	12.6	7.6	2.5	0.9
Punjab	-	92.8	0.5	0.1	4.4	0.1	-
N.W.F.P.	-	32.7	64.9	-	2.2	-	-
Sind	0.1	4.9	0.7	71.7	10.2	6.6	2.3
Karachi	1.3	12.8	5.2	7.1	53.9	5.3	1.0
Baluchistan	0.1	7.4	28.1	12.2	1.7	33.5	15.8

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

In linguistic homogeneity, as far as mother tongues are concerned, East Pakistan leads, followed by, in decreasing order, Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P., Karachi and Baluchistan.* Before considering the question of national and official languages and the politics of language, it is useful to examine the importance of these languages, as well as that of English, as languages of speech. Mother tongues may be important as a measure of cultural heterogeneity but languages of speech, and the acceptance of lingua franca in different regions, indicate the degree of assimilation and of 'national' cohesion.

Spoken Languages: Besides the seven languages discussed above English is also included in this analysis because it is still

* With the inclusion of Karachi in Sind under the present administrative reorganization of West Pakistan, the overall linguistic heterogeneity of Sind will appreciably increase.

the official language and the medium of instruction at higher levels of education. The relative position of the eight languages in the two wings is shown in Table 11.

Table 11

Spoken Languages* as Per Cent of the Population of Each Area, 1961

	Beng.	Punj.	Push.	Sind.	Urdu	Balu.	Brah.	Engl.
East Pakistan	99.0	-	-	-	1.3	-	-	0.9
West Pakistan	0.1	67.6	8.9	14.2	14.9	2.9	1.2	2.1

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

Following the position in mother tongues, East Pakistan shows a remarkable homogeneity in spoken languages too. The number of persons who speak more than one language is less in East Pakistan than in the western wing. The importance of West Pakistani languages in East Pakistan is negligible. Unfortunately, the Census does not provide the actual number of persons who are bilingual and multilingual and in which language. Each person is counted as many times as the number of languages he speaks. However, the Census figures do throw considerable light on the relative importance of each language in West Pakistan (Table 12). It appears that Urdu is by far the most popular second language in West Pakistan followed by English and that the regional languages are relatively far less important

* 'Spoken language' includes all the persons who speak a language as mother tongue as well as those speaking it as a second language.

Table 12

Mother tongues and Spoken Languages as per cent of the total Population of West Pakistan, 1961

Language	As Mother Tongues	As Spoken Languages	Additional Speakers
Bengali	0.10	0.10	0.03
Punjabi	66.40	67.60	1.20
Pushto	8.50	8.90	0.40
Sindhi	12.60	14.20	1.60
Urdu	7.60	14.90	7.30
Baluchi	2.50	2.90	0.40
Brahui	0.90	1.20	0.30
English	0.04	2.10	2.06

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

as the second languages of speech. In East Pakistan the position of second languages is different i.e. English is more important as a second language - 0.9 per cent of the total population, than Urdu with only 0.7 per cent. This means that in inter-wing communication a greater number of persons from East Pakistan can participate in English rather than in Urdu. Bengali, which gives East Pakistan a remarkable unity, is of no consequence in West Pakistan, nor are West Pakistani languages, Punjabi, Pushto, Sindhi, Baluchi and Brahui, in East Pakistan. Languages of literacy and their relationship with the languages of speech will be considered in the next Chapter.

Spoken Languages in Urban Areas: For urban areas all the cities and towns with over 50,000 inhabitants have been selected. The composition of spoken languages in these is shown in Appendix VI,

which indicates that in general the cities and towns show the characteristics of the area in which they are situated but with a higher degree of multi-lingualism, a question to be explored in greater detail in Chapter 7. Here a comparison of the urban figures with those of the whole of former provinces brings out interesting results regarding the mode of distribution of the speakers of different languages in the former provinces. Table 13 shows the percentage occurrence of different spoken languages in urban areas of West Pakistan compared to the percentage of urban population in the total population of the Provinces.

Table 13

Percentage of total speakers in the Provinces living in cities of over 50,000 persons, West Pakistan, 1961

Area	Beng.	Punj.	Push.	Sind.	Urdu	Balu.	Brah.	Engl.	Urban Pop. as % of total
Punjab	60.0	12.2	25.8	8.4	38.2	2.9	16.1	51.0	13.4
N.W.F.P.	62.0	8.2	8.6	50.8	21.2	59.1	90.3	32.1	8.5
Sind	19.2	17.1	26.5	4.5	41.7	2.2	2.0	39.0	10.2
Baluch.	85.2	49.0	8.8	1.9	46.8	1.7	4.2	71.2	8.5
Karachi	96.6	97.6	95.5	69.3	95.9	80.2	73.0	98.8	93.6

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

Urdu and English speakers, as is clear from the table, tend to concentrate in cities mainly because the two languages are related to literacy and education. Bengali speaking persons are also concentrated in urban areas except in Sind where a considerable proportion is in rural areas. This is because of some Bengalis who have been settled in the canal colonies of lower Sind,

particularly in Tharparkar and Sanghar districts. Sindhis are generally more numerous outside urban areas because most of them go out of their areas to work as hired labour on the farms except in the N.W.F.P. where more than 50 per cent of them are in urban areas. Baluchis, like Sindhis, are also less urban except in the Frontier province. Brahuis on the other hand outside their native areas are more urban as are Pushto speaking people who, in Punjab, are about equally divided between rural and urban areas. Punjabis are highly urban in Karachi and Baluchistan where they are engaged mostly in commerce and trade, they are less so in Sind where a large proportion of them are cultivators in the canal colonies. These characteristics of different cultural groups may reflect their level of development and literacy, and consequently their role in the political processes. They may also result in different reactions in different areas to 'outsiders'. How far has this mixing led to assimilation or is the cause of regional divergence? This is the main question to be considered in the succeeding chapters.

The role of language in politics will be discussed in Part IV. Here it may be noted that since 1956 Urdu and Bengali have been the two national languages while English is still in use as the official language. Recently the present government announced the intention to replace it with the national languages by 1975 but it is doubtful whether it will be completely abolished at the higher academic level or in the business of the central government in the near future.

CHAPTER 5

EDUCATION AND LITERACY

The need to study education and literacy in political geography is imperative from many angles. First of all, the literate population in any state is usually the most active section of the inhabitants in the political life of that state. Education and literacy enable people to participate more fully in politics directly through elections and indirectly through press, radio and other forms of mass media. Through education people are more able to communicate effectively with each other and thus it often becomes an important basis of state policies, especially where cultural plurality is a major hindrance to national integration. It is one way of diminishing the linguistic or even physical barriers within the boundaries of a state. Even where linguistic unity does exist people's inability to read and write tends to keep them in relative isolation. The benefits of modern developments in communications can only be reaped if people are able to use them. In countries like Pakistan, where different languages are spoken in different areas, it is through education that people can learn to communicate with each other in a common language and thus be able to share each other's experiences. This raises the problem of which language is to be used as a medium of instruction in schools and whether people in different areas are going to accept it or not. Though it depends on different languages whether they are suited for education or not, the government's

decision in this regard often reflects the state policy towards cultural heterogeneity. If different regional languages are used for education in their respective areas then even high literacy may not bring about any appreciable increase in the intensity of communication between various regions. On the other hand people are often resentful when their children are forced to be educated in a language which is not their mother tongue. In a situation where a group of people are literate and educated in a language which is not accepted in other parts of the state or in employment, that group may feel discontented to the extent that a serious political issue may arise. "These persons therefore are more likely than any others to experience national conflict, and they are the persons who first take part in it" (Deutsch 1966, p.130). This sort of situation certainly exists in Pakistan as this and the succeeding chapters will show.

Secondly, from an economic angle, the role of education need not be stressed in the field of development. It is now recognised that education is as important an ingredient for economic development as capital and manpower. A well-known economist writes "...no independent value attached to education is considered to be valid if it conflicts with the value of education as an instrument for development ... From a development point of view, the purpose of education must be to rationalize attitudes as well as to impart knowledge and skills" (Myrdal 1968, p.1621). Unfortunately, these considerations are exactly the aspects of education that are most difficult to quantify and treat statistically. However, the quantitative aspects of

education, quite apart from qualitative ones, as often gathered and published by government agencies in the form of statistics on expenditure, number and types of institutions, teachers, students etc. are a fair indication of the regional differences and the government policies concerned with those differences. Perhaps more important than these figures are those on different languages as vehicles of literacy and education and their relative importance in various areas of the state. It may be possible to test, by using this information, how far education has led to cultural integration and the relationships between education and some other indicators of cultural homogeneity within Pakistan. Obviously there is a strong relationship between education and urbanization but the latter does not necessarily act as a cultural 'melting pot' because, although cities act as 'up-draughts' pulling in population from surrounding or even distant areas, social distance may in many cases tend to increase in cities rather than diminish. Therefore while cities on the one hand may increase the prospects of national integration through increased literacy and education, they are on the other hand also sources of political conflict by bringing together disparate elements. This latter is more true of such places which have experienced rapid urban expansion, e.g. Karachi, and have drawn in all the cultural elements in substantial numbers. However, these points will be taken up in detail in a later Chapter when all the relevant accessible information is available.

This chapter follows the same pattern as the preceding one i.e. first exploring the issue of education and literacy between East and West Pakistan and then considering the differences within the provinces of West Pakistan.

Literacy: There is a great deal of confusion about the figures of literacy because of varying definitions of the term used in different censuses. In the 1951 Census of Pakistan, for example, literacy was defined as the "...ability to read clear print in any language". This is obviously an inadequate criterion because in all Muslim countries, and particularly in Pakistan, there is a large number of persons who can read the Koran in Arabic without any understanding. To count such persons as literate is certainly not justified. Secondly, this definition also included those children who were at the elementary stages of schooling and who, though they could read their primers, were not really literate. It has been suggested that at least five years of regular schooling is necessary to achieve basic literacy. However, in 1961 the definition of literacy was changed to bring it in line with that prescribed by U.N.E.S.C.O. and the criterion for literates became the 'ability to read any language with understanding'. Though this definition does not exactly conform to the U.N.E.S.C.O. standard, which is 'ability to read and write any language', in the 1961 Census separate figures were collected for those able to read and write, those able to read with understanding and also those able to read the Koran without understanding. Since comparable figures for 1951 do not exist the data on literacy in the two censuses cannot be compared.

Another reason for the incomparability of data is that different methods of deriving literacy rates are used in different countries or even in different censuses of one country. These rates may be obtained as the percentage of literates out of the total population, population over five years of age, over nine years, over ten years and so on. So, any comparison of figures relating to different countries, or to different censuses in one country, is not meaningful unless a standardized formula for obtaining the rates is used. It does not really matter what formula to derive rates is used so long as it is uniform for all areas and all censuses. It is also important to know in which language a person is literate because, obviously, one literate in the lingua franca of the state is better qualified for communication at the state level than one who is literate only in a minor regional language. The data on the languages of literacy may also reveal how far education within a state has been a means to increase bi- or multilingualism transcending the traditional linguistic isolation. In this regard it is interesting to study the education policies of states and assess their effects in terms of increased or decreased communication between different cultural groups.

Another difficulty about literacy figures is that many persons, especially in rural areas, who drop out during or after completing primary schooling may lapse into illiteracy after some time. This problem may be circumvented by analysing the figures, if available, about the levels of education reached by the literate persons. Two areas may have the same literacy

rates but in one of them a greater portion of the literate population may have attained higher standards of education than in the other. A greater proportion of literates with higher education in an area may result in its being more prominent in the state politics than an area with higher literacy rate but lower educational standards.

Though in the Indian sub-continent literacy made rapid progress during this century Pakistan and India are still in relative terms highly illiterate countries. During the sixty years from 1881 to 1941 the percentage of literate population in the sub-continent aged ten years and over increased nearly three times (Davis 1951). However in 1941 it was still as low as 15.1 per cent. Since independence this trend of rising literacy has continued. In 1961 in Pakistan the percentage of literates out of the total population aged five years and over was 19.2. East Pakistan is better placed in literacy than West Pakistan as a whole with a literacy rate of 21.5 in 1961 compared to 16.3 in the western wing. This is a rather curious phenomenon because it is generally less developed than West Pakistan. The reason for this anomaly lies mainly in the fact that East Pakistan, or former East Bengal, lies close to Calcutta, one of the earliest strongholds of the British and from where their penetration into the sub-continent was launched. Since modern education was introduced by the British, those areas which came into contact with the colonial rulers earlier were more affected by the process of modernization. This is true of all areas of European rule and consequently higher literacy in the sub-continent is to be found on or near the coast.

"It seems clear that, as in Turkey and other Asian countries, the areas of greatest foreign contact, the coast, boasts the greatest amount of literacy. This connection of literacy with the coast is noticeable even by districts - those districts lying to the interior of the coastal states and provinces being less literate than those on the shore" (ibid. p.153).

Another factor which led to higher literacy in East Pakistan has been undoubtedly the linguistic unity of the province. One language facilitates the introduction of uniform courses and text books at a lower cost, while linguistic heterogeneity not only increases the expenditure but also raises the delicate question of the language of literacy. It is certainly easier to impart education in the mother tongue of the recipient but in order to bring about the integration of different areas the imposition of one lingua franca may be necessary.

The difference in literacy between urban and rural areas is naturally high, as shown in Table 14.

Table 14
Literacy in Urban and Rural Areas, 1961*

Areas	Literacy	
	Urban	Rural
1. Pakistan	35.8	16.6
2. East Pakistan	45.7	20.2
3. West Pakistan	33.0	10.9

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

* All literacy rates are those used in the Census of Pakistan, 1961, i.e. literates as per cent of total population aged five years and over, except where otherwise stated.

Here again the difference between East and West Pakistan is obvious, but the difference between urban and rural literacy is higher in West Pakistan, perhaps because of higher urban growth in that province. This unequal rate of literacy in urban and rural areas is expected but the distribution of literates in these areas is highly unbalanced between the two wings as shown in Table 15.

Table 15

Percentage Distribution of Literates in Urban and Rural Areas, 1961

Areas	% of total literates in: Urban Areas	Rural Areas	Urban Population as % of total population
1. Pakistan	25.8	74.2	13.5
2. East Pakistan	11.4	88.6	5.2
3. West Pakistan	49.8	50.2	24.9

(Source: Census, 1961)

Cities always attract a greater portion of literate persons than their share of the total population both because of better education facilities and the sort of jobs that literates naturally demand. However, in East Pakistan the proportion of literates in urban areas, though greater than the percentage of urban population, is not high. On the other hand in West Pakistan about half of the total literates are in urban areas whereas the urban population is about a quarter of the total population. For this disparity between the two wings of the state one can think of two main reasons: (i) that in East Pakistan urban areas have not offered employment opportunities to literates from

rural areas as [redacted] in West Pakistan; (ii) that because of its more compact size and smaller area the distribution of educational facilities in rural areas are more diffused in East Pakistan i.e. education is not so much an urban phenomenon as one would have thought. While the first point will be supported by other evidence in Part III, the second one is supported by the findings of a sample survey carried out in 1959. These findings are given in Table 16 which shows the percentage of rural population situated at different distances from schools.

Table 16

Rural Population and Distance to School

Type of School	Area	% of villages situated from a school at: 1 mile or less	2-4	4-5	5-10	Over 10	Not reported
Primary	W.Pakistan	10.5	7.7	7.2	13.3	37.4	24.9
	E.Pakistan	85.0	7.5	2.0	1.5	4.0	-
High (Boys)	W.Pakistan	4.4	17.7	16.6	34.8	26.5	-
	E.Pakistan	24.0	43.0	15.5	13.5	4.0	-
High (Girls)	W.Pakistan	1.1	6.1	7.2	25.4	55.8	4.4
	E.Pakistan	2.0	6.5	7.0	22.0	62.5	-

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, National Sample Survey, First Round, 1959)

Rural areas in East Pakistan are definitely better served in at least primary and secondary education. Only the girls wishing to have high school education are about equally placed

in both wings.* So, in West Pakistan people have to travel relatively far to get education, often to the urban centres which also offer better employment facilities than their counterparts in East Pakistan, which are less numerous anyway, and thus a greater concentration of literates in urban areas in West Pakistan has taken place. This is a very important difference, and a fundamental one, between the cultural geography of East and West Pakistan of which the political implications will be discussed later. Here it is sufficient to note that rural East Pakistan is about twice more literate than rural West Pakistan, and this fact combined with the linguistic unity of the eastern wing must have important repercussions on the political and cultural life of the state as a whole.

There is a great deal of inequality between the sexes in both wings of the state. The sub-continent as a whole has been an extreme case of this sort of inequality due to a number of social reasons which discouraged, and in many cases made people look down upon, female education. Though Islam enjoins all Muslims, male and female, to get education, the attitude of the orthodox religious people has been against the spread of modern education generally, particularly among females. However, during the past decades female literacy has also shown rapid increase, in fact it has increased more rapidly than among

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* Shorter distance in East Pakistan, however, may not necessarily mean less journey time because of slower transportation.

males, though still the percentage of female literates is far short of that of males. Table 17 gives the literacy rates for the sexes in Pakistan and the wings.

Table 17
Sex and Literacy, 1961

Area	Literacy Rate	
	Male	Female
1. Pakistan	28.0	9.3
2. East Pakistan	31.5	10.7
3. West Pakistan	16.3	7.4

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

The figures of the proportion of male and female literates in the two wings show the same sort of inequalities as are found in the total literates.

Table 18
Distribution of Literates in Rural/Urban Areas by Sex, 1961

Areas	Total literates (Males)	Urban Areas	Rural Areas	Total literates (Females)	Urban Areas	Rural Areas
1. Pakistan	100	24.0	76.0	100	32.0	68.0
2. East Pakistan	100	10.8	89.2	100	13.5	86.5
3. West Pakistan	100	45.3	54.7	100	66.9	33.1

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

The information summarized in Table 18 is very interesting in that it once again brings out the fundamental differences in the social life of the two wings. The rural/urban distribution

of male literates is about the same as that of total literates as given in Table 15, but the distribution of females is more interesting. In West Pakistan over two-thirds of the total female literates are in urban areas which means that female education is even more closely related with urbanization than that of males. Because of social taboos, literacy and education among females remained very low indeed in the whole of the sub-continent. When the first census was taken in 1891 females literates as a percentage of population aged ten years and over were only 0.5 as against males over 10 per cent (Davis ibid.). Since then female literacy has made rapid progress but in 1941 it was still only about 6 per cent. When female literacy did start rising it was mostly among the girls of upper class urban families that modern education was accepted. In areas that later comprised West Pakistan the orthodox influence has been much stronger with the result that female education remained confined to certain urban classes only and its spread to rural areas has been comparatively slow. Even now higher education, especially at the level of universities which are all co-educational, is not considered suitable for girls in many families. On the other hand in East Pakistan the social conditions have been more favourable and the influence of the orthodox religious opinion has not been so great in opposing modern education. For example, dancing and music, which is not encouraged by certain sections of religious opinion, have been two of the important artistic aspects of Bengali culture. To teach dancing and music to children in

West Pakistan is generally considered evil, while in East Pakistan they are not only taught but considered a source of pride and of cultural attainment in many families. All these conditions have led to not only a higher general female literacy in East Pakistan but also a much greater portion - 86.5% of the total - of female literates in rural areas. Here urbanization has not controlled the spread of female literacy, as it has not controlled male literacy, and the rural/urban inequality in literacy of the sexes is not so pronounced as it is in West Pakistan. This is perhaps in general contrast to other under-developed areas where literacy and education are dependent on a process of diffusion radiating from urban centres. This has been possible because of the use of a single language, Bengali, with a rich literary tradition of its own, as the medium of instruction in schools. Unlike most of West Pakistan, education in East Pakistan has been available to the people in their own mother tongue and nearer to their homes.

Literacy has varied considerably between the different religious groups in the sub-continent, although the greatest amount of inequality involved only minor religions. The most highly literate religious group has been the Parsis - with a literacy rate of over 80 per cent - but their number is very small and almost all of them are confined to Karachi city. In general literacy in the sub-continent varied from region to region depending to a large extent on the degree of urbanization. The more urbanized a religious group in an area, the higher the

literacy among its members. However, this general rule has many exceptions because before independence in many areas the literacy differential between Muslims and Hindus varied inversely to their degree of urbanization and hence there must have been some other factors influencing the rate of literacy. One of them, different reactions of the communities to colonial rule and western influence, has already been pointed out in an earlier chapter. Commenting on this Davis says,

> "What this factor is which favours Hindus we cannot say for sure, but it is probable that it is partly a function of Hindu cooperation with the English-introduced educational system and partly a function of the higher socio-economic status of Hindus in the rural or within the urban habitat" (ibid. p.154).

Table 19 gives the share of each religious community in the literate as well as total population in both the wings.

Table 19

Literacy and Religious Communities, 1961

West Pakistan			East Pakistan	
Share in Literate Population	Share in Total Population	Religious Communities	Share in Total Population	Share in Literate Population
100.00	100.00	Total	100.00	100.00
98.00	97.20	Muslims	80.50	73.90
0.60	0.50	Caste Hindus	8.60	16.10
0.20	1.00	Scheduled Castes	9.80	8.90
1.10	1.40	Christians	0.30	0.50
0.02	0.02	Others	0.80	0.60

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

Apart from a small Parsi community in Karachi, literacy is highest among East Pakistani Hindus. This higher literacy is probably because of the previously mentioned historical reasons. In West Pakistan Hindus, who are a small proportion of the total population, have a slightly greater share in the literate population. Scheduled castes in both the wings show a smaller share in the literate population than their percentage of the total population. This is undoubtedly due to their low social standing and the fact that they have been a depressed class for centuries. Muslims in West Pakistan now have a slightly greater share in the literate than in the total population, but in East Pakistan they are definitely relatively less literate. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that since the literacy rate is higher in East Pakistan than in the western wing, the former has a greater absolute number of literates.

There are even wider variations among the religious groups in female literacy. Along with general literacy, female literacy is a vital measure of modernization and reflects the different socio-religious influences and the historical experiences of different communities. Table 20 shows the percentage of female literates out of the total literates in each religious group in both the provinces.

The group classed Others in West Pakistan, which includes mostly Parsis, is the most highly advanced educationally with literacy about equally divided between the sexes. Next are the Christians who have a higher female literacy in both the wings.,

Table 20

Female Literates as Per Cent of Total Literates in Each Religious Community, 1961

Religious Communities	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Muslims	23.0	20.7
Caste Hindus	29.2	16.7
Scheduled Castes	17.1	10.8
Christians	41.5	33.9
Buddhists	21.8	-
Others	20.8	43.1

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

probably because of the involvement of modern European missionary activity in education. East Pakistani Hindus again show their educational superiority with 29.2 per cent female literates. Scheduled castes because of social reasons are the least literate group, and among Muslims female literacy still remains low owing to religious and historical reasons already mentioned, though, in keeping with the general trend, it is relatively higher in East Pakistan.

Another feature of the literacy differential between East and West Pakistan is that in the former literacy is more evenly distributed with the seventeen districts ranging between 15.3 and 27.2 per cent; out of these, twelve districts have literacy ratios of 20.0 per cent or over (Appendix VII). As already pointed out the literacy rate in East Pakistan is generally higher in the coastal districts (Fig.12).

In West Pakistan there are wide variations in literacy rates between different areas. The forty-five districts of the



Source: Census 1961.

Fig. 12. Literacy (Districts), 1961.

wing range in literacy from 3.4 to 38.1 per cent, and the interesting feature is that the districts at the two extremes, Lasbela and Karachi, are contiguous and have belonged to one administrative division since 1955 (Appendix VII). However, the general literacy rates when considered on the level of the provinces do not tend to be so variable as is shown in Table 21.

Table 21

Literacy Rates in the Former Provinces of West Pakistan, 1961

Provinces	Literacy Rates
Punjab	16.6
N.W.F.P.	12.6
Sind	14.9
Karachi	38.1
Baluchistan	9.0

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

The highest literacy rate of Karachi is obviously due to a higher degree of urbanization and economic development, as is also true of the Punjab. Sind ranks higher than the Frontier Province and Baluchistan, a fact which may partly be explained by the use of Sindhi, the local mother tongue, at the lower levels of education. Like Bengali, though not to the same degree, Sindhi is a more developed language having its own literature. Literacy rates, however, are hardly uniform within these provinces (Appendix VII).

Literacy in urban areas show the same pattern as general literacy in East and West Pakistan. Appendix VIII gives the

literacy rates in all the cities and towns of Pakistan with over 50,000 inhabitants. It will be observed from these figures that two features stand out. Firstly that East Pakistani cities have higher literacy than their West Pakistani counterparts, and secondly, that the largest cities do not necessarily have the highest literacy.

Education: Apart from the general data on literacy, the 1961 census also provides fairly detailed information on the levels of education. The literates have been divided into two broad categories - (i) those who have had no formal education; and ii) the educated i.e. those who have had some formal schooling. The latter group is then divided into different categories according to the level of education reached. Before these figures are analysed, the reader should be familiar with the system of education, at least in its broad features so that one can compare the system with other systems with which one may be more familiar. The schooling system from the age of entering a primary school is shown in Fig. 13.

Although this structure of school system is uniform throughout Pakistan, the actual courses that are taught at different levels differ according to the type of school and the region where it is situated. For example the teaching of English as a compulsory language starts at the primary level in most missionary schools and some government schools in large cities, while in rural areas it may not be taught before the secondary level. Secondly, the language of instruction also varies in different areas; it is Bengali up to, at least, secondary level

Figure 13

The Structure of the School System in Pakistan



(Based on Myrdal, 1968)

in East Pakistan, in Sind it is Sindhi in many primary schools, elsewhere it is Urdu. In Punjab, or anywhere else, Punjabi is not taught at any level.

The first thing that emerges from an analysis of the figures on education is that in East Pakistan the percentage of educated persons out of the total literates is considerably lower than in West Pakistan. The comparable figures for the two wings are 61.3 and 87.4 per cent respectively. This means that in the eastern wing a greater proportion of literates have had no formal education. The Census (1961) provides detailed data about the levels of education of the literate population of only the Muslims in both the wings. However, these figures do reveal

interesting differences in education between the various parts of the country. Although the general literacy is higher in East Pakistan, of total as well as Muslim population, the percentage of educated persons is lower but their absolute number remains higher than in the western wing, though the difference between the two wings is considerably narrowed. Table 22 gives the figures of population at different levels of education.

Table 22

Levels of Education (Muslim Population), 1961*

Area	Educated as % of literates	% of the total educated: Matric. & over	Inter. & over	Degree & over	Higher Degree
East Pakistan	61.3	4.7	1.3	0.5	0.1
West Pakistan	87.4	13.9	1.9	1.7	0.5

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

In education East Pakistan does not have the same superiority over West Pakistan as it has in general literacy. From Table 22 it is clear that a vast majority of the educated have received education only up to the primary level, or at any rate below matriculation. And the East Pakistani position becomes increasingly weaker as the academic level increases.

* Matriculation is the final high school examination and intermediate is the stage, comprising two years at a college, between leaving high school and entering a degree course.

The greatest disparity is found at the higher degree level where the percentage figure in West Pakistan is five times that in East Pakistan. This puts the whole issue of literacy and education in a different perspective, and one has to look for some reasons which may explain these wide disparities.

One reason for the low proportion of the educated above the primary level in East Pakistan is probably to be found in the partition of the sub-continent. Though East Pakistan inherited a larger number of primary schools than West Pakistan, its position was less favourable in institutions of post-secondary level because at the time of partition higher education was confined to urban areas, as it still is to a large extent. In the provinces of British India, institutions of higher level were more or less confined to the provincial metropolis which in the case of East Bengal was Calcutta. The partition of the Punjab left Lahore, the provincial capital and an educational centre, within Pakistan. All other provinces were transferred to Pakistan intact with their capitals and educational institutions. East Bengal was the comparatively less developed part of the Bengal province, so it lacked the facilities of higher education which were mostly transferred to India as a result of the partition. Secondly, at the higher levels of education, especially post-secondary, the language of instruction was English. Therefore, the advantage of having education in their own language, Bengali, which East Pakistanis had at lower levels, was not available to them at higher levels.

Another and more convincing reason is found in what has happened since independence. Appendix IX shows the number of different types of educational institutions, teachers and students over most of the period since independence. This information has been summarized in Table 23 in the form of percentages.

Table 23

Relative Position of East and West Pakistan in Education, 1953-54 to 1965-66

Items	East Pakistan % share in the total			West Pakistan % share in the total		
	1953-1954	1965-1966	% variation	1953-1954	1965-1966	% variation
1. No. of Primary Schools	65.7	44.7	+5.7	34.3	55.3	+150.3
2. No. of Students in Primary Schools	68.7	60.5	+59.7	31.3	39.5	+128.6
3. No. of Secondary Schools	58.9	47.0	+27.8	41.1	53.0	+106.5
4. No. of Students in Secondary Schools	40.2	39.1	+114.7	59.8	60.9	+124.7
5. No. of Teachers in Primary Schools	68.5	53.7	+34.4	31.5	46.3	+151.9
6. No. of Teachers in secondary Schools	49.3	39.0	+64.8	50.7	61.0	+151.3
7. No. of Teachers' Training Institutions	65.2	40.4	-19.2	34.8	59.6	+113.1
8. Enrolment in Teachers' Training Institutions	47.2	52.1	+266.2	52.9	47.9	+199.8
9. No. of Colleges (all types)	47.5	37.6	+135.1	52.5	62.4	+252.9
10. No. of Universities	33.3	40.0	+100.0	66.7	60.0	+50.0
11. No. of Students in Universities	61.5	32.1	+263.3	38.5	67.9	+1130.0

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-1967)

Figures in Table 23 - and in Appendix IX - at once reveal a highly imbalanced picture of educational development in the two wings of the country. In general the expansion of education at all levels has taken place at a much higher rate in West Pakistan. Between 1951 and 1961 the number of matriculates increased by 143.7 per cent in West Pakistan, only by 6.3 per cent in East Pakistan; graduates increased by 21.3 per cent in the former, they decreased by 32.3 per cent in the latter; variation in postgraduates was 68.6 per cent increase and 12.0 per cent decrease respectively. Even in primary and secondary education, in which East Pakistan was ahead of the western wing, the share of the former has steadily declined to less than half the country's total. Though East Pakistan still has a higher portion of primary students, the decreasing number of schools must have increased the number of students per school or per class. The number of teacher training institutions for the primary and secondary levels has actually decreased in East Pakistan by 19.2 per cent. The only items in which East Pakistan has shown an improvement are in its share of the enrolments in teacher training institutions and in the number of universities. Moreover, in the latter case, although there has been an improvement in the share of universities in East Pakistan, as far as the number of students are concerned, university education has expanded at an enormous rate in West Pakistan. Here the inevitable question arises: whether this increasing disparity between the wings has been due to government policies or whether some other factors are involved? This will be pursued later in connection with important economic distributions, but here it should be noted

that in view of the increasing disparities it is highly probable that East Pakistan may lose whatever advantage it has had in general literacy and it is not difficult to visualise the political implications of these vital inequalities.

To complete this survey of education in the country, governmental expenditure on education has also been analysed. Education in Pakistan has been a provincial subject but there is a fully fledged central ministry of education whose main task is to formulate educational policy, grant aid and loans to provincial administrations and to run educational institutions in the centrally administered areas. The actual implementation of policies and the running of most educational institutions is a provincial responsibility. The revenue budgets and the expenditure on education by the central government as well as the two provincial governments are considered. Appendix XI gives the actual expenditure on education as well as the total expenditure of the central and provincial governments since independence; this information is summarised in Table 24.

The reason for the increasing disparity between East and West Pakistan is apparent from the figures on expenditure on education. Only about half the amount spent on education in West Pakistan has been available in the eastern wing. No wonder the share of the latter in educational facilities has been going down. Moreover, the benefit of the amount spent by the central government on institutions in the central capital must also go to West Pakistan because of the location of the capital in that wing. This disparity may not necessarily mean that the central government

Table 24

Expenditure on Education, Pakistan and Wings

Expenditure	Pakistan	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1. Expenditure on Education as % of Total Expenditure, 1948-49	0.5	11.8	11.6
2. Expenditure on Education as % of Total Expenditure, 1967-68	0.5	9.9	16.2
3. Per cent Increase in the expenditure on Education, 1948-49 to 1967-68	533.3	736.8	797.1
4. Per cent Increase in the Total Expenditure, 1948-49 to 1967-68	487.7	901.2	542.5
5. Expenditure on Education as per cent of Total spent on Education by Pakistan and the wings:			
1948-49	4.9	33.7	61.4
1967-68	3.9	32.3	63.8

(Source: Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Twenty Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-1967)

has deliberately kept East Pakistan at a disadvantage because, as has been remarked, education is a provincial subject and the total revenue receipts available to East Pakistan have been less than in West Pakistan (Appendix X), hence less overall provision for education in the budget of East Pakistan.

In education there are differences within West Pakistan as in other distributions though the range of differences is not so high. Appendix XI gives the complete information on levels of education of the literate population by administrative divisions. It seems that in educational levels of the literate population the Punjab does not have a pre-eminent position. However, Karachi again stands out, as in literacy, for obvious reasons (Table 25). Punjab is in fact at a disadvantage in relation to Sind and the

Frontier province as there is a greater proportion of literates without any formal education in the former.

Table 25

Levels of Education in the Provinces of West Pakistan, 1961

Area	Educated as % of literates	% of the total educated: Matric. & over	Inter. & over	Degree & over	Higher Degree
1. Punjab	88.7	12.8	3.3	1.4	0.4
2. N.W.F.P.	96.0	14.7	3.7	1.6	0.4
3. Sind	92.8	7.5	2.4	0.9	0.4
4. Baluchistan	86.9	17.8	3.8	1.6	0.4
5. Karachi	84.0	26.1	8.3	4.3	1.4

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

However, within the Punjab there are considerable differences from one area to another, as one can see from Appendix XI, for example Lahore division is well ahead of other areas in education and is second to Karachi. Unfortunately, comparable figures are not available for the earlier census which would have made possible the comparison of the effects on different regions of the administrative integration of West Pakistan. It will be tried later to find out from other available evidence if this integration has had any significant influence on the socio-economic distributions but one must not expect to discover any radical changes in those distributions because this integration has been in force for only about fourteen years.

Languages of Literacy: Having analysed the regional disparities in literacy and education, and the nature of those disparities, the position of different languages as languages of literacy should now be looked at. As was remarked at the beginning of this chapter, the main interest of a political geographer lies in the outcome of education and literacy in terms of increased communication. If literacy is achieved in different languages in different regions of a state, then any rise in it may not necessarily mean a greater degree of cultural integration. States may develop as coherent political entities even with many regional or national languages - Switzerland is an example but, perhaps, the only such example - and in most states linguistic heterogeneity is a real problem as in Pakistan. States have developed into coherent entities with the evolution of one common language - U.S.A. - and where old ethnic or linguistic groups have retained their identities - Canada - the evolution of a nation has been difficult, if not impossible.

For this analysis of languages of literacy only those literates have been treated who could read and write in any language; firstly, because this conforms to the U.N.E.S.C.O. standard of literacy, and secondly, because data on this category were available in greater detail. Appendices XII and XIII give complete information on languages of literacy by divisions in both the wings of Pakistan and in some selected urban areas. The first thing that stands out is that distribution of languages of literacy is not so complex as is the case of mother tongues or spoken languages. Four of the regional languages, Punjabi,

Pushto, Baluchi and Brahui, account for a very small portion of the literates. However, two additional languages, Persian and Arabic, become more prominent in literacy than they are in mother tongues, and their importance is mainly due to religious and historical reasons. For the state as a whole Bengali, Urdu and English - to a lesser extent Sindhi too - are the principal languages of literacy (Table 26).

Table 26

Languages of Literacy, 1951 and 1961

Able to read and write as % of Population 5 & over

	Pakistan		West Pakistan		East Pakistan	
Languages	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
1.Bengali	9.50	10.85	0.01	0.04	16.60	19.43
2.Punjabi	0.09	0.09	0.19	0.18	0.01	0.02
3.Pushto	0.03	0.08	0.07	0.18	-	0.01
4.Sindhi	0.51	0.76	1.18	1.71	-	0.01
5.Urdu	3.76	6.11	7.63	12.46	0.86	1.08
6.Baluchi	-	0.02	0.01	0.03	-	0.01
7.Brahui	-	-	-	0.01	-	-
8.Persian	0.33	0.46	0.60	0.92	0.13	0.09
9.Arabic	0.27	0.57	0.11	0.48	0.43	0.63
10.English	3.12	3.22	2.35	3.02	3.69	3.38

- means negligible or data not available.

(Source) Census of Pakistan, 1961)

Within East Pakistan Bengali is by far the most important language of literacy because it is the medium of instruction in schools. The higher level of education, at which a student would require English or some other language, accounts for a

relatively small portion of education. In all divisions the percentage of those literate in Bengali out of the total literates is above 95. From 1951 to 1961 the number of Bengali literates rose by about 36 per cent. English is the second important language in the eastern wing with 17 per cent of the total literates, but the increase in it between the two censuses has been only 6.4 per cent. English is followed by Urdu having 5.4 per cent of the total literates and with the ten years increase of about 46 per cent. This increase in Urdu may not be due to any significant spread of the language among Bengali speaking population in view of the fact that during the same period there was an increase of 68.5 per cent in the number of persons with Urdu as their mother tongue. However, whatever the reason, Urdu still accounts for only one-twentieth of the total literates. Arabic, to which all Muslims have a deep attachment for religious reasons, jumped by 84 per cent and in 1961 more than 3 per cent of literates could read and write it. Persian, which was the official language during the Muslim period in the sub-continent and is also a subject of historic associations for them particularly in the north and west of the sub-continent, declined in East Pakistan by about 20 per cent. This may be a reflection on the fact that West Pakistani Muslims look towards neighbouring Muslim countries for their cultural attachment in the past, while in East Pakistan these sentiments are not of much substance.

In West Pakistan the importance of different languages is summed up in Table 27.

Table 27

Languages of Literacy in West Pakistan, 1961

Languages	As % of total able to read and write					
	West Pakistan	Punjab	N.W.F.P.	Sind	Baluchi-stan	Karachi
1.Urdu	86.43	97.90	96.20	35.54	91.61	82.88
2.English	20.95	21.94	24.05	10.16	26.97	25.67
3.Sindhi	11.82	0.06	0.08	74.47	1.84	4.91
4.Persian	6.37	6.90	13.92	1.83	14.42	2.69
5.Arabic	3.34	4.26	1.77	1.69	6.14	1.58
6.Punjabi	1.28	1.02	1.52	1.27	1.14	2.22
7.Pushto	1.22	0.09	11.65	0.49	1.93	0.73
8.Bengali	0.25	0.03	0.30	0.20	0.61	1.27
9.Baluchi	0.20	0.02	N	0.85	1.32	0.57
10.Brahui	0.08	N	N	0.20	0.76	0.16

N = less than 0.01

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

Here Urdu has about the same overall position as of Bengali in East Pakistan, followed by English and Sindhi. As regards the position of provinces it was found that there were important regional differences though the magnitude this time is not so high. Urdu is undoubtedly the main language of literacy in West Pakistan and the lingua franca except in the former Sind province where Sindhi is at the top because of being the medium of instruction in most of the schools. Outside Sindhi speaking areas, however, Sindhi is unimportant. Punjabi, as a language of literacy, is not of much importance and surprisingly it has a higher percentage everywhere compared to within the Punjab. Pushto is also relatively unimportant except in the former

Frontier province where it accounts for over 11 per cent of the literates. Baluchi and Brahui are of no consequence even within their own areas. English ranks second in all provinces except Sind where its position is third after Sindhi and Urdu; The proportion seems to have a direct relation with higher education, which is logical. Persian commands a considerable proportion in the former Frontier province and Baluchistan, a fact probably due to strong cultural and commercial links of these areas with Afghanistan and Iran where it is the official language, but, as has already been remarked, Muslims everywhere in West Pakistan generally feel a strong attachment to Persian as being 'their' former official language. Urdu itself, as being the outcome of a marriage between Persian and Sanskrit, borrows heavily from Persian in vocabulary and form. Arabic, because of religious attachment, is also quite important even though it is of no practical value in government or business employment. Surprisingly Sind has the lowest percentage of literates in Arabic since it was the first area in the sub-continent to come in direct contact with Muslim Arabs in the eighth century A.D., but one does find the evidence of this contact in Baluchistan where Kalat division has more than 11 per cent literates in Arabic. There are Arab settlers on the Mekran coast, especially around Gwadur, which till recently was under Oman, and some trade on the local scale has been going on across the Persian Gulf for centuries.

What do these figures on the languages of literacy really reveal? It is too early to say that the areas with higher

percentages of regional languages are lower on the scale of national integration though it does seem to be so [redacted], a point to be elaborated in Chapter 7. It is certain that Urdu and English are the only languages which have a state-wide distribution. Bengali, though a language of a majority of the population, is almost totally confined to East Pakistan. In West Pakistan only 0.25 per cent of the literates can use it, the majority of them are certainly East Pakistanis living in the western wing. Likewise Urdu is not accepted to any large extent in East Pakistan where it accounts for only 5.4 per cent of the literates. So, any effective communication between the two wings must of necessity be confined to those literate in Urdu and English, 6.11 and 3.22 of the total literates respectively, a very small portion of the total population indeed. The number of Urdu literates in West Pakistan rose by over 100 per cent between 1951 and 1961 and it also increased by over 45 per cent in East Pakistan, which is a good sign. Nevertheless, it is certain that Pakistan cannot hope to become a uni-lingual state in any foreseeable future. The best which can be achieved, with great effort and compromise, is a bi-lingual state with Bengali in the east and Urdu in the west. This can be achieved only if there are no other serious causes of conflict, economic, social or political.

Languages of literacy in cities show the same general pattern as the areas in which they are situated, the only difference being that the percentage of English is higher. In East Pakistan cities also have a considerably higher percentage

of literates in Urdu than in the wing as a whole. This means that the position of Bengali is even stronger in rural areas. In West Pakistan the major difference is to be found in Sind where cities command a higher percentage of Urdu than Sindhi literates - the position is the reverse in the whole of the province. This is due to the fact that in the cities of Sind, Sindhi speakers are in a minority. The greater concentration of non-Sindhis in the large cities not only gives a higher percentage of Urdu literates but is also a considerable source of friction in that province.

So, the overall picture emerges as that of deep regional differences with East Pakistan more literate but considerably less educated than West Pakistan, and that, while the literacy gap has been narrowing, disparities in education are increasing. In the acceptance of a lingua franca, if Urdu can be taken as such for the whole state, the provinces in decreasing order are the Punjab, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Karachi, Sind and East Pakistan. If the importance of regional languages is considered as an indicator of regionalism then East Pakistan leads, followed by Sind, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Karachi and Punjab. This is, however, a tentative conclusion to be explored in greater detail in a later chapter when other cultural considerations will also be taken into account.

CHAPTER 6

URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION

The study of the distribution and growth of urban and rural population is interesting not only as an indicator of economic development but also of social and political change. Even in countries where a greater portion of population is rural, cities play a dominating role by virtue of being centres of industry, trade and commerce as well as of decision-making and political power. In geography the role of capital cities in the evolution of states has received considerable attention (e.g. Cornish 1922; Spate 1942) and the degree of importance of sub-national capitals vis-a-vis the state capital may be of vital importance in assessing how well integrated different regions in a state are in a national framework. In this chapter urban and rural population is studied from the viewpoint of distribution and growth, necessarily involving the internal movement of people between different regions. The composition of the population of some selected cities and towns has been analysed on the basis of the origin of the inhabitants, as far as the available data allows, in order to see how far these cities and towns have helped in intermixing different cultural groups as identified in Chapter 4.

In Pakistan, as in the rest of the sub-continent, urban population has expanded rapidly during the present century but still a large proportion of people live in rural areas. Some areas have shown greater urbanization than others for varying

reasons. In the past a great majority of the population in the whole of the sub-continent lived in self-sufficient agricultural villages more or less isolated from the few urban centres. There was relatively little contact between cities and villages because, though cities depended on rural areas for food supply, timber, other agricultural materials, etc., villages were not only self-sufficient in food supply but also their craft industries provided them with all of their other necessities. With the development of modern transport and communications and industrialization, this isolation became weaker and the two segments of society, rural and urban, became more and more dependent on each other. Besides food supply and industrial raw materials, cities drew on rural areas for labour supply while villages, whose craft industries could not face the competition from mass produced factory goods, became increasingly dependent on cities for the supply of manufactures. Even so this two-way relationship between cities and villages has not been so strong as in the western countries and the "...gulf between city and country is greater in Pakistan-India than in Western countries" (Davis 1951, p.130). This gulf is apparent in occupational structure, literacy and education, sex ratios, age structure, density and housing, and so on. Moreover, this gulf has apparently increased during these early stages of development probably because urban areas have generally developed at a faster rate than rural areas. However, with increasing urbanization the social and political impact of cities on rural areas is likely to become more pronounced.

> "The city is where social change begins, where the specialization, talent, and organization necessary for originating and executing new ideas are available. City development is therefore a good index of past economic progress and safe augury of new progress to come. In many ways what is happening in the city today is what will be happening to all of India in the future" (ibid. p.127).

The differences between cities and villages which are more fundamental than those referred to above are sociological relating to peoples' attitudes and habits. In cities generally people are more aware of their surroundings and react more effectively partly through higher literacy and education, and partly through organizations like trade unions, student unions and other such bodies. In rural areas peasants still remain politically inert because of illiteracy, poverty and lack of organization, thus giving a far greater advantage to cities in politics than their proportion in the total population. Not much statistical evidence is available about these differences but reference will be made to them in this study wherever other indirect sources of information make it possible.

In a study of urban/rural population the first problem which arises is one of definition. What constitutes urban and rural population? Obviously if one can delimit either of the two the other can be derived by subtracting it from the total, therefore in censuses of most countries urban population is defined and delimited and the rest is considered rural. Urban areas are usually defined on the basis of size, functions, or administrative organization, or any combination of these. In

the Census of Pakistan, 1961, areas considered as urban were

> "Municipalities, Civil Stations and Cantonements not included within municipal limits, and any other continuous collection of houses inhabited by not less than 5000 persons which the Provincial Director may decide to treat as urban for census purposes" (Census 1961, Vol.3, Ch.I, p.24).

So the basic criteria were size and administrative organization, but places with less than 5000 inhabitants and with none of the above forms of organization were also considered as urban if they fulfilled the following conditions:

> "1) All areas having Town Committees under the Basic Democracies Order, 1959.
> 2) Concentration of population in continuous collection of houses possessing one or more of the following characteristics:
>
> a) Those where the community sense is well developed and the community maintains public utilities such as roads, street lighting, water supply, sanitary arrangements etc.
> b) Centres of trade and commerce with a population substantially non-agricultural or having a non-agricultural labour concentration.
> c) Those possessing a markedly high literacy rate or which are civil stations" (ibid. p.24).

All this left much to the discretion of the Provincial Directors in the case of smaller settlements whether to class them as urban or not, therefore much depended on the subjective judgement of Census officials in classifying urban population, at least on the lowest scale of towns. Commenting on some new areas classed as urban one Provincial Director wrote:

> "These areas were declared urban after local investigation and discussion with local administration. Some of these

areas have developed so recently that no Municipal body or Town Committee has yet come into existence" (ibid. Vol.2, Ch.II, p.17).

On the other hand all places with more than 5000 persons were considered urban irrespective of their functions or occupational structure thus giving validity to the argument that in Pakistan many small towns which are considered urban are in fact 'outgrown villages'. Leaving this point for settlement geographers to argue about, in this study the census figures have to be accepted because they are the only ones available, however faulty they may be. The problem can, however, be somewhat overcome by dealing with only larger cities and towns when analyzing the characteristics of particular urban areas, say with more than 50,000 persons, because at this level the confusion about urban functions and administrative organization is not likely to arise. Secondly, it is only at this level of urban areas that the data is available in greatest detail.

It is common knowledge that Pakistan is a predominantly rural country. The most striking feature of urbanization is not its extent but that it is highly uneven, and that the disparity between the two wings had been a feature even before independence (Table 28). What is now West Pakistan not only had a greater percentage of urban population than what is the East Pakistan area at the beginning of the present century but the former has also shown a faster growth since then. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely the causes for the slow urbanization in East Pakistan and it seems that a number of

Table 28

Urban and Rural Population in East and West Pakistan
1901-1961

	East Pakistan						West Pakistan					
Year	Urban	%	Change	Rural	%	Change	Urban	%	Change	Rural	%	Change
1901	702	2.4	-	28226	97.6	-	1619	9.8	-	14957	90.2	-
1911	807	2.5	+15.0	30748	97.5	+8.9	1689	8.7	+4.3	17693	91.3	+18.3
1921	878	2.6	+8.8	32367	97.4	+5.3	2058	9.8	+21.9	19051	90.2	+7.7
1931	1076	3.0	+22.6	34528	97.0	+6.7	2769	11.8	+34.6	20773	88.2	+9.0
1941	1537	3.4	+42.8	40460	96.6	+17.2	4015	14.2	+45.0	24267	85.8	+16.8
1951	1820	4.3	+18.4	40112	95.7	-0.9	6019	17.8	+49.9	27761	82.2	+14.4
1961	2641	5.2	+45.1	48200	94.9	+20.2	9654	22.5	+60.4	33226	77.5	+19.7

(Thousands)

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

factors have played their part. Lack of industrialization, of good potential urban sites, of efficient transportation and of capital have all played their part. Bengal province, of which East Pakistan was a part, was one of the most highly industrialized parts of British India but most of the industries were located in the western half especially in and around Calcutta, and there was little spill-over from this process of industrialization to the eastern districts. East Bengal remained primarily a jute producer to feed the mills on Hooglyside; in fact the partition of the province did not leave a single jute mill in East Pakistan. The problem of the shortage of capital has not been overcome even since independence. Means of transport have been so inadequate that even today there does not exist a bridge over the main channel of the Brahamputra River throughout its course in East Pakistan.

Consequent upon the disparity in urban/rural population between the wings, West Pakistan has more cities and towns in all categories (Table 29).

Table 29

Urban Population by Size of Cities and Towns, 1951 and 1961

Size of cities and towns	Number				% of Urban Population			
	East Pak.		West Pak.		East Pak.		West Pak.	
	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
1.Over 100,000	3	4	9	12	34.4	45.9	55.3	58.9
2.50,000-99,999	3	5	6	10	12.0	11.2	7.4	7.3
3.25,000-49,999	12	15	23	30	27.1	20.6	13.9	11.4
4.10,000-24,999	20	23	54	78	17.9	14.6	13.6	11.9
5.Under 10,000	25	31	123	185	8.6	7.8	9.9	10.5
6.Total	63	68	215	315	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

So here in the case of Pakistan there is no direct relationship between population density and urbanization (Davis op.cit.). This is not only true between the wings but also within East Pakistan where some of the most densely populated districts have relatively low urban population (Appendix XIV and Fig.14). In 1961 Chittagong was the most urban district and the least urban was Noakhali with 11.7 and 1.0 per cent urban population respectively. By comparison there were 31 districts in West Pakistan with an urban percentage higher than that of Chittagong, and even the least urban district of the western wing, Lasbela, was nearly three times more urban than Noakhali.



Fig. 14. Distribution of urban population (Districts), 1961.

Between the provinces of West Pakistan there is not much disparity in urbanization although there is a wide difference between individual districts. The percentage of urban population varies from 93.6 in Karachi to 3.5 in Lasbela (Appendix XIV and Fig.14). When looking at the figures of West Pakistan on district level there do seem to be some interesting relationships which are absent from East Pakistan. The most urban districts of each of the provinces - Lahore (Punjab), Peshawar (N.W.F.P.), Hyderabad (Sind), Quetta (Baluchistan - have not only the highest density in their respective province but also contain the former provincial capitals and the main cultural and educational centres. They may well be regarded as regional cores considering the fact that these provinces coincide more or less to distinct cultural units. Their actual role in politics since independence is considered in Part IV.

Table 30

Urban Population in West Pakistan

Area	Urban Population as % of Total Population		% increase
	1951	1961	1951-61
1.N.W.F.P.	15.17	17.92	46.35
2.Punjab	17.42	21.40	52.24
3.Sind	14.06	19.59	78.95
4.Karachi	93.90	93.60	79.00
5.Baluchistan	15.05	17.80	55.94

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

In West Pakistan urban population has generally increased at a faster rate than rural population and in three districts of Baluchistan, Sibi, Mekran and Kharan, the percentage of the latter actually decreased between 1951 and 1961. Whether greater urbanization during this period in West Pakistan has been a direct result of industrialization or not is a debatable point, but if urbanization is considered as an indicator of modernization in any way then East Pakistan has certainly been lower on the scale than most of West Pakistan. Thus to bring about parity between the two wings urban expansion in the eastern one must go on at a much faster rate than has so far been achieved. Fig.15 shows the rate of growth of urban and rural population in both wings of the country on the district level.

Apart from the differences in the percentage and the growth of urban/rural population, the pattern of rural settlement also differs radically between East and West Pakistan. In West Pakistan rural population is generally located in nucleated villages with relatively easy access. On the other hand rural settlements in East Pakistan are mainly in the form of dispersed hamlets often situated on higher ground along rivers and the number of compact villages is small except in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Sylhet (Ahmad 1968). This wouldmean that rural population in East Pakistan has been more isolated than in the western wing making any process of diffusion of modernization more difficult in the former. However, as seen in Chapter 3, primary and middle schools are more accessible to villagesin



Fig. 15. Variation in urban population (Districts), 1951 - 1961.

East Pakistan, at least in matter of distance, but in other services and public utilities West Pakistani rural population is definitely better served as shown in Table 31.

Table 31

Distances to Services and Utilities from Villages in East and West Pakistan, 1961

Percentage of villages at a distance of (miles):

	-1		1-5		5-10		10-20		Over 20		Not reptd.	
*	E.P.	W.P.	E.P.	W.P.	E.P.	W.P.	E.P.	W.P.	E.P.	W.P.	E.P.	W.P.
1.	5.5	22.7	20.3	38.0	14.8	21.3	26.1	9.1	21.4	4.1	11.8	4.8
2.	3.1	4.8	24.2	28.5	20.3	26.4	19.5	22.0	23.4	15.6	9.5	2.7
3.	3.5	0.7	13.3	2.0	14.5	1.4	16.6	-	28.5	0.3	23.4	95.6
4.	9.8	21.0	29.7	51.5	18.4	19.0	23.1	4.0	12.5	1.0	6.5	3.4
5.	36.7	33.2	45.3	38.6	3.9	14.2	0.4	3.1	0.4	-	13.3	10.8
6.	5.1	6.4	35.9	30.9	38.3	42.0	15.6	16.9	1.9	1.7	3.2	2.0

							Over 10 miles			
							E.P.	W.P.		
7.	20.2	7.8	25.8	21.6	16.4	22.4	32.8	43.8	7.0	5.1
8.	17.6	32.0	26.2	20.3	16.4	13.2	30.1	23.4	9.8	21.0
9.	28.1	32.9	32.1	21.0	13.7	18.3	18.4	23.1	7.8	4.8
10.	23.5	14.6	50.4	49.9	16.4	25.1	6.6	9.8	3.1	0.7
11.	0.8	4.8	5.8	20.7	14.1	24.1	68.0	47.1	11.3	3.4

(Govt. of Pakistan, C.S.O., National Sample Survey (Third Round), 1961)

*1. Metalled Road
2. Railway Station
3. Steamer Station
4. Bus Stop
5. Post Office
6. Police Station
7. Library
8. Radio
9. Co-operative Society
10. Dispensary
11. Maternity Home

Besides the differences between urban/rural population as discussed above, there are other differences on some of which statistical evidence is available but on some no data exists and reliance has to be placed on observation. There are two important demographic factors which should be taken into account here: age structure and sex ratio. In both of these, urban and rural populations differ from each other in both parts of the country. Generally speaking urban population in both the wings has a higher percentage of the more productive age group i.e. between 10 and 40 years (Table 32).

Table 32

Age Structure of Total and Urban Population by Sex in East and West Pakistan, 1961

	Age groups as percentage of total									
	0-9		10-19		20-39		40-59		60 and over	
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Total Pop.										
E.Pakistan	35.9	38.2	17.2	16.4	26.9	27.7	15.5	12.9	5.5	4.8
W.Pakistan	31.9	33.8	19.0	18.2	26.8	27.7	14.9	13.9	7.4	6.4
Urban Pop.										
E.Pakistan	26.5	37.1	19.6	19.9	36.1	27.6	14.0	11.4	3.8	4.0
W.Pakistan	28.7	33.0	20.3	20.8	30.9	28.4	14.4	12.5	5.8	5.3

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961) (M=males; F=females)

This difference in age structure is undoubtedly because of the selective movement of people into urban areas from villages in search of employment and education. Normally a person going to a city to find a job would leave his family behind in the

village, if he is married at all, and send money home regularly to maintain his wife and children. Occasionally he would visit his home on religious festivals or family occasions. Similarly, students going to cities and towns for education often find jobs in urban centres after the completion of their studies and sometimes marry into urban families. Even if the graduate cannot find a job he is reluctant to go back to his village once he has been exposed to city life, thus creating problems of unemployment and housing. In this way experience of city life often estranges rural people from their own environment. This is probably more true of those rural areas which are not very productive economically. Unfortunately no statistical evidence is available on this problem of alienation as a result of modernization.

As a corollary to the movement of people into urban areas, cities and towns have more males than females. In 1961 the number of females per 1000 males in East and West Pakistan was 930 and 868 respectively; in urban areas the female ratio was commonly lower - less than 850 in most places, (Table 33). It is not difficult to visualize the social and political problems created in urban areas by this uneven distribution of male/female population. It is difficult, however, to find out the main causes for the lower number of females generally in Pakistan - higher female mortality may be the main reason but no reliable figures are available - but the effect of partition and the subsequent transfer of population have probably been quite important. In the welter of post-independence movement

Table 33

Sex Ratio in Cities and Towns of over 50,000 persons

Cities/Towns	Females/1000 males 1951	1961	Cities/Towns	Females/1000 males 1951	1961
East Pakistan					
Dacca	630	667	Chittagong	557	532
Narayanganj	549	592	Khulna	621	562
Barisal	422	676	Saidpur	809	874
Rajshahi	751	817	Mymensingh	641	749
Comilla	732	806			
N.W.F.P.					
Peshawar	697	735	Mardan	833	824
Kohat	674	725			
Punjab					
Lahore	775	793	Lyallpur	808	777
Multan	820	632	Rawalpindi	644	740
Gujranwala	856	843	Sialkot	764	851
Sargodha	808	772	Jhang	847	870
Bahawalpur	782	779	Sahiwal	803	801
Kasur	853	863	Okara	823	835
Gujrat	856	885	Jhelum	731	626
Sind					
Hyderabad	825	784	Sukkur	772	833
Murpur Khas	795	824	Shikarpur	834	874
Baluchistan					
Quetta	525	641			
Karachi	739	759			

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

of people men probably fared better than women. In that case the predominantly male nature of the refugee population would have increased the male ratio of the overall population. Thus West Pakistan, which received the bulk of refugees, has fewer females per 1000 males than East Pakistan. As a result of resettlement the disparity between the sexes showed some improvement in 1961 over 1951 figures. In urban areas, however, this disparity is expected to persist as the cities continue to grow and draw in population from rural areas. The proportion of men to women is generally higher in those cities and towns which have either experienced rapid growth or contain military cantonments. East Pakistani cities and towns have on the whole an even greater proportion of male population and therefore the differences between rural and urban areas are greater in that wing. This could be due to the relatively less favourable economic conditions in East Pakistani cities which force more migrants to leave their families back in their homes (Ahmad op.cit.).

Internal migration. Movement of people between all parts of the country is unrestricted, as it was before independence, and the government does not collect and publish figures on permanent or temporary migration between districts or even provinces. The censuses do, however, contain some data which, with some limitations, can be used to assess the extent and direction of migration on the district level. These data are on the basis of birth places of the inhabitants in each district and presents

two major difficulties when used to ascertain migration. Firstly, every individual was enumerated in the district where he happened to be on the date of the census and, if this was not his birthplace, no clue was given as to whether he was a permanent or temporary migrant, or if he had moved more than once since the previous census. Secondly, all the refugees who had come in after independence were listed under the general heading 'born elsewhere in the sub-continent' and their movements after coming into Pakistan were not revealed. Their children who were born in Pakistan were listed under the district of their birth and their number could not be separated from the local inhabitants born in the same district. Similarly no information is available about the origin of the refugees, hence no indication of their mother tongues. However, with these limitations in view, a fairly detailed picture of internal migration can be construed if the actual numbers involved are not of great concern.

Voluntary migration, as a general rule, is motivated by economic interests which can be both negative and positive. As an example of the former, when people from depressed areas, like drought or flood affected rural districts, move to other areas, urban or rural, in search of better opportunities the motive may be called negative. It is positive when movement takes place as a result of definite attraction by urban employment or agricultural expansion. This negative push and positive pull can often combine to induce people to leave their homes and go to other areas. So, an outflow can be expected

from rural areas particularly those where economic prospects are not favourable and from densely populated regions where pressure of population is comparatively higher. The inflow would then be expected into urban centres particularly those with industrial expansion or rural areas with greater scope for agricultural expansion. Thus migration is a useful index of the economic status of different areas and can be correlated with other distributions like industrialization, irrigation etc. Migration, however voluntary it may be, is affected by government policies in land grants, industrial and government employment and so on. Besides economic implications, migration is also an indicator of cultural intermixing and can provide some insight into the degree to which different regions come into contact with eachoother and how this contact affects the political life of the state. Contact between cultural groups can lead to better mutual understanding and certainly isolation rarely brings about cohesion. However, depending on the particular nature of the contact it can also cause conflict, even violence.

Contact between East and West Pakistan measured in terms of human beings born in one wing and living in the other showed a rapid rise between 1951 and 1961. Persons born in West Pakistan but living in the eastern wing increased by 70 per cent during the ten years and those born in the East and enumerated in West Pakistan jumped by more than four times (Appendix XV). However, the actual number of persons involved in this exchange still remains very small because in East Pakistan the persons

born in the western wing were only 0.03 per cent of the total population, and those from East Pakistan counted in the western wing formed 0.08 per cent of the population of West Pakistan.* These percentages would be still lower if it was known how many of those born in West Pakistan and counted in East Pakistan were not West Pakistanis, but were actually children of East Pakistanis who happened to be in the western wing at the time of their birth, and vice versa. Considering also the fact that those who undertake inter-wing movement are mostly government officials and businessmen it becomes clear that there has been little contact between the two wings of the state at the level of common man. Obviously distance and the physical separation of the two parts is the major cause for this lack of contact but other factors, social and economic, have also played their parts. This problem of the relative isolation of East and West Pakistan from each other has been the main hindrance in evolving a sense of nationhood and is the root of many political ills. It is difficult to see how this problem can be overcome to any significant degree in the near future.

Within East Pakistan high densities of population, slow industrialization and urban growth, little scope for agricultural expansion and meagre means of transportation have not left much room for inter-district movement. Before independence there was some outflow from the East Pakistan area to the upper Brahamputra valley and the tea estates of Assam (Davis op.cit.; Spate and Learmonth 1967) but this possible outlet

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* It is thought that a considerable number of these were officials from one province posted in the other, and their families.

for the densely populated districts of the delta was cut off by partition in 1947. Thus, as Appendix XVI and Fig.16 show, the percentage of persons involved in inter-district migration has been relatively small. From none of the districts has more than 10 per cent of the population moved out, in fact in 14 out of the 17 districts less than 5 per cent of the inhabitants have migrated to other districts. The general trend of whatever migration there has been is from high density areas to those with comparatively low densities. The districts which have lost the highest percentage of population as a result of migration are those of Noakhali and Comilla, two of the most densely populated. It is an unfortunate fact that in East Pakistan the potential advantages of having a culturally homogeneous population are largely lost through a lack of greater mobility mainly because of economic backwardness and stagnation. The slower rate of industrialization and of urban growth, and the difficulty of movement, besides the social factors which keep people tied down to their homes, have discouraged the pull of urban employment, even though the push by rural poverty has been very strong.

Though mobility in West Pakistan has been lower than in some Western countries, inter-district migration has taken place at a greater scale than in East Pakistan. This migration has been of two types: a) from rural areas to urban centres because of industrial growth particularly after independence; b) from rural to rural areas as a result of new irrigation schemes. The first type of migration started on an appreciable



Source: Census 1961.

Fig. 16. Inter-district migration, 1961.

scale in the post-independence period when industrial and commercial expansion was undertaken as a result of various development plans. Before independence industries were mostly concentrated in areas which went to India after partition and the areas that constituted Pakistan were predominantly agricultural and primary producing. The history of the second category of migration dates back to the early twentieth century when new canal irrigation schemes were undertaken in central Punjab. This process of opening up new areas for agriculture, popularly called 'canal colonies', gradually moved south and westward down the Indus valley and is still going on, though the ultimate limit of cultivable area is coming nearer. This steady advance of irrigation has drawn in agricultural population from eastern and northern districts, a trend which is visible from Fig.17. Figures in Appendix XVI, which are plotted on Figs.16 and 17, clearly tell the difference in the extent of internal migration in both wings of the country.

In West Pakistan there are eleven districts, out of a total of 45, in which more than 10 per cent of the population born there were enumerated in other districts. Table 34 gives the number of districts according to the percentage of population born outside their boundaries in both the wings. In West Pakistan most of the districts in the first category of Table 34 are situated in Baluchistan and N.W.F.P., or in those parts of Sind and Punjab where because of a lack of irrigation agriculture has not been so much developed.*

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* Generally the trans-Indus districts have seen little irrigation compared with those east of the river.



Fig. 17. Direction of migration(inter-Division), 1961.

Source: Census 1961.

Table 34

Districts and their Population by Birth Places, 1961

Born outside the district as % of total population	Number of Districts	
	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1. Less than 10.0	14	18
2. 10.0 to 20.0	3	12
3. 20.1 to 30.0	-	9
4. 30.1 to 40.0	-	5
5. More than 40.0	-	1
Total	17	45

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

The figures on which this table is based also include all the persons born outside the boundaries of Pakistan who were mainly refugees from India,* and since most of the refugees came into West Pakistan, rather than East Pakistan, the districts in the western wing would naturally have shown a higher proportion of in-migrants. Moreover, these refugees who had already been uprooted from their homes, kept wandering about the country, often changing their residence before settling down and thus rather inflated the migration figures in both the censuses. In order to remove the effect of these refugees, to a certain extent, Table 35 gives the gain or loss in each district as a result of internal migration both including and excluding those born outside Pakistan. In both cases the general trend of

* There were some other persons born in Afghanistan, Iran and other countries but their number was relatively small.

Table 35

Internal Migration as Gain or Loss
Percentage of Total Population, 1961

(a = including born in all places; b = born only in Pakistan)

District	(a)	(b)
N.W.F.P.		
Hazara	- 2.0	- 2.8
Mardan	+ 0.3	- 0.4
Peshawar	+27.4	+25.2
Kohat	- 7.4	- 7.7
D.I.Khan	+ 0.3	- 1.2
Bannu	-68.0	-68.7
Punjab		
Campbellpur	- 6.8	- 7.9
Rawalpindi	+ 9.4	+ 1.1
Jhelum	- 7.1	- 9.8
Gujrat	+ 0.5	- 6.7
Sargodha	+13.0	+ 1.7
Mianwali	+ 6.3	- 0.3
Lyallpur	+28.6	- 2.5
Jhang	+ 6.5	- 2.7
Lahore	+26.7	-
Gujranwala	+19.1	- 0.8
Sheikhupura	+46.8	+23.9
Sialkot	+ 5.4	-11.9
D.G. Khan	- 0.1	- 2.9
Muzaffargarh	+10.9	+ 3.7
Multan	+21.9	+ 1.8
Sahiwal	+26.9	+ 0.9
Bahawalpur	+17.7	+ 5.7
Bahawalnagar	+36.6	+ 8.9
R.Y.Khan	+22.9	+12.8
Sind		
Jacobabad	+ 4.4	+ 3.2
Sukkur	+ 9.0	+ 0.8
Larkana	+ 4.6	+ 1.7
Nawabshah	+13.7	+ 5.6
Khairpur	+10.0	+ 5.1
Hyderabad	+23.6	+ 3.9
Dadu	+ 4.3	+ 0.4
Tharparkar	+ 9.3	+ 0.1
Sanghar	+24.7	+11.2
Thatta	+ 1.7	+ 0.1
Karachi	+56.2	+13.2
Baluchistan		
Quetta	+ 4.5	- 2.6
Sibi	+ 7.3	+ 5.2
Loralai	+ 5.7	+ 4.5
Zhob	+ 3.4	+ 2.2
Chagai	- 2.4	- 4.1
Kalat	- 2.4	- 2.9
Makran	-10.2	-10.8
Kharan	- 4.8	- 4.9
Lasbela	+ 4.4	+ 4.0
East Pakistan		
Dinajpur	+ 9.0	+ 4.4
Rangpur	+ 6.0	+ 3.8
Bogra	+ 0.3	- 0.7
Rajshahi	+ 5.6	+ 2.4
Pabna	- 3.3	- 3.6
Kushtia	+ 8.2	+ 0.4
Jessore	+ 5.4	+ 3.4
Khulna	+ 4.6	+ 3.0
Bakerganj	- 1.2	- 1.2
Mymensingh	- 1.5	- 1.6
Dacca	+ 3.0	+ 1.0
Faridpur	- 1.8	- 2.1
Sylhet	+ 3.5	+ 2.8
Comilla	- 4.1	- 4.3
Noakhali	- 8.5	- 8.5
Chittagong	+ 2.9	+ 1.7
C.H.Tracts	+ 10.1	+ 9.5

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

migration is the same i.e. from northern and eastern districts south and westwards down the Indus valley to canal colonies and industrial centres. The only reverse trend is that of movement from D.I.Khan division of N.W.F.P. northwards into Peshawar division where industry and agriculture have experienced greater expansion. Baluchistan, which is mostly an arid rocky upland with little scope for agricultural development, has not attracted any great number of migrants (Fig.17) and because of its low overall population relatively fewer people from it have entered other areas. The main areas of in-migration are southwest Punjab, Sind, Karachi and industrial centres in central Punjab; of out-migration N.W.F.P., northern mountainous districts and eastern densely populated ones of Punjab, and Baluchistan. Punjab has also received disproportionately higher numbers of refugees who, in 1961, were distributed thus: Punjab 69.43; Karachi 13.46; East Pakistan 10.07; Sind 6.44; N.W.F.P. 0.47; Baluchistan 0.13. It is clear from Table 35 that Sind is the only province in which all districts have gained population as a result of migration irrespective of the refugees from India who, when included in column (a), further increase the gain. This is because of the more recent canal colonies in that province and new areas still being won for cultivation. Canal colonies of central Punjab, which were opened up earlier, are showing signs of saturation with the resultant onward movement to new projects, for example the district of D.G.Khan is expected to show a rise of in-migration in the next census because new areas are still being colonized which are attracting people from eastern districts.

Table 36

Percentage Distribution of Persons Born in Different Areas, 1951 and 1961

(a = 1951; b = 1961)

Area of Birth		Enumerated in NWFP	Punj.	Sind	Balu.	Kara.	E.Pak.
N.W.F.P.	(a)	96.93	2.20	0.28	0.37	0.16	0.06
	(b)	93.57	2.76	0.74	0.41	2.43	0.10
Punjab	(a)	0.44	98.71	0.30	0.15	0.35	0.05
	(b)	00.32	98.15	0.68	0.13	0.68	0.04
Sind	(a)	0.02	0.16	99.41	0.05	0.35	-
	(b)	0.02	0.23	99.29	0.04	0.42	-
Baluchistan	(a)	0.16	0.41	3.33	93.26	2.84	-
	(b)	0.08	0.93	3.46	93.64	1.85	0.04
Karachi	(a)	0.05	1.46	2.44	0.10	94.84	0.11
	(b)	0.20	2.75	1.42	0.10	95.23	0.30
E.Pakistan	(a)	———	———	0.01	———	———	99.99
	(b)	0.01	0.01	0.01	-	0.04	99.93
India	(a)	0.75	71.38	7.56	0.38	8.68	11.24
	(b)	0.47	69.43	6.44	0.13	13.46	10.07

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

To assess the relative mobility of the people in various provinces Table 36 gives percentage distribution of persons born in different areas. The most mobile people have been those born in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan (Table 36). In both of these provinces most of the land is rocky and mountainous, unfit for agriculture, and industries are relatively few. This explains sufficiently why a greater proportion of people from these areas have moved out to more promising agricultural areas of Sind and Punjab, and to industrial Karachi. Though only about 2 per cent of those born in the Punjab had gone out to

other areas, they far exceed migrants from other areas in actual numbers because the total population of Punjab was more than half that of West Pakistan in 1961. These people have mostly gone to Sind as cultivators in the canal colonies or to Karachi for industrial and commercial employment. Though there are no statistics available to substantiate this, it is generally believed that Punjabis, when they go to other areas, urban or rural, have a better economic status than the comparable local population. They are better cultivators, as their record in the canal colonies shows, usually have some money to invest because of their better economic background and secure better jobs as a result of their better education. All these factors have generated feelings of hostility against Punjab, particularly in Sind, which have been reflected in politics at a number of times.

Sindhis, with the exception of East Pakistanis who have problems of distance and transport, are the most immobile people as less than one per cent of them have been enumerated outside their province. Even Karachi, which has attracted people from all over the country and was the administrative capital of Sind province till 1947, had in 1961 only less than half of one per cent of the population born in Sind. This extremely insular nature of the people of Sind has its roots in the social and economic character of the province. The people have been under the control of big landlords and religious leaders, and the number of owner-cultivators compared to Punjab has been small. These latter are the people who

generally have a motive to better their lot and are independent enough to go wherever they think they can achieve their objectives. Such people have been few in Sind. This character of Sind ties in with other cultural characteristics, some of which have been discussed earlier. Together with the fact that there is a considerable proportion of people from outside the province whose economic status is higher than that of the majority of the local population it has made Sind a politically sensitive area.

It is difficult to say what the effect has been of the administrative unification of West Pakistan upon the pattern and degree of internal migration. This one unit had been in operation for only five years when the last census was taken in 1961. However, 1961 figures showed a general increase in the movement of people within West Pakistan, as well as that between the wings. Nevertheless, this increase was nowhere drmatic and even by 1961 inter-provincial movement of people was relatively small. From none of the provinces more than 8 per cent of the people had moved out, even in West Pakistan where means of transport and economic opportunities are relatively better. Though there is no measure which prescribes a minimum amount of intermixing to evolve a homogeneous nation, 8 per cent is clearly a small and inadequate amount; there is a greater movement across international borders in some parts of the world.

Urban Areas. Urban population in Pakistan has expanded at a faster rate than rural population, particularly in West Pakistan

(Tables 28 and 30). There are two reasons for this growth. The influx of refugees after partition increased the population of cities and towns, especially that of the larger ones, because some of the refugees already came from urban areas (the Muslims, for example, were largely urban in the United Provinces) and preferred to settle in cities and towns. Many of those who originally came from rural areas also decided to stay on in cities after they had experienced city life in the emergency refugee camps which were located in urban centres. This sudden increase in the population of cities and towns put a great strain on housing, services and employment. After this initial increase in urban population the growth was continued as a result of the establishment of industries and expansion of trade and commerce. Gunnar Myrdal, in his book 'Asian Drama' (1968), talking generally of urbanization in South Asia does not consider urban growth to be a result of economic development and the attraction of cities, but rather of the poverty of rural areas and peoples' attempt to escape from it. He writes:

> "Urbanization is thus more a reaction against the lack of vigorous economic growth than a response to rising levels of income per head. Indeed, much of it is due to factors inhibiting economic development, such as civil wars, instability, and crop failures, as well as to excessive rates of population growth. Instead of standing as symptom of growth, as it was in the West, urbanization in South Asia is an aspect of continued poverty" (ibid. p.471).

It is true that rural areas generally have not experienced any appreciable economic development, some areas have actually undergone stagnation, yet it is difficult to see how this

assertion is entirely true in the case of Pakistan. If Myrdal's analysis applied correctly to all areas then East Pakistan, where rural areas are more subject to population pressure, floods, drought, and other natural calamities, should have experienced a greater urban growth than it actually has. And in West Pakistan some of those districts in which rural areas are economically better off should not have experienced rapid growth of urban population. In support of his argument, Myrdal refers to the increase in urban population in the Indian Punjab as a result of partition and migration (ibid. fn.2, p.471). It is true that the influx of refugees brought an increase in the population of cities but in Pakistan, as probably in India too, urban growth was higher between 1951 and 1961 than in the preceding decade. Urban population in West Pakistan rose by over 60 per cent between 1951 and 1961, as against about 50 per cent between 1941 and 1951. And most of the refugees had entered the country by 1951. In East Pakistan the comparable figure for the latter decade was 45.1 per cent, and that of 1941-51 about 18.5 per cent. However, economic considerations will be taken up more fully in Part III; in this chapter the interest is in the composition of urban population according to origin.

The population of some selected cities and towns in all the provinces of Pakistan is given in Table 38 according to the origin of birth in both the censuses. It is at once clear from this table that cities and large towns are more heterogeneous than their corresponding districts. In East Pakistan all the

cities and large towns, with the exception of Saidpur, are predominantly Bengali with a comparatively higher proportion of persons born in the same district. In West Pakistan there is a large ~~percentage~~ proportion of those born outside Pakistan, mostly refugees from India, and those born in the same district are relatively less important. Within West Pakistan, urban areas of the Frontier Province stand out prominently as there is a greater ~~percentage~~ proportion of persons born in the same province and district, and the ~~percentage~~ proportion of those born outside, particularly of refugees, is relatively low. In all other areas of West Pakistan the refugee element is strong; in 1951 the refugees formed a majority in many urban areas but by 1961 their ~~percentage~~ proportion had decreased all over the country. However, this does not mean that now the refugees are in a minority in cities and towns because the census figures do not reveal the number of children born to refugees after they had come into Pakistan. East Pakistani cities have generally lower ~~percentages~~ proportion of those born outside Pakistan because that wing received only about 10 per cent of the total refugees coming from India.

Table 38 also shows that in West Pakistan the trend in the composition of urban population between 1951 and 1961 has been towards greater mixing of population from different areas. Karachi has the greatest mixture, followed by Quetta, and Sind and Punjab also show an increase in the percentage of people born in other provinces. However, this increase has nowhere been dramatic, although the trend towards greater mixing is an encouraging sign that in most areas of West Pakistan cities are

pulling in and bringing together different cultural elements. The crucial question, however, is what is the reaction of local inhabitants to outsiders? Whether local people resent the presence in their midst of alien languages and customs, or has cultural fusion taken place in urban areas? The answer is by no means easy and no generalizations can be made about this highly complex human problem. In the light of actual experiences since independence some explanation of these questions will be sought later. In East Pakistan the situation is different. Here the trend has been towards a decreasing proportion of persons born outside the province. It is natural that the number of those born outside Pakistan should gradually decrease as the number of original refugees goes down - it has also happened in West Pakistan - but a diminishing percentage of people born in West Pakistan in many East Pakistani cities and towns is not a good sign for national integration. Between the two censuses cities and towns in East Pakistan have become more 'Bengali' which means their cultural insularity has increased. In West Pakistan although there is not much substantial difference between the two census years, the increase in the percentage of those born in the same province has been at the cost of those born outside Pakistan, and not of those from other provinces within the state.

Table 38

Population of Some Selected Cities and Towns by Birth Places, 1951 and 1961

(a = 1951; b = 1961)

Cities/ Towns		Percentage of Population born in:								
		Same Dist.	East Pak.	West Pak.	NWFP	Punj.	Sind	Balu.	Kara.	Outside Pak.
N.W.F.P.										
Mardan	(a)	85.06	-	95.32	92.28	2.88	0.08	0.08	-	4.48
	(b)	79.00	0.05	96.54	91.90	4.16	0.13	0.05	0.30	3.42
Peshawar	(a)	67.47	0.10	93.32	78.43	9.03	0.12	0.06	0.03	12.23
	(b)	70.47	0.37	92.86	82.65	9.70	0.05	0.10	0.36	6.77
Kohat	(a)	71.15	0.71	93.32	78.84	14.35	0.13	0.05	0.93	5.97
	(b)	70.75	3.47	91.62	76.62	14.55	0.07	0.17	0.21	4.91
Punjab										
Rawalpindi	(a)	37.95	0.18	59.93	6.62	52.96	0.10	0.09	0.17	39.88
	(b)	56.15	0.46	78.58	6.49	70.54	0.11	0.19	1.26	20.96
Jhelum	(a)									
	(b)	58.47	0.87	84.72	4.84	79.23	0.12	0.25	0.26	14.41
Gujrat	(a)									
	(b)	82.59	0.01	89.39	0.42	88.72	0.05	0.09	0.11	10.60
Sargodha	(a)	22.04	-	31.62	1.09	30.49	0.02	0.02	-	68.38
	(b)	51.08	0.23	69.08	2.13	66.47	0.10	0.07	0.31	30.68
Lyallpur	(a)	21.14	-	29.65	0.40	29.20	0.02	0.03	-	70.35
	(b)	41.50	0.02	55.76	1.06	54.37	0.12	0.08	0.13	44.21
Jhang	(a)	39.11	-	47.13	0.03	47.01	0.03	0.02	0.04	52.87
	(b)	55.04	-	62.62	0.17	62.25	0.14	0.03	0.03	37.38
Lakore	(a)	43.10	0.01	54.57	1.27	53.04	0.08	0.07	0.11	45.42
	(b)	56.98	0.08	70.14	2.07	67.47	0.11	0.15	0.34	29.78
Kasur	(a)									
	(b)	80.45	-	82.58	0.26	82.26	0.01	0.01	0.04	17.42
Gujranwala	(a)	42.46	-	49.01	0.38	48.71	0.05	0.02	0.01	50.99
	(b)	56.58	-	66.76	0.42	66.11	0.04	0.07	0.12	33.24
Sialkot	(a)	55.98	0.15	66.69	2.06	64.22	0.05	0.35	0.02	33.16
	(b)	75.61	0.07	81.84	0.93	80.65	0.03	0.10	0.14	18.09
Multan	(a)	44.37	-	50.97	0.51	50.34	0.03	0.05	0.04	49.03
	(b)	58.37	0.05	68.58	0.90	67.32	0.11	0.09	0.16	31.37
Sahiwal	(a)									
	(b)	45.91	0.01	55.82	0.61	53.95	0.14	0.56	0.55	44.12
Okara	(a)									
	(b)	40.79	0.01	49.00	0.79	47.97	0.12	0.04	0.09	50.98
Bahawalpur	(a)	53.67	0.04	60.33	0.66	59.52	0.06	0.04	0.05	39.63
	(b)	56.97	0.16	74.14	0.91	72.54	0.30	0.09	0.30	25.70

[contd.]

Table 38

[contd.]

Cities/ Towns		Percentage of Population born in: Same Dist.	East Pak.	West Pak.	NWFP	Punj.	Sind	Balu.	Kara.	Outside Pak.
Sind										
Sukkur	(a)	37.33	0.03	45.00	0.64	3.77	39.05	1.15	0.30	54.97
	(b)	54.81	0.02	66.26	1.05	5.61	57.37	1.41	0.82	33.72
Shikarpur										
	(a)	59.92	-	63.97	0.10	0.76	61.34	1.59	0.18	36.03
	(b)	72.40	0.02	79.35	0.49	1.74	74.97	1.78	0.37	20.62
Hyderabad										
	(a)	28.37	0.09	35.53	1.03	2.49	31.18	0.26	0.56	64.38
	(b)	44.28	0.10	53.30	1.84	3.01	46.93	0.35	1.17	46.60
Mirpur Khas.										
	(a)	18.33	-	30.54	1.18	2.30	21.69	4.46	0.91	69.46
	(b)	38.44	0.02	53.35	0.87	6.40	43.60	1.37	1.11	46.63
Baluchistan										
Quetta	(a)	38.76	0.49	71.81	8.03	20.94	0.40	42.23	0.22	27.70
	(b)	54.19	0.98	84.51	8.31	18.19	0.61	56.90	0.60	14.50
Karachi	(a)	27.34	0.25	40.75	4.27	4.84	1.30	3.01	27.34	59.00
	(b)	39.98	1.02	55.34	5.80	7.33	1.10	1.13	39.98	43.64
East Pakistan										
				West Pakistan						
Saidpur	(a)	19.25	24.60	0.18						75.22
	(b)	51.21	58.60	0.28						41.12
Rajshahi	(a)	62.95	74.96	0.12						24.92
	(b)	71.30	83.07	0.14						16.79
Khulna	(a)	47.14	75.92	0.34						23.74
	(b)	41.17	85.02	0.29						14.69
Barisal	(a)	81.70	96.27	0.11						3.62
	(b)	84.31	98.50	0.06						1.44
Mymensingh										
	(a)	63.43	81.84	0.49						17.67
	(b)	72.15	92.88	0.20						6.92
Dacca	(a)	60.17	78.35	0.81						20.84
	(b)	60.17	85.87	0.95						13.18
Narayanganj										
	(a)	(part of Dacca in 1951)								
	(b)	68.03	91.52	0.18						8.30
Comilla	(a)	88.14	96.57	-						3.43
	(b)	87.67	99.69	-						0.31
Chittagong										
	(a)	78.12	90.88	0.37						8.75
	(b)	69.89	91.80	0.66						7.54

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

CHAPTER 7

A MEASURE OF CULTURAL INTEGRATION

This chapter is in effect a summation of the cultural aspects which have been looked at in the preceding chapters in which the emphasis has been on finding out the differences in cultural distributions between the various provinces of the state. In the present chapter, however, an attempt has been made to assess how far these provinces have been culturally integrated. It has been shown that a common religion, strengthened by certain economic factors, formed the basis of the partition of the sub-continent, and although all the areas now comprising Pakistan are predominantly Muslim, there are differences between East and West Pakistan, as well as within West Pakistan, in the proportion and composition of religious minorities. However, the role of these minorities in politics has not been very important, especially in West Pakistan. In other cultural distributions too it has been seen that the provinces have their own particular characteristics in which they differ from each other more profoundly than in religion, with West Pakistan having a markedly heterogeneous population corresponding more or less to the provincial boundaries inherited from British India. The main questions raised in this chapter are, what is the common ground between these culturally different areas that make up the state of Pakistan; how far have these provinces progressed towards national assimilation; and what are the cultural barriers that are hindering the evolution of a nation?

A common religion may prove a strong binding force, as it did in the sub-continent, against what is considered a common enemy, but once independence has been achieved the evolution of a nation in its full meaning depends mainly on other cultural and economic forces and not merely on sharing a common faith and common political boundaries. To live within the boundaries of one state undoubtedly provides a framework within which national integration and cultural fusion can become relatively easier to achieve, but as long as the population of the state is divided by cultural barriers a coherent, homogeneous nation cannot emerge. In this regard language is an important element the unity of which facilitates,and the diversity hinders, assimilation. Economic and political barriers hinder the physical movement of people and goods but linguistic barriers shut up people from each other's idea, attitudes and experiences. Only when the freedom of physical movement is accompanied by the freedom of the movement of ideas can an effective exchange of information take place, and in that case a common religion can provide an added stimulus to the emergence of a united national feeling. Otherwise the sharing of a religion may prove no more effective than the sharing of common political boundaries. The political unity provided only by a common religion can often wear off once independence has been achieved because the negative influence of a common enemy is then removed and the inherent cultural differences begin to assert themselves. However, sometimes the political unity is prolonged even after independence

because of a foreign threat, supposed or real, but a foreign threat, especially if it is supposed, is flimsy ground on which to base the foundations of a nation because it can cease to exist at any time. There must be some solid, positive factors for national integration to be stable and lasting.

Karl Deutsch in his search for a theory of nationalism put forward the idea of "communicative efficiency" or the "complimentarity of communicative facilities" as the basis of a nation in its full meaning (Deutsch 1966). He considered the effectiveness of social communication to be the necessary ingredient in the process of national evolution and suggested a quantitative method of studying this aspect of nationalism. However, his concept cannot be fully used and tested in this study because of the obvious limitations of data. Firstly, it is not possible with the existing statistics to divide the population of the provinces into the nine groups suggested by him in order to assess their relative degree of national assimilation. Secondly, his method of predicting the probable growth of assimilation is also not practicable because there simply is not enough information available to make any predictive projections. Pakistan has had only two censuses so far, with much of the information of the two not being capable of comparison because of the different definitions used. Only two sets of census figures are inadequate for making projections anyway. This being so an attempt has been made here to utilize Deutsch's basic concept of communication within the limitations of the available data in order to see how different areas rate

on different scales of communication and what are the relationships between different cultural distributions which have already been discussed. For this purpose the provinces have been ranked on the district level according to the various indices derived from the distributions already discussed. By using a rank correlation method, illustrated by scatter diagrams, an attempt has been made to find out not only the degree of cultural integration of different areas but also how this integration is related to various distributions on the level of districts. The ranking of districts on the various indices used is given in Appendix XVII.

The distribution of various languages, both as mother tongues and as languages of speech, was discussed in Chapter 4, and the importance of these languages as vehicles of literacy was seen in Chapter 5. It was also seen that the linguistic distributions in Pakistan are highly complex and that the provincial boundaries more or less enclose linguistic regions. In Chapter 6 the internal movement of people was considered and it was shown that between the two wings there has been very little migration. Even within East Pakistan there has not been much inter-district movement. In the western wing there has been relatively greater movement in which people from the Punjab have been more prominent, with relatively little outflow from Sind. The refugees who came from India have introduced another cultural element since independence. Naturally the question arises as to what extent all these factors of movement, urbanization, literacy and education have brought about cultural

integration. Obviously the first thing to look at is language - or communication in Deutsch's terms - but here there are some serious limitations posed by the form in which the census data is available. As has been pointed out earlier every person is counted as many times as the number of languages he speaks, and there is no way of finding out the number of persons who are bi- or multilingual and in which languages. However, disregarding the actual numbers involved, an index of multilingualism has been devised for each of the 62 districts by using the simple formula

$$M = (S-P)/P$$

where

M is the index score of multilingualism;

S is the total number of speakers of all languages including mother tongues and second languages;

P is the total population.

The underlying assumption is that although the actual number of bi- or multilingual persons is not known, the index score is a reasonably accurate indication of how much different linguistic groups in each district have learnt to speak languages other than their own mother tongues. The scores thus derived are given in Table 39 and have been plotted on Fig.18. There is no information in the census data about the mother tongue or the origin of persons speaking more than one language. Even if a correct estimate of the bi- or multilingual persons can be made no clue exists as to their origin; whether they are local inhabitants or immigrants; if immigrants, then from which areas.

Table 39

Index Scores on Multilingualism of Districts, 1961

District	Score	District	Score	District	Score
N.W.F.P.					
Hazara	0.103	Mardan	0.072	Peshawar	0.227
D.I.Khan	0.114	Bannu	0.069	Kohat	0.116
Punjab					
Cambellpur	0.094	Rawalpindi	0.171	Jhelum	0.112
Sargodha	0.073	Mianwali	0.099	Lyallpur	0.069
Lahore	0.291	Gujranwala	0.150	Sheikhupura	0.131
D.G.Khan	0.072	Muzaffargarh	0.040	Multan	0.054
Bahawalpur	0.056	Bahawalnagar	0.052	R.Y.Khan	0.060
Gujrat	0.068	Jhang	0.056	Sialkot	0.125
Sahiwal	0.045				
Sind					
Jacobabad	0.311	Sukkur	0.131	Larkana	0.136
Khairpur	0.118	Hyderabad	0.197	Dadu	0.197
Sanghar	0.297	Thatta	0.204	Nawabshah	0.155
Tharparkar	0.219				
Karachi	0.343				
Baluchistan					
Quetta	0.436	Sibi	0.179	Loralai	0.173
Chagai	0.400	Kalat	0.438	Mekran	0.007
Lasbela	0.352	Zhob	0.074	Kharan	0.262
East Pakistan					
Dinajpur	0.032	Rangpur	0.012	Bogra	0.019
Pabna	0.013	Kushtia	0.014	Jessore	0.013
Bakerganj	0.009	Mymensingh	0.018	Dacca	0.050
Sylhet	0.024	Comilla	0.015	Noakhali	0.017
Rajshahi	0.031	Khulna	0.021	Faridpur	0.007
Chittagong	0.036	C.H.Tracts	0.057		

Anyway, if the index of multilingualism described above is an any sense an indicator of communication between different linguistic groups, which it is hoped is ~~the case~~ so, then it is important to see the relationships, if any, between this index and other cultural factors. Table 40 gives the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients (ρ) separately between the index of



Fig. 18. Multilingualism, 1961.

Table 40

Rank Correlation Coefficients
for East and West Pakistan

Rank Correlation between	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Multilingualism and:		
1. literacy	+0.21	+0.03
2. urbanization	+0.49	+0.11
3. in-migration	+0.51	+0.07
4. linguistic heterogeneity	+0.71	+0.75

multilingualism and literacy, urbanization, in-migration, linguistic heterogeneity. Surprisingly, there is no relationship between peoples' ability to communicate across linguistic boundaries and literacy (Table 40). This is probably because of two factors: a) that in the country as a whole a large ~~percentage~~ proportion of the population is still illiterate, and b) that a majority of the literate persons can communicate only in their mother tongues - especially in East Pakistan and Sind as has been seen in an earlier chapter. This means that in order to enable literacy to make an appreciable impact on communicative efficiency not only education must be expanded but also that it must be imparted in one language. As long as regional mother tongues are retained for basic literacy linguistic boundaries will remain a barrier to effective communication.

Urbanization, like literacy, has not made any significant impact on multilingualism (Table 40, Fig.19 c and d) but the slightly higher coefficient for East Pakistan is probably due



Fig. 19. Scatter diagram showing some cultural relationships (Districts), 1961

Source: Census 1961.

to the fact that non-Bengali speaking refugees from India, as well as the few West Pakistanis, in the eastern wing are mainly concentrated in urban areas. In West Pakistan as a whole the more rapid urban growth does not seem to have had any effect on the linguistic differences of their inhabitants. Perhaps twenty years is too short a period for cities to show their cultural 'melting-pot' effect. The influence of in-migration on multilingualism seems to be similar to that of urbanization (Table 40, Fig.20 a and b). The most significant relationship of multilingualism is with the degree of linguistic heterogeneity (Table 40, Fig.20 c and d). In both wings of the country the districts that have a greater mixture of mother tongues are also generally higher on the index of multilingualism. This means that even without literacy different linguistic groups learn to speak each others' language when they live and work long enough in the same area. The district which is highest on the index score, Kalat, has three mother tongues, Sindhi, Baluchi and Brahui, in more or less equal proportions. This explains the low scores of East Pakistani districts in which there is a remarkable homogeneity of mother tongues. This may seem encouraging that when people come into direct contact with each other they learn each other's languages, but it is not a very satisfactory means of achieving better communication because only a fraction of the population, in the cities or districts where linguistic boundaries overlap, is affected. And, secondly, this process is rather slow requiring perhaps many generations to show its effects. The process of education



Fig. 20. Scatter diagram showing some cultural relationships(Districts),1961.
Source: Census 1961.

and literacy to overcome linguistic barriers cannot be substituted. However, literacy along with greater mobility and mixing will no doubt accelerate the growth of communication.

Within West Pakistan, however, the situation is far from uniform and rank correlations as well as scatter diagrams show important differences between the provinces (Table 41).

Table 41

Rank Correlation Coefficients
for the Provinces of West Pakistan

Rank Correlation between	NWFP	Punj.	Sind.	Balu.
Multilingualism and:				
1. literacy	+0.71	+0.71	-0.56	+0.05
2. urbanization	+0.77	+0.50	-0.05	+0.07
3. in-migration	+0.54	-0.11	-0.02	+0.18
4. linguistic heterogeneity	+0.49	+0.12	+0.69	+0.73

In the Punjab and the Frontier Province literacy does have a strong relationship with multilingualism (Table 41, Fig.19 b), because education in both, especially in the Punjab, is imparted in Urdu and English, and not in the local mother tongues as is the case in East Pakistan, Sind, and to some extent in Baluchistan. The same is true of urbanization which has had a relatively greater effect in removing linguistic barriers in the Frontier Province and the Punjab. Migration of people into the districts does not seem to have had any influence except to some extent in the Frontier Province. In Sind and Baluchistan linguistic heterogeneity has influenced multilingualism more than

anything else (Table 41, Fig. 20 d). This may mean that most of the bi- and multilingual persons in Sind and Baluchistan are immigrants from India and other provinces of Pakistan and that the local population, i.e. Sindhi or Baluchi speaking, is still relatively isolated by linguistic barriers because in Sind even most of the literates have received education in their own mother tongue, Sindhi. If this is so then Sind, and to a lesser extent Baluchistan, are less integrated into the larger framework of West Pakistan compared to the Punjab and the Frontier Province. This conclusion is in accord with the observation made in earlier chapters that Sindhis have made little movement out of their province and that immigrants into Sind's canal colonies and urban centres are economically better off than most of the local inhabitants.

In the above analysis of multilingualism all the major eight languages - Bengali, Pushto, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, Brahui, Urdu and English - were included, but it is surely unrealistic to imagine that cultural integration can come about as a result of people from all areas learning all other languages. It is impossible to expect all people, or even a sizeable percentage of the population, to become fully conversant with all the languages, even only the major ones, spoken within the state. There has to be one language, a lingua franca, in which people receive education and prepare for effective communication with each other. However, it has already been shown that unfortunately there are no prospects, short or long term, for achieving a unilingual state in Pakistan. The best that can be

hoped for is a bilingual state and the government policies have been directed towards this end by declaring two national languages, Urdu and Bengali, for each wing and retaining English as the language of the government, higher courts and higher education. It was also seen in Chapters 4 and 5 that in West Pakistan persons speaking Bengali and in East Pakistan persons speaking any of the West Pakistani tongues as their second language are very few. So, any communication between the two wings must of necessity be confined to Urdu and English speakers. Unfortunately it is also a fact that because of various reasons Urdu is not accepted to any large extent in East Pakistan* nor Bengali in the western wing. Urdu is the most widespread language as its speakers as mother tongue are to be found in all parts of the country, but relatively few in East Pakistan. The opposition to Urdu in East Pakistan is understandable because of the remarkable linguistic unity of the wing and the attachment to Bengali. In West Pakistan it is the linguistic fragmentation which is the main problem as the adoption of Urdu requires the acceptance by five different groups. To make even the present three language system succeed it is necessary to assimilate all parts of West Pakistan to Urdu and any resistance to such a move must be considered a major hindrance to the

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* It is the experience of the writer that some East Pakistanis refuse to speak in Urdu, even though they can, when they meet West Pakistanis, especially Punjabis. These feelings against Urdu in East Pakistan have seriously affected the growth of communication between the two wings.

cultural integration of the state as a whole. Fig.21 shows the distribution of Urdu spoken as an additional language but it does not mean that in the districts showing higher percentage of Urdu speakers Urdu is accepted among the local inhabitants because the origin of the Urdu speakers is not known. Table 42 shows the correlation coefficients between Urdu spoken as an additional language and literacy, urbanization, Urdu as mother tongue, in-migration.

Table 42

Speakers of Urdu as Additional Language: Rank Correlations

Rank Correlation between	Correlation Coefficient ( )					
	E.P.	W.P.	NWFP	Punj.	Sind	Balu.
Urdu and:						
1. literacy	+0.44	+0.56	+0.66	+0.83	-0.04	+0.86
2. urbanization	+0.45	+0.43	+0.71	+0.55	+0.31	+0.13
3. Urdu as mother tongue	+0.29	+0.39	-0.20	-0.07	+0.79	+0.97
4. in-migration	+0.44	+0.40	+0.60	+0.06	+0.85	+0.70

In both East and West Pakistan as a whole there is a positive relationship between Urdu as additional language and other factors considered in Table 42 and Figs.22 and 23 but not a very significant one. In the case of the provinces of the western wing, however, in the Punjab, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan literacy is mainly responsible for Urdu as an additional language but not in Sind where there is absolutely no relation between the two (Table 42, Fig.22 b). In the Punjab and Frontier urbanization is also positively correlated



Fig. 21. Distribution of Urdu as a spoken language (Districts), 1961.



Fig. 22. Scatter diagram showing some cultural relationships (Districts), 1961.
Source: Census 1961.



Fig 23. Scatter diagram showing some cultural relationships (Districts), 1961.

with Urdu. What then explains the situation in Sind? Part of the answer can be gathered from Table 42 and Figs. 23 b and d. In Sind, and Baluchistan too, there is high positive correlation between Urdu as additional language and in-migration as well as Urdu as mother tongue. This means that more people speak Urdu as an additional language in those districts where there is a higher proportion of immigrants and Urdu speaking refugees. This may well mean that in Sind and Baluchistan the distribution of spoken Urdu does not necessarily mean that the language is accepted as in the Punjab, and that whatever number of the local inhabitants speak it they do so because of a necessity to do so rather than voluntarily. This conclusion is supported by what has happened in the political field as discussed in Part IV. To achieve a communicative efficiency in terms of Deutsch's concept it is necessary for a great majority of the population of West Pakistan, excluding only the Urdu speaking refugees and their descendants, to become bilingual in Urdu. The populations of districts with a low percentage of Urdu speakers and a high one of literates in vernaculars can be considered to fall under the category 'mobilized but differentiated' which Deutsch (op.cit.) considers to be the first to experience national conflict. On this scale Sind comes to the top of the list with Punjab at the bottom.

Table 43 gives the correlation coefficients between the index of multilingualism and the percentage of persons in each district speaking Urdu as additional language. This indicates the importance of Urdu in multilingualism in East and West

Table 43

Multilingualism and Urdu as Additional Language

Areas	Rank Correlation Coefficients ( ) between Multilingualism and Urdu as Additional Language
East Pakistan	+0.73
West Pakistan	+0.58
N.W.F.P.	+0.60
Punjab	+0.96
Sind	+0.48
Baluchistan	+0.40

Pakistan as well as in the provinces. The higher figure for East Pakistan is undoubtedly due to the fact that Urdu is practically the only other language in that wing. In West Pakistan the complete acceptance of Urdu in literacy and education explains the high figure for the Punjab. The Frontier Province also shows considerable positive relationship but in Sind and Baluchistan the coefficient is not very significant. Here the local mother tongues are relatively more important in communication, a fact which may be of value locally but in the larger interests of the state it hinders the development of a common language and national assimilation. If suitable data were available to demarcate the 'assimilated' population as defined by Deutsch it is very likely that the position of different provinces would conform to the figures in Table 43. So, the major obstacles in the way of national assimilation should be expected in areas of Sind, Baluchistan, and to some extent in the Frontier Province, because a bulk

of the 'differentiated' population would be found in those provinces. These are, however, the prospects for West Pakistan only; there are no indications that the two wings will be assimilated to each other's language. There are, therefore, no prospects for evolving a single system of communication facilities spreading equally over both the wings.

One of the results of this linguistic heterogeneity in Pakistan and the resistance of various areas to the adoption of a common language has been the retention of English as a compromise for government business and higher education. It is the major language of communication between the two wings because in East Pakistan it is more important as an additional language than Urdu. Fig.24 shows the percentage distribution of English speakers in all districts. Table 44 gives the rank correlation coefficients of English with other distributions.

Table 44

English as Additional Language

Rank Correlation between English as Additional Language and	E.P.	W.P.	NWFP	Punj.	Sind	Balu.
1. literacy	+0.21	+0.81	+0.77	+0.83	+0.39	+0.45
2. urbanization	+0.43	+0.66	+0.43	+0.61	+0.73	+0.13
3. in-migration	+0.19	+0.55	+0.54	+0.15	+0.76	+0.97
4. Urdu as additional language	+0.75	+0.75	+0.43	+0.94	+0.68	+0.71

English is generally positively related to literacy everywhere except in East Pakistan which is lower on the scale of higher education as discussed in Chapter 5, and also in Sind for



Fig. 24. Distribution of English as a spoken language (Districts), 1961.

reasons already mentioned. Urbanization also seems to have some influence on the distribution of English speakers which does not need any explanation. Like Urdu, in Sind and Baluchistan English also has strong positive relationship with the in-migrants which supports the contention that these areas are less equipped for national assimilation and have largely differentiated populations. Urdu and English as spoken languages are strongly correlated because by far the majority of English speakers must be educated persons who must also have studied Urdu at some level, or that those literate in Urdu who form the 'assimilated' group are likely to proceed to higher education. Table 45 gives the percentage of total literates in Urdu and in the predominant local languages in West Pakistan. The figures clearly illustrate the different character of Sind compared to other areas.

Table 45

Literates in Urdu and Local Languages as Percentage of Total Literates, 1961

Areas	Literates in Urdu	Literates in Vernacular
1. N.W.F.P.	96.20	11.65
2. Punjab	97.90	1.02
3. Sind	35.54	74.47
4. Baluchistan	91.61	4.01
5. Karachi	82.88	-

This, however, does not mean that Sind is the only area to face national conflict. So far only cultural aspects have been considered. Economic distributions also have

an important influence on cultural relations and the situation is worse where cultural conflict is combined with economic conflict. The next Part deals with some of the economic aspects to see how these culturally diverse provinces of Pakistan are affected by economic realities.

PART III ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTIONS

CHAPTER 8

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of Pakistan and supports directly an overwhelming majority of the population. Even with the continuing industrial development the prosperity of the country will remain dependent on agricultural production in any foreseeable future. Industrial expansion itself is to a very large extent ancillary to agriculture because of the scarcity of mineral resources, and most of the manufacturing has to be tied-up with the requirements of and the production in the agricultural sector. Agriculture and other related occupations employ a large percentage of the labour force in all parts of the country except in a few areas, like Karachi, where the concentration of industries and greater urbanization account for higher employment in manufacturing and services. Although both the wings are similar in their dependence on agriculture, there are some important differences in land tenure and ownership, besides the more obvious differences in crops and agricultural practices because of the diverse physical environment. This chapter deals mainly with the social and political aspects of agriculture, and the pattern of crops, their production, the problems facing agriculture etc., receive only brief mention because such topics have been dealt with more thoroughly in various published works and, moreover, they are not of much direct relevance to this study. The general approach of this chapter is the same as in the previous part,

in this instance to find out the regional differences in the nature of land tenure and ownership, the pressure of population on agricultural land and the general level of agricultural development. In order to do this a large amount of data on the district level - the total number of districts is 62 - was gathered and analysed. Frontier states and Tribal Agencies had to be excluded because no detailed statistical information is available on them. An attempt has been made to reduce this large amount of statistical data to a manageable quantity by devising two indices which have been tabulated and mapped. This is the first time, as far as the writer is aware, that the land statistics of Pakistan have been analysed and mapped in this form, and although these indices may seem a little crude, this is probably the best that can be done with the information available. They can, however, be refined as the quality of various censuses and surveys improves, and even in their present form, it is felt, they depict a fairly accurate picture of the conditions prevailing in the state. Much of the information was derived from the 1961 Census, which may seem a little outdated, but the 1961 District Census Reports are still the only source which provide information on the district level in some detail.*

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* 1. Useful data is published by various agencies, such as the Planning Commission and the Central Statistical Office, on the inter-census period but the figures are seldom given below the level of the wings.

It is a well known fact that Pakistan is predominantly dependent on agriculture and out of the total labour force of the country about three-quarters are directly involved in agriculture. Since independence there has been an increase of over 40 per cent in the value of agricultural production calculated at constant factor cost, giving an average annual growth rate of about 2.4 per cent. However, as a result of industrial expansion, the share of the agricultural sector in the GNP has decreased from 60.9 per cent in 1949-50 to 46.5 per cent in 1966-67. The total GNP itself has shown an increase of over 80 per cent over the same period. Agricultural development in the two wings has been summed up in Table 46 in the form of indices for acreage, quantity and value of production.

Table 46

Development of Agriculture

(Base: 1959-60 = 100)

	Acreage		Quantum		Value	
Year	East Pak.	West Pak.	East Pak.	West Pak.	East Pak.	West Pak.
1947-48	93	80	85	74	85	74
1954-55	100	91	91	88	45	62
1959-60	100	100	100	100	100	100
1964-65	108	109	120	128	118	147
1966-67	109	110	115	135	167	184

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

In the years immediately following independence till the middle '50s agriculture actually experienced a little decline as a result of various causes, mainly decreasing fertility, dislocation because of partition, stoppage of canal water in the Punjab,* water logging, fluctuating world prices etc. However, since the late '50s agricultural sector has been showing more or less steady progress. As is evident from Table 46 agriculture has undergone a faster expansion in the western wing than in the eastern one. There are various reasons for this unequal development but the main one lies in the sheer size of West Pakistan. West Pakistan is about six times the area of East Pakistan but contains less than half the total population of the state. Thickly populated, lowland, humid East Pakistan is about 65 per cent cultivated compared to only about 20 per cent of West Pakistan; of the total cultivated area of over 62 million acres, over 20 million are in East and about 40 million in West Pakistan. In addition there are 28 million acres of cultivable waste, 26 million in West Pakistan could be brought under cultivation if water could be made available for irrigation but only 2 million in East Pakistan. The eastern wing has almost reached its limit of cultivable area and any measures to increase agricultural

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* As a result of the partition some canals, which irrigated areas in the Pakistani Punjab, were cut off from their take-off points. The resultant shortage of water in the Punjab remained a serious problem till the Canal Water Treaty was signed by Pakistan and India in 1960 under the auspices of the World Bank.

production must concentrate on raising the productivity of the existing cropland. On the other hand there are still possibilities of bringing more land under the plough in West Pakistan though at an increasing cost in irrigation works and here again raising of yields, which are some of the lowest in the world, seems more appropriate.

Table 47
Land use

(in million acres)

Land Use	Pakistan	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
Total area	234.0	35.3	198.7
Net sown area	53.7	20.3	33.4
Current fallow	9.4	1.4	8.0
Total cultivated area	63.1	21.7	41.4
Forest area	8.6	5.5	3.1
Area not available for cultivation	37.4	5.6	31.8
Other cultivable land	26.0	1.9	24.1
Area not reported	98.9	0.0	98.9

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)

Because of this highly unequal distribution of area and population between the two wings, per capita acreage of cultivated land is 0.44 in East Pakistan and 0.90 in West Pakistan. Even in the latter the amount of per capita cultivated land is too small for any reasonable standard of living. In view of the factthat in East Pakistan most of the cultivable area is already cultivated it is not possible to significantly raise the per capita acreage of cropland. The acreage is, in

fact, bound to go down with increasing population. Even in West Pakistan growing population, 2.7 per cent per annum, puts definite limits to the man/land ratio and the present pressure on land can only be relieved by higher yields and diversion of agricultural labour to the industrial sector.

The differences in the natural environment of the two wings are well known and have been discussed in various regional and economic texts, therefore these topics are not taken up here. However, to have an idea of the effects of these differences Table 48 gives the area, production and yields of the principal crops in both the wings. Two food and two fibre crops, wheat and cotton in West, rice and jute in East Pakistan, are by far of greatest importance. As has been pointed out the actual production and pattern of crops is not of direct interest to this study. Note, however, that as far as the two wings are concerned, the western one is usually self sufficient and has a small surplus for export even in food grains while East Pakistan's self sufficiency in food crops is highly precarious and in most years considerable quantities of rice and other food grains have to be imported.

Fig.25 shows the percentage of cultivated area and brings out interesting differences between the regions. A relatively higher percentage in East Pakistan has already been mentioned but the map also shows interesting variations within West Pakistan. Generally eastern and central districts of the Punjab are as highly cultivated as East Pakistan. Most of Baluchistan remains out of cultivation because of its hilly

Table 48

Acreage, Production and Yield of Principal Crops, 1966-67

(Acreage in 000 acres; production in 000 tons; yield in maunds*/ acre)

Crops	East Pakistan			West Pakistan		
	Acreage	Production	Yield	Acreage	Production	Yield
Rice	22414	9424	11.4	3483	1343	10.5
Wheat	180	58	8.8	13205	4266	8.8
Jute	2165	1143	14.4	-	-	-
Cotton - Lint	36	2	1.5	3939	448	3.1
- Seed	36	4	3.0	3939	896	6.2
Sugar cane	413	8070	531.9	1605	21635	366.9
Tea	95	29	8.3	-	-	-
Tobacco	113	37	8.9	177	138	21.2
Rape and mustard	486	102	5.7	1136	200	4.8
Maize	9	3	9.1	1368	578	11.5
Millet	-	-	-	2069	369	4.8
Vegetables	282	665	64.2	285	831	79.3

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

nature and a lack of water for irrigation. In East Pakistan the Chittagong Hill Tracts District is least cultivated, also because of its hilly terrain, and the southern coastal parts of Khulna district are covered by mangroves and other forests called 'Sundarbans'. In West Pakistan agriculture, mainly in the Punjab and Sind, depends on the Indus River and its tributaries for irrigation. The River Indus itself passes through three of the West Pakistan

* Maund is the standard unit of weight and equals 82.244 lbs.



Fig. 25. Cultivated Area (Districts).

provinces, N.W.F.P., Punjab and Sind. So far there has been no dispute regarding the distribution of its water as West Pakistan has been under one provincial administration since 1955, but now with the re-emergence of former provinces this could lead to inter provincial conflict because irrigation and land management are provincial responsibilities. This point will be taken up again later.

Apart from the differences in the percentage of cultivated area, the provinces also vary in their dependence on agriculture measured in terms of persons employed in agriculture. Table 49 gives the percentage of agricultural labour force for each of the provinces.

Table 49

Labour Force, 1961

Provinces	Total Labour as % of total population	Agricultural Labour as % of total population
East Pakistan	34.3	29.2
West Pakistan	32.3	19.2
N.W.F.P.	30.3	20.4
Punjab	32.0	18.9
Sind (incl.Karachi)	34.8	19.3
(excl.Karachi)	35.2	25.2
Baluchistan	30.9	20.7
Pakistan	33.4	24.9

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)

Clearly East Pakistan is most highly dependent on agriculture and the Punjab least dependent. Sind, if Karachi which is highly urbanized and industrial is excluded, is second only to East Pakistan in its reliance on agriculture. The relatively lower percentage of the agricultural labour force in Baluchistan and the Frontier Province is certainly due to the lower percentage of the cultivated area and not because of higher industrialization. The pre-eminent position of the Punjab is too obvious to require any further emphasis. Here, a high percentage of the cultivated area (Fig.25) and a lower percentage of the population directly dependent on agriculture (Fig.26, Appendix XVIII, column 1) show that this province is relatively more advanced. In all but one district of the Punjab agriculture employs less than 75 per cent of the total labour force; in three districts the percentage is less than 50. On the other hand there are five districts in Sind, four in Baluchistan, one in the N.W.F.P. and fifteen in East Pakistan where the percentage of agricultural labour is over 75. In five, out of seventeen, East Pakistani districts agriculture accounts for more than 90 per cent of the total labour force.

This unequal distribution of agricultural labour and cultivated area gives different man/land ratios in the various provinces. Columns 3 and 4 in Appendix XVIII give respectively per capita acreages for the whole population as well as for the actual cultivators in each district. Because of higher population densities and greater dependence on agriculture per capita acreage of cropped area in East Pakistan ranges between



Fig. 26. Dependence on Agriculture, 1961.

only 0.23 and 0.64 for the whole population, and between 0.66 and 2.26 for the actual cultivators. In West Pakistan there are variations from one area to another but on the whole the man/land ratio is relatively low in Baluchistan and parts of the N.W.F.P. Per capita cropland is highest in Sind, because of its low overall population compared to the Punjab, but since there are relatively less people directly dependent on agriculture in the latter, acres available to each cultivator are as many, or even more, than they are in Sind. So, once again the relatively better economic status of the Punjab is reflected.

Besides these regional differentials in dependence on agriculture another important feature is the degree to which this dependence has changed in different areas. Column 2 in Appendix XVIII gives the percentages of agricultural labour for 1951 and a comparison with the figures in Column 1, i.e. 1961 percentages, clearly shows the changes in the dependence on agriculture, expressed solely as percentage of people employed in agriculture, in each district. In East Pakistan 12 out of the 17 districts show an increase in the percentage of agricultural labour. On the other hand only 9, out of 45, districts in West Pakistan registered a similar increase. This obviously means that in the eastern wing where land available for cultivation was already limited an increasing percentage of agricultural labour has further deteriorated the cultivator/land ratio, while in West Pakistan, particularly in the Punjab, the trend is clearly towards a decreasing percentage of the work force employed in agriculture.

Land Tenure and Ownership: In political geography a study of land tenure, ownership and land legislation is more important than an assessment of general agricultural development in economic terms. It not only yields information on the relative economic levels of the agricultural population but also about the influence on politics of the existing land system. In countries like Pakistan most of the electorate is rural and agricultural. In any democratic system the nature of land tenure is bound to be reflected in the complexion of the people elected to manage the affairs of the state. The policies framed by the government and the legislation enforced directly affect the power of the landlords, the rights of the peasants and the overall social and political relationships of the population. Where new land is brought under cultivation by irrigation, as ~~has been the case~~ in West Pakistan, governmental policies on land grants are of vital importance in that they may or may not tend to favour certain groups of population. Sometimes such policies are deliberately formed to benefit certain sections of the population and may be resented or actively fought against by others. All these things are of interest in order to have a better understanding of the social, economic and political processes operating within a state.

The present land system in Pakistan is the direct outcome of the British policies in the sub-continent. The British themselves inherited the land tenure system from the Moguls and it was modified to suit the needs of the changed circumstances. On the whole both the systems tended to create a class

of rich landed gentry with vested interests to resist any change in the system. After the Mutiny of 1857 large land grants and 'jagirs'* to those who had fought on the British side gave control of much of the agricultural land to a relatively small ~~percentage~~ proportion of the population. A large majority of the actual tenants remained landless with little security of occupancy. However, the system, like most other things in the sub-continent, was far from being uniform in all areas.

In the East Pakistan area the first legislation, and that of most far reaching effects, was passed under Lord Cornwallis in the form of the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793. Under this act propriety and hereditary rights in land were conferred on those who were previously only tax collectors. These new landlords were required to pay to the government a land revenue which was permanently fixed, and the landlords were empowered to collect their revenue from the tenants. The Act benefited only the landlords, and the government, for a short while, because of its convenience in collecting revenue from a small number of owners rather than from millions of actual cultivators.** The land owners, or 'zamindars', rarely

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* Jagirs were large estates exempt from land revenue granted for services to the Crown. A similar system of reward also existed under the Moguls.

** Lack of transport facilities could also have been a consideration as it must have been difficult for the officials to travel frequently to check records and collect revenue.

distributed the land themselves to cultivators but, instead, gave it to wealthy tenants who in turn sublet it further down the line. This chain of subletting had grown so long by the time of independence that there were often as many as ten intermediaries between the actual cultivators and the landowners. During the course of years some of these intermediary 'tenants' were given security of tenure either by judicial decisions or legislation. Nevertheless, at the time of independence only about half the land was controlled by such persons; the rest was still being cultivated by hired labour or sharecroppers. At the time of the enactment of the original legislation the fixed revenue taken by the government was estimated to be 90 per cent of the total collected by the landlords, the rest being the income of the owners and intermediaries. Over the years, as a result of increased yields, prices and the value of land, the rental income of the owners had gone up ten times and the government's revenue, which remained fixed at the 1793 level, now formed only ten per cent of the total collected from the tenants. So, the whole system had developed into an institution whereby the bulk of the population of Bengal lived under the overwhelming economic power of a handful of landowners. Since the government was entitled to a fixed revenue every year it was neither interested nor obliged to carry out any measures for agriculture development of the province, least of all to alleviate the hardship of the peasants. It was partly for this reason that Bengal, industrially most developed, a majority of the population remained very poor.

Besides these economic consequences of the Permanent Settlement there were social and political effects, more profound and far reaching. It has already been mentioned (Chapters 3 and 5) that Hindus proved more adaptable to European rule and were in fact favoured by the British. They readily took to modern education and became predominant in the civil service, business and industry. Consequently, as a result of the 1793 Act which conferred ownership rights on tax collectors, who were mostly Hindus, the predominantly Muslim peasants came under the control of this new class of Hindu owners. This vertical stratification of society in the land tenure system, perpetuated by the Act, came to coincide with the religious divisions of the population. Naturally, Bengali Muslims resented the whole system very much and protested in favour of a change, but nothing could be achieved in the face of the enormous influence of the vested interests. However, in 1905 the British Government decided to create a new province of the predominantly Muslim east Bengal and Assam, a step which was celebrated by the Muslim population of the area. Before the administration of the new province could remedy the injustices of the system the partition of Bengal was annulled under strong Hindu pressure and the conditions continued the same till the second partition came with independence in 1947. After the creation of Pakistan, although most of the East Pakistani Hindus preferred to remain there, they were no longer in so strong a position to block any attempt to change the system.

The first land reform measure was taken by the provincial government in the form of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950. Under this Act it was provided "to eliminate all intermediary rent-receiving interests; to acquire this interest for the state on payment of compensation to previous intermediary interests in instalments; to limit the area of tenancies that may be held under the state; and to distribute the land over and above the ceiling limit among cultivating families owning uneconomic holdings and landless agriculturists" (The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70, pp.409-10). A ceiling of 33 acres per family or 3.3 acres per family member, whichever was larger, was put on the size of holdings under the Act. Provisions were also made for the consolidation of holdings and restrictions put on further subdivisions.*

The actual implementation of the Act proved such a slow process, especially in the assessment of land, that in April, 1956, the government announced the summary application of the Act with the details of compensation to be worked out later. As a result all the rent-receiving interests and intermediaries were abolished, occupancy rights were given to cultivators and about 300 thousand acres of land were acquired by the government. In 1958 the East Pakistan government appointed a Land Revenue

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* Under the Islamic Law of Inheritance the property of a person is divided among all his heirs and this leads to a progressive fragmentation of holdings which has been a serious problem for agricultural development.

Commission to examine the progress made under the 1950 Act. As a result of the recommendations of the Commission the ceiling on the 'Khas', or self-cultivated, land was raised from 33 to 125 acres. The limits of subsistence and economic holdings were fixed at 3 and 8 acres respectively, though this provision was later abolished. In 1962 another Land Revenue Administration Enquiry Commission was set up and it was decided that the implementation of the original Act would be completed during the Second Five Year Plan, though the full settlement operations would take fourteen years. Curiously the Commission also recommended the stoppage of the consolidation programme. However, voluntary consolidation of holdings was continued. It will be some years before the full extent of the effects of the 1950 Act, and its later modifications, can be assessed. Some idea of the effects of these reform measures can be had from the fact that the land revenue receipts of the government increased from about Rs.* 20 million in 1948-49 to 180 million in 1967-68. After the abolition of the intermediary rent-receiving interests the government revenue receipts doubled in just one year.

In West Pakistan area the land tenure system of the British was different from that in Bengal. The British had reached this area much later, about the middle of the last century**, and

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* Rupee is the standard currency unit in Pakistan and, at the current rate of exchange, one Pound Sterling is equal to 11.4 Rs.

** In most of the West Pakistan area the British rule lasted almost exactly a century while in Bengal, starting with the East India company, the British influence dated back to the first half of the eighteenth century.

by that time they had either realized the defects of the permanent land revenue settlement or they now believed in the emergence of a strong middle class to ensure the safety of their empire. As a result, a system of temporary settlement was established which provided for a reassessment of land revenue every thirty years. This system required an elaborate machinery to keep accurate land records from village to village, although the practice of land grants and 'jagirs' in reward for loyal services was continued which also created a rich class of landlords with large holdings. However, with the extension of irrigation, land was given to cultivators in the canal colonies with varying degrees of proprietory rights. As a result of this about half the land in West Pakistan was held by big landlords and the rest by owner-cultivators. A large portion of the population still remained landless peasants working as tenants with little security of occupancy, though in some areas tenants had hereditary rights. Out of the owner-cultivators a majority owned extremely small holdings often highly fragmented. To supplement their income from their own small holdings they also worked as tenants and sharecroppers. The whole system thus created three main classes: landlords; owner-cultivators; and landless tenants. The percentages of these three categories of agricultural population varied from one area to another, but generally there were more owner-cultivators in the central districts of the Punjab with southwest Punjab and Sind characterized by big landlords and tenants. So, here in the West Pakistan area again power lay

mainly in the hands of a few* who controlled the majority of the population consisting of landless peasants and small-holders, but the conditions in the Punjab were probably better than in other provinces. In Baluchistan, of which only about half was administered, the percentage of owner-cultivators was relatively larger but because most of the land was unproductive owners of irrigated land were considerably more prosperous than others and had greater influence. The conditions in the princely states ranged from not unlike those in the British administered districts to extreme feudal systems. The state rulers were completely autonomous in their internal affairs as long as they remained loyal to the crown. In the tribal areas, where British administrative control was minimal, power rested with the tribal chiefs, and unlike British India where a person could go to the law courts for the redress of his grievances, legal jurisdiction was vested in the 'Jirgas', assemblies of tribal chiefs. Apart from the landlords there were the 'Pirs', or spiritual leaders, and the loyalties of the peasant were divided between these two. For his spiritual salvation he would go to a 'pir', for his more worldly needs he depended on his landlord. The conditions were, perhaps, even worse where the local 'pir' also happened to be the local 'zamindar'. However, on the whole the system was probably not

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* Even a small owner-cultivator is usually under the influence of his big landlord neighbour and is politically no more independent than a landless tenant.

so oppressive as in East Pakistan because a majority of the landlords as well as of the peasants was Muslim, and, however wide the economic differences between the two might have been, the social distance was much narrower because of the egalitarian principles of Islam.

Before independence there was some discussion on land reforms but the Muslim League had no clearly defined policy on this issue mainly because the League itself derived most of its leadership from the landed classes of West Pakistan. After independence there were some attempts to introduce land reforms which were successfully thwarted by the landlords who controlled politics, because any measure of reform was bound to be unfavourable to them. However, some legislation was passed by the various provincial governments which either affected only a minority of tenants or was ineffective because of weak enforcement.

Soon after the proclamation of Martial Law in October, 1958, when for the first time the government was free of the influence of landlords, a Land Reforms Commission was appointed to make recommendations for changes in the system. The Commission submitted its report on January 20, 1959, and a month later work started on the implementation of the recommendations. To the surprise of many people the measures announced were not too unfavourable to the landlords. A ceiling of 500 acres of irrigated and 1000 acres of unirrigated land was fixed on individual holdings, but the then existing owners were allowed to retain an area equivalent to 36000 units of produce index,

a classification of soil based on productivity, in addition to 18000 units which they could transfer to their heirs.* Further concessions were allowed in the form of an additional 150 acres of orchard and of land used for dairy farming. The limits of subsistence and economic holdings were fixed between 12½-16 and 50-60 acres respectively, depending upon the quality of land and irrigation supply, and their sub-division forbidden. All 'jagirs' and gifts in the form of land revenue remissions were abolished and rights of ownership were conferred on occupancy tenants. Some security to other landless cultivators was also assured. All the excess land resumed from the landlords was to be offered to the tenants for purchase over 25 years. The landlords were to be paid compensation for the resumed land in the form of government bonds bearing 4 per cent interest and redeemable in 25 years. That the reforms were too mild to bring any radical changes in the system is evident from the figures released. Because of a fairly high ceiling on individual holdings the landlords were mostly able to surrender only the uncultivated parts of their holdings. The total land resumed by the government as a result of these reforms was about 2.3 million acres, out of which only 0.7 million were under cultivation - just over 1 per cent of the total cultivated area of West Pakistan. The rest was either cultivable waste (1.2 million) or not available for cultivation

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*. During the years immediately after independence when there was a talk of land reforms many landlords transferred their lands to their heirs and, when the reforms did come, escaped surrendering any property. Thus they remained as wealthy as before.

(0.4 million). Tribal areas of Baluchistan and the Frontier were altogether excluded from this reform programme. However mild these reforms were they formed, nevertheless, an important step in the improvement of the land tenure system and it was demonstrated for the first time that a government could curtail the dominant influence of landlords on rural population if it so desired. The full effect of the Land Reforms is still being assessed and a complete picture will not be available for some years as the redistribution of land has not yet been completed.

Figures on the ownership of land on the basis of religious communities show the same provincial characteristics as observed in the distribution of religious communities in Chapter 3. Table 50 gives the percentages of landowners on the religious basis (breakdown of figures on the district level is given in Appendix XIX.. In East Pakistan and Sind there is a considerable

Table 50

Landowners by Religion, 1961

Province	Total Owners as % Agric. Labour	Non-Mus.Owners as % Total Owners	Non-Mus.Pop. as % Total Population
East Pakistan	61.50	17.50	19.60
N.W.F.P.	45.40	0.02	0.10
Punjab	53.00	0.20	2.20
Sind	21.60	6.30	7.30
Baluchistan	64.80	0.10	0.30

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol.2 and 3)

percentage of non-Muslim owners who, in both the provinces, are mostly Hindus; in the Punjab they are only about 2 per cent and are Christians. Within Sind, however, there are considerable variations from district to district. Generally in upper Sind, districts adjoining the Punjab, the percentage of non-Muslim owners is relatively small, but further south it reaches over 32 per cent in Tharparker which is only exceeded by two districts of East Pakistan. Because Hindus have this high percentage of landowners in these areas they are more rural (Chapter 3) in Sind and East Pakistan than are the minorities in other provinces.

Even more interesting than this religious aspect of ownership are the provincial variations in land tenure. Different categories of land tenure and their percentages in the total agricultural population is given in Table 51 on the provincial level (district figures are in Appendix XX).

The first important thing that emerges from land tenure figures is the low percentage of owner-cultivators in Sind. This province has been notorious for its landlords owning very large estates and as a result of this nearly 40 per cent of the declarations of excess land, filed after the implementation of the Land Reforms, came from Sind. Of the total 2.3 million acres of resumed land, over one million were located in Hyderabad Division alone. Fig.27 clearly brings out the distinctive nature of Sind in land tenure.

The second important feature of Table 51 is the relatively large percentage of landless labourers in East Pakistan and the



Fig. 27. Land tenure (Districts), 1961.

Table 51

Land Tenure, 1961,
Percent of Agricultural Labour Force

Category	East Pak.	NWFP	Punj.	Sind	Balu.
1. Non-cultivating agriculturists	1.8	2.4	4.8	5.2	15.6
2. Owning all land tilled	34.7	29.6	27.6	10.2	34.6
3. Owning part and renting part	2.8	7.1	9.4	6.4	5.1
4. Owning part, renting part and working for hire	6.4	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.3
5. Renting all land tilled and sharecropping	4.2	17.0	24.9	35.1	15.9
6. Renting land and working for hire	0.5	1.0	0.8	1.6	0.7
7. Unpaid family help	32.4	25.5	25.9	32.6	22.2
8. Landless agricultural labourers	17.1	17.0	6.0	8.1	5.6

(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vols.2 and 3)

Frontier Province. A larger share of Category 5, renting all land tilled and sharecropping, in the Punjab and Sind represent a greater availability of agricultural land on the holdings of the landlords. The Land Reforms particularly provided for the security of these tenants. Because of the extremely small size of many holdings in East Pakistan a greater percentage of the population has to supplement its income by renting some land as well as working for hire. However, there is a limit to the availability of land in East Pakistan because of higher population density and cultivators cannot find more land to hire even if they want to. For this reason 5 per cent of the agriculturists in East Pakistan find it necessary to work in non-agricultural subsidiary occupations against about 3 per

cent in West Pakistan (Census 1961). The 1961 Census, the latest available, could not show the effects of various land reform measures in both wings of the country because of the slow progress made in their implementation, but the next one, due in 1971, should show an increase of owner-cultivators and a decrease of landless labourers if these measures have made any impact on the whole system.

Pressure of Population: Another important aspect of agriculture, besides land tenure and ownership, is the pressure of population on cropland. It has important political implications because it directly affects, together with other factors such as industrialization and urban growth, the volume and direction of internal migration. In order to assess this pressure an index was devised in which the density of population was weighted by the amount of per capita cropland available and the average productivity of land in each district. The index values for the 62 individual districts were, thus, calculated as

$$\frac{\text{density of population}}{\text{per capita cropland X productivity}}$$

The productivity of cropland was calculated on the basis of average per acre yields of the two major food crops, rice in East and wheat in West Pakistan (data from Ahmad 1968; Zaidi 1966), and the values were reduced to an index in relation to the lowest yield. This index is given in Appendix XXI together with the final index of population pressure on cropland which has been plotted on Fig.28. ~~It is interesting to note the~~ There are significant relationship



Source: Census 1961.

Fig. 28. Pressure of population on agricultural land (Districts), 1961.

relationships between this map and that of internal migration (Chapter 6, Fig.16). When canal irrigation was started people from the central and eastern districts of the undivided Punjab, where population was more dense and holdings had become small through sub-division, gradually moved out into the new canal colonies in western Punjab. After independence this process of extending irrigation was continued southwestwards down the Indus valley, drawing in its wake people from older settled areas. At present the main projects are under way in the extreme western districts of the Punjab and in Sind. In East Pakistan too the main direction of migration is east to west, i.e. from darkly to lightly shaded areas on Fig.28, with the exception of Sylhet and Chittagong Hill Tracts into which more people have been moving in than those moving out.

It has been mentioned that the British policy in the Punjab canal colonies was to give more land to owner-cultivators and therefore land grants of moderate size, 25 to 100 acres, were made to ex-servicemen and other groups. Before independence, and after that till 1955, some Punjabis had obtained land in the canal colonies of Sind, but because of their relatively small numbers their presence was not too much resented by the local population. Up till 1955, when Sind was a separate province, the Sindhi landlords did not mind the coming in of Punjabis as they themselves had more than enough land and were in political control of the provincial administration. After the integration of West Pakistan, however, circumstances became different. Not only had the seat of provincial government

shifted to Lahore but also the whole administration was now dominated by the numerically superior Punjab. It was now easier for the Punjabis to obtain land in Sind as the administrative control was transferred to Lahore from Hyderabad.

Secondly, although there are no figures available, the whole government policy of land grants was somewhat partial during the regime of Ayub Khan. Land grants in the Sind canal colonies were frequently given to retired, or in-service, civil servants and military personnel, fields in which Punjabis have traditionally dominated. So, this policy, though fair on the face of it, was intrinsically biased in favour of the Punjab and, to a certain extent, N.W.F.P. This naturally resulted in a strong feeling against Punjabis among Sindhi leaders who not only felt frustrated about losing their own provincial government, but, probably, also saw an impending erosion of their hold on the vast majority of their tenants by the presence of a growing middle class of owner-cultivators in their midst. More of these political issues will be discussed in Part IV.

Finally, an attempt has been made to quantify the degree of prosperity of the agricultural population and map the results obtained in the form of another index (Fig.29, Appendix XXI). The best measure to assess the relative agricultural prosperity would have been, had it been available, the average farm income per acre for all districts, but no such estimates have been prepared. Therefore, the sort of data that is available, and which has been used in this chapter, was utilised and the



Fig 29. Agricultural productivity (per capita of cultivators), Districts, 1961.

prosperity of the agricultural population was simply calculated as the product of acres of cropland per cultivator and of productivity in each district. This index as plotted in Fig.29 once again clearly illustrates the relative poverty of East Pakistan and Baluchistan. Punjab is again prominent as being more prosperous, followed by Sind and Baluchistan. However, while Baluchistan's poverty in agriculture is due to unfavourable physical conditions, low figures for East Pakistan are undoubtedly due to high population densities and a relatively higher percentage of population directly dependent on agriculture.

Fig.29 provides a very good picture of the economic level of the agricultural population but it does, however, conceal some vital information. If all the land were being cultivated by its owners then the map would have been much more accurate, but since a considerable portion of the cultivated land is still owned by the absentee-landlords and cultivated by the tenants it does not take account of the vertical distribution of income. Of course, there is no information available on personal incomes, the inclusion of which would make the index of prosperity more comprehensive. It is not known how much from each farm is taken away by the landlord and how much left for the actual cultivators, but if it is kept in mind that in Sind the percentage of owner-cultivators is relatively lower and in East Pakistan higher, the difference between the two in Fig.29 would somewhat soften.

CHAPTER 9

INDUSTRY

In the preceding chapter it was seen that Pakistan is heavily dependent on agriculture, but because of high population densities, particularly in East Pakistan, the per capita cultivated acreage is low. With low average yields of all crops the present man/land ratio is not favourable for any great improvement in the living standards. Although there are possibilities of increasing the yields, as well as of addition to the cultivated area, a high population growth rate puts limitations on any significant increase in the per capita production of various crops. Any improvement, therefore, in the national and in personal incomes requires development in the non-agricultural sectors of manufacturing, commerce, mining etc. Progress in the agricultural sector too, which is of prime importance in view of the percentage of the population dependent on it, necessitates industrial development. Industries, not only to process the produce and supply the demands of agriculture, but, more importantly, to absorb the labour bound to become surplus as a result of agricultural modernization. So, a study of industrial development is very important in terms of assessing the relative development of different regions, and the influence it has had on politics.

This chapter is attempted on the same pattern as the preceding one but there are certain difficulties. The sources of data are about the same - population censuses, reports of

the Planning Commission, the Central Statistical Office and other official agencies - but in some respects the industrial data lacks something compared with agricultural statistics. In the latter some idea of the relative status of the various districts could be had from the figures on average yields, but no such information is available on industrial production. Similarly, the land tenure statistics provided information about the ownership of agricultural land and the status of agricultural population, but in industries no figures exist about ownership or the status of those employed in the various branches of industry. It has often been said in Pakistan that about 80 per cent of the industrial and business assets are concentrated in the hands of only 20 families. However, even if these assessments are not correct, it seems certain that the owner/worker ratio in industry is probably more in favour of the owner than is the case in agriculture, especially since the land reforms. Nevertheless, from whatever information has been published, it appears that the average per capita income is higher in industry than in agriculture; in both the wings the per capita income of the rural population is about 4 per cent less than the per capita income for the whole population. This means that although the industrialist/worker relationships may not be any better than those of the landlord/tenant, the industrial worker is slightly better off than his agricultural counterpart in financial terms, but of course there are wide regional variations. There is another respect in which the industrial worker stands better than the agricultural one.

Because the former is urbanized, concentrated and relatively organized through labour unions, he is not only aware of his problems but is sometimes in a position to at least protest about them. On the other hand the agricultural tenant, especially one without any statutory rights, is practically helpless to do anything about his problems. So, in this respect industrialization also means, apart from its economic consequences, an important social change which, with all its concomitant problems of urban growth, is reflected in the political life of a state.

Immediately after independence the need was felt for industrial development in order to relieve pressure on the agricultural land and to raise the general economic standards. Since then considerable progress has been made through implementing various development programmes and establishing a number of semi-autonomous public bodies to undertake these programmes in different sectors. Table 52 shows the progress made in the non-agricultural sector of the economy and its share in the Gross National Product at constant factor cost. As this chapter is mainly about manufacturing industries it is useful to have a brief look at the breakup of the GNP figures into different sections of the non-agricultural sector (Table 53). The share of manufacturing has been steadily and firmly rising throughout the period since independence and by the end of the Third Five Year Plan in 1970 it was estimated to reach about a quarter of the total non-agricultural GNP. The same has been true of construction, banking, insurance

Table 52

Non-Agricultural GNP, 1949-68

Year	Amount (million rupees)	Percent of the Total GNP	Percentage Increase
1949-50	9797	40	-
1954-55	12254	44	25
1959-60	14686	47	20
1964-65	21297	52	45
1967-68	26366	54	24
		Accumulated increase 1949-50 - 1967-68	169

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

Table 53

Non-Agricultural GNP by Sectors

Sectors	As percent of the non-agricultural GNP				
	1949-50	1954-55	1959-60	1964-65	1967-68
1. Manufacturing	15.0	18.0	20.0	22.0	22.0
2. Mining and quarrying	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5
3. Electricity, gas, water, and sanitary services	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.3	1.4
4. Banking and insurance	00.8	0.9	1.5	1.7	2.3
5. Transport, storage and communications	12.6	13.0	12.6	11.4	12.2
6. Trade	29.2	26.6	25.0	24.0	23.3
7. Construction	2.4	3.4	4.4	9.0	8.6
8. Ownership of dwellings	14.2	12.7	12.1	9.5	8.3
9. Services	15.1	14.5	14.4	11.9	10.8
10. Public administration and defence	10.9	10.1	9.1	8.4	10.7

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

and electricity which, of course, are all connected with the manufacturing industries. The Central Statistical Office index of the production of manufacturing industries shows an increase from 22.6 in 1950-51 to 233.0 in 1966-67 with the base year 1959-60 being equal to 100.0 (20 Years of Pakistan, 1968). However, the interest of this study lies more in the regional differences than in the overall progress, but unfortunately no official publication provides a regional breakdown of the GNP statistics. In order to assess the relative position of the provinces one has once again to approach it in an indirect way. Before attempting a map of industrial development, similar to the one of agriculture, it is necessary to look into the mineral and power resources of the various provinces.

Minerals: Table 53 very clearly shows the paucity of minerals in Pakistan. The whole value of mining and quarrying in the GNP does not exceed about 0.5 per cent of the non-agricultural sectors. Nearly all the important mineral bearing areas of the sub-continent were inherited by India, and Pakistan was left with a few relatively minor areas producing mostly non-metallic minerals. After independence considerable attention was given to the search for new deposits, particularly of petroleum, but so far only a few exploitable discoveries have been made. The total known mineral resources at present are far from providing enough indigenous production to support any large scale industrial requirements. However, mineral production since independence has gone up considerably both by the exploitation of new discoveries and the improvement of the existing mines (Table 54).

Table 54

Quantum Index of Mineral Production

(Base Year: 1959-60 = 100)

Year	Index	Year	Index	Year	Index
1950-51	42.3	1956-57	75.9	1962-63	144.7
1951-52	49.1	1957-58	82.9	1963-64	160.5
1952-53	57.1	1958-59	97.2	1964-65	174.5
1953-54	60.4	1959-60	100.0	1965-66	182.3
1954-55	62.7	1960-61	114.7	1966-67	193.0
1955-56	70.2	1961-62	124.0		

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

An important feature of the mineral production is the highly uneven distribution between the wings. Of the non-fuel minerals, which include limestone, gypsum, rock salt, glass sand, china clay, chromite, iron, sulphur, marble, baryte, antimony etc. in varying quantities, most are found in West Pakistan and the entire present production, except that of limestone and china clay, comes from that wing. Many of the deposits in West Pakistan are located in remote areas (Fig.30) and their exploitation is therefore not economically feasible. Table 55 gives the production of some selected minerals between East and West Pakistan.

Table 55

Production of Some Selected Minerals, 1966-67

(in tons)

Minerals	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	Minerals	E.Pak.	W.Pak.
Cromite	-	37655	Rock salt	-	231287
Limestone	261795	2170049	Silica sand	-	77786
Gypsum	-	121519	Marble	-	7000
China clay	2657	110	Iron	-	4000

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70; and 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)



Fig. 30. Non-fuel minerals.

Fuel and Power: At the time of independence the fuel and power resources of Pakistan were as meagre as those of minerals except that there was a considerable hydro-electric potential which could be exploited; but again most of the potential sites were in West Pakistan. As any programme of industrialization depended heavily on the availability of power the government launched various plans to boost power production in both the wings. In order to assess the power production various power sources are taken up one by one.

The known reserves of coal at the time of independence were located only in two areas of West Pakistan, in Baluchistan (Quetta and Kalat divisions) and in the Salt Range in northern Punjab (Fig.31). The total annual production of between 600 and 700 thousand tons was about equally divided between these two areas, which made up only about one-third of the total requirements. The present production should be about 3 million tons as planned in the Third Five Year Plan. There have been some new discoveries of coal reserves in Sind and the N.W.F.P., but most of these are difficult to work and are of low quality. Only about 20 thousand tons are being mined annually near Jhimpir in Sind. More important finds of coal have come about in East Pakistan. This wing was without any known coal in 1947 but since then about 700 million tons of reserves have been discovered at various places, the main ones being in Sylhet and Bogra districts. Most of this coal is of good quality, suitable for coking, but is located at a depth of 1200 to 4000 feet which means greater cost of mining. At



Source: K.S. Ahmad 1964; Third Plan 1965.

Fig. 31. Power resources.

present plans are under way to utilize these resources and the production was scheduled to start in 1970. Coal from these reserves will go a long way towards meeting the requirement of power in East Pakistan.

In addition to coal, about 1,000 million tons of peat deposits, mostly in Faridpur, Sylhet and Khulna districts of East Pakistan, have also been found, but so far there has been no production because of the difficulties of transport. However, a plan has been prepared to produce about 200 thousand tons of air-dried peat a year.

All the present petroleum reserves are located in the northern areas of the Punjab, but there are prospects of more reserves in other areas of West Pakistan as well as in the eastern wing. Production has gone up from 15.6 million gallons in 1947 to about 150 million gallons in 1970, but it still is only about 20 per cent of the country's needs.

Most of the attention in the field of mineral prospecting has gone to petroleum. By the end of the Second Five Year Plan in 1965 Rs. 596 million had already been invested in oil exploration. A further 300 million was planned to be spent in the Third Plan. In addition an agreement worth Rs. 142.9 million was signed with the U.S.S.R. for the provision of surveying and drilling equipment and the services of experts. So far there have been no important new discoveries but it is expected that some reserves will be found in certain areas of both wings.

The most important mineral discovery, which changed the whole power situation, was that of natural gas. This came directly as a result of oil drilling and the first strike was made at Sui in Baluchistan in 1952. Later more gas-fields were discovered in the adjoining areas of Baluchistan and Sind. The interesting feature of the gas discovery lies in its distribution, and not so much as in its quantity, although the Sui field is considered to be one of the largest in the world. In 1955 extensive gas reserves were also discovered in the Sylhet district of East Pakistan followed by more finds in the adjoining areas. So, in natural gas at least the two wings of the country stand on almost equal footing as the estimated reserves in East and West Pakistan are about 20 and 16 million million cubic feet respectively. The annual production of natural gas, which was 80 thousand million cubic feet in 1964-65, was estimated to reach 200 thousand million cu. ft. in 1969-70. The discovery of natural gas in large quantities did not only alter the picture of power resources but also provided raw material for some new industries. The location of the Sui gas field (Fig.31) required long pipelines - 347 miles to Karachi and 217 miles to Multan - to be laid in order to get the gas to the industrial areas. From Multan the pipeline has been extended to Lyallpur and Lahore and will eventually be taken to the Rawalpindi/Islamabad area.

Before the discovery of this gas, however, some natural gas from the oilfields (Fig.31) was already being piped 40 miles to Rawalpindi where it has been used in the first oil refinery, the only one inherited in 1947.

Most of the hydro-electric sites lie in the northern parts of West Pakistan where steep gradients and rivers with sufficient water supply throughout the year have made the generation of electricity possible. As a large part of East Pakistan is a deltaic plain the only water power resources are situated in the extreme southeast in the Chittagong Hill Tracts district and it is here that the only development so far has taken place.

Generation of electricity is not only essential for any industrial development, but is also a good indicator of the general standards of the population if its consumption figures are available. In 1947 the total installed capacity of hydro-electricity was only 10,700 k.w. Most of the cities depended on small local thermal stations using imported coal. Since then the electric generating capacity has increased greatly by the installation of either hydro-electric stations or large thermal stations using natural gas. Fig 31 also shows the location of various generating stations in relation to provincial boundaries. The total installed capacity of the generating stations is given in Table 56 and Fig.32. At present the output of electricity is quite enough for the needs of the country but with the expansion of industry the demand for power is expected to rise. The projected schemes for new stations and for increasing the capacity of the existing ones will, however, keep pace with the increasing needs. In addition to the hydro and gas/coal stations two nuclear ones, one in East Pakistan at Rooppur of 70 m.w. and the other in Karachi of 132 m.w. will be completed in the next plan period.



Source: K.S. Ahmad & Pakistan News.

Fig. 32. Electricity (installed capacity), Provinces, 1970.

Table 56

Electricity, Installed Capacity, 1970

Area	Total installed capacity in mega watts	Hydro-electricity as percentage of total
Pakistan	2075.8	35.0
East Pakistan	830.0	14.5
N.W.F.P.	200.0	100.0
Punjab	782.8	47.5
Sind	247.0	0.0
Baluchistan	15.0	0.0

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, the Second and Third Five Year Plans)

For the distribution of electricity a West Pakistan grid system is being constructed (Fig.31) to join all the stations in the wing. The northern section between the Punjab and the N.W.F.P. has already been completed. A similar integrated power grid is also under construction in East Pakistan with the completion of which all the important industrial centres will be connected to each other. Although there are good prospects for East Pakistan to catch up with the western wing in the generation of electricity, the present production in the former is about only 40 per cent of the country's total. Within West Pakistan the share of the four provinces in power production is: N.W.F.P., 16.1 per cent; Punjab, 62.9 per cent; Sind, 19.8 per cent; and Baluchistan, 1.2 per cent. This share in power generation is more or less proportionate to the share of the provinces in the total population of West Pakistan. However, there is one important fact which must be noted, i.e.

a high degree of interdependence of these provinces in the utilization of power resources. Nearly all the thermal production of the Punjab and Sind is dependent on the Sui natural gas which comes from Baluchistan. Unfortunately no consumption figures are available on the provincial level but it is likely that the Punjab consumes some power produced in the N.W.F.P. With increasing demand for electricity the Punjab is likely to become more dependent on the Frontier Province for its hydro-electricity or on Baluchistan for more gas to generate power. This integrated development of power was certainly facilitated by the integration of West Pakistan into one administrative unit and the break-up into the former provinces is likely to raise some problems, unless the central government takes over the whole system.

Taking Pakistan as a whole, despite all the development in power production, per capita consumption is still low relative to other countries. According to one estimate in 1960 Pakistan consumed 30 units of electricity per head of population. By comparison there were 38 units consumed in India, 92 in Turkey, 870 in Japan, 2083 in U.K., 4159 in U.S.A. and 5640 in Canada (Ahmad 1964). If similar figures were available on the district level it would have been much easier to assess the relative levels of economic development in different areas.

Manufacturing Industries: Pakistan inherited some of the least industrialized areas of the sub-continent and very few of the large modern factories fell to her share. Although East

Pakistan was the main jute producing area there was not a single jute manufacturing mill within her boundaries. Most of the cotton from West Pakistan was likewise exported raw to foreign countries or to mills located in areas which went to India. Most of the non-agricultural labour was engaged in small scale craft industries and modern manufacturing had to be started almost from scratch. Conditions were favourable for setting up industries based on local agricultural produce, particularly jute and cotton, and there was an abundant supply of labour. However, there were some serious problems which did not allow for an accelerated development, namely a shortage of capital, of experienced personnel in financial and technical fields, resettlement of refugees and the general political instability. Immediately after independence whatever industry there was suffered a decline as a result of the emigration of non-Muslims who mistly provided the technical and financial personnel. The economic difficulties were somewhat relieved in 1949 because of the Korean War which boosted the prices of cotton and jute, the main exports of Pakistan, and the country was able to earn enough foreign exchange to meet the import requirements of manufactured goods. With the end of the Korean boom in 1950 and a sharp fall in world prices of jute and cotton a rapid drain of the foreign exchange reserves resulted, and the government had to restrict the import of consumer goods. The free import of machinery and capital goods was, however, continued in order to encourage the establishment of domestic industries. High tariff restrictions on imported goods, liberal

tax holidays and other incentives encouraged industrialists to invest in the manufacturing industries. Despite all these encouragements private capital either proved to be insufficient in the sectors where it was invested, or was not forthcoming at all in such industries which did not promise fast returns. As a result of these circumstances the government decided to step in directly in industrial investment.

The first step was taken in 1952 with the establishment of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, a public body empowered to invest in whichever industry it considered the private efforts to be inadequate. Most of the private investment had gone into the cotton textile industry where there was a large home demand and, with heavy restrictions on imported cloth, the industrialists were able to make profits of over 100 per cent (The Third Plan). The PIDC, through which most of the public sector investment has been channelled, prepared plans to invest in jute, fertilizer, paper and newsprint, natural gas, coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding, cement and chemical industries. The establishment of this organization must be considered the most important landmark in the short history of industrialization in Pakistan. The general policy of the Corporation was to set up industries and then sell them to the private sector as going concerns and retain only those which were either too big for private hands or which had special importance for the country's economy. In 1962 the PIDC was decentralized into two separate bodies, East and West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporations, one in each of the wings under their respective

provincial governments. They inherited the policies, functions and projects of the parent PIDC.

Another important step was the establishment of an Industrial Development Bank (IDB) in 1961 which replaced the earlier Pakistan Industrial Finance Corporation set up in 1949. The main function of the IDB was to provide loans to private investors over medium and long periods. Later the work of relending foreign loans was also entrusted to the Bank.

A public limited company, Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC), is also engaged in the establishment, expansion and modernization of industrial establishments. Pakistani investors have contributed 60 per cent of its capital, and the rest has been subscribed by American, British and Japanese entrepreneurs. It purchases shares of public and private companies, as well as granting loans to investors. It receives loans, for direct investment or relending, not only from individual countries but also from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). In addition to these organizations there are the National Investment Trust - a unit trust organization, Investment Promotion Bureau - to act as an intelligence and information service for investors, and several other smaller organizations, all intended to help accelerate the growth of industry.

Soon after the proclamation of Martial Law in 1958 a Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was set up to co-ordinate and implement development of water and power resources. It too was split into two bodies, one for each wing.

Later its functions in matters of irrigation were transferred to the Agricultural Development Authorities, but it remains in control of all policies regarding the utilization of water and power resources and hands over irrigation to ADA only after the completion of a project.

These are the public/private bodies which are the actual instruments for the implementation of various development plans, and the plans themselves and broad policy decisions are made by the Planning Commission directly under the President. Till the middle fifties there was no co-ordinated plan for development and the whole progress in the industrial sector took place in a rather haphazard manner. The First Five Year Plan was prepared for the period 1955-60 but because of political instability and administrative inefficiency it fell far short of its targets. The Second and Third Plans for 1960-65 and 1965-70 proved more successful and for these ten years an average annual growth rate of 5 per cent has been achieved, as against only 2.5 per cent for the ten years before 1960. The actual outlay and allocations of these plans are discussed in the last chapter of this part.

As a result of these efforts industrial expansion has taken place at a relatively rapid rate and the share of manufacturing in the GNP (Table 53) has gone up considerably. The Statistical Office quantum index of manufacturing is shown in Table 57. The increase during the Second and Third Plan periods has been greater than in the years before that. The value index of manufacturing has shown an even higher increase,

Table 57

Quantum Index of Manufacturing, Pakistan

(Base 1959-60 = 100)

Year	Index	Year	Index	Year	Index
1950-51	22.6	1956-57	79.4	1962-63	159.5
1951-52	26.2	1957-58	84.6	1963-64	181.3
1952-53	36.2	1958-59	92.3	1964-65	201.7
1953-54	47.3	1959-60	100.0	1965-66	214.2
1954-55	60.9	1960-61	118.7	1966-67	237.0
1955-56	73.7	1961-62	138.8	1967-68	261.0

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Pakistan: Basic Facts, 1966-67; and C.S.O., Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol.17)

from 100.0 in 1959-60 to 302.8 in 1967-68. However, these indices do not show the share of the two wings in the total industrial production of the country. Table 58 gives the share of the wings in some selected industries. Although the share of East Pakistan in the total industrial production has been increasing at a faster rate during the past two plan periods, it is still considerably less than that of West Pakistan. It has been the declared policy of the central government that the difference in the industrial development between the two wings must be removed as quickly as possible, but, in view of the greater population of the eastern wing, its share in the industrial production will have to be raised to more than half of the total in order to bring the per capita value at par with that of West Pakistan. During the Third Five Year Plan there was a greater emphasis on removing these inter-wing differentials and the targets of production set for 1969-70, the last year

Table 58

Production of some Selected Industries, East and West Pakistan

Industry	Units of Production	1954-55 East Pak.	1954-55 West Pak.	1964-65 East Pak.	1964-65 West Pak.	1967-68 East Pak.	1967-68 West Pak.
Cotton Yarn	million lbs.	22	172	64	454	77	495
Cotton cloth	million yards	63	282	49	715	52	715
Jute goods	thousand tons	53	-	289	-	491	-
Art silk and rayon cloth	million sq.yds.	-	-	0.09	32	2.8	64.8
Sugar	million tons	28	47	77	156	91	318
Tea	million lbs.	56	-	62	-	65	-
Vegetable products	million tons	-	13	5	90	6	90
Cement	million tons	0.05	0.6	0.06	1.6	0.08	2.0
Chemical fertilizer	thousand tons	-	-	72	87	112	105
Paper and newsprint	thousand tons	-	-	79	-	78	-
Paper-board	thousand tons	-	-	-	24	-	22
Matches	million gross boxes	-	-	11	1	10	0.8
Cigarettes	thousand mills.	0.4	4	6	14	15	20
Chemicals	thousand tons	1	27	5	63	12	89

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, C.S.O., Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol.17)

of the plan, are shown in Table 59. It can be seen that if these targets have been achieved the disparity between the wings should now be less than at any time in the past. However, since industry still constitutes a relatively small section of the economy the question of standards of living depends mainly on agricultural development.

Table 59

Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70,
Main Targets of Industrial Production

Industry	Units of Production	East Pak.	West Pak.
Sugar	thousand tons	230.0	410.0
Tea	million lbs.	74.0	-
Cigarettes	thousand mills.	11.5	18.5
Cotton yarn	million lbs.	234.0	486.0
Jute manufactures	thousand tons	864.0	56.0
Writing and Printing paper	thousand tons	65.0	35.0
Paper-board	thousand tons	30.0	70.0
Newsprint and mechanical paper	thousand tons	65.0	35.0
Machine tools and heavy machinery	million rupees	102.0	160.0
Chemical fertilizer	million tons	1.6	1.4
Chemicals	thousand tons	341.0	511.0
Petrochemicals	thousand tons	151.0	178.0
Cement	million tons	2.0	4.0
Steel (ingots)	thousand tons	300.0	900.0
Electrical wires and cables	thousand tons	15.0	20.0
Heavy electrical equipment	million rupees	30.0	90.0

(Source) Govt. of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70

Industrial Labour Force: There is no need to discuss the distribution of industrial labour force, which includes all non-agricultural occupations, separately as it is a corollary to the agricultural labour as described in the previous chapter. All the districts which are relatively less dependent on agriculture have a greater percentage of their population in the industrial labour force, and any map of the distribution of the latter will be complementary to the one showing dependence

on agriculture. However, the composition of the industrial labour, i.e. in the different sectors of industry, is very important. Fig.33 shows the share of different categories of industrial population, as well as its total numbers, in the various provinces.

The most important feature of the distribution of the industrial labour force as revealed by Fig.33 is that in 1961 East Pakistan, with about 2½ times the population of the Punjab, had fewer persons in the industrial occupations than in the Punjab alone. The whole of West Pakistan had more than twice the actual number of the non-agricultural labour of East Pakistan. Then there are differences in the composition of industrial labour and West Pakistan has again a considerably higher percentage of those employed in manufacturing industries than/~~is the case in~~ the eastern wing. Within West Pakistan the inter-provincial differences are as pronounced as those between the wings. Baluchistan is clearly least developed in terms of manufacturing industries though, because of its coal, chromite and natural gas deposits, it has the highest percentage of the labour force working in mining. In manufacturing the leading position of the Punjab is only too obvious, followed by Sind and N.W.F.P. In Sind the percentage in manufacturing, however, would have been considerably lower if Karachi was not included.

Figures of industrial production, by quantity or value, however useful they may be for assessing the regional balance in industrial development, do not show the significance of such development to the actual population of the areas considered.



Source: Census 1961.

Fig. 33. Distribution and Composition of non-agricultural Labour Force, 1961.

An increase in the total value of production may not have much relevance to personal incomes, though it will no doubt be reflected in the increase of per capita incomes, if it does not directly involve a significant portion of the population. For this reason the distribution of the employment in manufacturing is shown in Fig.34 as percent of the total labour force in each district. Given that average economic level of the industrial labour is higher than that of the agricultural labour, this map is a more accurate reflection of industrial development than the actual figures of production. One can see the higher level of industrial development in West Pakistan compared to the eastern wing, and also of the Punjab within the former. Karachi, of course, is the most highly industrialised district in the country. However, since these figures relate to the 1961 Census, some difference in the inter-regional disparities must have taken place since then as the various tables in this chapter tend to suggest, but it appears that no radical change in the employment structure as shown in Figs.33 and 34 will be revealed by the next census. The differences between the wings in the inter-censal period 1951-61 did actually widen as pointed out in Chapter 8 in connection with the changes in the percentage of agricultural labour. It was shown that while in the western wing the percentage of those engaged in agriculture decreased generally during the period, there was an increase in most of the East Pakistani districts. In the modern large scale manufacturing industries, however, the inter-wing disparity was slightly less as 3.0 per cent of



Fig. 34. Magnitude of Manufacturing (Districts), 1961.
(in terms of employment in manufacturing)

the industrial labour in West Pakistan was engaged in cottage industries, against only 1.8 per cent in East Pakistan.

Location of Industries: Although the government has been committed to removing inter-regional disparities in industrial development, its main concern has been to bring about a parity between the two wings.

> "Industrial investment policy as to kind and location of industry will be pragmatic and rational to the maximum extent consistent with over-riding Plan objective of eliminating economic disparity between East and West Pakistan" (Third Plan, 1965, p.451).

However, so far as the location of industry on the intra-wing basis was concerned the Plan is explicit about the maximization of returns as being the main consideration.

> "As a general guide, investment opportunity which offers maximum rate of return on invested capital will be selected over alternative investments for the same purpose but indirect benefits of dispersing industries throughout the country will be fully taken into account" (ibid. p.451).

Thus, the location of industries in Pakistan has been thoroughly controlled by the government, especially during the period of the various plans. Fig.35 shows the location of important industries and the main industrial areas. Another important feature (Figs.34 and 35) is the remarkable concentration of industries in and around the various provincial metropolitan and port cities. Within the five provinces the highest percentages of manufacturing labour is found in Karachi and Hyderabad (Sind); Lahore (Punjab); Peshawar (N.W.F.P.); Quetta (Baluchistan); and Dacca and Chittagong (East Pakistan).



Fig. 35. Location of Main Industries.

So, the proximity of the administrative centres seems to be as important a factor as the economic considerations, or, perhaps, there is an inevitable correspondence between economic and political control. Only in the Punjab is there a significant dispersal of industries, though only within the central, more densely populated, districts, and the position of Lahore remains prominent.

The economic importance of the administrative centres is also reflected in Fig.36 which shows the distribution of employment in banking and insurance, sectors of the economy which have a very strong influence on the whole investment policy. In the Punjab a considerable dispersal can be seen but in other provinces the metropolitan or port cities have financial predominance. Karachi is by far the leading financial centre and in much of the rest of the country it has an overwhelming financial control. In fact much of the employment in finance in all the provinces is subservient to the industrial, financial and commercial interests based in Karachi, and the Third Plan frankly admits that

> "The rapid industrial development in the last two decades has been accompanied by growing concentrations of income and wealth in the hands of a few family groups" (ibid. p.450).

It will be interesting to know in the next census what effect the shifting of the central capital has had on both Karachi and Rawalpindi-Islamabad.



Fig. 36. Hierarchy in Financial Control, 1961.

Labour Relations and Legislation: Labour relations in Pakistan were governed till 1958 by the labour laws inherited from the British and by the 'First Labour Policy' announced in 1955. These laws specified mainly the duties of management towards labour but their enforcement remained very weak. Since the areas of the sub-continent forming Pakistan were mainly agricultural, industrial labour relations were relatively unimportant. Though some labour unions did exist even before independence, they were generally weak and ineffective and the whole situation was very much in favour of the employers. However, with expanding industrialization and increasing industrial labour the previous laws proved inadequate. So, after the proclamation of Martial Law in October, 1958, the government announced the 'Second Labour Policy', which was to a considerable extent based on the recommendations and conventions of the International Labour Organization. This policy was designed to encourage a healthy labour union movement and to bring about a general improvement in industrial relations. Under the policy various new legislations were enacted. One of these legislations was the Industrial Disputes Ordinance of 1959, superseding the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, which provided for statutory investigation, conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes. In 1960 works committees and bipartite bodies on the various regional and national levels were established to provide a forum for labour/management discussions. If a dispute failed to be resolved in these conciliation bodies, often presided over by government representatives, only then could it lead to a strike.

The Ordinance also established Industrial Courts to which either party could go for a decision in a dispute, [redacted] the decision of the court being subject to appeal to the provincial High Courts. However, this Ordinance was applicable only to those establishments which employed more than fifty workers.

The Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance of 1960, replacing an earlier Act of 1926, provided for compulsory recognition of unions by the employers, as well as laying down certain conditions for the labour unions to fulfil to be eligible for recognition.

In 1961 the National Minimum Wage Ordinance was promulgated which provided for the necessary machinery for the determination of minimum wages but only in selected industries. In addition there were a number of other legislative measures directed towards improving the working conditions in particular industries, e.g. tea estates, mining, road transport etc. While on the whole these various legislative provisions meant a betterment in the working conditions of the industrial labour, the government lagged behind in their proper enforcement.

> "It can be stated on the basis of available information that the industrial relations during the Second Plan period (1960-65), looked at in the context of the requirements of a developing economy, remained far from satisfactory" (ibid. p.233).

During the period prior to the Martial Law of 1958 there was an increasing number of strikes and the highest figure of man-days lost was recorded in 1957 when a total of 150 stoppages involving more than 188,000 workers cost about

808,000 man-days. With the proclamation of Martial Law there was a sudden drop in the number of strikes but after the lifting of the Martial Law in 1960 they again showed a rapid rise as shown in Table 60.

Table 60
Industrial Strikes

Year	No.of Stoppages	No.of workers involved	No.of man-days lost
1960	42	25749	78765
1961	54	26303	79191
1962	121	69482	387847
1963	221	221613	1888167

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)

Despite all the efforts of the government, which have not been very successful in the enforcement of legislation, the labour unions are still very weak and are not in a position to protect, much less to improve, the conditions of the industrial labour. Their weakness is shown by the figures on their number and membership in Table 61.

Table 61
Labour Unions

Year	No.of labour unions	Membership
1960	708	360604
1961	721	347287
1962	815	440294
1963	830	471466

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)

In 1961 the total union membership amounted to less than 5 per cent of the population engaged in non-agricultural occupations. Thus, the labour relations in Pakistan remain heavily in favour of the employers, and one of the reasons for this is the general illiteracy. Since the employers are invariably educated they are in a better position to defend themselves than the workers who, because of illiteracy, cannot even understand their own statutory rights, much less defend them before conciliation bodies and industrial courts. They have to depend in these matters on outsiders who have often exploited them. The idea of collective bargaining, though embodied in the various legislative measures, is of little value to workers in practice because of the lack of enforcement of laws. The wages, though slightly better than in agriculture, are hopelessly low and the income differentials between the workers and owners are high. The retention of the job, however ill-paid, is often more important to a worker than the improvement of labour conditions.

> "During the Second Plan period the number of trade unions grew keeping pace with the growth of industry. The same is not, however, true of their organization and function. The movement has continued to be weak. The result has been that the system of collective agreements based on the principle of bilateral collective bargaining has been unfortunately rare in the country's system of settling industrial disputes" (ibid. pp.234-35).

The present Martial Law regime earlier this year announced yet another 'Labour Policy' under which, apart from the usual provisions for better industrial relations, for the first time

in the history of the sub-continent a minimum wage of Rs.120 per month was fixed for all industrial workers. The amount may seem too small by western standards but in the context of the sub-continent where the worker, industrial or agricultural, has been at the mercy of the employer for a long time, this marks an important step towards better working conditions. It is still too early to assess the effects of this industrial policy which may not show any significant results even in the next census.

CHAPTER 10

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS

The role of transport and communications is vital in all spheres of human activity and, therefore, has received due attention in various branches of geography. Apart from the importance of the means of transport and communications in the physical movement of goods and people, as well as of ideas and information, from one place to another, access is essential to the political control of an area.* It is difficult to extend effective political control over an area which is isolated, has poor transport facilities and is not easily accessible from other parts of the state, especially from the seat of the central authority. However, only occasionally are networks of roads and railways constructed for political reasons; in most cases such construction is motivated by economic interests. For this reason thinly populated and economically less productive areas which are not capable of generating enough trade and movement tend to be poorly served by roads and railways, and thus are, especially if they are marginally situated, not fully integrated into the political framework of a state. If international boundaries do not form

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* Zaidi, I.H. in 'Toward a Measure of the Functional Effectiveness of a State: the Case of West Pakistan', A.A.A.G., vol.56 (1966), has shown the importance of accessibility in the functional effectiveness of an area.

an effective economic and cultural barrier then such areas may often form a potential threat to the integrity of the state by having better economic and cultural links with a neighbouring state. It is therefore useful to study the network of transport lines and means of communication in order to assess how different areas within a state are linked to each other in economic and cultural terms.

Besides indicating the degree of integration of different parts of a state, transport and communication networks are also a good indicator of the economic development of different areas. Despite all the development in transport technology, the physical nature of an area does not only influence the alignment and cost of transport lines but also the economic justification of such cost. That is to say that if the scarcity of resources of the area has restricted economic activity within it there will not be enough movement of goods and people to justify the expenditure on the construction and maintenance of roads or railways. Thus better transport facilities generally mean relatively higher economic standards and higher population density. In some cases, however, the construction of roads and railways is necessitated by political and strategic reasons, as for example in the north western parts of the sub-continent during the British period, which may also bring about some increase in the economic activity. So, there is a two-way relationship between the economic and political nature of an area and the lines of transport and communications.

The territorial division of Pakistan has created enormous problems of transport and communication between the two widely separated parts of the state. The actual distance of about a thousand miles between the two wings understates their real separation from each other considering that the relations between Pakistan and India have not been friendly. Surface transport between the two wings of Pakistan through India virtually ceased to exist some years after the partition in 1947. Even before independence there was no direct train service between the East and West Pakistan areas. Transport by sea involves a much greater distance as one has to go round the Indian peninsula. Air transport is fast but expensive and again depends on the nature of Indo-Pakistan relations for rights to overfly India. Otherwise the distance is more than doubled by flying via Ceylon. The problem of distance also besets the means of communication - telephone, telegraph, radio, television, press etc. - and although the advances in space technology, namely satellite communication, promise radical changes in telecommunications the problem of cultural distance between the wings, imposed mainly by linguistic differences, is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.

Apart from these inter-wing difficulties transport and communications are by no means free from problems within the wings. The deltaic nature of East Pakistan has rendered the construction of roads and railways extremely difficult with very high construction and maintenance costs. The railway network which existed at the time of independence was severely

mutilated by partition. In West Pakistan surface transport is relatively easier but large tracts of arid mountainous terrain and thin population still remain isolated. There has been a rapid expansion in air transport during recent years but costs place air transport out of the reach of the vast majority of the population. Although most of the cities in West Pakistan are fairly well connected, means of transport in rural areas, particularly west of the Indus, are poor. Thin population and the scarcity of natural resources in most of the trans-Indus areas do not justify the high cost of road and railway construction which the rugged nature of the terrain in these areas imposes. Thus the cultural fragmentation of the state, more or less perpetuated by the relative isolation of some areas in terms of transport facilities, makes effective political integration in Pakistan a difficult proposition. In the following pages of this chapter different means of transport and communications are discussed with a view to assessing how well connected different areas are with one another.

Railways: Railway construction in the sub-continent started under the British around the middle of the last century. The first tracks were laid around Bombay and later the network was gradually extended inland. In the West Pakistan area the first line was constructed between Karachi and Kotri in 1861, and in the following year a railway line between Darsana and Jagati was laid down, the first in the East Pakistan area. By the

time of independence in 1947 there was a wide and well established system of railways serving most parts of the sub-continent. This system was severed at a number of places by the partition boundaries. Since railway construction in the sub-continent started as private enterprise, which was later taken over by the government in 1925, different companies preferred different railway gauges with the result that Pakistan, like India, inherited three types of railways: broad gauge (5 ft. 6 in.); metre gauge (3 ft. 3¼ in.); narrow gauge (2 ft. 6 in.). The partition left Pakistan with 6931 route miles of railways of which 5041 miles were broad gauge, 1413 metre gauge and 477 narrow gauge (Table 62). West Pakistan got a major share of the broad and narrow gauge lines and most of the metre gauge was inherited by East Pakistan. During the last three Five-Year Plans for development the emphasis was put on the improvement of the existing railway network rather than increasing the mileage of routes.

Table 62

Route Mileage of Railways

	East Pakistan				West Pakistan			
Year	Total	Broad Gauge	Metre Gauge	Narrow Gauge	Total	Broad Gauge	Metre Gauge	Narrow Gauge
1947-48	1615	500	1095	20	5316	4541	318	457
1954-55	1708	548	1140	20	5333	4558	318	457
1959-60	1715	546	1149	20	5327	4628	318	381
1964-65	1713	546	1147	20	5334	4636	318	380
1966-67	1713	554	1139	20	5335	4637	318	380

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

Although East Pakistan received about 24 per cent of the total mileage of railways in Pakistan - against about 15 per cent of area - the railway network is relatively less efficient than in the western wing. There are three main reasons for this (Ahmad 1968): a) The deltaic nature of the wing with numerous rivers liable to extensive flooding during the monsoon season puts limitations on the construction of railway lines. It is not only expensive to construct railways in East Pakistan which require many bridges but also involves huge expenditure on the maintenance and repair of track, embankments and bridges which are washed away year. Because of the physical nature of the area, there is also a shortage of stone required as ballast, which has to be imported. The result is that there are frequent gaps in the network at river crossings where ferries involve more time and money in trans-shipment. For example, all along its course through East Pakistan the Brahamputra River is still unbridged. b) The railway network in that part of the sub-continent was constructed to serve the port of Calcutta (except for the metre gauge system in the east linking Assam with Chittagong), which was cut off by partition and the truncated lines inherited by East Pakistan were not suited to serve the needs imposed by the new political boundary. c) Whatever railway lines and rolling stock were received in 1947 were run down as a result of over-use during the war on the Burma front and were in need of extensive repair and replacement. Unfortunately no important railway workshops were left in East Pakistan, particularly on the broad gauge system.

Some improvements since independence have taken place by laying 98 miles of new lines, improvement of existing ones, replacement of the rolling stock, setting up workshop facilities and by changing over from coal to diesel, but the overall situation is still far from satisfactory. The general orientation of the railway lines in East Pakistan has been influenced by the direction of rivers. There are in fact two separate systems east and west of the Brahamputra (Fig.37). The eastern one is entirely metre gauge and is part of the old system designed to serve the tea estates of Assam through the port of Chittagong. The western one is mostly broad gauge, with some branch metre gauge lines, and was severed by the partition at a number of places. However, with the construction of some new lines it now provides direct connections between all the western districts. It may be noted that while north-south travel, that is in the direction of the rivers, is generally easier, east-west is usually tediously slow. For example a rail journey between Dacca and Khulna takes more than 24 hours involving a long circuitous route though the two cities are less than 100 miles apart. Moreover even this long detour involves one ferry on the Brahamputra. There are plans to make further improvements in the railway system but it appears that it is very difficult to have a really efficient network in the near future.

West Pakistan has about 75 per cent of the total rail mileage of the country but because it has an even larger share of the area, the ratio between a mile of railway and area is



Source: K.S. Ahmad, 1964.

Fig. 37. Railways.

higher than in East Pakistan. Though some districts west of the Indus are not served by railway, all districts to the east of the river do have rail connections. In the irrigated districts of the plains which are more thickly populated the railway network is more dense (Fig.37). In this part of the sub-continent too railways were constructed to provide an outlet (except for some lines in the northwest laid for strategic and political reasons), in this case for the raw produce of the Indus plains through the port of Karachi. However, unlike East Pakistan, the western wing received the major port of the area as well as most of its hinterland and inherited not only an efficient railway network but also the major workshop situated at Mughalpura near Lahore. Of the total 5335 miles of railways in West Pakistan 4637 are broad gauge without any gaps at river crossings. Even metre and narrow gauge sections are connected to broad gauge terminals. The main broad gauge line runs north from Karachi - it is double tracked for 500 miles - to Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar and beyond to the Afghan border through the famous Khyber Pass. Many branch lines take off from it and, serving all the districts of the Punjab, join it again before the Indus crossing at Attock. The only district of the Punjab without a railway line, Dera Ghazi Khan on the west bank of the Indus, is now being joined up through a new line under construction. Another important broad gauge line takes off at Kotri and goes to Quetta where it bifurcates, one branch going to Chaman on the Afghan border and the other 500 miles to the west to Zahidan in

Iran. A 300 mile metre gauge network serves the cotton growing areas of Sind with a line running east across the border to Jodhpur in India. Two narrow gauge systems in Baluchistan and N.W.F.P. were constructed to serve the military garrisons in the rough country of the legendary north-west frontier. Since independence some new track has been laid in the sugar cane area of Mardan district but the main improvement has taken place on the existing lines. Steam locomotives have been replaced by new diesel-electric ones and the renovation of the track and rolling stock has increased the speed and efficiency of trains. A 170 mile section of the main line between Lahore and Khanewal is being electrified. After independence the rapid growth of Karachi as the capital and the principal port greatly increased the volume of traffic on the main line and the need was felt for an alternative route between the coast and the northern districts. This will be provided by the completion of a 180 mile line between Kasmor and Kot Adu along the west bank of the Indus.

In view of the above, railways play a more important role in West Pakistan in the movement of goods and passengers than in the eastern wing where inland waterways carry the bulk of traffic. Table 63 shows the movement of people and freight by railways in both wings of the country. During the year 1966-67 Pakistan Western Railway carried about 75 per cent more passengers than Pakistan Eastern Railway and because of the larger size of the western wing involving longer distances the passenger-miles operated were more than three times that in the east. The same is ~~the case in~~ true of the movement of freight.

Table 63

Movement by Railways

(millions)

Year	Passengers		Passenger-miles		Freight (tons)		Ton-miles	
	East Pak.	West Pak.	East Pak.	West Pak.	East Pak.	West Pak.	East Pak.	West Pak.
1947-48	101	81	2923	4875	2	3	441	1908
1954-55	46	86	1368	4410	3	10	474	2855
1959-60	70	121	1816	5590	6	12	872	3814
1964-65	71	132	1923	6257	6	15	894	4949
1966-67	73	128	2005	6207	5	15	809	5046

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

Roads: The road network in East Pakistan is even poorer than the railway although considerable development has taken place since independence. In 1967 West Pakistan had over 80 per cent of the total mileage of 'high type' (hard surface, all weather) roads in the country as well as of 'low type' (paved but motorable in fair weather). However, East Pakistan has a larger share of the 'unmetalled' dirt roads which can be used only in the dry season and even then are often not suitable for motor vehicles.

Since independence the length of 'high type' roads in East Pakistan has increased from 240 to over 2500 miles but the road system in this wing is still rudimentary. Most of the mileage is in the form of short stretches radiating from urban centres and longer journeys involve ferries which are even more frequent than in the case of railways. The longest stretch of road uninterrupted by ferry is that between Cox's Bazar and the Meghna

Table 64

Road Mileage in Pakistan

	East Pakistan		West Pakistan	
Year	High type	Low type	High type	Low type
1947-48	240	-	5053	8768
1954-55	320	150	7980	11122
1959-60	890	150	8772	10912
1964-65	1963	150	9971	11787
1966-67	2438	150	10759	11749

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

River, a distance of about 280 miles. The main problems of road building in East Pakistan are the same as that of railway construction, and it is estimated that, like railways, one mile of road building in the eastern wing costs about four times as much as in the western one. The cost of maintenance is also proportionately higher. As a result roads in East Pakistan have for the most part local importance, and that only in the dry season.

Fig.38 shows the main roads in both wings of the country and it is clear that they form an important means of transport in West Pakistan. Generally the road network is similar to that of railways and many roads run parallel to railway lines, but in areas not served by railways they provide the only means of transport. Almost all the districts are linked by all weather roads except in the extreme north where high mountain passes become snowbound in winter. Like railways, river crossings are frequently bridged and one can travel from Karachi to Peshawar



Source: as for App. XXII.

Fig. 38. Main Roads.

and beyond without any interruption, a distance of well over 1000 miles. Many branch roads take off from trunk arteries and serve smaller towns and rural areas. Although West Pakistan has a smaller share of 'unmetalled' dirt roads, they are more useable than they are in the eastern wing because of drier climate, especially in the plains.

In order to improve the road network in all parts of the state a Central Road Fund was created in 1949 out of customs and excise duty on motor spirit. Out of this 80 per cent was given to provincial governments and the remaining 20 per cent retained by the central government for research, grants-in-aid and other projects connected with roads. In 1951 a new Fund for Roads of National Importance was created to provide the Central government's share of 50 per cent in the cost of construction of major arterial roads. The First Five Year Plan, 1955-1960, allocated Rs. 380 millions for research and new road machinery. The Second Plan, 1960-65, allocation for road development totalled Rs. 569 millions out of which Rs. 250 millions was for each wing and the remainder was for certain specific purposes in West Pakistan. For the Third Plan period, 1965-70, the total expenditure was raised to Rs. 2070 million with East Pakistan getting a larger share of Rs. 1100 million and West Pakistan Rs. 900 million. The remaining Rs. 70 million was set aside for development in the centrally administered areas (Pakistan, Basic Facts 1966-67). As a result of these efforts the road situation has considerably improved in both wings of the country, particularly in West Pakistan. At present a project

to link Karachi and Peshawar by a modern multi-lane highway is under way with the help of the World Bank. A 100 mile section of this system between Karachi and Hyderabad has recently been opened. While the Central government keeps the overall control of policy, roads and railways are provincial responsibilities. Many minor and all village roads are maintained by local authorities.

There are no official statistics available on the movement of traffic by road. However, with the help of the above facts and the number of registered motor vehicles (Table 65) it is not difficult to see the difference in the importance of road traffic between the wings. Although the number of motor vehicles has registered a higher percentage increase in East Pakistan since 1947, West Pakistan has well over 80 per cent of the country's total. In addition to motor vehicles, which have to

Table 65

Registered Motor Vehicles

	East Pakistan				West Pakistan			
Year	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1947-48	2662	668	80	118	10255	4519	832	5603
1954-55	4346	1391	1774	1151	39200	6514	13349	12514
1959-60	6072	1948	3736	2654	58481	8688	19412	22647
1964-65	14300	2976	7077	18207	101035	13402	29578	74451
1966-67	16641	3516	7241	28887	105136	15382	25704	113173

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

1. Motor cars including taxis.
2. Buses.
3. Trucks.
4. Other vehicles including two and three wheelers.

to be registered, there is a large number of other road users. There are no figures available but a great deal of movement of people and goods takes place by animals and animal drawn vehicles, particularly in the rural areas of West Pakistan. The quantity of farm produce that reaches market towns from villages by these methods must be very large. It is interesting to see how villagers use bicycles not only for transporting an entire family but also a considerable quantity of freight. However, with the development of the road system and an increase in motor vehicles, many areas, which were isolated before, have become easily accessible. In many cities cabs and three-wheeled scooter 'rickshaws' have replaced, or are replacing, traditional horse drawn 'tongas'.

Inland Waterways: The very physical conditions that have hindered the development of roads and railways in East Pakistan are ideal for inland water transport. The rivers of this wing provide a cheaper, though slower, transport system which carries about three quarters of the total passenger and cargo traffic. The total length of perennial waterways navigable by steamers is about 3000 miles (Fig.39); they increase to over 4000 miles during the monsoon season. Insofar as the bulk of the total traffic is carried by small country craft of shallow draught the total length of waterways actually used for transport must be considerably higher. In fact during the flood season almost the entire local traffic is carried by boats and many places which are inaccessible in the dry season can be reached by boats.



Source: N. Ahmad 1968.

Fig. 39. Inland Waterways, East Pakistan.

In East Pakistan waterways have the same importance as roads and railways have in the western wing. West Pakistan's bullock carts, horse-drawn 'tongas', trucks and buses have their counterparts in dinghies, flat-bottomed 'pulwars', 'putelees', launches, barges and steamers in the eastern wing. In addition to country boats the flotilla of the East Pakistan Railways and of some private operators, using motor craft, is used mainly for transporting baled jute to factories and the port of Chalna, as well as for ferry services between road- and railheads. Pakistan River Steamers Ltd., a British based private company in which the government-owned Pakistan Eastern Railways also have shares, operate steamer services for both passengers and cargo on long distance as well as feeder routes.

Despite the enormous importance of waterways in East Pakistan this sector of transportation remained more or less neglected till 1958 when the government set up an Inland Water Transport Authority to plan and co-ordinate the development of river transport. An amount of Rs.316.1 million (Rs. 134.1 million in the public sector and Rs. 182.0 in the private sector) was allocated under the Second Five Year Plan for this purpose. In the public sector the main schemes completed were the provision of navigational facilities, a workshop ar Barisal, development of river ports at Dacca, Narayanganj, Chandpur, Khulna and Barisal, in addition to the improvement of waterways. Under the private sector the period from 1960-66 saw an increase of 61 per cent in the number of motor vessels, 126 per cent in the number of operators, 40 per cent in the cargo and 32 per

cent in the passenger carrying capacity. The Third Five Year Plan, about to end shortly, allocated an even higher amount of Rs. 965 million, about two-thirds in the private sector, for further development. Shortly before the launching of the Third Plan an East Pakistan Shipping Corporation, a semi-public enterprise, was established to provide steamer services especially between the mainland and the offshore islands. One of the serious problems of river navigation in East Pakistan is the silting and the consequent high expenditure of dredging. The Karnaphuli Project in Chittagong and the projected Ganges-Kobadak scheme are intended to control excessive silting in their respective areas (Third Plan 1965; Pakistan, Basic Facts 1968).

Inland water transport in West Pakistan was once important but could not survive in competition with railways, and the construction of irrigation barrages on rivers created obstacles in the way of boats. Secondly, the drawing of water for irrigation reduced the flow in rivers, particularly in winter, making them unable to take any craft larger than small boats. Some rivers in their mountain reaches, as also the Karnaphuli in East Pakistan, are used for floating timber downstream to markets in the plains.

Sea Transport: Because of the division of the state area into two halves sea transport is vital for inter-wing movement. Unfortunately all the major ports of the sub-continent were inherited by India after partition and Pakistan received only two relatively minor sea-ports, Karachi and Chittagong, in West and East Pakistan respectively.

At the time of partition Chittagong was a small dilapidated port, situated near the mouth of the heavily silted Karnaphuli River, handling only a small portion of the trade of Bengal. Most of the export and import trade of the area was oriented towards Calcutta and Chittagong served only the tea exports of Assam. It had only four berths capable of handling about half a million tons of cargo each year and the presence of a sand bar at the mouth of the Karnaphuli limited the size of ships entering the harbour to 8000 tons. With independence, and consequently the cutting off of Calcutta, the whole burden of the external and inter-wing trade of East Pakistan was put on Chittagong. As a result extensive improvement works had to be undertaken involving a short term scheme costing Rs. 10 million completed in 1950, and a long term plan involving an expenditure of Rs. 134.1 million. These development projects have increased the handling capacity of the port to over 3 million tons annually, though the problem of silting still does not allow larger ships to enter the port. Chittagong has good rail and road connections with the districts east of Meghna River but has a marginal location in relation to the rest of the province. Although the bulk of freight to and from Chittagong is carried by rail, a considerable portion of jute exports reach the port by coastal steamers.

As a result of the increased pressure on Chittagong and its remote location relative to the main jute producing areas there was a need for another outlet somewhere on the coast of the delta. In December, 1950, an anchorage for ocean going vessels was

opened to traffic at Chalna on the Pussur River. Four years later another anchorage at Mongla, downstream from Chalna on the same river, was also brought into use. Because the Pussur is in fact a creek of the sea it is free from silting and ships up to 23 feet draught can easily enter it. The nearest railhead at Khulna is about 18 miles to the north but this is not a very great disadvantage because Chalna is mainly meant for jute exports, most of which can come by boats through the Pussur and lie alongside the ocean going vessels for the transfer of cargo. The port is at present handling between 1.5 and 2 million tons of cargo annually and permanent shore facilities are under construction.

Karachi is the only sea-port in West Pakistan and, in addition to the trade of West Pakistan, has been handling the transit trade of Afghanistan as well. Before independence it was used mainly for handling the export of cotton and other agricultural produce from the Punjab and Sind. In 1947 there were 17 berths out of which 13 were over 60 years old. The increased pressure as a result of partition necessitated extensive development and by 1962, at a cost of Rs. 159 million, four new berths had been added in addition to the reconstruction of the older ones, which with the extension of railway yards and storage facilities, increased the handling capacity to over 5 million tons. Further improvements were carried out with the help of the World Bank and by 1967 it was able to handle imports and exports totalling about 9 million tons (Pakistan, Basic Facts, 1968).

To relieve pressure on Karachi various plans to construct a new port on the Mekran coast have been studied. A feasibility study for Sonmiani, about 60 miles northwest of Karachi, has already been completed. However, no definite plans have yet been announced mainly because the whole of the coast west of Karachi is rather remote with almost no transport facilities in relation to the rest of the wing. Some coastal settlements, namely Pasni, Gwadur and Jiwani, engage in offshore fishing and local coastal traffic. There is also a regular weekly mailboat service between these settlements and Karachi.

Because of the importance of sea transport between the two wings, as well as for foreign trade, Pakistan's merchant navy fleet was rapidly expanded. In 1947 Pakistan had only three ocean going vessels, one built in 1904 and the other two in 1920. It was decided at once to build up the fleet and by the end of the First Plan in 1960 the number of vessels had increased to 26 with a total dead weight of about a quarter of a million tons. Efforts to improve the merchant fleet continued during the Second Plan increasing the number of ships to 52 with an aggregate of over half a million tons dead weight. The setting up of the National Shipping Corporation and of a shipyard at Karachi during the Second Plan period helped the whole development programme. By the middle of 1970, the end of the Third Plan, the total strength of the fleet is estimated to reach 98 ships totalling about 1 million tons dead weight. Besides operating cargo and passenger services on international routes, the entire seaborne inter-wing trade is now carried by Pakistani ships.

Airways: To have a 'national' airline seems to have become a symbol of prestige for many states, but for Pakistan a network of efficient air services is necessary not only to bridge the long distance between the two wings but also to connect remote areas with them. As has been seen, in East Pakistan, although distances are relatively short, journey times are long because of many interruptions in surface transport at river crossings. Within West Pakistan there are vast areas, particularly west of the Indus, where roads and railways are scarce. Air cannot provide a complete alternative to surface transport, if only because of cost; it can, however, supplement the conventional methods of movement and has a great advantage in terms of time saved. So, the need to have a domestic airline was realized immediately after independence.

After the inability of two ill-equipped private airlines, one after the other, to cope with the requirements of the new state a semi-public Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA) was established in 1955 to promote and develop air transport on domestic as well as on international routes by acquiring new equipment, improving airport facilities and signing air agreements with other countries. Fortunately there were many aerodromes and landing strips in both wings of the state built during World War II and although most of them were not fit to be used by modern civil aircraft, they could be improved and developed into civil airports. The result has been a rapid expansion of air transport within and outside the state. Operating Boeing, Trident and F27 Fokker aircraft, PIA's

international network extends from Tokyo to London including China and the USSR. Internally, 9 places in East and 18 in West Pakistan are now linked by regular air services carrying passengers as well as cargo (Fig.40). At least one air route in West Pakistan, Peshawar to Chitral, as is also the case between Rawalpindi and Gilgit and Rawalpindi and Skardu in the disputed territory, provides the only link in winter when roads are snowbound.*

In 1963 PIA also started, in addition to services shown on Fig.40, a network of helicopter services in East Pakistan linking Dacca to Chalna, Barisal, Begumganj, Hatia, Sandwip, Kushtia, Sirajganj, Rajshahi, Bogra, Rangpur and Dinajpur. These services proved very useful by cutting drastically journey times between these isolated places - the rail journey of about 24 hours between Dacca and Jessore is cut to just half an hour by air! Unfortunately these services had to be given up for technical reasons and now the possibilities of introducing short-take-off-and-landing aircraft are being studied. Hovercraft is another possibility to improve transportation in East Pakistan.

Karachi is the main base of the PIA and is by far the most important international as well as domestic airport. Other international airports are at Dacca and Peshawar - and also at Lahore when Indo-Pakistani relations are better and air services operate between the two countries. There are also regular services to Rangoon from Chittagong.

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* Information supplied by Pakistan International Airlines, 45-46 Piccadilly, London W.1.



Fig. 40. Scheduled passenger flights, 1970.

Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services: There is a fairly developed postal system in both wings of the state run by the central government, but since postal services are directly dependent on means of transport as discussed above, it is relatively slow in areas where there are poor transport facilities. Here again rural areas are at a disadvantage both in terms of distances to post offices and the time taken in the movement of mail. However, in the more densely populated parts of West Pakistan village post office facilities are better compared to other areas of both the wings. The very nature of rural settlement pattern in East Pakistan - scattered hamlets rather than nucleated villages - makes the diffusion of postal facilities more difficult. Nevertheless, although the number of post offices in East Pakistan has been less than that in West Pakistan (Table 66), the post office/area ratio is much more favourable to the former wing. In 1966-67 East Pakistan

Table 66

Post Offices in West and East Pakistan

(rounded to the nearest thousand)

Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1951-52	31,000	32,000
1954-55	37,000	52,000
1959-60	44,000	58,000
1964-65	51,000	66,000
1966-67	54,000	71,000

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Some Socio-Economic Trends, 1968)

had one post office for about 10 square miles of area; West Pakistan had one for nearly 44 square miles, but it must be kept in mind that shorter distances in East Pakistan may not necessarily mean shorter journey time compared to some areas of West Pakistan. Table 66 also shows that postal services in West Pakistan have clearly expanded at a faster rate mainly due to better transportation.

Telephone and telegraph services are, together with post offices, under the central Ministry of Communications. The network of telephone and telegraph is not so much developed as that of post offices. However, the services operate in all parts of the state though, because of the lower number of telephones and exchanges (Table 67), the average distances to the nearest telephone are longer than to the nearest post office.

Table 67

Telephones and Telephone Exchanges

Year	No. of telephone exchanges		No. of telephones	
	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.
1951-52	40	250	3,000	18,000
1954-55	50	390	5,000	31,000
1959-60	100	730	12,000	60,000
1964-65	240	1100	28,000	100,000
1966-67	270	1200	32,000	120,000

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Some Socio-Economic Trends, 1968)

As far as the ratio with area is concerned the two wings are not very different from each other - one telephone exchange for every 200 sq.m. in East and for every 276 sq.m. in West Pakistan -

but considering the number of telephones and the population of each wing West Pakistan is in a much better position. There is one telephone for every 415 persons in the west, against one for every 1639 in the east.

Between the two wings, as also to some remote mountainous places in the north, the telephone is through radio link. It is hoped that the inter-wing link will be greatly improved through the projected communications satellite over the Indian Ocean. It will also improve inter-wing radio and television broadcasting. Within the wings telephone services have improved during the past years, apart from the expansion of network, through telex and direct dialling systems between many cities.

Radio and Television: Radio and television are state monopolies operated under the central Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. At the time of independence there were four radio stations, three in West and one in East Pakistan. Since then some new stations have been opened in both the wings. The short wave transmitters at Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Dacca broadcast programmes in Urdu, Bengali and English while the regional medium wave stations produce and transmit in the local languages besides relaying national programmes from the main stations. Since independence the transmission hours have increased about four times and the number of radio licences have gone up by more than ten times. Although the radio is not available to political parties as a communication medium, the government in power uses it overtly for political reasons. The introduction of cheap transistor sets in recent years promises

useful possibilities for broadcasting in the field of mass communication.

Television is a more recent development as the first station was opened in Lahore in November, 1964, shortly followed by another in Dacca. Two more stations, one in Karachi and the other in Rawalpindi, have also been operating for about two years. Because of the limited range of television in the absence of a network the stations in Dacca, Lahore and Karachi are effective only in their immediate environs. The Rawalpindi-Islamabad station, however, is received over a large area north of Lahore because of the installation of a transmitter near Murree at a height of 7000 feet above sea level. Because of the cost of sets television is still limited only to well-off urban families but it can play an important role in the field of education.

Press: The circulation and effectiveness of newspapers is directly related to literacy which, as has been seen, is not high in Pakistan. The second problem for the press in Pakistan is the linguistic heterogeneity. Any paper intended to have a circulation in both wings of the state has to be published in English and the percentage of those literate in English is low.

The press, which was generally independent and privately owned, came under strict government control in 1958 with the proclamation of Martial Law. The restrictions were temporarily lifted but with the promulgation of the Press and Publications Ordinance in September, 1963, a sort of censorship was again

imposed. Later the formation of the official National Press Trust further weakened the independent press as some newspapers were taken over by the Trust. In the face of increasing official pressure some independent dailies did, however, manage to survive. Since about the last days of the previous regime government restrictions on the press seem to have been relaxed.

In the number of daily newspapers and periodicals published West Pakistan is ahead of the eastern wing (Table 68).

Table 68

Newspapers and Periodicals in Pakistan

	Dailies		Weeklies		Other periodicals	
Year	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.
1954	12	63	66	248	40	372
1955	13	66	62	243	50	396
1956	16	72	63	265	52	440
1957	17	81	74	320	78	562
1958	16	87	78	318	77	540
1959	12	90	79	342	93	647
1960	13	61	67	250	248	529
1961	12	58	67	235	269	480
1962	16	59	59	213	302	476
1963	19	80	59	273	334	846
1964	21	73	64	247	308	775
1965	22	70	69	241	387	763
1966	22	75	72	240	385	794

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

The greater number of dailies and periodicals in West Pakistan was, one would have assumed, due to the linguistic heterogeneity of the wing but this is not entirely so as revealed by the circulation figures. According to one estimate, in 1963 the total circulation of all the dailies was about 500,000.* Out of this about half was accounted for by Urdu papers, 150,000 in English, 45,000 in Bengali, 30,000 in Gujrati and 7000 in Sindhi (The American University 1965). This is really surprising because, as has already been shown, Bengali claims to be the language of a majority of the literate population. This may be due to the relatively lower economic levels in East Pakistan. A quite high circulation of Gujrati papers is explained by the fact that most of the Gujrati speaking people belong to the richer commercial class concentrated in Karachi and have a high rate of literacy. Table 69, which shows the language of newspapers and periodicals, throws interesting light on the relative importance of different languages in the two wings; unfortunately there is no information available at the level of districts or provinces but it is reasonable to assume that most of the regional language publications are printed and circulated in their respective areas. The position of Bengali in West Pakistan and of Urdu in East Pakistan may particularly be noted.

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* The actual number of readers is, however, greater because one copy has its own circulation among family members and friends. Even illiterates sometimes get someone to read out the news.

Table 69

Newspapers and Periodicals by Language, 1966

Area	Beng.	Urdu	Engl.	Sind.	Push.	Punj.	Bi-/multi-lingual
East Pakistan	271	4	92	-	-	-	112
West Pakistan	1	716	184	54	10	3	122

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

Connectivity: Because railways and roads are the most efficient and relatively fast means of transport, it is interesting to find out the relative position of different areas in terms of connectivity with adjoining districts by road and rail links. In order to do this an index of connectivity was derived for all districts based on the existing roads and railways. This index was calculated as a ratio between the transport connections and the number of contiguous districts for each district as:*

$$C = (L - N)/D \qquad \text{where}$$

C is the index of connectivity;

L is the number of direct road and rail links each district has with contiguous districts;

N is the number of contiguous districts without any link;

D is the total number of contiguous districts.

For L one point was given for every uninterrupted all-weather road or rail connection and half a point for those involving a ferry. The relevant information was obtained from the Survey of

* This method is only intended to determine connectivity between districts and not necessarily within them.

Pakistan, Road Map of West Pakistan, Third Edition, 1965, on a scale of 25 miles to the inch, and the Survey of Pakistan, Province Map of East Pakistan, Second Edition, 1962, on 1:1,000,000. The index scores thus derived are given in Appendix XXII and have been plotted in Fig.41, which gives a fairly accurate picture of the whole state in terms of connectivity by road and rail. In East Pakistan the districts which are marginally situated have relatively better connectivity than the central districts of the delta. Within West Pakistan the Indus River divides the wing into two halves. East of it the transportation is relatively well developed and the connectivity is relatively high in the Punjab. West of the Indus, except Quetta and a part of the N.W.F.P. around Peshawar, the whole area has poor surface transport facilities. Here it is an interesting relationship between the physical features, population density and transport network. Most of Baluchistan and the N.W.F.P. are as poorly connected as the central districts of East Pakistan, but while in the latter inland waterways provide an alternative the former areas have no other means of surface transport available to offset the scarcity of road and rail connections. Even in Sind, where the terrain is not difficult, inter-district connections are poor relative to most of the Punjab. This map of connectivity brings out clearly the importance of domestic air links as shown in Fig.40. In East Pakistan, although the districts with low rail and road connectivity have generally better river transport facilities, it should be kept in mind that since a large majority of the river craft



Source: as for App. XXII.

Fig. 41. Connectivity (road & rail), Districts.

are small country boats the movement is limited to short journeys. Most of the rural countryside as well as many urban places are isolated, and river transport, although cheaper, is nevertheless not suitable for easy mobility especially involving longer distances.

After having looked at the various means of transport and communications the question now arises as to their role in the movement of goods, people and information. While the movement of goods is dealt with in the next chapter on trade, this chapter is concluded by discussing the exchange of people and information. Unfortunately there is no published information available on the various aspects of transport and communications at any level below that of the wings. Even the statistics on the level of the wings are scanty as, for example, there is no data on the movement of passengers or goods by road and river transport. However, some idea can be found about the extent to which people move about within the state by a few published statistics.

As has already been pointed out, traffic between the two wings by land route through almost completely ceased after independence. The entire traffic is now carried either by air or by sea. Table 70 gives passenger movement between East and West Pakistan (1959-67), which shows a large increase, 158 per cent, in the inter-wing traffic. Most of this increase is due to the expansion of air services. In 1959 about 40 per cent of the passengers travelled by sea and by 1967 this percentage had fallen to about 20. During the period of eight years covered in Table 70 air traffic increased by 242 per cent against only

Table 70

Inter-Wing Passenger Movement

Year	East to West Pakistan			West to East Pakistan			Total Movement
	By air	By sea	Total	By air	By sea	Total	
1959	29973	19032	49005	29925	19704	49629	98634
1960	36494	19104	55598	37676	14631	52307	107905
1961	47024	16778	63802	45230	14457	59687	123489
1962	52376	18102	70478	51027	13511	64538	135016
1963	64533	21264	85797	59868	15857	75725	161522
1964	77921	16989	94910	73540	13592	87132	182042
1965	71367	16501	87868	65069	10662	75731	163599
1966	91436	31834	123270	87597	25398	112995	236265
1967	105081	28103	133184	99696	21837	121533	254717

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, March, 1969)

28 per cent increase in sea travel. The entire sea traffic is between Karachi and Chittagong, while two thirds of the air movement takes place between Karachi and Dacca, and the remaining one third between Lahore and Dacca.

While the increase in the inter-wing movement of people may seem quite large the fact is that the total number of persons involved was a little over a quarter of a million, or just about 0.2 per cent of the whole population. Assuming that most of the persons had undertaken a return journey, and were counted twice, and some probably travelled many times during the one year, the percentage of actual people involved in inter-wing movement must be even smaller. The fact is, though there are no statistics to prove it, that the bulk of these travellers is made up of government officials, businessmen and their

families and that there is practically no contact between the wings at the level of the common man. This conclusion is in accord with the earlier observation made in connection with internal migration (Chapter 6).

As regards the movement of people within the wings it has been pointed out that no data are available. However, the total number of persons carried by the railways in the two wings are, irrespective of the origin and destination of journeys, published and are shown in Table 63. Disregarding the figures for 1947-48, which were inflated by the movement of refugees, rail passenger traffic increased between 1948-49 and 1966-67 by 78 per cent in West and by only 9 per cent in East Pakistan. The low increase in East Pakistan has been undoubtedly due to the rudimentary nature of the railway system. In 1966-67 75 per cent more people travelled by railways in West Pakistan than in the eastern wing even though the total population of the latter was higher. On average, assuming that all members of the population undertook rail journeys during the year, in East Pakistan every person had 1.3 trips as against 2.7 in West Pakistan. The figures do not reveal the nature of journeys in terms of distance and areas, but it is reasonable to suppose that the average length would be higher in the western wing. There is also no clue as to the extent of inter-provincial travel within West Pakistan but presumably most of the journeys would be intra-provincial but with a fair number of travellers on long distance inter-city routes. Because much of the travel is necessitated by family occasions there must be considerable

movement back and forth between the home areas of migrants and where they have settled and found work.

It is estimated that a greater number of persons travel by other means of transport - by boats in East Pakistan and by roads in West Pakistan* - but in the absence of any data the estimate cannot be substantiated. From looking at the figures of registered motor vehicles as given in Table 65 it can be seen that road transport is of far greater importance in the western wing than it is in the east. On the whole, means of transport are more developed in West Pakistan where in many areas, despite longer distances, movement is easier and faster than over most of East Pakistan. Within the western wing, however, transport facilities do bear some relation to the provincial units,** that is the Punjab has definitely better road and rail networks than the rest of the wing. Baluchistan and parts of the N.W.F.P. and Sind are relatively isolated.

The available figures on postal traffic also show a greater movement in West Pakistan compared to the eastern wing. Table 71 shows the number of registered letters and parcels, money

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* Many local journeys in rural areas are also undertaken by on foot even where some transport is available and people can afford it.

** Unlike railways before they were taken over by the central government in 1955, though transferred back later, roads have always been provincial responsibilities and there was not much co-ordination between the provinces on the extension of road network before the integration of West Pakistan in 1955.





Fig. 42. Foreign Trade, Pakistan and Wings, 1947 - 67.

Source: 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67.

Table 71

Postal Traffic in East and West Pakistan

Year	East Pakistan				West Pakistan			
	Reg. letters	Reg. parcels	Money orders No.	Money orders Value (m.Rs.)	Reg. letters	Reg. parcels	Money orders No.	Money orders Value (m.Rs.)
1954-55	4975	396	3812	141.0	8118	1238	4612	217.9
1959-60	5930	560	5121	224.6	10857	1903	5099	309.4
1964-65	5992	648	5198	279.1	11614	2621	5880	422.0
1967-68	7413	769	5318	355.7	12567	2587	5766	432.2

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, March, 1969)

orders and their value. The position for ordinary mail is probably not very different and the main reason for the relatively smaller postal traffic in East Pakistan seems to lie in the fact that there has been less internal movement of people in the eastern wing. Greater urbanization and relatively long-distance migration may be the cause of greater traffic in West Pakistan, even though literacy is lower compared to East Pakistan. It may also be a reflection of the economic conditions in the two wings that not only a greater amount of money has been sent by money orders in West Pakistan, but also the average amount of a money order is higher in the western wing - Rs. 7.5 against Rs. 6.3 in East Pakistan.

The number of radios, as revealed by radio licences issued (Table 72), shows the same imbalance between the two wings. In 1966-67 the estimated ratio between radio licences issued and population was 1 licence for every 65 persons in West Pakistan, and 1:196 in the eastern wing. One cannot think of any reason

Table 72

Number of Radio Licences Issued

Year	East Pakistan	West Pakistan
1947-48	5376	45426
1954-55	13719	120322
1959-60	33287	289292
1964-65	216185	542275
1966-67	292533	769014

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

other than the financial status of the population as responsible for this disparity. Unfortunately no comparison can be made between the provinces of West Pakistan but other evidence suggests that the Punjab should be ahead of the rest with Baluchistan at the bottom. The inclusion of Karachi would undoubtedly increase the relative position of Sind which otherwise is comparatively less developed.

In view of the above discussion it can be argued that East Pakistan, in spite of having a compact area and linguistically homogeneous population, is much less integrated in terms of transport and communications both internally as well as in the wider framework of the state as a whole. This does not, however, mean that West Pakistan is entirely better organized in this respect because clearly there are marked differences within it. These differences are all the wider when one considers the cultural fragmentation of the wing and, although considerable improvements have taken place in the transport and communications facilities, the area is far from

being one effectively integrated unit. Movement across provincial boundaries has increased during the years since independence but there is no evidence that the cultural barriers are falling down. The break up of the one administrative unit of West Pakistan and the reassertion of the former provincial basis clearly indicates the inadequacy, to say the least, of governmental action towards an effective integration of the whole area.

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CHAPTER 11

TRADE AND COMMERCE

In political geography the study of trade and commerce, as also of other economic activities, has two aspects quite distinct from each other but having a close relationship between themselves. The first one is purely economic insofar as it deals with only the material side of the exchange of goods and commodities, i.e. the nature, direction and the intensity of trade between different areas within a state or at the inter-state level. Such a study may reveal the degree of economic interdependence of the areas engaging in trade with each other, as well as throwing light on the relative levels of economic development in those areas. The intensity and direction of trade will yield valuable information about how far the areas under study are linked with each other in economic terms, while the nature of goods and commodities exchanged may show the characteristics of the economies of those areas.

The second aspect is social and political, though it is closely linked to economic considerations. Movement of goods from one area to another, whether within a state or on the international level, must bring about some movement of people and information, people involved in the actual transportation of goods and merchants travelling in search of suppliers and consumers as individuals within a state or as official trade delegations between states. Thus trade and commerce create

a movement of people and information which, though primarily of an economic nature, may well have social and political implications.

Another point about the second aspect of trade, which may be more important than the first, particularly at the intra-state level, is that it gives considerable power to those who control it. In all countries where trade is a private enterprise without strict government control - as in Pakistan it is internally - people engaging in this activity have considerable financial control which can be used for political purposes. Sometimes when trade and commerce is more or less exclusively controlled by one or more particular communities, as has been the case in the sub-continent before and since independence, a social and political conflict can arise out of the grievances and jealousies of the less favoured population. It is true that a major portion of the population in Pakistan is poor and liable to exploitation by various vested interests. The main source of power, which was traditionally vested in the rich landed class, has gradually shifted to commercial and industrial communities as a result of industrialization and the Land Reforms of 1959. However, whereas the influence of landlords was local, that of commercial classes and industrialists extends far beyond the place where they live because the scope of their activities is state-wide. It is necessary, therefore, to consider these two aspects of trade and commerce in order to relate the economic conditions of the area to the social and political relationships of the population.

Unfortunately the task is made extremely difficult as practically no information is usually published by governments, particularly on the second aspect of this important human activity.* Since foreign trade is subject to customs and tariff regulations all governments usually keep accurate records of goods exchanged between them and other countries, and frequently they are published in one form or another. This is not the case in internal trade. In most countries there are no restrictions on the movement of goods and commodities within their boundaries and consequently little statistical information is available on the nature and volume of trade between provinces, districts or their equivalent sub-state units. This is, at least, the situation in Pakistan** but, because of its territorial shape, there is one sector of the internal trade in Pakistan on which some information is collected and regularly published. Because nearly the entire inter-wing trade is sea-borne it has to pass through the seaports of the country, and port records of shipments provide some account of its volume and nature.*** Within the wings, however, no such

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* Because of these difficulties domestic trade usually receives a brief treatment, mostly qualitative, in regional and economic texts.

** Excepting some occasional government controls on the movement of certain commodities to check smuggling or procure them for export.

*** The accuracy, however, of the inter-wing trade statistics is not high because it is generally not subject to any control and regulations.

records are available, except for the indirect information on transport discussed in the preceding chapter.*

The second aspect of trade as pointed out earlier is even more difficult to substantiate by statistics because very little in official publications is available to elaborate the many imponderable issues involved. There is no way to get information on the cultural background, the influence on government policies and the political importance of those who control the overall trade and commerce in the country except to rely on personal observation and judgement. It is necessary to do so, however subjective it may seem, because in recent years the whole political debate in Pakistan, resulting in violence and changes in governments and governmental policies, has rested on the issue of the management, or mismanagement, of financial resources not only by successive governments but also in the private sector.**

While the political implications of this topic are pursued, together with other topics, in Part IV, the following pages of this chapter deal with the pattern of trade in both the wings as well as between them, followed by a brief discussion of the social nature of trade relationships. Because this chapter,

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* With the formation of one administrative unit of West Pakistan as far as the government was concerned the old provinces, which were also more or less cultural units, did not exist, and so no statistics of any sort were published on the provincial basis.

** This is reflected in the various provincial demands for more powers in relation to economic autonomy.

as indeed the whole of this work, deals with domestic conditions, foreign trade has been excluded but some reference to it will be necessary in order to make certain points.

Rural trade: Although in general the nature of rural trade is not very different in the two wings of the state, the variations in the settlement pattern, means of transport and general economy give a different character to the pattern of trade in the rural areas of East and West Pakistan.

As mentioned earlier in this work the rural settlements in East Pakistan are in the form of scattered hamlets rather than nucleated villages, with the result that the village shop as the local trading centre is non-existent in that wing. Most of the local buying and selling take place at 'hats' which are open markets held once or twice a week, sometimes throughout the week in the more densely populated areas, at which people from the surrounding area gather. These hats, of which there is a profusion - one for every 10 square miles (The American University 1965) - are usually situated at a convenient place on a riverbank, near a railway station or road and to them converge farmers with their produce, village craftsmen with their manufactures and a few factory made goods from cities. Most of these 'hats' last for a day only, or part of a day, and when they are over the places remain deserted till the next 'hat', but at some places a few permanent stalls may be built to form a more or less regular bazaar. The main items which are sold and exchanged at these country markets and are moved

from one area to another are paddy and rice, cloth, fish, cattle, crude sugar, pulses and spices. By its very nature and the difficulty of transportation, rural trade in East Pakistan is very local and the goods do not generally move beyond the vicinity of the area where they have been produced.

In addition to these regular 'hats' there are a number of annual or bi-annual 'melas', or fairs, usually attached to the anniversary of some local religious personage. They may last for a week or longer and attract people from a wider area. Considerable trading takes place at these 'melas', mostly in the same local produce but there is a greater amount and variety of city goods as well.

Apart from their importance in local trade, 'hats' and 'melas' are also important in the dissemination of information. Many people go to them primarily for social reasons, and much of the local information is exchanged there because the scattered settlement pattern keeps the rural people somewhat isolated from each other.

A third category of trading centres is that of rural centres engaged mainly in collecting activity and their location is determined by transport facilities - a steamer station, a road or rail-head. Villagers go to these trading centres to get those things, mostly manufactures, which they usually cannot get at 'hats' and 'melas'.

By comparison, in West Pakistan for most of the rural population, mainly concentrated in villages, the village shop is the immediate trading place. These shops - the number varies

in each village according to its size - provide many of the local requirements, cloth, foodstuffs, kerosene, cigarettes, matches, etc., and farmers can sell their surplus produce to the shopkeepers. For their other needs the villagers go to nearby towns, which are more numerous in West Pakistan, and are relatively easier to reach.

There are no periodic 'hats' in West Pakistan although at some places open markets are occasionally held mainly for the trading of cattle and other livestock. Annual 'melas', or 'urs' when connected with the anniversary of some religious personality, are also held throughout the wing but, unlike East Pakistan, such occasions are mainly for entertainment and recreation rather than trading. The villages are still to a large degree self sufficient but over the past years more and more city goods have been finding their way to rural areas.

Marketing of Agricultural Produce: While some money does change hands in rural trade, most of it is still on a barter basis; village craftsmen providing the needs of the farmer in exchange for grain and other farm produce. In order to get cash to pay off his debt,* his land revenue and to purchase city manufactures, the farmer has to sell his cash crops

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* After the departure of Hindu money lenders from West Pakistan not much credit has been available to the farmer which in some ways is good for him because he is now not so heavily in debt. In East Pakistan the practice probably still continues.

and whatever other produce is in excess of his needs.* This aspect of internal trade differs considerably between the wings. Rice is the main food crop in East Pakistan and it is estimated that about three quarters of the total production is consumed by the producers themselves. Most of the rest is exchanged at local 'hats' and very little enters into trade beyond the district borders (Ahmad 1968). So, to farmers rice is not an important source of income.**

Jute, on the other hand, is mainly a cash crop. Almost the entire production enters into trade either for export or for home consumption. It passes through three or four stages from the grower to the factory or the port. A very large portion of the total production, about three quarters, is sold by farmers at their doorsteps, after it has been retted, to small itinerant dealers, 'farias', who move about in their small boats. Most of these 'farias' are on their own but some are engaged as agent by bigger merchants or 'aratdars' at the collecting centres. When a 'faria' has collected about a ton of jute, which is the maximum capacity of their boats, he takes it to the 'hat' or thecollecting centre and sells it to a 'beopari' or middleman who in turn takes the fibre to larger

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* This necessity to earn cash, and the importance of money for buying other things, makes those areas relatively better off where important cash crops are produced. In areas where the emphasis is on food crops people are comparatively poor, though they may be better fed.

** There is no similar estimate for West Pakistan but it is certain that wheat does enter into trade in fairly large quantities. Rice is also an important cash earner in many canal irrigated areas.

centres where it is graded. After grading the jute is pressed into loosely packed 'kacha' bales if it is meant for home consumption, or tightly pressed 'pacca' bales if for export. The main distributing centres are Narayanganj, Khulna and Chittagong, but before partition all these functions were performed by Calcutta. Because of this long chain of middlemen involved in the marketing of jute the actual growers, most of whom cannot take their crop to market themselves because of transport difficulties, are forced to sell at far below the market prices. This is shown by the fact that most of the crop - although it is not a perishable commodity - is sold in a few months immediately after the harvest when the countryside is still flooded and farms are easily reached by country boats. Only in the north and northwest of the province, where rivers are less numerous and railways more frequent, is a considerable portion of the crop transported by rail wagons or by road. Secondly, because of their poverty, the farmers are not in a position to hold the crop in order to get better prices; they are forced to sell it immediately at terms favourable to the purchasers.

The second important cash crop is tea which is graded and packed in chests on the plantations and transported by rail to Chittagong for distribution to West Pakistan or to foreign countries. Because of rising home demand the export of tea has been gradually falling; it virtually ceased in 1963 but picked up again and now varies between 4 and 6 million pounds per annum.

In West Pakistan besides cash crops, mainly cotton, sugar cane, oil seeds, tobacco, fruits, etc., a considerable quantity of food grains, which is surplus from local needs, also enter trade and in many areas are a source of income for farmers. Although a large portion of the produce is sold in the villages to the local shopkeepers or the travelling middlemen often working on behalf of commission agents, a considerable amount is taken by growers directly to market or 'mandi' towns and sold to purchasers through 'dalals' or brokers.

The marketing of sugar cane and tobacco has a different pattern. Depending on the crushing capacity each sugar mill is allotted two zones, A and B, within two particular radii. The mill is required to purchase 65 per cent of the crop of each grower in zone A, which is the nearer one, and 35 per cent in zone B. Usually each grower delivers his quota himself at the factory on the date already settled and the means of transport vary from trucks to pack animals. The rest of the crop is converted by the grower into crude sugar or 'gur' for his own consumption as well as for selling in the market. The mill may also buy this 'gur' for refining when the crushing season is over. Some better off farmers, who can afford the equipment, may make brown sugar, instead of 'gur', which fetches better prices.

In areas suitable for the cultivation of virginia tobacco the production is controlled by tobacco companies who allot a quota to each grower and also provide seed to maintain quality. When the crop is ready it is purchased by the companies at their

collecting centres. The local varieties of tobacco used in 'hookahs' are sold by the farmers in 'mandis' through brokers and commission agents.

The marketing of fruit has again a different pattern. Some time before the crop is ready, sometimes one or many years before, it is bought by dealers who look after the orchard in the final days before harvesting. When ready the fruit is picked and transported to 'mandis' where it is sold to buyers through commission agents. Recently more of the crop is taken directly from the farms by trucks to cities throughout the wing where there is a demand. The dealers are generally well aware of the current prices at different centres through telephone, telegraph or radio and send the produce to cities where they can get the best profit. By its very nature this type of marketing involves considerable speculation but generally the dealers come out with good profits.

Although there are similarities in the general pattern of marketing between the wings, the producer in East Pakistan is relatively more dependent on middlemen and this is largely because of the scarcity of transportation facilities. In West Pakistan, especially in the plains, the farmer has access to market towns which, compared to the eastern wing, are more numerous. The same is true of retail trade and consequently prices of manufactured goods are generally higher in East Pakistan. There are, however, areas in West Pakistan where conditions are similar to, or worse than, those in East Pakistan.

Inter-wing Trade: Prior to independence there was little direct trade between East and West Pakistan areas. The whole economy of Bengal was tied up with the port and industries of Calcutta and there was very little produced in the East Pakistan area which was needed in the northwest of the sub-continent. Similarly, not much of the produce of the latter area went directly to east Bengal. Whatever commodities were exchanged between the two areas had to pass through Calcutta either for distribution or processing. With independence and partition the situation was radically changed. Calcutta was cut off from east Bengal as the main outlet and industrial area and East and West Pakistan became directly dependent on each other as parts of one independent state. Even then during the years immediately after independence there was not much to be exchanged between the two wings because the economies of the two areas were mainly export oriented - jute and tea from East Pakistan; cotton from West Pakistan. With relatively little industrialization there was not much that the two areas needed from each other and, thus, their economies were not integrated to any large degree. However, the volume of trade between the wings increased rapidly after independence because of their reliance on each other for some commodities which they could obtain, before independence, from parts of the sub-continent situated more closely but now cut off by partition boundaries. The interwing trade by value is shown in Table 73. Besides the sea-borne trade as shown in this table there has been a considerable increase in the inter-wing air freight but its share in the

Table 73

Inter-wing Seaborne Trade

(in million rupees)

Year	East to West Pakistan			West to East Pakistan		
	Pakistan Merchandise	Re-exports	Total	Pakistan Merchandise	Re-exports	Total
1954-55	180.7	17.5	198.2	293.0	12.0	305.0
1955-56	220.7	17.6	238.3	318.9	14.9	333.8
1956-57	235.1	8.9	244.0	510.3	21.6	531.9
1957-58	264.0	5.5	269.5	689.2	12.2	701.2
1958-59	277.6	11.1	288.7	660.7	25.1	685.8
1959-60	361.0	1.4	362.4	542.6	26.8	569.4
1960-61	355.9	7.6	363.5	800.5	25.0	825.5
1961-62	394.7	7.3	402.2	829.3	25.8	855.1
1962-63	465.3	6.2	471.5	917.5	39.7	957.2
1963-64	508.6	2.6	511.2	844.2q	51.0	895.2
1964-65	536.0	1.1	537.1	856.8	17.7	874.5
1965-66	649.7	2.1	651.8	1189.8	18.8	1208.6
1966-67	720.3	18.6	738.9	1304.7	20.1	1324.8
1967-68	778.6	6.3	784.9	1216.6	16.6	1233.2

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Bulletin No.3, Vol.17)

total trade is still small and is mostly confined to certain perishable commodities, mainly fruit. There are two important features of the inter-wing trade which should be noted: firstly that West Pakistan exports about 50 per cent more to East Pakistan than the latter does to the western wing, and, secondly, the value of re-exports of foreign merchandise from West to East Pakistan is higher and has generally imcreased compared to the flow in the other direction. The sudden decrease after 1964 was due to the war with India in 1965 which was followed by a more strict import policy.

Although accurate figures are not available, it is clear from various Central Statistical Office publications that the major exports from East Pakistan to the western half are tea, jute and jute goods, matches, paper and leather. In the opposite direction the main items are cotton and its products including garments, rice, finished factory goods, rape and mustard seed, vegetable oil, tobacco, cement, drugs and chemicals.

Before going into the political implications of the domestic trade, which are one of the causes of the political conflict, it is necessary to look into the relative standing of the wings in the foreign trade of the state. Despite the small size, scarcity of resources, high population density and other handicaps, East Pakistan has contributed a larger share in the total exports of Pakistan (Table 74, Fig.42). During the twenty years from 1947 to 1967 East Pakistan's share in the total exports amounted to about 57.2 per cent by value - during the year 1966-67 jute and jute products alone constituted over 50 per cent of the exports - and, by contrast, it received during the same period only 30.6 per cent of the total foreign imports.* Out of these twenty years there were only two when imports into East Pakistan exceeded exports from it in value; West Pakistan imported more than it exported in all the years

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* These figures relate to the visible imports and exports, and differ from the current account statistics but the overall picture is not very different.

Table 74

Foreign Trade

(in million rupees)

Year	East Pakistan			West Pakistan			Pakistan		
	Im-ports	Ex-ports	Bal-ance	Im-ports	Ex-ports	Bal-ance	Im-ports	Ex-ports	Bal-ance
1947-48	24	273	+249	245	444	+ 199	269	717	+ 448
1948-49	478	1328	+850	1009	542	- 467	1487	1870	- 383
1949-50	410	683	+273	874	535	- 339	1284	1218	- 66
1950-51	453	1211	+758	1167	1342	+ 175	1620	2554	+ 934
1951-52	763	1087	+324	1474	922	- 552	2237	2009	- 228
1952-53	366	643	+277	1017	867	- 150	1383	1510	+ 127
1953-54	294	645	+351	824	641	- 183	1118	1286	+ 168
1954-55	320	732	+412	783	491	- 292	1103	1223	+ 120
1955-56	361	1041	+680	964	743	- 221	1325	1784	+ 459
1956-57	819	910	+ 91	1516	698	- 818	2335	1608	- 727
1957-58	736	988	+252	1314	434	- 880	2050	1422	- 628
1958-59	554	881	+327	1024	444	- 580	1578	1325	- 253
1959-60	655	1080	+425	1806	763	-1043	2461	1843	- 618
1960-61	1015	1259	+244	2173	540	-1633	3188	1799	-1389
1961-62	873	1300	+427	2236	543	-1693	3109	1843	-1266
1962-63	1019	1249	+230	2800	998	-1802	3819	2247	-1572
1963-64	1448	1224	-224	2982	1075	-1907	4430	2299	-2131
1964-65	1702	1268	-434	3672	1140	-2532	5374	2408	-2966
1965-66	1328	1514	+186	2880	1204	-1676	4208	2718	-1490
1966-67	1567	1668	+101	3625	1338	-2287	5192	3006	-2186

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

except two. This gives an accumulated surplus of 5799 million rupees during the period to East Pakistan and a deficit of 18680 million rupees to the western wing. The country as a whole incurred a deficit in the balance of trade amounting to

12881 million rupees. Since 1960-61 West Pakistan's imports have been running at a higher level than the total exports of Pakistan, a fact sufficient to arouse even the most indifferent East Pakistanis.

Before independence non-Muslims, mainly Hindus, dominated in the spheres of banking, insurance, trade and commerce, except a few small Muslim communities in Bombay and other large centres. After the departure of Hindus and Sikhs in 1947 there was a shortage not only in the amount of money available but, perhaps more seriously, in personnel trained in banking and finance. This vacuum was partly filled by those of the local people who had some experience in these fields, for example Parsis, but largely by such Muslim commercial communities as Memons, Khojas and Ismailies who migrated from India and settled down mostly in Karachi.* Although many Hindus preferred to stay in East Pakistan their position was somewhat weakened with the cutting off of Calcutta where most of them had their connections.** So, trade and industry remained exclusively under the control of small well-knit communities who were not identified with the rest of the population in many ways.***

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* Some of these communities were already settled in Karachi and many of the others, who were mostly in Bombay, had some connections in Karachi which was a part of Bombay Province till the separation of Sind in 1935.

** However, it is believed that Hindus in East Pakistan still have a considerable influence in business, in excess of their numbers.

*** The Muslim commercial communities of Karachi are mostly Gujrati speaking, a language not understood in other parts of the state.

Another important development was the emergence of Karachi as the state capital as well as the main financial centre. As far as East Pakistan was concerned the change meant a shifting of financial control from Calcutta - predominantly Hindu but located nearby - to Karachi - mostly Muslim but distant physically as well as culturally. Though independence had brought equal opportunities to the Muslims of the eastern wing to enter into finance, which had been an almost exclusive domain of Hindus before 1947, there were two factors which gave an advantage to those in the western wing, particularly in Karachi. Firstly, there was a relatively greater shortage of capital in East Pakistan, and, secondly, businessmen in Karachi were in a better position to obtain official favours from the central government which was located in the same city. Both these advantages were fully exploited by the commercial communities of Karachi to the detriment of not only East Pakistani businessmen but also of those in other parts of West Pakistan. The result was that Karachi-based businessmen and commercial firms gained control of the foreign and domestic wholesale trade, and the high profits thus obtained further strengthened their position to the extent that when various plans for industrialization were launched the same communities also became the leading industrialists. Their financial position inevitably brought them considerable political power which they used, to some extent by entering into politics, but largely by invisible influence on government policies.

These were the conditions which have resulted in the trade figures given in Tables 73 and 74. Large deficits in the balance of trade of West Pakistan were caused by the import of capital goods to set up manufacturing industries which brought huge profits as a result of protectionist policies, profits which were either ploughed back to increase the assets or used to import luxury goods. This fact has been one of the main issues of discontent in East Pakistan where it has been felt that the foreign exchange earned by East Pakistani exports has been used for the benefit of West Pakistan. This is reflected in the figures on inter-wing trade which show the commanding position of West Pakistan in relation to the eastern wing. It is clear from the figures that in the economic situation that has developed since independence East Pakistan has become more dependent on the western wing. During the past years nearly half of the total imports into East Pakistan have come from the western wing - in 1966-67 43.5 per cent of the total imports were of West Pakistan origin; on the other hand goods from East Pakistan constituted less than 20 per cent of the total imports into West Pakistan - 18.5 per cent in 1966-67. The share of manufactured goods in the export from West to East Pakistan has been rising, a fact which many East Pakistanis see as a result of West Pakistani industrialists' attempts to use the eastern wing as a market for their products.*

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* The greater amount of re-exports from West to East Pakistan is also interpreted as the result of most of the importers being based in Karachi who then distribute the goods through their agents in East Pakistan, thus earning exhorbitant profits.

It is very difficult to assess the true position within the two wings because of the lack of information. However, it seems that there is clearly an imbalance in the pattern of trade and commerce at this level also and economic arguments have, therefore, been very prominent in the political controversies that have recently taken place.

CHAPTER 12

A MEASURE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

This last chapter of Part III is an attempt to integrate the various indices that have been used in the previous chapters to prepare a single map of the relative levels of economic development at the district level. Economic issues have been very prominent in the various political debates during the last decade, and they are certainly going to play an important role in the coming elections and the subsequent constitutional wranglings. Although the lack of statistical information on incomes and per capita production on the district and provincial levels makes it difficult to assess the level of economic development in different areas, the evidence used in the preceding chapters is sufficient to create a reasonably accurate picture of the standing of various districts in almost all fields of economic development. However, since the main efforts of the governmental development activity have been directed towards bringing about an economic parity between the wings, there is more information available on the inter-wing level. Therefore, before going on to the task of making a map of economic development it is useful to have some further discussion of the economic conditions and particularly the government's attitude towards them.

Although economic development on a planned basis started in 1955 with the First Five Year Plan, relatively little was achieved in practice till 1960. The First Plan fell far short

Table 75

Rates of Economic Growth

Area	Percentage Annual Growth Rate		
	1949/50-1959/60	1959/60-1964/65	1964/65-1969/70 (estimate)
		GNP	
Pakistan	2.5	5.2	6.5
East Pakistan	1.9	5.4	7.0
West Pakistan	3.1	5.0	6.5
		Per capita income	
Pakistan	0.2	2.5	4.2
East Pakistan	-0.3	2.7	4.5
West Pakistan	0.8	2.4	4.0

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)

of its targets and the economy, particularly in East Pakistan, actually experienced stagnation and decline. Even in West Pakistan the growth rate only slightly exceeded the increase in population. For the whole of Pakistan the economic growth rate barely equalled the population growth rate (Table 75). Economic growth in East Pakistan till 1959-60 was in fact so low that the average per capita income actually suffered a decline of 0.3 per cent. However, since the launching of the Second Five Year Plan in 1959-60 the situation has changed mainly because of more vigorous planning made possible by a strong and stable government. The trend has been towards the narrowing of the gap between East and West Pakistan; the average per capita income in West Pakistan in 1959-60 was 32 per cent higher than that in East Pakistan, and by 1954-65 it had

Table 76

Per capita Incomes

(in Rupees per annum)

Area	1959-60	1964-65	1969-70 (planned)	1974-75 (planned)	1979-80 (planned)	1984-85 (planned)
Pakistan	340	386	467	577	727	932
East Pakistan	297	340	416	537	709	932
West Pakistan	391	442	531	627	750	932

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)

come down to 29 per cent. It was planned to reduce it further to 28 percent in 1969-70, 17 per cent in 1974-75, 6 per cent in 1979-80 and remove the differential altogether by the end of the Perspective Plan in 1984-85. The actual figures of per capita income in the two wings are shown in Table 76.

This trend towards narrowing the economic gap between the two wings has come about as a result of increasing development expenditure in the eastern wing, which in turn has been, to a considerable extent, motivated by growing political discontent in East Pakistan. Table 77 shows the total development funds allocation between the wings during the three plan periods. It can be seen that the allocation in the public sector has been turning more in favour of East Pakistan, but it should be remembered that a major portion of the Central government allocations has been spent in the western wing because of the location of the central capital and of the centrally administered areas in that wing.

Table 77

Inter-wing Allocations of the Development Plans
(Public Sector)

(million rupees)

Area	First Plan, 1955-60	Second Plan, 1960-65	Third Plan, 1965-70
East Pakistan	983	3867	16000
West Pakistan	1884	3547	14000
Central Government	3083	4086	4430
Total	5950	11500	30000

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, Second and Third Five Year Plans)

The performance of the private sector has been more biased towards West Pakistan, probably to the extent that any advantage that East Pakistan may have had in the public sector has been more than offset. The Third Plan recognized this problem thus

> "There will, however, be a difference in the role of the private sector under the Third Plan in East and West Pakistan. The experience of the Second Plan shows that the private sector is relatively less active in East Pakistan. There is no firm estimate of private investment for East and West Pakistan separately, but available information indicates that only about one-third of the total private investment during the Second Plan period will have been made in East Pakistan" (Third Plan, 1965, p.101).

Despite this the Third Plan allowed for the private sector investment of Rs. 22,000 million, equally divided between the wings. As both the Second and Third Plans emphasise in a number of places the poor performance of private investment in East and the exceeding of the targets in West Pakistan,

Rs. 11,000 million in the private sector for 1965-70 seems too optimistic for the eastern wing. A shortfall in the private sector of about 10 per cent in East Pakistan and a similar over-subscription in the western wing - a very likely possibility in view of the past experiences and recent political upheavals - would bring the total development expenditure during the Third Plan period at par in the two wings. This will mean that East Pakistan, with greater population, will experience a consequent shortfall in the estimated growth rate. The performance of the private sector is probably going to be even more biased towards West Pakistan for several reasons. Another aspect of the private investment, which unfortunately cannot be substantiated by statistics, is its origin. The Second Plan emphasised the need for transferring private investment and savings from West to East Pakistan and, if it means that a considerable portion of private investment is of West Pakistani origin, then the benefit of development to the East in real terms would be even smaller. Fig.43 shows the amount of post office savings bank deposits, which are more representative of small middle class savings, and a widening gap between the two wings is clearly noticeable. Considering the higher population of the eastern one the per capita values would show an even wider gap. This problem of the shortage of capital in East Pakistan is because of various economic and historical causes and the disparity between the two areas existed even before partition.

"Historically the economic growth of East Pakistan has lagged far behind that of West Pakistan. At Independence



Fig. 43. Post Office Saving Bank Deposits, Wings.

Source: 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics.

> the two areas started from different levels of development. After Independence, for a variety of reasons, a larger flow of immigrant capital, enterprise and technical skills went into West Pakistan than into East Pakistan" (Second Plan, 1960, p.397).

The shortage of capital in East Pakistan probably worsened after independence because there is evidence that during the early stages of economic development regional inequalities tend to increase

> "...rising regional income disparities and increasing North-South dualism is typical of early development stages, while regional convergence and a disappearance of severe North-South problems is typical of the more mature stages of national growth and development. ....there is a systematic relation between national development levels and regional inequality or geographic dispersion" (Williamson, 1965, p.155).

Williamson has specifically noted the widening gap between the two wings of Pakistan.

Perhaps more important than growth rates and development expenditure, to the politicians and public at large, is the social nature of the process of development, that is the impact on the real incomes of the population. Despite the large share of the public sector in development, private investment has remained important; it has been over 40 per cent in the Third Plan and probably exceeded the allocated share. The Plan admitted the problem of the concentration of wealth:

> "In Pakistan the process of rapid industrialization based on the reinvestment of corporate profits, led to the emergence of a relatively small class of dynamic entrepreneur

> who owned and controlled a substantial portion of the small industrial sector" (Third Plan, 1965, p.117).

The Plan laid down certain measures aimed at a better distribution of incomes and wealth but it is too early to expect any real impact on the whole situation regarding the vertical distribution of wealth. In view of the large share of the private sector it is not likely that the measures proposed by the Plan will have any significant effect. Moreover, the proposing of remedial measures is one thing, their proper implementation is quite another. For example the Third Plan stated the different measures taken during the Second Plan period to counter the concentration of wealth in a few hands, and one of them was the refusal of permission "to holders of large industrial undertakings to open financial institutions like banks and insurance companies". This was certainly an appropriate measure but the plan is silent about its implementation, and anyone familiar with the conditions in Pakistan cannot help thinking that there has not been a proper execution of this particular proposal. In short, to the millions of common inhabitants the benefits accrued as a result of development have meant far less than the impressive growth figures indicate.

> "To the ordinary citizen, however, the progress which may seem impressive to the observer as yet means very little. Of the scant 2% increase a year in income, a quarter is taken back in taxes to provide the balance needed beyond the massive contributions of foreign aid and investment" (Spate and Learmonth 1967, p.366).

Table 78

Distribution of Personal incomes, 1959-60

Income groups as % of population	Average income of the group, Rupees		
	East Pakistan (Rural)	West Pakistan (Rural)	Karachi (Urban)
1.Lowest group,5%	186	203	80
2.Lower middle group, 45%	222	276	211
3.Upper middle group, 45%	368	398	624
4.Highest group,5%	686	995	2165

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)

As has been stressed a number of times there are no accurate statistics about the distribution of personal incomes, but there is some information available from sample surveys in the rural areas of both the wings and in Karachi (Table 78). The two important features of Table 78 are: i) the difference between the rural areas of the two wings; ii) a much greater difference in the vertical direction, between low and high income groups, in Karachi. If these figures could be shown in more detail a greater clustering of incomes would probably be seen towards the upper part of the highest group. The Third Plan, although concerned about raising the incomes and decreasing the vertical differences, ruled out any radical measures to achieve this. It preferred "a rapid increase in production and employment" to "a drastic redistribution of existing incomes" in order to bring about an "enlightened capitalism" and a "greater social justice".

However, taking Pakistan as a whole the development planning has proved so far quite sound (Spate & Learmonth 1967) and as a result of it important changes in the economy have taken place. Besides the growth rates achieved, as shown in the tables earlier in this chapter, the country has become an exporter of manufactured goods while previously almost the entire exports consisted of raw materials. Table 79 shows the sectoral allocation of development funds since 1950.

Table 79

Sectoral Priorities in Development Expenditure, 1950-70

Sectors	Percent of the total expenditure in each period			
	1950-55	1955-60	1960-65	1965-70
1.Agriculture	6	7	13	15
2.Industry, fuels and minerals	36	31	28	26
3.Water and power	13	17	19	15
4.Transport and communications	14	17	17	18
5.Physical planning and housing	22	20	15	13
6.Education	5	6	4	5
7.Health	3	2	1	2
8.Manpower and social welfare	1	-	-	1
9.Works programme	-	-	3	5

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)

The output and employment of the main sectors of the economy till 1970 and at the end of the Perspective Plan in 1985 are given in Table 80.

Table 80

Structural Changes in the Economy, 1950-1985

Sectors	Percent of the total in each year 1950	1965	1970	1985
	OUTPUT			
1. Agriculture	60	49	45	36
2. Manufacturing	6	12	14	21
3. Others	34	39	41	43
	EMPLOYMENT			
1. Agriculture	75	65	62	49
2. Manufacturing	25	11	12	14
3. Others		24	26	37

(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)

Enough has been said about the economic inequalities between East and West Pakistan, and the government's concern to achieve a parity between the wings in production and per capita incomes. This may come about, according to the estimates of the Planning Commission, by the end of the long-range Perspective Plan in 1985. The whole thinking behind the development planning seems to be dominated by the East-West inequalities, but what about economic development and per capita incomes on the intra-wing or the intra-provincial level? The Third Plan contains exactly two paragraphs, or half a page, on this issue out of a total of 549 pages. Obviously West Pakistan, at the present stage, is economically more advanced than the eastern wing but there are wide variations from district to district, and the Plan stresses the lack of data on the district level. However, some

material has been collected by the Central Statistical Office on inter-district per capita income differentials but it has not yet been published.

> "Studies to determine the extent of these disparities (inter-district) in per capita incomes are at present underway, and specific policies will be recommended as soon as the final results of these studies become available. Tentative findings indicate that while the average district per capita income is higher in West Pakistan than in East, the deviations from this average are also much more pronounced in the former. The preliminary results show that 31 out of 51 districts in West Pakistan and 5 out of 17 in East Pakistan have per capita incomes that are less than the provincial averages. In fact, there are ten districts in West Pakistan which have a lower per capita income than the lowest in East Pakistan. Further comments will have to await the completion of these studies" (Third Plan, p.131-32).

No specific proposals were made to counter these inequalities and the matter was left to the discretion of the respective provincial governments regarding the actual spending of resources. The Frontier states and Tribal Agencies, however, remained central responsibilities.

In order to find out these inter-district disparities an attempt has been made to derive an index of economic development by adding together the scores of various districts on four different indices which have been used in the preceding chapters. They are: literacy, agricultural productivity per capita of cultivators, the magnitude of manufacturing and connectivity by road and rail. The result, which has been reduced in



Fig. 44. Relative levels of economic development, (Districts) 1961.

relation to the district with lowest rating taken as 1, is given in Appendix XXIII and plotted on Fig.44. This Fig. is therefore, a combination of the four Figs. - 12, 29, 34 and 41. The important things to note from Fig.44 are: a) the relatively lower level of economic development in East Pakistan; b) a much greater degree of inter-district disparity in West Pakistan; c) the relatively higher level of the Punjab; and d) the importance of the provincial metropolitan districts and port cities. This Figure is in accordance with the findings of the Planning Commission and, although it does not represent absolute figures of incomes or any other economic variable, it does show with reasonable accuracy the relative standing of each district on the general level of economic development, which itself is a rather vague and elusive subject.

On the basis of this economic assessment and the cultural distributions already considered in the preceding Part this study turns to political issues with a view to exploring the two way relationship between the socio-economic and political realities.

PART IV POLITICAL DISTRIBUTIONS

CHAPTER 13

PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATION

In considering the spatial pattern of administrative areas, the historical development of the territorial administration is discussed briefly, followed by an account of the administrative hierarchy that existed at the time of independence. As stated earlier, the District is the basic administrative unit and since independence very few changes in fact have taken place in the pattern of Districts. In many ways the administrative heritage of the British period has hampered political integration because of the imprint of the administrative boundaries not only upon the landscape but also on the minds of the people over a period of generations. At the same time this heritage has proved to be beneficial insofar as it provided a well-established administrative system which, despite the difficulties caused by partition, was able to support the running of an entirely new state created almost overnight. Although the pattern of administrative districts has not changed much, there has been important reorganization regarding the provinces and princely states. These changes are discussed and, finally, the role of the Civil Service as the actual wielders of power, and of the armed forces, which have been a most significant political force since the 1958 Martial Law, are considered.

The British had evolved a complex pattern of administration in the subcontinent to maintain law and order and to collect

revenue. Before them the Moguls too had an elaborate administrative machinery for the same purposes. In each case the territory was divided into various levels of administrative areas controlled by appointed officials, either drawing salaries or having rights to collect revenue for themselves. However, the British system was more comprehensive and extended to the whole of the subcontinent. This was the system which was inherited by both Pakistan and India at the time of independence. Although many changes have taken place since 1947, the basic pattern of administration in Pakistan remains very much the same as it was before independence..

Before independence the British Empire in the subcontinent in fact consisted of two 'Indias': the 'native India' and the 'British India'. The first one included over 500 semi-autonomous principalities, called 'states', scattered all over the subcontinent and ranging in area from over 80,000 square miles to 0.29 square mile. The degree of autonomy in these states also varied greatly according to their individual treaties with the British government. Some had the right to issue their own currencies and postage stamps and to maintain small armies, while others were no more than small feudal estates. The only thing that they had in common was their allegiance to the British crown which they served well. The British had the right to remove any ruler who proved recalcitrant, and replace him by any of his relations.

The 'British India' consisted of several categories of administrative areas based, in some cases, vaguely on linguistic

distributions. These areas could be grouped into three broad categories: a) Governor's Provinces; b) Chief Commissioner's Provinces; c) Tribal and Special Areas. The Governor's Provinces were the most important with highly developed administrative machinery and the greatest amount of representative government. Chief Commissioner's Provinces were also directly administered areas and some of them, like Baluchistan, were directly under the Central Government with no elected provincial administrations. Tribal Areas, or Agencies as they were called, were subject to only a minimal administrative control. Although parts of the 'British India', the Agencies were in fact more autonomous than the princely states. That they were kept under the empire at great military expenditure, particularly those in the northwest, was because of their strategic importance.

Although the British had established themselves at Calcutta about the middle of the eighteenth century, it was not before the later half of the nineteenth century that the whole of the subcontinent came under their control. Bengal was naturally the first area to be taken over but it was not until 1872 that they could annex Assam. In the West Pakistan area Sind was annexed in 1943, the Punjab in 1849 and by 1860 the British control had reached most of the trans-Indus areas. However, the provinces that existed at the time of independence were created later as the lines of transport developed and administration became more intensive. The North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) was separated from the Punjab as a

Governor's province in 1901 because of administrative convenience but the new province also conformed, to some extent, to the cultural distributions. Sind remained a part of Bombay till 1935 when it was separated and constituted as a new province. In the east the Bengal province proved too large for effective administration and therefore it was partitioned in 1905 creating a new province consisting of East Bengal and Assam. The partition was, however, annulled in 1911 and East Bengal was rejoined to West Bengal, though Assam remained a separate province. There were no main changes in the administrative pattern after 1935.

Pakistan inherited areas belonging to all the three categories mentioned above.* These main categories of administrative areas are shown in Fig.45. In East Pakistan there has been a uniformity in administration as this wing inherited only the administered districts. The only change

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* 1. Governor's Provinces:
The partitioned half of Bengal with one district of Assam, Sylhet.
The partitioned half of the Punjab.
Sind.
NWFP.

2. Chief Commissioner's Province:
Baluchistan.

3. Princely States:
Bahawalpur in the Punjab.
Khairpur in Sind.
Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela in Baluchistan.
Swat, Dir, Chitral and Amb in the NWFP.

4. Tribal areas:
Tribal Agencies of North and South Waziristan, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand and Malakand in the NWFP.
Some tribal areas attached to various administered districts.



Source: Tayyeb 1966.

Fig. 45. Pattern of Administration, 1947.

was that one Muslim majority district of Assam province, Sylhet, was also awarded to Pakistan after a referendum. All the other districts belonged to the province of Bengal. By comparison the administrative nature of the West Pakistan area was complex as its provinces included all the three categories of administrative areas except that there were no tribal areas in Sind. Before looking at the changes that have taken place since independence it is useful to examine briefly the administrative hierarchy within the provinces.

The provinces were divided by the British into Districts, two or more of which were grouped into Divisions. As explained in Chapter 2 the Districts were further subdivided into Tehsils, Talukas or Thanas. At each level of these administrative areas there was an official who was in charge of all the administrative functions of the government. Fig.46 shows the hierarchy of administrative functions, both executive and judicial. It is clearly noticeable that the District was the most important level of local administration, and the Deputy Commissioner or his equivalent was the key official in charge of a District. There was a separation of judicial and executive functions, the former under the control of the District and Sessions Judge, who had below him Civil Judges dealing with civil actions. Criminal judicial functions were performed by Magistrates who also had to perform executive duties. In their judicial functions they were under some control of the District Judge and in executive matters the Deputy Commissioner was their immediate superior. At the Tehsil level the Tehsildar or his

Levels of administration	Executive functions	Judicial functions
Province	Governor or Chief Commissioner	High Court or Judicial Commissioner
Division	Commissioner	
District	Deputy Commissioner, or Collector	District and Sessions Judge
	Executive functions / Judicial functions	
	Magistrates	Civil Judges
	Executive functions / Judicial functions	
Tehsil	Tehsildar	
	Executive functions / Judicial functions	

Fig. 46

Administrative Hierarchy, 1947

equivalent, directly under the Deputy Commissioner, was mainly concerned with the collection of land revenue and other executive functions, but he also performed some minor judicial duties. The Deputy Commissioner was the central figure in the whole administrative machinery and his main task was the maintenance of law and order, and the collection of revenue. All officials in the district were subordinate to him except the judicial officers who worked directly under the supervision of the District Judge.

Above the level of the District the District and Sessions Judge was under the supervision of the High Court. On the executive side two or more districts were grouped in a Division under a Commissioner who also acted as a court of appeal against the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner in matters related to land revenue. The Commissioner worked directly under the provincial administration headed by the Governor. So, it was a highly developed bureaucratic system which efficiently maintained the British empire for over a century.

To run this efficient bureaucratic system the British had evolved a complex civil service structure with various central and provincial branches. At the top of this structure was the elite Indian Civil Service (ICS) whose members filled most of the administrative posts in the districts and divisions as well as in the central and provincial secretariats.* In the

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* In addition the members of the ICS were also appointed to judicial posts in the districts as well as in the High Courts.

beginning the ICS was exclusively filled by the British personnel, but later its ranks were opened to the 'Indians' as a result of the 'Indianization' and 'democratization' policy. By the time of independence nearly half of its members were 'Indians'. This ICS, with a little over a thousand members, was responsible, assisted by the Army, for the running of the empire and all other branches of the central and provincial civil services were subordinate to it. The 'Indian' ICS officers by their training became thoroughly British in outlook and identified themselves with the colonial rulers rather than with the native population. The relationship between the district and divisional administrators and the people remained formal. To the common man the Deputy Commissioner was a representative of the British crown and the Viceroy, and the people exercising power were remote from the vast majority of the population.

Since independence, although the basic structure of administration has remained more or less the same, there have been some important changes in the form of administrative areas. The pattern of administration inherited by Pakistan at the time of independence (Fig.45) was uniform in the eastern wing but West Pakistan contained a variety of administrative areas. This variety of administrative areas, though useful in the British period when the main objectives were law and order and revenue collection, was not very suitable for an independent state where economic development and co-ordination of planning are important functions. It is necessary to create an

administrative homogeneity in order to achieve homogeneity in the cultural and economic spheres. However, the administrative pattern continued substantially unchanged from 1947 to 1955. The two important administrative changes that took place during this period were the creation of a federal district of Karachi around the state capital and the inclusion of the princely state of Amb into the NWFP. All other areas remained unaffected. Amb was the smallest and probably the most retrograde feudal state acceding to Pakistan with a population of only about 50,000. On February 16, 1949, the Provincial Assembly of the NWFP passed a resolution requesting the central government to take over the administration of Amb (Wilcox 1963). Its territory was then gradually taken over and added to the adjoining administered districts and by 1953 the state had all but vanished; the ruler was left with only about 15 square miles (ibid).

Unlike the Congress Party in India, the Muslim League had no clear policy about the integration of the princely states. In the years immediately after independence the main concern in Pakistan was to secure the legal accession of the state rulers to Pakistan. By March 17, 1948, all the state rullers had signed the instruments of accession which were accepted by the central government. The position of the rulers within their states was, however, not affected and they continued with their powers and privileges as before independence. Throughout this period the central government and the Constituent Assembly were concerned with framing the constitution (see

Chapter 14) and nothing was done towards administrative reforms. However, when the draft of the constitution was at last prepared in 1954 it was intended to provide for a federal system in which the states were assured of their separate existence as federated units. This draft was, however, not able to become the actual constitution as the Constituent Assembly was dissolved before it could pass it. This period did not bring any change in the status of Tribal Areas.

The most important administrative change came in 1955 with the integration of the provinces of West Pakistan. As will be discussed in Chapter 14 this step was not taken primarily as an administrative reform but was in fact a political move. Although there were proposals to merge the provinces into a single administrative unit during the time of the first Constituent Assembly, opposition, mainly from East Pakistan and Sind, did not allow any definite step to be taken. It was after the Assembly had been dismissed that the central government prepared a definite plan of merger which was accepted by the second Constituent Assembly and the new unit of West Pakistan came into being on October 14, 1955. The new administrative pattern as it emerged as a result of the integration is shown in Fig.47. It can be seen that it brought some important changes compared to Fig.45. Not only the provinces and their boundaries vanished but also all the princely states in the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan. Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and Khairpur were incorporated within the administrative framework of West Pakistan as individual



Source: Census 1961.

Fig. 47. Pattern of Administration, 1955.

districts, and Bahawalpur was integrated in the form of three districts, that of Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar and Rahimyar Khan. For the first time a large part of the western wing came under a uniform administration. The district of Karachi, although it remained a federal area, was also put under the jurisdiction of the West Pakistan government for actual administration.

However, the states in the NWFP were allowed to go on as before, enjoying all their previous rights. Although no official explanation of this was given, the exemption granted to these states was certainly because of their strategic location. The government feared that the state rulers might create some trouble, backed by the Afghanistan government who had supported the cause of Pathan autonomy, if their states were taken over. The Tribal Areas too remained the same for the same reasons.

As expected there was considerable opposition from the state rulers, particularly of the Baluchistan states, to the merger plan but on the whole the government were able to overcome such difficulties. The main opposition, however, came from East Pakistan who saw this as a move to counter the population superiority of the eastern wing; and from Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan who feared the domination of numerically and economically superior Punjab. The central government did manage to overcome this opposition as well by using all sorts of means, foul and fair. There is no need to emphasise that there was no need of any such administrative change in the eastern wing except that its official name was changed from

Bengal to East Pakistan when the one unit of West Pakistan was created by the merger of the provinces.

This administrative pattern continued as shown in Fig.47 till the spring of 1970. One point which must be noted is that despite these changes the basic pattern of districts did not undergo any alterations and the administrative hierarchy which existed at the time of independence (Fig.46) continued to function.

During the strongly centralised rule of Ayub Khan the opposition to the one unit of West Pakistan grew stronger because of various political reasons explained later. The result was that when his government fell in 1969 the new Martial Law government at once promised to break up West Pakistan into the former provinces as soon as possible to placate the bitter opposition resulting in violence that had erupted during the winter of 1968-69. Accordingly on March 30, 1970, the former provinces re-emerged as the administrative units that they had been before 1955. Nevertheless, the reorganization, which is still going on, did not lead to exactly the same administrative pattern as that of the pre-integration period. Firstly the states in the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan which had been absorbed have not re-emerged. They will remain as administered districts within their respective provinces. Secondly, during this reorganization the government took the opportunity to integrate the states of the NWFP which had hitherto remained an administrative incongruity. The Tribal Areas, however, once again have been left out and they are

scheduled to continue as before. Thirdly, the district of Karachi has been returned to Sind of which it was a part before 1947. The new administrative pattern (Fig.48) is on the one hand more complex than its predecessor (Fig.47) as the former provincial boundaries have been recreated but on the other it is simplified in that it has removed the states of the NWFP by integrating them as regular districts. The only areas which remain out of line from the rest of Pakistan are the Tribal Agencies of the NWFP. It remains to be seen if another political upheaval will bring them into uniformity with the rest of the wing.

Apart from these changes in the spatial pattern of administration, equally important is the role of the civil service and its political and social implications. The civil servants as the wielders of actual administrative power usually remain obscure from the eyes of the public but in actual fact much that a government and politicians do is related to the attitudes of the civil servants. They are not only important in the execution of policies but are equally significant in their formulation. Since independence the bureaucratic nature of the government in Pakistan has not changed very much. In fact the powers of bureaucracy have increased in more than one way.

On partition the members of the civil service were given the option to go into either of the two successor states. Because the Muslims had taken to modern education less readily (Chapter 3) their representation in the ICS was less than



Fig. 48. Pattern of Administration, 1970.

their proportion in the population, and therefore comparatively much fewer trained civil servants in senior appointments became Pakistanis. There were only 82 members of the ICS and the Indian Political Service who opted for Pakistan in 1947 (Callard 1957). As a successor to the ICS the Pakistan Government set up a Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) which recruited and trained new officers to fill the shortage of administrative personnel. Before independence the civil servants were only concerned with the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenue, but now they had the additional and more important duties of planning and development to fulfil. Nevertheless, the training of the new recruits was continued on the same lines as before independence, producing alienated young officers who looked back to the ICS traditions for inspiration. In administrative matters they proved almost as efficient as their ICS predecessors. Their role in the political life of the state is directly related to the political conditions as described in Chapter 14. The dislocation caused by partition, large influx of refugees and the setting up of a new capital and the machinery of the central government put a huge strain on the resources of the state. The civil servants had enormous problems in running the whole administration machinery, the creation of many new ministries and departments. It must be said in fairness that they fulfilled their responsibilities very ably and it was they who carried the major task of steering Pakistan through those difficult years. After the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, the

first Prime Minister, in 1951 and with the decline of the Muslim League the civil servants became more important because of the changing governments at the centre and the provinces. The politicians were too busy in their political intrigues and the constitutional controversies, and the actual government was very much left to the civil servants. Moreover, during the periods when provincial governments were dismissed by the central government under Section 93 of the Government of India Act and the assemblies dissolved, the whole governmental machinery was run by civil servants under the supervision of the Governors. Thus, although the legal powers of the Civil Service were the same as before independence, they could be used more effectively in the changed circumstances. Even provincial chief ministers and their colleagues were in many ways dependent on district officials because of their powers to influence voters and landlords. Two civil servants, though they did not belong to the ICS, rose to be Governors-General and one to be Prime Minister.

The power of the civil servants was enhanced when Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, a former civil servant, dissolved the Constituent Assembly and appointed a non-party cabinet to rule the state. His Minister of Interior, also a civil servant, said:

> "You cannot have the old British system of administration (and) at the same time allow politicians to meddle with the civil service. In the British system the District Magistrate was the king-pin of administration. His

authority was unquestioned. We have to restore that" (quoted in Callard 1957).

This man, Iskandar Mirza, later became Governor-General and the first president of Pakistan, and it was he who imposed Martial Law on October 8, 1958. Such was the importance of the civil servant in administration and politics. After the election of the second Constituent Assembly in 1955 there again followed a period of falling governments and shifting loyalties. One day a particular member of the Assembly was in opposition, the next day he had joined the government by changing his party loyalty, and so on. The civil service again remained important in running the administration and it was during this period that corruption also got into the ranks of the high officials. In the years immediately before the Martial Law of 1958 conditions were worst, politicians were desperately trying to remain in power so that they could turn the coming elections to their advantage, and the conduct of the civil servants was being openly questioned.

After the proclamation of Martial Law in October, 1958, the government set about cleaning the morass created by the political conditions of the past years. First of all the past record of all the politicians who had held public offices or who had been members of the central and provincial assemblies was examined, and those found guilty of misconduct were debarred from public life for varying terms. Then the government undertook a screening process of the entire civil service. Many civil servants, including some very senior members of the CSP

were dismissed, retired or sent on leave leading to retirement on account of charges of corruption and inefficiency. Some of them were even imprisoned. This was the first blow that the civil service had suffered since its establishment. No civilian government was strong enough to make any changes in the administrative structure and the power of the civil servants had gradually grown. However, after this initial blow to the civil service the Ayub regime soon discovered that, in spite of Martial Law, they could not function and carry out their policies without the support of the civil service. In fact, in the absence of any representative government it was discovered that the civil servants would have to be taken into confidence and given considerable powers. After the first few years of the Ayub regime the power of the civil service increased more than ever. Even after the introduction of the 1962 Constitution and the restoration of civilian government and democratic institutions the civil service gathered greater influence and power. As explained in Chapter 14, the 1962 Constitution, although it established elected representatives at every level of the administrative areas, did not allow much power to the various elected bodies. In fact with the provision for the civil servants to be chairmen of the various councils, the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner were now not only responsible for law and order but they became also the appointed guardians of democracy. As a result of the increased development and planning activity after 1960 the civil service obtained additional economic

powers because of their considerable influence in the framing of the policy, the granting of various licenses and entirely controlling the actual expenditure of development funds. Members of the CSP, who rarely had any specialized training, were often appointed to such specialized agencies as the Water and Power Development Authority, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and so on. Whenever there was any devolution of administrative powers the District and Divisional officers were vested with more functions, and power, instead of gradually flowing into the hands of the elected representatives, became concentrated into the hands of a few civil servants. One illustration of the influence of the civil service is the fact that when the Pay and Services Commission appointed by Ayub Khan in 1959 submitted its report in 1962, it was kept secret for "further study". It has been said that because the report recommended radical reforms in administration by abolishing the CSP and joining all the categories of public servants into a single cadre, the higher civil servants were powerful enough to get this report shelved and unimplemented (von Vorys 1965). It is a fact that the report has never been published.

Another aspect of the civil service which is equally important in this study is the representation in it of the two wings. Of the 82 of the ICS and the Political Service personnel which Pakistan received at the time of independence only two were from East Pakistan (Callard op.cit.); the rest were either from West Pakistan, mainly the Punjab, or from

United Provinces or other areas which had gone to India; some British officers also chose to serve in Pakistan. Because of the shortage of East Pakistanis in the civil service persons from West Pakistan had to be posted in the eastern wing at all levels of the administration, and the attitude of some of these towards the East Pakistani people was far from satisfactory. Their arrogant behaviour and a sense of superiority earned unpopularity not only for themselves but also for the whole of West Pakistan, particularly the Punjab.

After independence the recruitment to the CSP and all other branches of the central civil service was put on a quota basis in order to give a fair representation to all areas. After a written examination and an oral test, 20 per cent of the vacancies were filled strictly on merit, the rest were equally divided between the wings i.e. 40 per cent each to East and West Pakistan. Within West Pakistan the vacancies were again allotted to the provinces on the basis of proportional representation. Although this recruitment policy has been fair regarding the new recruits entering the civil service after independence, so far the original imbalance between the wings has not been removed. This unfavourable position of East Pakistan has been a source of considerable tension between the wings and East Pakistanis have expressed their dissatisfaction time and again. Besides this imbalance between the wings in the number of persons in the civil service there has been an added cause of grievance regarding the postings of civil servants. East Pakistanis have always

Table 81

Representation in the Central Government Administrative Positions, East and West Pakistan, 1956

Positions	from West Pakistan	from East Pakistan
Secretaries	19	0
Joint Secretaries	38	3
Deputy Secretaries	123	10
Under Secretaries	510	38

(Source: Tayyeb 1966)

complained that all the important civil service jobs in the central government have been held by persons from West Pakistan. Some figures tend to prove these allegations (Table 81).

There are no exact figures available but it is certain that within West Pakistan the same sort of imbalance exists between the provinces despite the fact that even after the integration of West Pakistan recruitment on the basis of the former provincial areas had been continued. Moreover, some areas have felt that the recruitment policy, although apparently fair, has benefited only some particular groups. For example, the vacancies alloted to Sind appear to have been filled beyond an acceptable proportion by non-Sindhi settlers, who have been educationally more advanced (Chapter 6), and not by the local inhabitants of Sind. There is no doubt about the fact that the higher ranks of the civil servants have been dominated by Punjabis and the Urdu speaking refugees.

After the new Martial Law government took over in 1969 they appointed six East Pakistani secretaries in the central government and the news was prominently published in the papers.

Another important group which has become, during the past years, even more significant politically, is the armed forces. The services - army, navy and the air force - became directly involved in politics and administration in October, 1958, when Martial Law was proclaimed. However, there are indications that long before Martial Law some army officers had been taking an interest in the political conditions of the state. In his autobiography Ayub Khan (1967) has reproduced a memorandum which he wrote in 1954 when he was C.-in-C. of the Army. This is a political document in which he reviewed briefly the political conditions in Pakistan and sketched a plan for constitutional, economic and legal reforms for the state. One may ask why a serving soldier should write a political essay and lay down specific proposals for constitutional and economic reform. It may just be coincidence but there is a marked resemblance between what he wrote in 1954 and what he did after coming to power in 1958. This raises a number of interesting points but they are not relevant here. The constitution that he introduced in 1962 was almost exactly on the lines he proposed in the 1954 document. However, even if the army and other armed forces generally were not interested in politics before 1958, they did become very much involved after that and have remained so till the present. Even after

Martial Law had been lifted and the civilian government restored by Ayub Khan the army, though no longer active in politics, was the main source of strength for the president. He remained the supreme commander of the armed forces and, by virtue of being a Field Marshal, did not leave the active ranks of the army. Moreover, when he was forced to resign he handed over power to another Martial Law regime. So, the armed forces, particularly the army, is at present a significant political force in Pakistan.

Provincial representation in the armed forces is once again a very highly unbalanced picture (Table 81).

Table 81

Representation of the Wings in the Armed Forces (Senior Officers), 1956*

Positions	from West Pakistan	from East Pakistan
Lt.-Generals	3	0
Maj.-Generals	20	0
Brigadiers	34	1
Colonels	49	1
Lt.-Colonels	198	2
Majors	590	10
Naval Officers	593	7
Air Force Officers	640	40

(Source: Tayyeb 1966)

* No authentic figures of a more recent date, regarding the representation of the wings or of provinces in the Civil and Armed Services, are available.

The causes of this imbalance actually date back to the British days and to the mental inclination of the East Pakistani people. They have always tended to be averse to employment in the armed forces though some regulations regarding recruitment, like the physical qualifications, have tended to be biased against them. Traditionally the Punjab and the NWFP have been more inclined towards military professions, but after twenty years of independence this unequal representation in the services is an obvious politically explosive issue particularly when in the economic and political fields there have been many grievances of East Pakistan against the central government and West Pakistan. Recently the government has been giving some thought to removing this disparity in the services as for example:

> "The beginning of proportional representation of East Pakistanis in the Army was made when a platoon of the East Bengal Regiment, the Junior Tigers, was inducted into the Frontier Force Regiment ... at a parade at Dacca stadium" (Pakistan News, London, Feb. 1, 1970, p.3).

and

> "the C.-in-C. of Pakistan Navy, Vice-Admiral Muzaffar Hasan, in a speech in Chittagong on March 5 regretted that although 40 per cent of sailors of Pakistan Navy came from East Pakistan, the number of officers from this Wing was not satisfactory" (ibid., April 1, 1970, p.1).

If detailed figures on the provincial level were available it is very likely that relatively small representation from Sind as well would be shown. The army, and the other branches of the services, are predominantly Punjabi and Pathan. During

the last years of Ayub Khan's regime when feelings in East Pakistan against him and the western wing were high, the units of Pakistan Army stationed in East Pakistan were openly labelled by some as an 'army of occupation' and as instruments of Punjabi domination. If the policies of the present government are carried through vigorously the imbalance between the wings will no doubt decrease but it will take some time to bring about proportional representation in the civil service and the armed forces. Now with the re-creation of the provinces the question may no longer be that of differences between the wings but also of those between the four provinces of West Pakistan. As things stand at present in the administrative distributions, there is the same sort of inter-wing differentials as found in the case of various economic distributions and this time the magnitude of the differentials is even higher. Apart from that the pattern of administration has undergone a change towards uniformity since independence though the pace of change has been slow. It has been shown that vested interests tend to make administrative reform, like all other reforms, difficult to carry out by normal democratic process. All the major changes have taken place as a result of executive pressure. The anomaly of the Tribal Areas still remains but since it involves some external factors, particularly the relations with Afghanistan, it will be some time before they are fully integrated.

CHAPTER 14

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

The actual history of the constitutional development is not of particular relevance to this study. However, it is necessary to consider the main features of the various controversies over constitutional provisions for two reasons. Firstly, they illustrate the role that religion has played in the post-independence politics, a question very much relevant to the present work. Secondly, they also show the attitude of the various provinces particularly in relation to the division of powers between the central and provincial governments, i.e. the question of federalism versus a unitary system.

Almost the entire history of Pakistan has been dominated by the efforts to shape a constitution for the State. There has been a general lack of agreement among the various interested groups not only about the general shape of the constitution but very often on small insignificant points with the result that all attempts to work the various constitutions have ended in failure. As pointed out in Chapter 2, there was no real effort before independence to sort out some of the constitutional problems which were bound to be faced once partition had taken place. So immediately after the partition the energies of the new state were sapped by its efforts to frame a constitution, energies which at that critical stage should have been more usefully employed towards solving the social and economic

problems that arose as a result of the general dislocation. Before noting the actual constitutional changes that have taken place since 1947, it is appropriate to consider the political institutions which existed at the time of independence.

For centuries the subcontinent had remained under one form or another of absolute rule and when the British formally took over in 1857 a highly centralized and absolute system of government was built up to administer the British Indian Empire. However, after the turn of the century various legislative measures were gradually taken to allow increasing participation of the native inhabitants in government and administration, though the supremacy and the control of the centre was maintained. Modern political institutions in Pakistan and India developed only during the fifty years prior to independence and owe their origin to the western, particularly British, ideas of democracy, but there is a fundamental difference in the growth of democratic institutions between the subcontinent and western Europe. While in the latter such institutions grew as a result of a conscious effort on the part of the people to wrest power from the traditional rulers and ruling classes, in the subcontinent every step towards democracy was taken as a result of a concession granted by the colonial rulers, except in the later part of the British rule when pressure from the local inhabitants was considerable. The history of the constitutional development and the growth of political institutions in the subcontinent has been discussed in detail in various published works (e.g. Sayeed 1968; Symonds

1950; Coupland 1944; etc.). Such historical material has limited relevance here except to point out that the divergence between the Muslim and Hindu communities had become a political fact during the last century, though the Muslim League, the first political organization of the Muslims, was formed only in 1906. Although there were some attempts to bring the two communities closer - at one stage they did formally come together in what is known as the Lucknow Pact of 1916 - the differences between the two were too wide to be permanently bridged. Even long before the Muslim League demanded partition and independence it was almost always at loggerheads with the Congress on nearly all constitutional and legislative measures proposed or implemented by the British government. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (d.1898), a modernist Muslim leader in the later half of the nineteenth century, frequently and publicly expressed his fears of the numerical superiority of the Hindus (Stephen 1964; Sayeed 1968). The result had been a disagreement between the two communities, or at least between their two main parties, on all-important political issues and reforms, particularly the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1906; the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919; the Government of India Act of 1935; and the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946. The basis of all these differences was the League's fear of Hindu domination and their insistence on safeguarding the interests of the largest minority. The Congress was, however, opposed to any such proposals and insisted rather on 'India' being one nation and that it should remain one state.

By 1947, when independence and partition came, the gradual process of democratization and 'Indianization' of political institutions had reached a stage whereby in all provinces of British India there was an elected parliamentary system of government. Besides a central legislature and a cabinet, there were provincial Legislative Assemblies and cabinets of ministers headed by their respective chief ministers. The chief executive authority was the Viceroy in Delhi, represented by a Governor or Chief Commissioner in each province. The working constitution was the Government of India Act of 1935. This Act allowed for a federal system of government with provinces having a considerable degree of internal autonomy, but in practice there were many safeguards in the Act which ensured the supremacy of the British.

Another important feature of the Act was the provision of separate electorates on a religious basis, i.e. the Muslims had their separate constituencies from which only Muslims could be returned. In those provinces where they were in a minority they were given some weighting in excess of their percentage of the population. No such favours were, however, given to Hindus in provinces where they formed minorities. Besides their own seats the Muslims could also vote in and contest the general constituencies, though in practice the Congress controlled most of them. The franchise was restricted on the basis of property and education and, although the actual conditions differed from province to province, only about 15 per cent of the population was eligible to vote (Callard 1957). Although

separate electorates were given constitutional recognition in the Indian Councils Act of 1909, Muslims had remained politically very weak. Since they were generally poor relative to Hindus, especially in Bengal, the property requirements for the right to vote did not make much difference in spite of all the weighting. In the Bengal Legislative Council, the province where they were in a majority, they had only five out of the total twenty-eight elected members. In the Punjab, another Muslim majority province, there was not a single Muslim elected member (Ambedkar 1946). These were the circumstances that made the Muslims believe that under a joint electoral system in a united India they would always remain at a disadvantage. However, under the Government of India Act of 1935 and with the broadening of the electorate the League was able to win most of the Muslim seats in the 1945-46 elections. Moreover, they were able to form the government only in Sind and in the rest of the Muslim majority provinces the League sat as the main opposition party. After partition the position was changed. The outflow of non-Muslims and the inflow of Muslims rendered all areas predominantly Muslim. The partitioned half of Bengal, which became Pakistan, had a large Muslim majority even though most of the non-Muslim population decided to stay on. The Muslim League was now able to form governments in all the provinces.

After independence no new elections were held and the central legislative assembly, which was indirectly elected in 1946 from the various provincial assemblies, was divided into

two to form the central legislatures of Pakistan and of India. Members of the central assembly in the undivided India did not represent any territorial constituencies but were elected 'en bloc' proportionally by each provincial legislature. The Pakistan portion of the assembly, consisting of less than 69 members, became the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. It was originally elected to perform two functions, i.e. to act as a constituent assembly to amend the Government of India Act and also to act as the central legislature. After independence, besides performing these two functions, its major task was to continue to frame a new constitution for the state, and till then it was to continue with all its previous functions. Throughout its life it sat separately for the two different sets of functions and its proceedings were also published separately as the 'Debates of the Constituent Assembly' and the 'Debates of the Constituent Assembly (Legislature)'. While in its latter role it was like any other elected parliament with cabinet government, in its former capacity it was in theory above party politics. The cabinet ministers sat as ordinary members and there were no government and opposition parties. However, in practice there was not any difference when it sat for either business and the government acted as the party in power even when the Assembly debated constitutional matters.

Pakistan inherited the Government of India Act of 1935 as a working constitution and the Constituent Assembly made a number of amendments in the Act according to need. The Act,

as has been noted earlier, set up a federal system of parliamentary government with the centre having many over-riding and residuary powers. The most important was the Section 93 under which the central government, i.e. the head of the state, could at any time dismiss a provincial government and legislature, and assume direct control of the province through its governor or chief commissioner who, in all cases, was a nominee of the Viceroy or the Governor General. The main features of the Act have been shown diagramatically in a simple form in Fig.49. The solid arrows show the electoral system and the broken ones the direction of political and administrative controls. Below the level of the province the local government consisted of elected Municipal Committees/ Corporations in towns/cities and District Boards for the rural areas of each district. Their main functions included health and sanitation, primary education, some roads and other public utilities. They were rather like miniature parliaments and their chairmen were elected from among their members.

For a study of the salient constitutional and administrative changes since independence it is convenient to divide the past twenty-three years into four periods: 1) the First Constituent Assembly, 1947-1954; 2) the Second Constituent Assembly, 1955-1956; 3) the First Constitution, 1956-1958; and 4) Martial Law and the Second Constitution, 1958-1969.

<u>The First Constituent Assembly</u>: The first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, which had been elected in 1946 indirectly by



Direction of election. ——→

Direction of political control. - - - - →

Fig. 49

Political Hierarchy under the Government of India Act of 1935

provincial assemblies on the basis of communal groups and proportional representation, met for the first time in Karachi on August 10, 1947. The Assembly was originally elected for the whole of the British India before independence and partition had been conceded. So, its division into two parts, one each for Pakistan and India, was a development which was not in view at the time of its election. Although the members of the Assembly were elected at the ratio of one to each million inhabitants, the total authorized membership of the Pakistan Assembly at the time of its inauguration was sixty-nine, a little less than it should have been. Some of these members decided to remain in India and at least six non-Muslim members later resigned and migrated to India, their constituents having already left Pakistan. However, in time the membership was gradually increased to give representation to the refugees and the princely states. Towards the end of its life in 1954 the Assembly thus had seventy-nine seats of which four non-Muslim seats were lying unfilled. In no session of the Assembly were all the members present, the maximum number recorded at a division was 53 and often the attendance was only around forty. Callard (1957) has discussed the reasons for poor attendance in detail. Perhaps the most important reason was the fact that many members accepted various offices in the central and provincial governments or diplomatic appointments abroad and did not care to either resign their seats in the Assembly or attend its sessions more regularly. Another reason was the short duration of the sessions for which the

Assembly was called so that many members did not take the trouble to travel to Karachi from far off places only to be there for a short time.

Until 1954 the Muslim League controlled the central and all the provincial legislatures, and whenever there was a vacancy in the Assembly it was sufficient to secure the nomination of the Central Parliamentary Board of the League to be elected. The total strength of the opposition in a division never exceeded fifteen. Although there were a few Muslim dissidents in the Assembly, the opposition mainly consisted of the Hindu members, mostly from East Pakistan, belonging to the Pakistan National Congress, the partitioned remnant of the Indian National Congress, the ruling party in India. This opposition was not only small in numbers but was totally ineffective because the members belonged to a party, and to a religious community, which had strongly opposed the idea of Pakistan. The opposition members, instead of levelling effective criticism at the government were occupied all the time in saving themselves from being labelled as traitors.

As has been said earlier the main task of the Assembly was to frame a constitution and in the meanwhile to amend the Government of India Act of 1935 whenever necessary. During its life it passed 44 amendments to the Act including the provision for adult franchise. In constitution-making the first major step was taken in the form of the Objectives Resolution which was then moved by the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and was adopted by the Assembly in March, 1949.

The Resolution was 'Islamic' in nature and laid down some fundamentals of the future constitution. It started with

> "In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful; Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust" (Callard 1957, p.89),

and required the state to be democratic, to guarantee fundamental rights, to provide opportunities to Muslims to lead their lives according to the teachings of Islam, to protect minorities and to operate a federal structure with autonomous units. The Resolution was a compromise in that it did not lay down specifically the requirements of an Islamic state and was open to many interpretations. Binder (1961) remarks:

> "The Objectives Resolution, acknowledged the sovereignty of God, recognized the authority of the people derived from their creator, and vested the authority delegated by the people in the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of making a constitution for the sovereign state of Pakistan. Thus is God sovereign, the people sovereign, parliament sovereign, and the state sovereign in Pakistan" (ibid. p.149).

The day the Objectives Resolution was adopted the Assembly established the Basic Principle Committee to prepare a report on which to base the draft of the constitution. The Committee was composed of 25 members with the President of the Assembly as its president and the Prime Minister as vice-president. Provincial Chief Ministers and the Chief Justice were also co-opted as its members. Very soon it was realized that the

Committee was too large and that most of its members had other official duties to fulfil and so could not give their full attention to its business. It was, therefore, divided into three sub-committees, each responsible for Federal and Provincial Constitutions and Distribution of Powers, for Franchise, and for the Judiciary. Moreover, a Board of 'Talimaat-e-Islamia', teachings of Islam, was set up, consisting of 'Ulama',* to advise the three sub-committees on the religious aspects of their recommendations.

The Federal and Provincial Sub-Committee was the first to present its report in July 1950 which, after having been discussed in the main Committee, was presented to the Assembly in September of the same year. This was the first time that these constitutional efforts were made public because the proceedings of the Basic Principles Committee and its sub-committees were considered to be confidential. This report did not cover all the constitutional matters as the other two sub-committees had not submitted their views, but its recommendations bore a marked similarity to the Government of India Act, 1935, recommending a bicameral parliamentary system. It could not recommend the distribution of seats in the two houses because this was the task of the Franchise Sub-Committee. Among its recommendations there were two points which were of

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*'Ulama' is the plural of Arabic 'Alim' meaning a learned person. In Pakistan the word has been specifically used for the traditional religious scholars, learned in the Koran and Arabic.

main importance: a) that the report contained very little by way of clearly defined Islamic provisions, a fact which disappointed the Ulama who had welcomed the Objectives Resolution; and, b) it was clearly stated that Urdu was to be the national language of Pakistan, a fact which was resented by East Pakistanis. Besides, the East Pakistani members also somehow inferred that in the new legislature they would not get representation proportional to their population. So, this report should be treated as the starting point at which the religious as well as the inter-wing differences actually came into politics. The religious differences between the secular politicians and the Ulama can be judged from the views of the Board of 'Talimaat-e-Islamia' on the report of the sub-committee contained in two documents which have been reproduced in Binder (ibid). The Board listed ten qualifications for the head of the state who could only be elected by "...the learned and pious representatives of the people". Moreover, the head of the state was to be elected for life and, although he was required to take advice from the representatives of the people, he had wide administrative powers. All these recommendations were in conflict with the secular democratic ideals of the modernist politicians who argued that since a modern parliament could be the equivalent of 'Shura', an advisory body, or of 'Ijma', consensus, the institutions allowed in Islam, the recommendations of the Board were unnecessary. However, the Board did not prove to be very rigid in their views and did in fact give much ground towards the election of the head of

the state for a fixed term and the acceptance of the proposed federal legislature as the equivalent of '...the pious and learned representatives of the people'. Nevertheless, the Ulama insisted that there was no provision in Islam for the inclusion of non-Muslims in any process of law making, though this particular point was not taken up by the Board in the document quoted above.

After the submission of the Federal and Provincial Sub-Committee report the Assembly appointed yet another special sub-committee to receive suggestions from the public about the recommendations of the report. The number of suggestions received by this sub-committee was described as 'enormous', and most of them referred to making the constitution Islamic according to the varying interpretations of their authors concerning the requirements of an Islamic state. The suggestions included a 'Draft Constitution for Pakistan' by Abul Ala Maududi, the fundamentalist leader of the religio-political party 'Jamaat-i-Islami'. As it proved later Maududi, despite his changing views on the Islamic constitution, turned out to be more intractable for the politicians than some of the Ulama, but unlike the latter Maududi was not a member of the Assembly, though he could arouse enough public feeling to embarrass the politicians. This was not an entirely unforeseen development as sectarian differences within the Ulama had always existed but now they had moved out into the political field, and in 1953 led to violent disturbances in the Punjab resulting in the imposition of Martial Law in Lahore.

The Suggestions Sub-Committee submitted its report to the parent Basic Principles Committee in July, 1952, and by that time the other two sub-committees, on Franchise and Judiciary, had also presented their reports. It took a further five months for more discussions and the consideration of the recommendations of the Board of 'Talimaat-e-Islamia', and finally the draft of the final report was presented to the Assembly on the 22nd December, 1952. This draft did not receive a better welcome than the earlier report of the Federal and Provincial Sub-Committee. This time the awkward insertion of the Islamic provisions was considered objectionable as was their absence from the earlier report. Besides the controversy over the religious clauses the interwing rivalry continued. The East Pakistanis continued to infer that they had not received their due share in representation and the Punjabis held the view that too much had been conceded to the eastern wing. The question of language was left open in both the reports and therefore remained a source of suspicion on the part of both East Pakistanis and Punjabis. However, after the presentation of the Report the Assembly was adjourned for three weeks to allow time to its members to study it. At the end of this period the Assembly was once again adjourned and when it finally met again in March, 1953, the report was surprisingly not on the agenda. In April the central government was changed and the new Prime Minister, who had been out of Pakistan as Ambassador to the United States, needed time to become familiar with the political conditions in the state. It was not before October, 1953, that the Prime Minister was able to announce that

> "The House will be pleased to learn that the formula has been unanimously accepted by my colleagues, by the Chief Ministers of East Bengal, the Punjab, Sind, the N-W.F.P. and Bahawalpur and by all members of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party" (Constituent Assembly, Debates, Vol. XV, p.14).

This magic formula, known as the 'Mohammed Ali Formula' related to the most controversial issue of representation in the new constitution. Under the formula there was to be proportional representation in the lower house of the central legislature and an equal number of seats allotted to the provinces and other administrative units in the upper house. The two houses, however, were to have equal powers and the total number of seats in the combined legislature was to be equally divided between the two wings as shown in Table 83.

Table 83

Allocation of Seats in the Central Legislature according to the Muhammed Ali Formula, October, 1953

Areas	Upper House	Lower House	Total
East Bengal	10	165	175
Punjab	10	75	85
NWFP, Frontier States, Tribal Areas	10	24	34
Sind and Khairpur	10	19	29
Baluchistan, Baluchistan States Union, Karachi	10	17	27
Total	50	300	350

(Source: Binder 1961)

The important thing to note about this formula, as indeed about all the important issues during that period, is that all the discussions and compromises were made outside the Assembly and there was not much debate in the formal proceedings of the Constituent Assembly. Commenting on this Callard writes

> "The conclusion is unavoidable that, on major constitutional issues, the place of decision was transferred from the Assembly to the Muslim Leagie Parliamentary Party" (op.cit. p.98).

Most of the issues were decided in the meetings of the Party and presented as 'fait accompli' to the Assembly where, because of weak opposition, there was not much discussion. It was only towards the end of the period when the League was declining in the provinces, particularly in East Pakistan, that the Assembly became an arena of heated debates. However, it shows that the Muslim League, because of its strong position in the Assembly, had circumvented the normal democratic practices by deciding everything in its closed door meetings rather than on the floor of the Assembly. Democracy was being undermined by the very people who stood for modern democratic institutions.

After the introduction of the Report of the Basic Principles Committee there followed a period of meetings and legotiations, mostly in secret and out of the Assembly, and finally in September, 1954, a drafting committee was appointed. It was announced that the new constitution would be presented to the next session of the Assembly and that it would be launched on 25th December, 1954, the birthday of Jinnah. A month later,

in October, 1954, the Assembly was dissolved by the Governor-General. Thus ended the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan which, after seven years of political struggles was about to frame a constitution for the state of Pakistan. The Draft Constitution, on which most of the work had probably been finished when the Assembly was dismissed, had not been fully disclosed to the public. The decision of the Governor-General was later challenged by the President of the defunct Assembly in the Supreme Court but was upheld.

There were several reasons for the dismissal of the Assembly. One of them was the argument that all the provinces had had new elections and legislatures after independence, and the Assembly as elected by the provincial legislatures elected before independence, was no longer a representative body. This argument would not have mattered much, because the Muslim League still controlled all the provincial legislatures in West Pakistan, but for the eastern wing where in 1954 the League was routed in the provincial elections by a United Front formed by several opposition parties, who claimed that the League members in the Constituent Assembly had now no right to represent East Pakistan as their original electors had miserably lost in the elections.

The second reason, which was probably more important, was the conflict that had developed between the Assembly and the Governor-General. There was no question of such a conflict arising during the life of Jinnah, 'Quaid-e-Azam' or the great leader as he was called, because of his personal prestige.

He was not only the Governor-General but also the President of the Constituent Assembly as well as being the President of the Muslim League. After his death, on September 11, 1948, Khawja Nazimuddin, a veteran Bengali politician, was elected as the Governor-General and remained in this office till October, 1951. During this period too the relations between the head of the state and the Assembly went on smoothly and the real power lay in the hands of the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, a trusted lieutenant of Jinnah. It was after the death of the latter on October 16, 1951, that the crisis of leadership gradually developed. Khawja Nazimuddin stepped down to become the Prime Minister and Ghulam Muhammed, a former civil servant and the then Finance Minister, became the Governor-General. It was the latter who proved to be strong and ambitious, particularly in the last years of his office, and came in direct conflict with the Constituent Assembly. It was he who dissolved the Assembly in October, 1954.

Part of the reason for conflict lay in the ambiguities of the Government of India Act of 1935. All acts of the Assembly required the assent of the Governor-General in order to become law, but, whereas the Assembly asked for such assent for all its legislative acts, it considered itself sovereign in constitutional matters. The Assembly not only extended its sovereignty in regard to the framing of the new constitution, but also in relation to any amendments in the working constitution, i.e. the Government of India Act, 1935. This, in other words, meant that the Assembly considered that it had the

powers to amend the Act without the assent of the head of the state but Ghulam Muhammed did not think that it had the legal right to make any changes in the powers of his office without his approval. The matter came to a head in 1954 when in September members from Sind and East Pakistan moved and passed an Act repealing the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949. This Act had provided powers to the Governor-General to institute a judicial inquiry against any politician suspected of misconduct while holding a public office. This was the first blow which the Assembly aimed at reducing the powers of the Governor-General.

The second, and a more drastic, step was taken by the Assembly on the day immediately following the passage of the repeal Act. On October 21, 1954, circumventing many procedural rules the Assembly passed The Government of India (Fifth Amendment) Act by which the Governor-General was almost stripped of all independent powers. The Bill was moved by a Sindhi member and was supported by a majority of the members from East Pakistan. This important constitutional amendment, it may be noted, was carried through only two months before the Assembly was supposed to adopt a new constitution. A few days later, when the Assembly was in recess, the Governor-General reacted viciously and did away with the Assembly itself. So the Assembly died, and the new constitution as well, before it was even born.

This was briefly the state of politics during the first seven years of Pakistan. There is no need here to go into the

details of the various political manoeuvres, which have been fully treated in various published works. The interest of this study lies in the general pattern of politics and its relationship with the cultural and economic distributions, a subject discussed in the next chapter.

The Second Constituent Assembly and the First Constitution: The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved in October, 1954, and the second Assembly was not elected till June, 1955. During this period of nine months the Governor-General ruled directly by degree and assisted by a cabinet appointed by him. Some very important things had happened during this interval in connection with the administrative integration of West Pakistan. Although the actual unification took place in October, 1955, most of the ground had been prepared before the election of the second Assembly.

It is the general opinion of most of the independent observers that the unification of West Pakistan was a very sensible step. 'One Unit', as the new unit of West Pakistan was popularly called, was necessary mainly because of three reasons: a) the development of transport, communications, water and power needed to be planned and executed on the West Pakistan level rather than on the levels of various provinces and other units; b) it provided an opportunity to rationalize the administrative structure by integrating princely states, an odd heritage of the colonial past. The second objective was not fully achieved as the Frontier States and the Tribal Areas

were allowed to continue as before. c) It also provided an opportunity for the culturally diverse areas of West Pakistan to be more closely linked to one another and thus create conditions for potential cultural integration.

However, the One Unit scheme as it was carried through, had strong political overtones. During the life of the first Constituent Assembly the plan to integrate West Pakistan was moved from time to time but was always successfully thwarted by members from East Pakistan and from some areas of West Pakistan. With the victory of the United Front in East Pakistan in 1954, their subsequent demands for more autonomy forced the central government to think seriously about the One Unit. They were not prepared to give greater powers to East Pakistan without having a comparable organization in the western wing. There was one plan for retaining the provinces and the states but having a 'zonal federation', a new level of government inserted between those at the provincial and central levels. No decision was, however, taken by the first Constituent Assembly on this issue.

After the dismissal of the first Assembly the government had no opposition to face at the centre, but the approval of the provinces was necessary. Within three months of the announcement that West Pakistan was to be integrated the three provincial legislatures of the Punjab, the NWFP and Sind had approved the plan. The methods used by the central government to get the approval were quite persuasive (Callard op.cit.). The Punjab Assembly smoothly voted its approval but some

opposition was expected in the NWFP Assembly. However, it too 'unanimously' passed its assent when the opposition had staged a walkout. Sind was the most difficult province as its Chief Minister, Pirzada Abdus Sattar, who was a public opponent of the unification plan, had got a statement opposing the One Unit signed by 74 out of the 110 members of the Sind Assembly. On November 8, 1954, he was dismissed by the Governor-General under the 'breakdown' clause of the Government of India Act, 1935, and was replaced by M.A.Khuro who proved so persuasive that the assembly passed the proposal by 100 votes to 4. Thus the central government was able to secure the agreement of the provinces about their merger into the one unit. All the functions of the various provincial governments were to be transferred to the new administration based in Lahore. By March, 1955, the new Governor and the Chief Minister of West Pakistan had been announced and the unification, by an order of the Governor-General, was about to go into operation when the Federal Court stepped in and, ruling on a petition, held that the Governor-General had no powers under the Government of India Act to integrate the provinces. So, the matter had to be postponed till the election of a new Constituent Assembly.

The second Assembly, consisting of 80 members equally divided between the wings, was elected by the various provincial legislatures and held its first meeting in July, 1955. As expected the Muslim League now no longer had so strong a position as in the first Assembly, particularly in East Pakistan. A Bill was moved in the new Assembly in August, 1955, to

bring about the integration of West Pakistan and a heated debate extending over four weeks followed. Most of the opposition to the Bill was voiced by members from East Pakistan and Sind, but a few from the Punjab and the NWFP also spoke against it. However, the government was able to force enough members, many against their will, to get the Establishment of West Pakistan Act passed on September 30, 1955. In the final division, of the thirteen votes cast against the Bill, all but one came from East Pakistan. On October 14, 1955, the new unit of West Pakistan came into being. To many people it was not the proposal for One Unit but rather the manner in which it was carried through that appeared undesirable. It was felt that when the Constituent Assembly was elected to frame a constitution it should have been left to it to incorporate the One Unit plan in the new constitution. The manner by which an important constitutional issue was decided by almost an executive order certainly appeared objectionable. However, as Callard (op.cit.) has remarked, this issue of integration was of such a nature that some coercion had to be applied anyway. Nonetheless the fact cannot be missed that the Governor-General and the central government wanted to rush this plan through in order to strengthen their positions before the bargaining regarding the new constitution restarted. Secondly, the civil service was very much in favour of the One Unit and their covert support of the plan was probably responsible for its successful completion in a relatively short time. The main opposition to the plan can be divided into two categories.

That of the members from East Pakistan was based on the fear that the whole scheme was aimed at reducing the numerical superiority of the eastern wing in the central Assembly; and that of the politicians from Sind and the NWFP was due partly to the fear of Punjabi dominance and partly because of impending redundancies in ministerial jobs as there was going to be one administration instead of several provincial ones. However, the Governor-General and the central government proved strong enough to get the approval of the provincial legislatures as well as of the central Assembly. One important feature of the Act, which otherwise was a simple document, was that the Punjab was allowed to have only 40 per cent representation in the new West Pakistan assembly, which was indirectly elected by the existing provincial assemblies, for a period of ten years. Only after the end of this period the Punjab could have 60 per cent of the total seats which was in actual proportion to its share in population. Karachi, which remained a federal district, was also allowed representation in the West Pakistan Assembly, a fact particularly opposed by East Pakistanis.

After the Assembly had disposed of the unification of West Pakistan it began framing the constitution. In functioning this Assembly was not different from the first one, but because of the experience gained during the first seven years no committees were now appointed to make recommendations for the new constitution. Instead the government prepared their own draft constitution which was published on January 15, 1956. After a recess of one week to allow time to the members to

study the Bill the Assembly met to discuss the various provisions of the Bill. As expected the debate that followed was heated with most of the opposition coming from the East Pakistani members, Muslims as well as non-Muslims. At the first division the combined opposition recorded 26 votes against 40 for the government. On another issue, the adoption of the title 'Islamic Republic', when the government whip was not used, the opposition scored 47 votes against 22. However, the government was able to carry all the clauses of the Bill, most of them during periods when the opposition members had walked out of the chamber in protest against one thing or another. Finally the Constitution was passed by the Assembly on February 29, 1956, and it came into force on March 23, the anniversary of the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Pakistan was declared to be a "Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan" (Constitution 1956, Part I Clause 1 (1)), within the Commonwealth.

This Constitution was again not very different from the Government of India Act, and the major departure from the Draft Constitution of 1954 was the provision for a unicameral central legislature with the two wings having equal rather than proportional representation. The head of the state, to be called President, emerged to be as powerful as the Governor-General was under the Act of 1935. The controversial clause 92(a)*

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* The Section 93 of the Government of India Act of 1935 was repealed immediately after independence but was soon reincorporated, on the insistence of Jinnah, as Section 92(a) without any amendment of the original provision.

was retained as clause 193 which gave powers to the President to dismiss provincial governments and take over direct administrative control through the Governor. The other difference between 1954 and now was that there were to be only two units of the federation instead of the several provinces, West Pakistan having been merged into one unit. The main features of the Constitution are shown diagramatically in Fig.50.

As far as the Islamic nature of the Constitution is concerned there was very little to satisfy the Ulama. The only specific provision in this regard was that the President must be a Muslim, over 40 years of age. Chapter I of Part XII of the Constitution did, however, provide for the appointment of a Commission by the President to advise on the enactment of Islamic law but the recommendations of the Commission were not binding on the legislature. Clause 198 also stated that no law should be enacted against the principles of Islam but again there was no mention of a procedure to decide whether a particular law was or was not in conformity with Islamic provisions. There was, however, no provision to debar religious minorities from any office except that of the President.

On the issue of federalism, the subjects on which provincial and central legislatures could legislate were separately demarcated but there was also a concurrent list including some subjects which were the common jurisdiction of both levels of government. In essence the degree of federalism was not in any sense greater than that under the Government of India Act. The centre remained powerful and Clause 193 was a strong weapon



Direction of elections. ——→

Direction of Political Control. - - - →

Fig. 50

Political Hierarchy under the 1956 Constitution

in the hands of the central government to deal with any provincial government who proved to be recalcitrant. This was against the spirit of federalism because the party in power at the centre was in a position to impose their will on a province where a different party might be in control.

On the coming into force of the new Constitution the existing offices and assemblies continued to function but under new names pending the elections. Thus the then Governor-General, Iskander Mirza, became the President, the Constituent Assembly turned into the first National Assembly and the provincial legislatures into the Provincial Assemblies of East and West Pakistan.

Another important question, that of electorates, was left open in the Constitution. The Muslim League before independence had fought hard, as the main minority party, to secure separate electorates and seats in the various Assemblies. After independence it retained this policy, which had now become even stronger as a result of the religious pressure to keep non-Muslim minorities out of the main decision making process, and therefore advocated separate electorates for Hindus, Scheduled Castes, Christians and Parsis. In West Pakistan there was widespread support for separate electorates, but in the eastern wing, as things turned out, there was a considerable opposition to separate and support for joint electorates. There were two main reasons for this. East Pakistani Hindus, particularly Caste Hindus, felt that by separate electorates they would remain in perpetual political isolation and would have no

influence in the legislature where Muslims would always remain in overwhelming majority. Secondly, the opposition Muslim parties in East Pakistan felt that under a joint system they could be in a position to get the support of the non-Muslims and oust the League - and this is what actually happened in the elections in 1954. By having separate electorates they could not use the 25 per cent religious minorities to their advantage. This line of thought also appealed to Hindus because, although they would be entitled to a quarter of seats from East Pakistan under a separate system, joint electorates would enable them to hold the balance between rival Muslim candidates in a greater number of constituencies.

The whole question of electorates was left by the Constituent Assembly to be decided by the two provincial legislatures. Accordingly the West Pakistan Assembly in August, 1956, decided in favour of separate electorates by 129 to 10 votes. A few weeks later in October, the East Pakistan Assembly, after a violent debate, rejected a motion for separate electorates and decided for the joint system by 159 to 1 votes. Now, everything was left to the National Assembly which, meeting a week later in Dacca, passed a Bill in a stormy session establishing separate electorates for the religious communities. Thus the old philosophy of the League, on which it had fought the Congress before 1947, found a statutory recognition in the first Constitution of Pakistan. It also pleased some of the Ulamas, though others remained adamant on excluding all non-Muslims from at least the main law making body.

On the question of language the Constitution followed the Draft Constitution of 1954 in declaring both Urdu and Bengali as the national languages but it retained English for official use for a period of twenty years.

The period between 1956 and 1958 was characterized by continuous political intrigues, shifting loyalties and unscrupulous manoeuvres, as the various factions prepared to gain power in the coming elections, the first under the new Constitution. Stephens (1964) has summed up the conditions that existed in 1958 thus:

> "By now, mere stratagems to retain or capture office were practically the sole preoccupation of politicians, Central and provincial, because of the prospect of general elections early next year, the first in Pakistan's history. Everyone assumed that, whoever held Ministerships at the time in Karachi, Dacca or Lahore would rig the results and so keep power. Manoeuvrings of the most shameless sort therefore intensified, while the country's affairs slid towards chaos. The national finances were in frightening disarray; prestige abroad had slumped to almost nil; corruption or allegations of it flourished everywhere, and there could be little doubt that it had reached the higher ranks of the civil service. In the East wing, during September, a meaningless vendetta in the Legislature resulted in the Awami League faction getting the Speaker formally declared insane; whereupon, two days later, its rivals of Mr Fazal-ul-Haq's Krishak Sramik party, in an organized demonstration, hurled pieces of furniture at his Deputy, causing his death" (pp.298-299).

It was in these circumstances that Martial Law was proclaimed on October 8, 1958, by President Iskandar Mirza who, three weeks

later found himself on a plane to London after having been forced to resign by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, Ayub Khan.

Martial Law and the Second Constitution, 1958-1969: Martial Law, under the circumstances described above, was welcomed generally. Of course, the politicians did not like it because they suddenly found themselves out of business and office, but to the general public it was a relief after years of political wrangling and intrigue. Martial Law was, however, very mild compared to the experiences of some other states mainly because the politicians had become so much discredited that the military regime had nothing to fear from them, and so they were let go without any harsh treatment. Besides debarring most of the politicians from public life and removing the corrupt and inefficient officials, the new government took several reform measures, particularly the Agricultural Reforms discussed in Chapter 8.

Immediately on assuming powers in October, 1958, President Ayub Khan announced that he would hand over power to a civilian government under a new constitution suited to the needs of the country. On the first anniversary of Martial Law in 1959 the President stated his willingness to go ahead with the framing of the new constitution, but before that he had to have some legal framework and a legitimate authority to institute the new constitution. So, in October, 1959, a Basic Democracies

Order was issued under which 80,000 representatives,* equally divided between the wings and each representing a constituency of between 600 and 1000 population, were elected to form an electoral college. This electoral college returned a 95.6 per cent vote of confidence confirming Ayub Khan as the civilian President. On February 17, 1960, a Constitution Commission consisting of eleven members was appointed by the President to make recommendations for the future constitution. The Commission submitted its report in May, 1961, the Constitution was promulgated in March, 1962, and went into effect on June 8, 1962. On the same date Martial Law was formally withdrawn. The new Constitution was really new in that it marked a radical departure from all previous attempts. Its main features are shown in Fig.51. For once all pretence of federalism and parliamentary democracy was dropped. It was a straightforward Presidential system in which the executive was all-powerful. The legislature, and to some degree the judiciary too, was subservient to the President. The National Assembly, elected on the basis of parity between the two wings, did not have much power against the wishes of the President who, once elected, was not responsible to anybody. The powers of a central legislature under any democratic system to amend or reject the annual budget proposed by the government were so much curtailed under this Constitution that the Assembly was not much more

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* Later the total number of the 'Basic Democrats' was increased to 120 thousand, 60 thousand in each wing.



Fig. 51

Political Hierarchy under the 1962 Constitution

than a rubber stamp to give a formal approval to the Bills moved on behalf of the President. For example a part of the financial procedure of the centre read:

"Article 41, Clause 1.

So much of an Annual Budget Statement as relates to expenditure charged upon the Central Consolidated Fund may be discussed in, but shall not be submitted to the vote of, the National Assembly.

Article 41, Clause 4.

The National Assembly may, with the consent of the President, reduce a demand for a grant referred to in clause (3) of this article and, in that event, the Assembly shall be deemed to have assented to the demand as so reduced."

and so on.

The President was to appoint a council of ministers who were not to be members of the Assembly and, therefore, not responsible to it. Later, by an amendment, the ministers were chosen from among the members of the Assembly but they remained answerable only to the president. There is no need to go into all the details of the Constitution which was in effect meant to give legal sanctity to a highly personalized and almost absolute rule. There were many ingenious safeguards to protect the incumbent of the office of the President as, although there were provisions for the impeachment of the President, in practice it was highly unlikely to happen. Any motion for his impeachment was required to be signed by at least one-third of the members of the Assembly and, in order to succeed, it had to be carried by a three-quarters majority of total members. In case such

a motion failed to get one half the members of the Assembly in its support, the original signatories were to lose their seats in the National Assembly.

In the two wings there were two Provincial bodies and the head of the executive was the Governor, an appointee of the President, who could only be removed by the latter. This was another disguised measure but very effective to safeguard the executive. Since the actual administration was carried out by the two provincial governments, if either of the wings was dissatisfied with its Governor it was necessary to impeach the President in order to remove the former. This was impossible without the substantial support of the members from the other wing. In view of the cultural and past political differences it was not very likely that the two wings would join together. The Governors in the wings enjoyed the same sort of relationship with the Provincial assemblies as did the President with the Central one.

The 1962 Constitution was the least Islamic of all the attempts made. It did not even carry the name 'Islamic Republic', though some years later the word was inserted in face of growing pressure from the Ulama. The Constitution did, however, provide for the establishment of an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology and an Islamic Research Institute, but these bodies ~~did not~~ could had have any powers. This was just an ineffective measure to give an 'Islamic' semblance to the Constitution.

Besides consolidating the power of the President and the central government, the Constitution also introduced a new method of elections. As mentioned before the 80,000 representatives elected on the basis of adult franchise (Fig.51) formed an electoral college for the election of the President, the National Assembly and the two provincial assemblies. Moreover, the 80,000 'Basic Democrats' formed members of about 8,000 local councils, 4,000 in each wing, called Union Councils in rural areas and Union Committees in urban areas. Above them there were several tiers of councils at the Tehsil, District and Division levels, headed by official chairman who virtually controlled these councils. It was in fact a reproduction of the President/National Assembly combination on a decreasing scale down to the level of Tehsil or Thana Councils. Only the Union Council or Committees had elected chairmen but these bodies had no real functions. So, while on the one hand the system involved public representatives at all the levels ranging from a small neighbourhood to that of the state, it ensured the concentration of power in one man and his trusted appointees.

Gradually the people realized the faults of the system and the opposition started growing, first in East Pakistan and then spreading to all parts of the state. The system had unwittingly brought political consciousness at the grass roots level through the so-called 'Basic Democracies'. Riots and widespread violence, directed particularly at the supporters of the government during the winter of 1968-69 ultimately

forced Ayub Khan to abdicate in the spring of 1969 and hand over power to another Martial Law regime. Under his system there was no provision for an instant alternative government; one personalised rule had to be replaced by another in the situation where law and order in many areas had completely broken down.

The new Martial Law government has, however, arranged to hold elections to a new Constituent Assembly on December 7, 1970. After the election of the Assembly a limit of 120 days has been set to frame a constitution, failing this the Assembly shall stand dissolved and fresh elections shall be held.

One important step the present government has taken is the disintegration of West Pakistan into the former provinces as a result of rising demands from East Pakistan, Sind and the NWFP. The details of the reorganization are still being carried out at the time of writing.

CHAPTER 15

SOCIO-ECONOMIC REALITIES AND POLITICS

Insofar as politics is a product of organized human society it must reflect the socio-economic conditions of the population of a state. This does not mean to say that socio-economic conditions are a determinant of the form of government and constitution but they do have a strong influence on the political processes and the administration of territory. As pointed out in Chapter 1 there is a two-way relationship between politics and geography - the latter includes all the cultural, social and economic characteristics of the population as well as the physical aspects of territory, climate and resources. Politics is affected by the economic and cultural distributions, while political decisions directly bear on the pattern and the nature of those distributions. Obviously, on the one hand, the influence of cultural and economic distributions on politics is relatively more visible in a democratic system, and on the other hand the effect of politics on geography becomes deeper the more regulatory a state is. In the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to find out the important differences in the various cultural and economic distributions between the wings and the provinces. In some cases the inter-regional differences are very marked, in others the variations are relatively slight. Wherever possible the trends in these differentials have also been observed. In this chapter a systematic examination of the inter-relationships between these distributions and the

actual politics in Pakistan has been made. It must be remembered that twenty years is a short time in the history of a state. It is not fruitful, therefore, to attempt a projection of the future conditions, nor is it useful to base any definite rules on past political history because man's political behaviour is not subject to any laws. However, it is necessary to find out the relevant relationships in order to have a better understanding of the functioning of the state. To this end the various cultural, economic and political aspects are considered in turn.

Religion has undoubtedly been one of the most important issues both before and since independence. The state-idea of Pakistan was based on the assumption that the Muslims in the subcontinent were a nation and therefore entitled to live in a state of their own. The complex nature of the religious distributions in the subcontinent has already been noted (Chapter 3), but the main problem for Pakistan on the religious question, however, arose after partition. Although a new state was demanded on religious grounds, there was no definite commitment to establish a theocratic state as was implicit in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League (see Chapter 2). Because of the preoccupation of the leaders with the independence issue it was taken for granted that once Pakistan had been achieved it would not be difficult to resolve the question of an Islamic state and that whatever differences there were between different groups would be removed after independence. It was not so when

the discussions about the future constitution started after 1947. It has been remarked earlier (Chapter 3) that the bulk of religious opinion opposed the idea of Pakistan on the grounds that Islam did not provide for any territorial nationalism and that it was a universal religion based on the unity of all the believers irrespective of their nationalities. In fact nationalism was condemned by some religious leaders as something evil and anti-Islamic (Binder 1963). On the other hand the leaders of the Muslim League and that section of the religious opinion which supported the League not only found nationalism desirable but necessary to protect Islam in the subcontinent. These differences, which remained rather academic till 1947, came to dominate the post-independence politics, particularly in connection with the discussions over the shape of the future constitution.

Much of the differences between different groups on the nature of an Islamic state can be attributed to the fact that Islam has not laid down any specific constitutional provisions, and the various sources and precedents on the subject are liable to different interpretations.

> "The desire to have an Islamic constitution, as in Pakistan, Egypt and the Sudan, is in part the acceptance of a European idea, namely, that of constitutional government. The difficulties in framing an Islamic constitution for a modern state are formidable, since atmany points the Islamic political tradition is far from being clear and unambiguous" (Watt 1968, p.121).

However, as the controversy over these issues developed during the years after independence different views and interpretations crystallised into three categories:

a) Traditionalists; b) Fundamentalists; c) Modernists. To the first category belonged the Ulama, including those who supported the Muslim League in demanding partition, who were prepared to accept most of the proposals of the modernists as long as they received a statutory recognition of themselves as an institution with the sole right to interpret the Islamic law. In other words they wanted to have control over the legislative functions as to them secular politicians were not competent to frame Islamic laws.

The second category, fundamentalists, have been represented by Maududi, head of the 'Jamaat-i-Islami', a politico-religious party, and they looked back for precedents and guidance to the time of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs. They wanted to re-establish the caliphate and, despite his changing views, Maududi has not been prepared to give any statutory recognition to the Ulama. According to his views all the executive, legislative and judicial powers must be vested in the head of the state who must be a pious Muslim elected for life by an electoral college of pious Muslims.

The third category of Modernists included the leaders of the League and other secular politicians who did not find anything un-Islamic about the western democratic institutions as long as such laws were not passed which clearly violated the religious injunctions. On some points the differences

between the first two categories proved to be deeper than those between the Ulama and the modernists. In fact Ulama did give much ground to modernists but they, as well as the fundamentalists, had no place for the religious minorities in any process of law making. In this regard the only concession the two groups received was the provision in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions that the head of the state must be a Muslim. Despite the so-called Islamic provisions in the two constitutions both were basically secular and thus not acceptable to most of the Ulama. So, till the Martial Law of 1958 religion played a very prominent role in politics, sometimes resulting in violence, but in practical terms religious opinion gained almost nothing. As Callard remarked in 1957:

> "Men of religion have laid claim to complete authority and have achieved almost none" (ibid, p.5).

The electorate maintained a complete separation of religion and politics. While people always looked to the religious leaders for matters of the spirit - as happened in the violent religious riots in the Punjab in 1953 - they never failed to return the secular politicians as members of legislative assemblies. However, the poor performance of the Jamaat-i-Islami and other religious parties in elections is not indicative of their influence in arousing public sentiment on certain issues.

The regime of Ayub Khan and the 1962 Constitution proved even more secular than their predecessors. However, because of the greater coercive power of his government there was not much public expression of opposition. There was no occasion

for a formal or public debate over the 1962 Constitution as it was framed by one man and imposed by one man rather than by an assembly. Because of the almost absolute powers of the president, the Islamic Advisory Council and the Institute of Islamic Research, provided under the 1962 Constitution, were even less effective as Islamic provisions than in the 1956 Constitution. For the same reasons the government, which derived most of its power from the armed forces rather than from the people, was less sensitive to any pressure from the religious leaders though at times it did accept some minor demands, as for example the changing of the name from the Republic of Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. On other issues, when the government believed it was in the interest of the people, it did not yield to any pressure from the Ulama. The family planning programme and the Family Laws Ordinance, which among other things put some restrictions on polygamy, were vehemently opposed by nearly all Ulama but there was no change in the policy of the government.

As a result of the prolonged controversies on religious issues, which even years of debate failed to resolve, there has been a certain amount of disillusionment among the more articulate sections of the population. This is not due to any decrease in the importance of religion in the daily life of the people but because of the unnecessarily long and unproductive bickering between the politicians and Ulama. That Islam is very much the major force keeping all the different parts of the state together is shown by the fact that no

political party or politician can afford to divorce religion from politics, at least not publicly. Even the extreme left wing parties find it necessary to include Islam in their policies as is shown by the manifestoes of the various parties prepared to fight the coming elections to the Constituent Assembly (Pak. News, Jan.15, 1970). However, the confusion regarding the Islamic Constitution is again clearly reflected as none of the parties have put forward any definite constitutional proposals even though the Assembly is to be specifically elected to frame a constitution; it will have no legislative or financial powers. The debate in this coming Assembly is bound to be heated particularly if the Ulama and the Jammat-i-Islami can find enough public support to get some of their members returned to the Assembly. There is, however, no indication that all the parties concerned can agree on the exact provisions of an Islamic constitution. The fact that the Objectives Resolution passed by the first Constituent Assembly was accepted by all the interested groups within and outside the Assembly, except by the minorities, was because of its ambiguous nature which allowed for different interpretations to be made satisfying all the viewpoints of the traditionalists, fundamentalists and modernists.

Related to the problems of an Islamic constitution is the question of minorities. Although Pakistan is overwhelmingly a Muslim state, the substantial Hindu minority in East Pakistan is important in holding the electoral balance between the various parties. The importance of their political support

was shown in the Muslim League defeat in the 1954 provincial elections in East Pakistan. Any proposal by the fundamentalists or the traditionalists to keep non-Muslims out of the decision-making process is bound to be opposed by most of the East Pakistani politicians. It will be seen as an attempt by the western wing to turn the eastern wing's numerical majority into a minority, although this argument cannot now be validly maintained as East Pakistan can no longer argue so convincingly that West Pakistan as a whole is aligned against it because of the recent disintegration of the western wing. Secondly, the elections to the Assembly itself are going to be held on the basis of proportional representation and that minorities will have the same rights as the Muslims, with the result that East Pakistan will have more members. It must also be noted that there are regional differences among Muslims in their attitude towards minorities, particularly towards the Hindus. In the Punjab, which experienced the greatest amount of violence at the time of partition, and among refugees, there is a general feeling of hostility towards Hindus who, at certain times, have been regarded as a fifth-column working for the interest of India. In East Pakistan Hindus suffered considerably after independence but when feelings against West Pakistan grew deeper there was some improvement in the Muslim-Hindu relationship. Although Islam remains a strong social and political force, the feeling of being Bengali is very strong in East Pakistan and the common language shared by East Pakistani Hindus and Muslims is a factor of considerable importance.

In the question of minorities Sind has been markedly similar to East Pakistan. Here too the largest religious minority is Hindu (Chapter 3) and the relationship between the Sindhi Muslims and Hindus has been on the whole very good. In fact all the religious trouble in Sind took place after independence when the refugees clashed violently with the Sindhi Hindus, a clash in which Sindhi Muslims either did not take part or supported the Hindus (Binder op.cit.). In Baluchistan and the NWFP the question of minorities is not very important because of their relatively small number.

On the whole the relationship between religion and politics in Pakistan has proved to be inconclusive. Religious issues have for many years dominated the politics of the state but the Ulama have not succeeded in bringing about a religious state. The main reasons for their failure to do so lie in their own differences regarding the nature of an Islamic state, the remoteness of the historical precedents on which they have tried to base their interpretations, the secular outlook of the politicians and the intelligentsia, and the absence of any ecclesiastical organization in Islam. However, Islam is an important influence in the lives of people because even those who are not practising Muslims, or are agnostics, generally "...feel a deep loyalty to Islamic society as a cultural entity" (Watt op.cit., p.120). Among the modern educated classes there is a tendency towards what has been called "a secular Islamic nationalism" (ibid. p.120). Many Pakistanis feel disappointed or embarrassed by the many internal

dissensions within the Muslim world and try to ascribe these to the intrigues of the Western powers. It is not advisable to make any predictions but it is likely that in Pakistan the importance of religion in politics will somewhat decrease as other issues, economic and political, have become quite important during the recent years. Nevertheless, since Islam affects all spheres of human life, it is not possible to eliminate the religious issues altogether even if the questions considered are purely economic, cultural or political.

The second important cultural element to be considered is language. The politics of language has been as important as that of religion, though there has been some temporary agreement since 1956. The variety of languages spoken in Pakistan and their distribution (Chapter 4) and the importance of language in education (Chapter 5) are basic to the discussion of the role that the language issue has played in politics since independence.

During the Mogul period Persian was the official language of the government but Urdu had developed as a 'lingua franca' by the fusion of Persian and Sanskrit. When the British took over, Persian was replaced by English as the official language but local languages continued to be used on the lower administrative levels and for basic literacy. Under the overall superiority of English there was no question of a rivalry between the different local languages in the subcontinent. After independence, however, when it was understood that English would be given up as the official language because of its

connection with the colonial past, the rivalries between the various languages came to the surface and led to violence. The Muslim League leadership was agreed that the state language of Pakistan would be Urdu and immediately after independence, for the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, both English and Urdu were allowed to be used. In 1948 when a Bengali Hindu member of the Assembly introduced a motion to use Bengali in the house, the motion was turned down and the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, emphatically said that Urdu was going to be the state language (Callard 1957). Later in March, 1948, Jinnah himself, while addressing a public meeting in Dacca, declared that"...the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language" (ibid p.182). Such was the authority and prestige of both these leaders that there was no strong reaction against their pronouncements in favour of Urdu and Liaquat Ali Khan was able to incorporate this attitude in the Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee which flatly declared that Urdu alone was to be the national language.

After the death of these two leaders, there was no one in the Muslim League strong enough to impose this decision. In February, 1952, when the then Prime Minister, Khawja Nazimuddin, himself a Bengali, spoke in favour of Urdu in Dacca, students of Dacca University violently protested resulting in the police firing on the demonstrators causing some deaths. It was at once made clear that the people of East Pakistan were not prepared to accept Urdu as the national language. Within twenty-four hours of this incident the East Bengal Assembly passed a

resolution asking the central government to give Bengali the status of a national language. The result was that the national language question was dropped altogether from the Interim Report followed by a period of uncertainty during which East Pakistanis continued to feel that the central government was not prepared to accept their demand.

This controversy over the language issue continued until in the 1956 Constitution Urdu and Bengali were both declared as national languages but English was retained for a period of twenty years as the language of the government, higher education and the law courts. The Constitution of 1962 gave the same recognition to Urdu, Bengali and English. This arrangement is likely to continue and because of the rivalry between Urdu and Bengali, English will probably go on as an official language, at least at the level of the central government and in higher education.

Although Urdu has been officially recognized as the language of West Pakistan, regional languages have played an important part in the politics of the western wing. As remarked earlier, Urdu has been fully accepted in the Punjab, to the extent that Punjabi is not taught in schools at any level. Mohammed Iqbal, a famous poet/philosopher and one of the originators of the Pakistan idea, wrote most of his poetry in Urdu and not in Punjabi even though it was his mother tongue. Punjabi language has not been a basis of any regionalism, the main reasons for which are probably the relatively advanced status of the Punjab and the fact that Punjabi is basically a spoken language with wide regional variations.

In the NWFP where Pushto is the main language, it has been important as a basis of local nationalism. The separatist movement of Pukhtoonistan derived most of its strength from the common language which is spoken on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan boundary. However, Pushto, because of its relatively low state of development (Chapter 4), is not a very important language of literacy and education. In Sind the local language, Sindhi, is more deeply entrenched. Even after the adoption of Urdu as the national language in West Pakistan Sindhi has remained important as a language of literacy. It has formed a basis for the strong Sindhi regionalism. Baluchistan, because of a higher degree of cultural heterogeneity, has no single language in a majority and thus the basis of a province-wide linguistic regionalism is relatively weaker, though at times Baluchi speaking people have appeared to be conscious of their separate cultural identity.

The one unit of West Pakistan was formed with the aim of gradually integrating the provinces but for various reasons it could not achieve this aim. In fact it has been in operation for only fifteen years, too short a period to break down the traditional linguistic barriers. The policy of the government on the question of language has not been firm and consistent. It did not use its influence and powers after the integration of West Pakistan to introduce Urdu at all levels of education in all areas. Looking back it appears that the integration was achieved only in administrative matters. In language policy the former provincial areas, particularly Sind, continued

as before. However, because of the removal of provincial boundaries in 1955 the movement of people and goods between different areas was certainly facilitated and the full extent of the effects of one unit will only be assessed after the 1971 Census. On the whole the problem of language as such is not serious but when the linguistic differences combine with other differences in the economic and political fields, language can give a considerable stimulus to regional tendencies because it is the most effective and tangible differentiating feature of the population. That the linguistic differences are still very important is shown by the recent re-emergence of the provinces. It is difficult to see what the future policy of the government will be in connection with language but it is almost certain that the provincial governments of Sind and the NWFP will try to advance the cause of their local languages. If this happens then the cultural isolation of the population will be perpetuated and the prospects of integration will become that much more remote.

There does not seem to be any prospect of Pakistan evolving into a unilingual state in any foreseeable future but bi- or multilingualism is not necessarily a weakness for a state if there are no other regional differences, economic and political, and if there is a common acceptance of the aims and objects for which a state has been established. However, the linguistic fragmentation in Pakistan is further aggravated by its physical fragmentation and, as shown in Chapter 6, the contact between the two wings is very limited and affects only a small fraction

of the whole population. Because of isolation the differences are often exaggerated and misunderstanding between the people grows. Moreover, the politicians have capitalized on this misunderstanding in order to grind their own axes. Greater and frequent contact between the provinces is essential for evolving homogeneity because it has been shown that where different linguistic groups have lived together for a sufficiently long time multilingualism is a relatively common phenomenon (Chapter 7, Fig.18).

In the coming constitutional discussions language itself may not prove to be an important issue but in the wider question of provincial autonomy it is certainly going to play a significant role. The main linguistic problem, however, arises out of the simple fact that Bengali is a regional language, like Pushto, Sindhi or Punjabi, but its speakers are in a numerical majority. If the Bengali speakers, like other linguistic groups in Pakistan, had formed a minority the problem of national language would not have been so serious and it is likely that Urdu would have been declared the only national language. Now the best which can be hoped for is a bilingual state and that only if all the provinces of West Pakistan accept Urdu, at least as the lingua franca. In that case too the retention of English at the central government level will probably remain a necessity.

In the field of cultural integration all governments have failed to take any definite measures. Of course it is impossible to overcome the linguistic and cultural barriers which have

existed for centuries in a matter of a generation but the absence of any concrete policies is not going to make the problem any easier. The main obstacle undoubtedly lies in the lack of contact, particularly between the two wings. It is not easy for the government to offset the effect of the physical separation of the two wings. However, air travel, which carries most of the passengers between the wings, has been made relatively easier by subsidizing it by 50 per cent. Even then it is too expensive to be used by any appreciable number of people. Almost the whole contact between the wings is limited to government officials and businessmen and at the level of the common man the two parts are almost completely isolated.

Within the two wings the movement of people is also not very significant. In East Pakistan the lack of a good transport system and in West Pakistan the linguistic barriers keep people separated from each other. Because of social traditions, even in large cities people tend to concentrate in various linguistic groups. With the expansion in literacy, language barriers are bound to become weaker but because of the government's preoccupation with economic development education has received a relatively small share of the funds.

The most important measure towards cultural integration was taken by the government in 1959 with the establishment of a Bureau of National Reconstruction, with the object "to coalesce all the divergent linguistic, sectarian and social groups into a single cohesive nation" (Dawn, January 14, 1959, p.1). For the first time an organization had been created which operated

on a secular basis though religion did form a part of its activities. However, despite the fact that the Bureau did a useful job, mainly through holding discussions, seminars and arranging the exchange of students and other persons between the wings, its activities were totally limited to large urban centres and affected only a tiny minority of educated people. Oddly enough the Bureau also encouraged literature in the local languages. However, its functions were greatly hampered by the scarcity of funds, and there is evidence that the Bureau failed to achieve any of its objectives partly because of its policy of encouraging regional languages, but mainly because of the suspicions and misunderstandings of East Pakistan (von Vorys 1965).

> "It is my impression, moreover, that even among the more educated, urbanized segments the initial results were on the negative side. Identification with regions and the provinces did not perceptibly decline in favour of national orientation. More often it intensified" (ibid. p.154).

During recent years the economic issues have become increasingly prominent in political debates. The nature and the main causes of economic differences have been discussed in Part III. It was seen that Pakistan is a relatively poor country and there are considerable variations in the level of economic development between different areas. Much of the economic differentials undoubtedly result from the different initial levels of economic development at the time of independence. East Bengal was relatively poor but there were also differences

within West Pakistan. In fact some districts in the latter have been poorer than the poorest in East Pakistan. During the past twenty years or so, differences in some cases have deepened; in others the trend is towards achieving equality. However, the major complaint of the relatively less developed provinces, particularly East Pakistan, has been that the central government as dominated by West Pakistan have failed to remove these differences in incomes and in general economic development. In fact a section of opinion has accused the central government of deliberately keeping certain areas backward. As in the case of language, the main confrontation has been between the wings. East Pakistani leaders have argued that East Pakistan, which has been the major earner of foreign exchange, has not received its due share of the development funds (Chapter 11). West Pakistan has certainly been receiving a larger share of the imports though it has exported less than East Pakistan. The same sort of grievances have been voiced by other provinces in West Pakistan against the economic dominance of the Punjab and Karachi.

As a result of the general issue of poverty the most significant political development in recent years has been the emergence of left wing parties. The Communist Party of Pakistan, which had never been of much political significance was totally banned in 1954 and because of religious influence any leftist movement did not have much chance of success as a result of being labelled anti-Islamic by Ulama and right wing politicians. Even though the Communist Party of India had

supported the claim of the Muslims for Pakistan in the early 1940s, it failed to attract any large scale following among the Muslims. However, when the religious controversies over the constitution failed to be resolved after years of discussions and later when economic issues became more important, socialist views came to be accepted by certain sections of the population. Sino-Indian conflict in the early 1960s and the resultant friendship between Pakistan and China gave an impetus to leftist parties. Nevertheless, even the extreme leftist parties in Pakistan have not found it possible to present a purely secular philosophy and have frequently used the term 'Islamic Socialism'. For example it was reported about Maulana Bhashani, leader of the pro-Peking left wing National Awami Party, that:

> "Maulana Bhashani reiterated his demand for Islamic socialism. 'Call me what you like - Communist or anything - but I will remain a Mussalman till my death', said the Maulana" (Pakistan News, January 5, 1970, p.2).

This new development in the politics in Pakistan, which in the past have been almost completely monopolized by the right wing elements whether Ulama or politicians, has opened up possibilities of a polarization between right and left wing philosophies rather than between the traditionalists, fundamentalists and modernists. Expansion in literacy and an increasing realization of the economic problems is bound to weaken the position of the Ulama, though not necessarily of Islam.

Regional economic disparities (Chapter 12, Fig.44) have strengthened the claims for provincial autonomy. Whether provincial autonomy in the utilization of resources can solve

the economic problems in Pakistan is an academic question open to different arguments, but the centralization of policy-making processes, particularly under the Ayub Khan regime, gave a powerful tool in the hands of East Pakistani politicians for their demands for greater provincial autonomy, in fact for a loose confederation. All the political parties, irrespective of their ideological complexion, which derive their main support from East Pakistan stand for provincial autonomy in all functions except defence, foreign affairs, interwing communications and currency. They all want complete provincial control over finance, trade, planning etc. The increased expenditure on development in the eastern wing during the Second and Third Plan periods has failed to placate the demands for greater provincial powers. The decentralization of some government and semi-government functions during the 1960s - like the Railways, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Water and Power Development Authority, etc. - were not accepted as sufficient concessions to the demands of provincial autonomy because, as seen in Chapter 14, there was little room for devolution in the 1962 Constitution and the elected assemblies, central and provincial, had no financial control. During the last decade a gradual hardening of the attitudes in East Pakistan against the central government and in particular against the Punjab which was believed to be dominating in the centre, in the armed forces and in the civil service, took place. All the measures taken by the central government, including coercion and appeasement, to pacify the opposition brought no results.

Consequently the fall of the Ayub regime was celebrated as a victory more in the eastern than in the western wing.

Within West Pakistan similar demands for provincial autonomy have also been voiced by politicians in Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan. There are no official figures available in detail about the economic benefits or otherwise accruing to the provinces as a result of the administrative integration, but the Punjabis have maintained that they have lost to other provinces a considerable portion of funds that they would have had if the Punjab had remained a separate province. On the other hand the provinces of Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan complain that some of their revenue has been spent on development projects in the Punjab. It is not possible here to ascertain the validity of the arguments but it is a fact that a lot of misunderstanding and conflict have developed between the Punjab and other provinces which, together with the demands for provincial autonomy from East Pakistan, has brought about the disintegration of West Pakistan. It is unfortunate that this integration, which might have proved tremendously useful to all parts of the wing, had to be undone because of various political and cultural reasons before it could show its effects. Keeping in view that the NWFP and Baluchistan had been two deficit provinces depending on subsidies from the central government, it is likely that they may not have any of the benefits which the opponents of one unit think they will have as separate provinces.

All the statistical evidence used in Part III shows that the central government, at least during the period of the Third Five Year Plan, did pursue a policy towards achieving a regional equality in economic standards. It failed to convince East Pakistan of its sincerity in this regard because of the political unpopularity which it had already earned as a result of the strongly centralized constitution under which the provinces had really no powers. While the central government tried to concede some economic demands at the cost of political control, East Pakistan has been pressing for political power in order to gain financial control. It is to be seen how the next constitution will tackle the problem of economic planning at the state level and the provincial demands for greater powers.

In day to day politics the constitutional issues, which of course derive from the cultural and economic differences, figure more prominently because they are usually the favourite subjects of politicians. In Pakistan the main constitutional issues, as can be gathered from the previous chapter, have been those of federalism and of representation. The two questions are very much related but here they are discussed separately.

As pointed out in Chapter 2 the original demand for Pakistan incorporated a federal idea in very vague terms. This was the price paid by the Muslim League to obtain the support of all the Muslim majority provinces. According to this demand, expressed in the Lahore Resolution of March 1942, a federal structure with a high degree of provincial autonomy was explicitly conceded. However, once Pakistan came into being

there were several factors which favoured a more centralized system.

First of all there was the problem of creating the whole governmental machinery for a new state which required a strong central administration to cope with the problems. Secondly, the general dislocation due to partition and the tremendous problem of the settlement of refugees also necessitated a strong centre to co-ordinate all the efforts to meet these difficulties. If the problems had been left to the provincial governments there would have been many complications, as for example the rather uncompromising attitude of Sindhis and the Sind provincial government towards refugees. Here the central intervention was necessary, so much so that, when rioting broke out in Sind between refugees and local Hindus, the central government stepped in and later removed the Chief Minister of Sind on the implicit charges of aiding the Hindus.

Another important factor was the almost autocratic leadership of Jinnah. His authority over the Muslim League was almost absolute and it was perhaps not conceivable to have Jinnah as the head of a weak central government. Everybody in the League accepted his authority and judgement; those who did not had already left the League or did so soon afterwards. There was no other party of any consequence because the fight for Pakistan had been fought solely by the League.

A more important factor favouring a strong central government was, perhaps, the Government of India Act of 1935. Although it was styled as a federal constitution, it in fact

provided for a strong centre - reference to Section 93 has already been made (Chapter 14). Because under the Independence of India Act of 1947 the earlier Act was inherited, with some amendments, by Pakistan as the working constitution, the setting up of a strong central government was inevitable. Perhaps it can be argued that if the first Constituent Assembly had framed a constitution within a short time after independence some of the conditions of the Lahore Resolution might have been fulfilled. However, as the constitutional controversies dragged on for years the central government grew stronger day by day. It used the emergency powers of Section 93 (92a) in three provinces, the Punjab, Sind and East Bengal. When the Assembly did after all try to curb the powers of the Governor-General it found itself dismissed under the same provision.

During all these years the working of the Government of India Act had become so familiar to politicians, civil servants and the public at large that the 1956 Constitution differed only in some details from the provisions of the Act. At the time the Constitution was passed by the second Constituent Assembly the central government under Governor-General Mirza had become so strong that it was not prepared to give up much of its power in the new constitution. Insofar as the delay in framing of a constitution is a reason for the strong centralized rule, the politicians from both the wings as well as the Ulama are equally responsible.

With the proclamation of Martial Law in 1958 all vestiges of federalism vanished altogether, but before that in 1955 the

provinces of West Pakistan had already vanished along with their dreams of being "sovereign and autonomous" units of Pakistan. Although there was some speculation about the nature of the constitution promised by Ayub Khan, there was no doubt that it was going to bring an even stronger central government. Its main features have already been discussed in Chapter 14. So, all the hopes of the provinces being autonomous, assured them in the Lahore Resolution, were gradually dashed and as the degree of autonomy decreased the opposition to the central government, particularly in East Pakistan, increased. The question of representation in the central legislature has had a similar history. The first Constituent Assembly as elected before independence on proportional representation contained more members from East Pakistan. However, under the overwhelming majority of the Muslim League the opposition in the Assembly was weak and ineffective as it consisted mostly of Hindu members. The Draft Constitution of 1954 provided for a bi-cameral legislature with the provinces having proportional representation in the lower house and an equal number of members in the upper house (Chapter 14, Table 83), but the Assembly was dismissed before it could pass the constitution.

The second Constituent Assembly came into being in 1955 and was elected on the basis of parity, i.e. membership equally divided between the two wings. The principle of parity was also incorporated in the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962. Thus East Pakistan's numerical majority was compromised on a principle of equality between the two wings not only in repre-

sentation but also in development funds and in recruitment to the armed and civil services. However, whereas the political aspect of parity became a fact very soon, its economic and recruitment sides remained very much a matter of controversy and bitterness between the wings. The persisting or increasing differentials in economic development and employment forced East Pakistani politicians to draw back from the principle of parity and strongly demand proportional representation along with their demands of provincial autonomy. This is construed as an attempt on their part to wrest as much of the governmental functions from the centre as possible and also to ensure that West Pakistan does not dominate whatever functions are left with the central government. Punjabis have seen these demands as purely an attempt by East Pakistan to extend their control over the western wing as well as in the centre and to undermine the economic and administrative superiority of the Punjab.

East Pakistan has not only demanded autonomy for itself and proportional representation, but has also insisted on the disintegration of the one unit of West Pakistan. On the face of it this demand appears extremely unreasonable but it is, perhaps, motivated by long term interests. It was observed in Chapter 2 that population in East and West Pakistan has grown at different rates, 2.1 and 2.7 per cent per annum respectively between 1951 and 1961. In the 1951 Census the share of East Pakistan in the total population was about 55.4 per cent, and it decreased to 54.2 per cent in 1961. It is likely that the East Pakistani leaders might have reasoned that

at some time in the future, because of this differential growth rate, the population of West Pakistan might exceed that of East Pakistan. In that case proportional representation, which favoured them now, would work against them. Thus to meet any such eventuality it was necessary for them to press for the disintegration of West Pakistan. The question of parity was, therefore, very much tied with the integration of West Pakistan; if proportional representation was to be achieved then West Pakistan had to be broken up into the former provinces. In this regard East Pakistan has succeeded as the provinces have been re-established and the elections to the Constituent Assembly are to be held on the basis of proportional representation.

Politics in Pakistan have been, it has been suggested in the preceding discussion, very much confounded by the highly complex cultural and economic distributions which have given rise to divergent political demands. However, during the twenty-three years in which the state has existed there has been a development of some thinking within the framework of Pakistan as a whole rather than of the provinces. In the concluding chapter the various internal regional tendencies are balanced against the more positive influences towards integration.

PART V CONCLUSION

Chapter 16 Regionalism and Political Integration

CHAPTER 16

REGIONALISM AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION

The pursuit of some measure of integration, however qualified or imperfect, which is the basic aim of any political community faces major problems in Pakistan. The difficulties posed by the territorial fragmentation cannot be overemphasised and the cultural fragmentation of West Pakistan, expressed in the variety of languages spoken, is an equally important obstacle in the way of achieving effective political integration. Many provincial differences, which result mainly from cultural differences but strengthened by economic and political factors, have deepened during the twenty-three years of Pakistan's existence. On the other hand the very fact that the state has existed for over two decades, through many difficult periods, has led among certain sections of the population to the emergence of some thinking on the state level which transcends the traditional provincial and cultural divisions. However, it is not easy to obliterate, or even diminish, the divisions in society that have existed for generations particularly when such divisions have had political recognition in the form of provinces and districts. It is easy to change political boundaries, inter-state or intra-state, but it is extremely difficult to change the impression those boundaries have made on the minds of the people affected by them. "The real partitions, those which are the most stable and the least flexible, are in the minds of men. The worst barriers stem from the diversity of the historical past" (Gottman 1952, p.85).

The influences upon regionalism and political integration in Pakistan may be seen as of two types, those inherited from the pre-independence period and those which have emerged since 1947. The influences derive from the complex interplay of the various cultural, economic and political distributions. Foreign influences have also been important in some cases and, although they do not form a part of this study, some reference to them is necessary in order to make certain points. It is not easy to separate the influences upon regionalism and political integration under the three headings - cultural, economic and political - because in most of the cases there is not any sharp division, and the three types of distributions have all combined in various degrees to produce the several centrifugal and centripetal influences. Regionalism and political integration are, however, discussed separately followed by an attempt to create a balance between the two.

An important stimulus to regionalism came from the heritage of the British period. Although during that period there was a strong central government, the federal nature of the administrative system kept the provinces rather isolated from each other. At the time of independence the provinces had been in existence as separate administrative units for varying lengths of time. The provincial boundaries had become strongly imprinted upon the landscape partly because of their historical existence but largely because they more or less corresponded with linguistic boundaries. The various linguistic units had

come to be identified with sharply defined political units i.e. Bengali-speaking with Bengal, Punjabi-speaking with the Punjab, Sindhi-speaking with Sind and so on. This does not mean that these units were entirely the creation of the British because these linguistic groups had existed in their respective areas for a long time. However, only under the British rule were they sharply demarcated by provincial boundaries and given constitutional recognition and a degree of representative government. So, the traditional linguistic divisions of the population became a political fact not only on the administrative map of British India but also in the minds of the people. Peoples' loyalties, which were most intense at the kinship level stopped at the provincial boundaries, often they did not extend beyond the boundaries of their districts. There were few feelings of being 'Indian'. To Sindhis, for example, there were Punjabis north of their province and not other 'Indians.'

This provincial identity was further strengthened by the policy of the Muslim League before independence. Until partition was conceded by the British government in 1947, provincial autonomy was the keynote of the League policy. It was feared that in a united 'India', whether dependent or independent, the central government would always be dominated by Hindus because of their numerical superiority in the subcontinent. As a result of this fear the League insisted on the greatest possible degree of provincial autonomy so that at least in the Muslim majority provinces the interference from the Hindu-dominated centre would be at a minimum. This policy stimulated

the already strong provincial loyalties and as a result the Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, not only asked for independent Muslim states in the "Northwestern and Eastern zones of India" but also autonomy and sovereignty for the "Constituent Units" (Chapter 2). It was a clear stipulation that if the demand for Pakistan was accepted the provinces would be even more autonomous and distinct identities than they were in British India. Thus the League had unwittingly promised and promoted regionalism, a mistake which was to be regretted later, because once partition was assured the policy of the League changed completely towards political integration while some of the provinces insisted on fulfilling the conditions of the Resolution.

During the British period there was no occasion for any conflict between different languages because of the overall superiority of English which was the official language. Apart from making English compulsory in higher education, government, the law courts, etc., the British had not tried to impose any of the local languages. The provinces were free to use their local languages for primary and secondary education and also as official languages at the lower administrative levels. This policy encouraged cultural isolation because only those persons who were literate in English could communicate across linguistic boundaries and the percentage of such persons was small owing to widespread illiteracy. After independence this language policy was continued until in the 1956 Constitution Urdu and Bengali were recognised as national languages.

However, nothing practical was done to translate this constitutional recognition into the educational field and some of the local languages, notably Sindhi, were allowed to continue as before independence. This adherence to the local languages has been an important factor of regionalism because linguistic differences are the most differentiating cultural attribute. Even bi-lingualism is a considerable strain on the integration of a state but where seven different languages are spoken, as in Pakistan, the adoption of a common language is a necessity if a cohesive nation is to be evolved. The fact must be noted here that Punjab has been the only area where the local language has not been given any importance. Urdu was accepted in the Punjab as the language of literacy long before partition and since then there has been no significant movement to enhance the status of Punjabi. It has been shown (Chapter 5) that as a language of literacy Punjabi has been the least significant. However, in other provinces there has been no such voluntary acceptance of the lingua franca.

Besides these historical and cultural causes, regionalism in recent years has gained a new stimulus from economic distributions. Before independence, as in cultural relationships, the provinces had very little economic contact with each other. After 1947 when they became parts of a new independent state there was bound to be a change in their economic relationships. The economy, which was geared to the interests of Britain, Calcutta or Bombay had to be planned according to the needs of an independent Pakistan. Industriali-

zation, which in the Pakistan area had lagged behind relative to some other parts of the subcontinent, had to be accelerated in order to raise per capita incomes and standards of living. There is no need here to discuss again the main features of economic development in Pakistan (Part III) except to point out that there are important differences in the relative levels of development not only between the wings but also within West Pakistan. Before 1947 it was the general belief among the Muslims of the subcontinent that their relative poverty was due only to the dominance of Hindus in industry and business and that once independence was achieved their economic condition would improve and inter-regional differences would vanish. However, when the post-independence period failed to fulfil any of these expectations frustration and disappointment led to sharp differences between the relatively poor areas and those a little better off. Again these economic differences arose in the provincial framework though the problem of intra-provincial economic disparities was as serious as that of inter-provincial. The provinces as territorial units dominated the various economic and political controversies. Thus all the cultural and economic bases of regionalism had a ready-made political framework of considerable standing provided by the existing provincial units. Against this provincial framework the state framework was rather weak because of its recent origin and the fact that the Muslim League had recognised and promised the continuance of the provinces as autonomous units. The main weakness of the state-idea lay in the vagueness of

the Lahore Resolution which apparently rejected the idea of a cohesive, integrated state.

Another factor which ga ve considerable support to regionalism was the composition of the Civil Service and the Armed Forces. The provinces did not have proportional representation in the Civil Service and the Army (Chapter 13), with the result that the Punjab and the refugee element dominated the higher ranks of the Civil Service, and the Punjab, with the NWFP to some extent, almost exclusively controlled the Army. Before independence it did not matter whether the Civil Service and the Army was dominated by one province or the other because the two, irrespective of the provincial origin of their personnel, represented the British Crown. As long as they remained under the control of an impartial alien rule there was little cause for concern on the part of those provinces which did not have enough representation. After independence, however, that impartial sovereign power was replaced by a new state authority which did not enjoy a loyalty strong enough to transcend provincial loyalties. The provinces had, of course, accepted the idea of partition but not at the cost of losing their separate political identities.

Finally, in discussing regionalism and political integration it is necessary to note the external influences deriving from Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan and India. The open support given by both these countries to some regional tendencies has caused considerable problems for Pakistan. The influence of India in promoting regionalism in Pakistan has not been as

strong as that of Afghanistan, a neighbouring Muslim country. To examine the role played by the various factors discussed above in promoting regionalism it is convenient to consider the provinces one by one. By far the most serious manifestation of regionalism has been the conflict between the wings. The economic and political grievances of East Pakistan against the central government, which has been strongly identified with the Punjab because of the latter's dominance in the central politics, in the Civil Service and in the Army, have over the years become deeper. The feeling in East Pakistan that the central government, as based in the western wing, is remote and unwilling to understand and solve the problems of the eastern half of the state has gradually grown stronger. Apart from the historical causes and the pre-independence policy of the Muslim League, a number of other causes can be identified which have strengthened the regional tendencies of East Pakistan.

Because of the long distance that separates the two wings there has been little cultural contact between them. The first contact after independence on the human level was in the form of the posting of West Pakistani, particularly Punjabi and Urdu speaking refugee civil servants, to administrative jobs in East Pakistan. The attitude of some of these officers to East Pakistanis was certainly far from being one of a compatriot. They, by their very training, considered themselves to have been sent there to rule rather than to serve the people. This initial unfavourable experience with West Pakistanis was later strengthened by other issues. The Civil Service cannot wholly

escape the responsibility of initiating suspicion and hostility among East Pakistani people against the central government. East Pakistanis utilized the first opportunity they had to defeat the ruling Muslim League in the 1954 provincial elections.

The very fact that the various central governments and Punjabi politicians and bureaucrats have tended to look at East Pakistan as a culturally and economically inferior part of Pakistan has been very much resented by the people of East Pakistan. East Pakistanis have always looked at Pakistan and at themselves as shown in Fig.7, and not as in conventional maps on which East Pakistan appears relatively insignificant. They have been conscious of their numerical superiority which because of the political and economic power of the western wing has not yet been truly translated into political reality. The attitude of many West Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats is perhaps exemplified in Ayub Khan's words.

> "East Bengalis, who constitute the bulk of the population, probably belong to the very original Indian races. It would be no exaggeration to say that up to the creation of Pakistan, they had not known any real freedom or sovereignty. They have been in turn ruled either by the caste Hindus, Moghuls, Pathans, or the British. In addition, they have been and still are under considerable Hindu cultural and linguistic influence. As such they have all the inhibitions of down-trodden races and have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom. Their popular complexes, exclusiveness, suspicion and a sort of defensive aggressiveness probably emerge from this historical background. Prudence, therefore, demands that these factors

> should be recognized and catered for and they be helped so as to feel equal partners and prove an asset. That can be done only if they are given a considerable measure of partnership" (Khan 1967, p.187).

So, "a considerable measure of partnership", and not proportional, had to be given to East Pakistan, and that too as a result of "prudence" instead of as a democratic right because of its higher population. Perhaps, even a faint smell of racial superiority can also be detected. No wonder East Pakistan has a number of times expressed views in conflict with the central government.

The language question was another issue on which the local aspirations of East Pakistan were at variance with the central government (Chapter 15). The public declarations by Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan about the adoption of Urdu as the only state language were certainly resented in East Pakistan, though because of the stature of these two leaders there was no public expression of that resentment. After the death of the two leaders, however, this language policy of the central government was met with violent opposition in the eastern wing and ultimately, after much hostility, the two-language compromise was accepted. Although the question of national language has been 'solved' since 1956, when Urdu and Bengali were both declared as national languages, the feeling among East Pakistanis still persists "that they have had to fight desperately to secure satisfaction that should have been theirs without argument, as a matter of simple justice" (Callard 1957, p.183).

The economic causes of East Pakistan's grievances against the central government and West Pakistan have already been discussed (Chapter 12). From the speeches of the East Pakistani political leaders and from the personal experience of the writer it is certain that there is a general belief in the eastern wing that the central government, dominated by the Punjab, have throughout the past twenty-three years deliberately ignored the economic development of East Pakistan in order to enrich the western wing. The foreign exchange earned by East Pakistani exports has been spent on importing luxury goods and industrial plants for West Pakistan. From the data analysed in Part III it is apparent that there is considerable evidence to suggest that the various central governments have failed to strike a balance between the wings in development expenditure. However, there is also evidence that at least during the Third Five Year Plan 1965-70 a conscious effort was made to narrow the gap in the economic levels of the two wings but, like in the language question, East Pakistanis do not feel satisfied and tend to remember the growing economic disparities during the earlier years. During recent years the economic basis of regionalism has grown more popular, particularly among students and the educated.

The political history of the past two decades has done nothing to remove the differences and misunderstandings; it in fact has reinforced regionalism considerably. The increasing centralization of political authority (Chapter 15), concentrated as it is in the state capital located in West Pakistan, has

has produced a strong corresponding reaction in East Pakistan. Every step taken by the central government to enhance its power, a process which reached its peak under Ayub Khan, was accompanied by a growing support in East Pakistan for the demands of regional autonomy. Although the selection of Karachi as the state capital was not relished in certain quarters of East Pakistan, it was gradually accepted because the choice was made by Jinnah himself. When the capital was later shifted to Rawalpindi and Islamabad it was seen as another attempt to further consolidate the power of the Punjab and demands were raised to make Dacca the capital of Pakistan.

All these factors have resulted in a strong East Pakistani regionalism. Its political expression has been a demand for some form of autonomy, its cultural consequences have been East Pakistan's general dislike of anything suggesting the superiority of West Pakistan, particularly of the Punjab. During the disturbances which caused the downfall of the Ayub regime in 1969 slogans like "Punjabi imperialism", "Punjabi domination" and "Punjabi army of occupation" were often used in East Pakistan. The results have been that East Pakistani leaders, who might have been satisfied with the principle of parity in 1956, now demand "full regional autonomy" based on the Lahore Resolution. For example, the leader of one of the East Pakistani political parties, National Progressive League, was reported to have demanded

> "a sovereign constitution to be framed by the elected representatives of the people - a constitution that would

> ensure full regional autonomy on the basis of Lahore Resolution and two economies and socialistic society. Referring to his earlier suggestion that two parts of the country should have two separate constitutions, he said this would help remove many inequalities between the two Wings of the country.
>
> He said the Centre should have a separate constitution with the responsibility of currency, foreign affairs and defence of the country" (Pakistan News, January 15, 1970, p.4).

Some leaders have even gone further to demand separate currencies for the two wings as well as the right to recruit provincial militias.

The central government in the past have at a number of times alleged Indian involvement in promoting regionalism in East Pakistan but there is no authentic information available to prove this, though considering the nature of relations between the two states any internal embarrassment to the Pakistan government must be more than welcome in India, and vice versa. However, the regionalism of East Pakistan, strong as it is, has not yet become separatism. At least no political leader or party has publicly expressed any separatist feelings, although separatism must be regarded as a potential threat.

Another important manifestation of regionalism, with strong separatist tendencies, has been that of the North-West Frontier Province. This regionalism, founded mainly on cultural grounds, has derived much support externally and, therefore, has been of greater concern. The boundary between Afghanistan and British India was delimited by a joint Anglo-Russian

Boundary Commission headed by Sir Mortimer Durand, and in which Afghanistan participated as an observer. The boundary, known as the Durand Line, was drawn in 1893 and divided a linguistically homogeneous people, the Pushto or Pukhto speaking Pathans. The Afghan government had to accept this boundary because of the might of the Imperial power in the subcontinent but when the British withdrawal from the subcontinent was announced the Afghanistan government started showing its refusal to recognize the Durand Line as the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, instead of openly claiming the Pakistan side of the Pathan territory, Afghanistan fostered a movement for the self-determination of Pushto speaking people whom they considered would prefer to join with Afghanistan. The leader of this movement was Abdul Ghaffar Khan, popularly called "Frontier Gandhi" because of his association with Gandhi and the Congress Party. With the open support of Afghanistan and Indian governments the Pukhtunistan movement created some difficulties for Pakistan from time to time. However, because of the relatively better economic status of the Pathans on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line the movement appears to have lost much of its momentum and at present it does not constitute a serious separatist threat.

> "Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, the 80-year-old Pathan leader of Pakistan's North-West frontier region, surprised India today by hinting that he had given up his struggle for a separate homeland for the Pakhtoons, and conceded Pakistan's sovereignty over Pakhtoonistan" (The Times, Wed. October 8, 1969, p.7).

Although it has lost its separatist component, the regionalism of the NWFP still remains fairly strong. Its supporters have tried to strengthen their claim on economic arguments that since the integration of West Pakistan they have not received their due share of the finances but there is no convincing statistical evidence available to prove this contention. Unlike East Pakistan no valid complaint can be made by the NWFP about their representation in the Civil and Armed Services.

Although Sind has not posed any separatist problem, the province has proved to be more difficult to integrate than other areas of West Pakistan. The distinctive nature of Sind's cultural and economic distributions has already been noted (Parts II and III). The Sindhi regionalism first came into focus soon after independence when the Muslim refugees from India were not welcomed by the Sindhi people. In fact there were instances when they were not allowed by the local inhabitants to settle in Sind (Binder 1963). This resulted in riots when the desperate refugees clashed with the local Hindus and it was the Hindus who were aided by the Sind government. The central government took action and Sind not only lost its Chief Minister but also Karachi which became a federal district. It is estimated that the inflow of refugees drastically changed the demographic ratio of Sindhi/non-Sindhi population to nearly 50-50 (Tayyeb 1966). This sudden arrival of a large culturally alien population was too much for the

local Sindhis who had been probably the most insulated people in West Pakistan (Chapter 6). The tensions between the locals and outsiders have persisted to this day.

The opposition of Sind to the plan to integrate West Pakistan was indicative of the strong regionalism and the continued adherence to the local language has reinforced the inward-looking character of Sind. The better economic status of many Punjabi and Urdu speaking immigrants has produced a greater reaction against integration. The narrow provincial outlook of most of the Sindhi leaders has made it very difficult to integrate the various cultural elements in Sind. The notoriously corrupt politics of Sind have been observed by many independent political writers. One Sindhi member of the first Constituent Assembly while speaking about the PRODA (Chapter 14), an Act which gave powers to the central government to start proceedings against any politician considered guilty of misconduct, said "it (PRODA) made the life of people in Sind very miserable" (Callard op.cit., p.102-3). By "people of Sind" he meant a handful of politicians, invariably belonging to the rich landed classes. The extreme feudal system of land tenure in Sind (Chapter 8) had kept a large majority of the population oppressed by landlords and 'pirs', and the Sindhi regionalism has been an attempt to preserve the vested interests which, it was feared, might be whittled away by an effective integration. Already the presence of a large percentage of non-Sindhi peoples, not subject to the influence of local wielders of power, was seen as a potentially dangerous influence on the local peasants.

As a result of these factors Sind has always found an ally in the East Pakistani politicians. Throughout the period since independence there have been many instances when Sindhi and East Pakistani members of the Assembly joined to oppose the central government. In its opposition to the 'One Unit' plan Sind derived much strength from East Pakistan's hostility to the same plan, though for different reasons. However, whereas the regionalism of East Pakistan has been based on genuine grievances that of Sind has been simply a reaction against change and the impending diminution of the powers of the landlords. The presence of a large percentage of non-Sindhi population, particularly in the urban areas of Sind which has been a source of present conflict, may well prove to be in the long run an aid towards cultural fusion within the province. However, at the time of writing the prospects of further conflict unfortunately appear more probable than those of integration.

Baluchistan covers a very large part of the area of West Pakistan but has only a small ~~percentage~~ proportion of the population (Chapter 2). During the British period it had remained largely out of the mainstream of politics because of its rather remote location, thin population and economic backwardness. It did not generate enough revenue to justify a regular provincial administration and was directly controlled by the central government in Delhi through an appointed Chief Commissioner. It also remained without any representative government which

all the Governor's provinces enjoyed. A large part of the territory was within the four princely states of Kalat, Kharan, Mekran and Lasbela. Linguistically it was also different from other provinces in that it did not have a majority tongue (Table 10). In 1961 the major language was Baluchi but it claimed only 33.5 per cent of the population. Baluchi, Pushto, Brahui, Sindhi and Punjabi together accounted for 97 per cent of the total inhabitants. Therefore, in Baluchistan there has been no basis for strong cultural regionalism extending to all parts of the province. In fact in some districts the local rivalries between the economically better off Pushto speakers and the relatively poor Baluchs have been more frequent than any widespread feelings of loyalty to Baluchistan.

However, the province has not been without troubles. The first serious expression of regionalism was made about the time of the integration of West Pakistan which involved the abolition of the princely states as such and their incorporation as regular administrative districts. There had been reports that Kalat's ruler opposed the merger plan and it has been said that he was called to Karachi and forced to sign the legal document, thus conceding his authority over the Baluchistan States Union of which he was made the head after independence (Wilcox 1963). The dissatisfaction of the Kalat ruler resulted in October 1958 in a rebellion which, the government alleged, aimed at separation and independence (ibid.). However, the ruler was later arrested and the rebellion - if there was one (ibid.) - was crushed and conditions returned to normal.

In 1960 the ruler was released and some of his privileges restored though he could not recover his state. Afterwards, during the 1960s, sporadic trouble in Baluchistan continued mainly in the form of, according to government reports, seditious acts by certain Baluch tribal chiefs. Nevertheless, because of the relatively low population, such incidents have usually been within the power of the government to control although the difficult terrain and lack of transport required the deployment of regular troops to control such recalcitrant elements. Throughout this period the northern Pushto speaking districts did not pose any problem though the Pukhtoonistan movement included all such districts of Baluchistan in its scope.

Much of the cause of these regional tendencies in Baluchistan can be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, like Sind, there has been a determination on the part of traditional state rulers and tribal chiefs to maintain their power which they feared might wither away as a result of integration. Secondly, Baluchistan has become increasingly conscious of its poverty (Chapter 12). All the districts in Baluchistan, with the exception of Quetta, are relatively very poor (Fig.44). Because of the rocky nature of the terrain and the lack of rainfall and water for irrigation there is not much scope for agricultural development. However, Baluchistan produces a large share of the minerals - all the chromite, about half the coal and all the natural gas production of West Pakistan. Whereas coal and chromite may not be very significant in the total economy,

the gas is extremely important to the whole of the wing, but so far all the gas being produced has been used outside Baluchistan. There is, therefore, some concern in Baluchistan about sharing the benefits of development which has been made possible by the Sui natural gas (Chapter 10). Otherwise Baluchistan may not pose any great problem for integration because the total number of population involved is relatively small, but transport and communications (Chapter 11) will have to be improved in order to break the isolation of the area.

There has been no such thing as Punjabi regionalism because the Punjab has stood for a strong centre. It can be argued that the reason for this attitude is that because of its economic and political superiority it has been in the interests of the Punjab to have a strong central government so that it can dominate other provinces. It was, for example, alleged that the Punjab supported the integration of West Pakistan so that its bureaucrats could have a wider area over which to exercise their power and so that the province could have financial control over the whole of West Pakistan. This might have been the reason but the fact cannot be ignored that the Punjab, in order to facilitate the integration of West Pakistan, agreed to a 40 per cent representation rather than its due 60 per cent. There were no significant public protests against this proposal which was accepted in the wider interests of the state.

In the refugee problem also the Punjab showed considerable maturity. The refugees were generally accepted everywhere in the province. It is true there were some factors favouring this receptive attitude of the Punjab. Firstly, a large number of refugees came from East Punjab who were not culturally different from the local population. Secondly, the Urdu speaking refugees from further east in India did not have much difficulty in settling in the Punjab because of the long-standing acceptance of Urdu language in the province. Another factor which inhibits any Punjabi regionalism is the fact that Punjabi, compared to other provincial languages, has a wide range of variations in dialects. So, if there is to be any regionalism in the Punjab based on language it has to be on a smaller scale based on particular dialects and thus involving relatively smaller areas.

While there may not have been any divergent regionalism in the Punjab, the Punjabis have certainly contributed to the growth of regionalism in other provinces by their condescending attitudes. The role of the civil servants in this regard has already been noted. This sense of superiority has created a certain amount of reaction and hostility against Punjabi, particularly among East Pakistanis and Sindhis, and against everything for which the Punjab stands.

The central governments since independence have done little positive towards effective political integration (Chapter 15). However, the stark facts that statehood was achieved under difficult circumstances and that Pakistan has been run as an independent identity for over two decades are in themselves of considerable importance in assessment of integration. Islam is still the major force which keeps all the different cultural elements together. Despite the vagueness of the Lahore Resolution it was implicit that, whatever the shape of the constitution and the form of the government might be, Pakistan was going to be a homeland for the Muslims. Despite all the economic and political differences of opinion among the politicians, to the millions of common people in Pakistan Islam continues to be a source of inspiration. Even if a Bengali and a Punjabi cannot talk to each other they can pray together and have many things common in their social behaviour. The belief and pride in Islam is so strong that many people feel perplexed at the internal dissensions of the Arab Muslim world. Pakistan's continued support for Arabs and the U.A.R. despite the unresponsive attitude of President Nasser is indicative of the importance of religion. Perhaps religion would not have been an integrating influence if it were only a spiritual faith but since Islam is a complete code affecting all the daily aspects of life and because of its universal approach transcending all racial, ethnic, linguistic boundaries it is the major centripetal force.

The role of religious controversies in politics regarding the Islamic constitution has already been discussed. Whatever the differences on the Islamic requirements between different interested groups and no matter how much one may blame the religious leaders for their role in delaying the adoption of a constitution, it must be admitted that their influence was in some ways beneficial to the state. The religious controversies did not have a provincial bias and they affected the whole state irrespective of cultural and economic differences. While debating the Islamic provisions of the constitution the focus had to be on the people of Pakistan rather than on Bengalis and Punjabis. Secondly, all the interpretations of the religious leaders about the requirements of an Islamic state, despite their mutual differences on details, stressed the unity, or integration, of Muslims under a strong central government and a discouragement of regionalism based on linguistic differences.

To this wider influence of religion must be added the nature of the Muslim League leadership. It was a party of the Muslims under the extremely strong leadership of Jinnah whose authority was accepted in all the provinces. Among his other qualities of leadership was the fortunate coincidence that he did not come from any of the areas inherited by Pakistan. He was settled in Bombay and so could not be identified with any of the provinces or the linguistic groups. As long as he lived, the inter-provincial rivalries and hostilities did not emerge. He lived for only about a year after independence but he left

a tradition and symbol of unity which is reflected in the respect that his name still commands.

Like the religious controversies, economic development and the debate concerning it, on the one hand produced further causes of conflict, this time between the provinces, but on the other hand developed some thinking on the state level. Because of highly centralised planning under the Ayub regime there developed some state-level uniformity in trade union organization. Although labour unions are still not strong enough to improve the conditions of their members (Chapter 10), there has been considerable contact between them at the state level. One recent newspaper report states:

> "The power of industrial workers in Pakistan under a surprisingly able leadership has now been recognised by General Yahya Khan's regime as the most important new political factor with which he and the dominant elite must come to terms before political stability can return to the country....
> What surprised and disconcerted the employers and the regime was the degree of unity and understanding between labour leaders from East and West Pakistan" (The Guardian, Tuesday July 28, 1970, p.3).

If this is true then for the first time an important section of the population, which hitherto have remained out of politics, will play an important role not only in day-to-day politics but also in the integration of the state because the labour movement has shown its tendency to overcome provincial barriers. Unfortunately the rural peasants, who form the majority of the population, are still illiterate and isolated

and thus susceptible to the influence of the local landlords who tend to be inclined towards regionalism in order to resist change.

Another consequence of the economic controversies and the inability of the government to remove inter-regional disparities has been the rise of leftist socialist parties. Traditional religious opinion has tended to look at socialism as identical with communism and thus un-Islamic. It is not possible to say whether socialism will succeed but the very fact that socialism is now talked about is a hopeful sign to curb regionalism. It is hopeful because there are indications that politics, which has been bedevilled so far by provincial rivalries, may become polarised between right and left and thus desert regionalism. It is still too early to detect any definite signs of such polarisation because most of the political parties in Pakistan are still based on personalities and lack ideological bases. At present there are about twenty different parties preparing to fight the coming elections. Perhaps most of them will be eliminated in these elections to the Constituent Assembly, due in the beginning of December 1970, and the rest will coalesce into a few state-level parties with distinct policies. If this happens then not only will a commonly agreed constitution be relatively easier to frame but it will mark a good beginning for a democratic system. If, on the other hand, the present chaotic state of the parties is translated to the floor of the Assembly then this Constituent Assembly may prove even less fruitful than its predecessors because most of the parties at

present, particularly those in East Pakistan, have a strong regional bias.

Another important uniting factor, though a negative one, has been the threat of India. Since external relations are not within the scope of this work the basis and the nature of Indo-Pakistan relations cannot be discussed here. However, it is essential to note that the threat of India, whether supposed or real, has been used by each successive government to induce people towards greater unity and integration. This factor might have weakened but for the short war between the two states in September 1965 which again brought it into focus. It is likely that this influence will continue to be used by the central government in the future though its positive effects are doubtful.

It is not possible to quantify the various centripetal and centrifugal influences. Moreover, politics is such an unpredictable area that the issues that may seem very significant today may lose their importance tomorrow. When the second Constitution was launched in 1962 by Ayub Khan it was generally felt that Pakistan had achieved political stability but after only seven years he had to leave unceremoniously as a result of conditions not very different from those which had brought him to power. The present Martial Law government has promised to hold free and impartial elections on the basis of proportional

representation to a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution within 120 days of its sitting. After the constitution has been framed, the government has promised to hand over power to an elected civilian government. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the government because in the coming elections, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the government in power is not going to be an interested party. It is very much in the hands of the politicians whether to agree and restore democracy soon or to disagree as usual over trivialities and prolong Martial Law.

It must be noted, however, that to a majority of the population of illiterate peasants the wranglings of politicians over constitutional provisions are totally irrelevant. Federalism or a unitary system, presidential or parliamentary government, an Islamic or a socialist constitution, cannot enhance the resources of the state. What matters is a wise and honest utilization of the already meagre wealth of the country. Reference has been made to the widening inter-regional economic disparities accompanying the initial stages of development (Chapter 12). Since most of the population in Pakistan, especially in the rural areas, believe what they are told by their leaders, it is the duty of the politicians, if they wish to see the state growing strong, to make the people understand that in order to have a better future a further increase in the inter-regional disparities may be expected (Williamson 1965). The linguistic differences and the lack of communication make it easier to create misunderstandings and hostility between

different regions. However, given wise and dedicated leadership there are reasonable chances that despite the cultural diversity and local loyalties a national feeling and a loyalty transcending the regional boundaries can be evolved.

> "However, the ordinary man is aware of his country's independence and he takes pride in it. It is a source of satisfaction to hear the name 'Pakistan', and to have an Air Force and a Navy and an Army. A sovereign independent republic can claim equality with all other nations in the eyes of the world. The foreign rulers have gone; Muslim Pakistanis sit in positions of power, authority and prestige. Every Pakistani is a nationalist at heart, and there are few who regret the passing of the old order" (Callard op.cit., p.270).

It is up to the leaders of Pakistan, religious or secular, whether to utilize this latent nationalism for the good of the state as a whole or to allow the divisive effect of regionalism and potential separatism to impair the national achievement.

Regionalism has already scored a victory over the forces of integration by compelling the government to re-create the provinces of West Pakistan. The central government has also conceded East Pakistan's demand for proportional representation. Perhaps the very territorial and cultural structure of Pakistan demands a federal system but any kind of federalism must involve some sacrifices on the part of the component units. No federal system in Pakistan can succeed if it entails the numerical dominance of the eastern wing or the economic superiority of the Punjab and Karachi. Once an acceptable compromise has been reached the component units must contribute fully to the

overall loyalty to the state in order to evolve a cohesive viable entity. It is as easy to stretch provincial autonomy to outright separatism as it is for a strong centralised rule to become corrupt, abusive and insensitive to sub-national aspirations. Now that the provinces have regained their former political recognition they must subscribe equally to the national feeling. For effective integration it is essential to evolve a supreme loyalty to which provincial loyalties should be subordinate and not in conflict. Before independence the supreme power of the British crown managed to keep the provincial differences buried. After 1947 the personality of Jinnah filled that role. Now the latent nationalism of the Pakistani people must be sensibly exploited to create a viable degree of homogeneity. Otherwise it may not be easy to draw the line between federation, confederation or political disaster.

Politicians have tried to find political answers to social and economic problems instead of striving for social and economic change able to nourish democratic institutions. Democracy in Pakistan collapsed in October 1958 because of the inability of the men in politics to demonstrate an honest determination to work for it rather than make it work for their parochial interests. If it fails to revive in December 1970 it will be precisely for the same reasons.

APPENDIX I

Area, Population and Density (Districts), 1961

Districts	Area (sq.miles)	Population (thousands)	Density (persons/ sq.m.)
East Pakistan	55126	50840	992
1. Dinajpur	2609	1710	655
2. Rangpur	3704	3796	1025
3. Bogra	1502	1574	1048
4. Rajshahi	3654	2811	769
5. Pabna	1877	1959	1044
6. Kushtia	1371	1166	851
7. Jessore	2547	2190	860
8. Khulna	4652	2449	526
9. Bakerganj	4240	4262	1005
10. Mymensingh	6361	7019	1103
11. Dacca	2882	5096	1768
12. Faridpur	2694	3179	1180
13. Sylhet	4785	3490	729
14. Comilla	2594	4389	1639
15. Noakhali	1855	2383	1285
16. Chittagong	2705	2983	1103
17. Chittagong Hill Tracts	5093	385	76
West Pakistan	310403	42841	138
N.W.F.P.	39283	7578	193
1. Hazara	6051	1385	220
2. Mardan	1211	823	672
3. Peshawar	1545	1213	737
4. Kohat	2707	628	181
5. Dera Ismail Khan	3476	383	81
6. Bannu	1695	428	210
7. Frontier States, Tribal Agencies, etc.	22598	2718	120
Punjab	79542	25582	322
1. Campbell-pur	4148	767	185
2. Rawalpindi	2022	1137	562
3. Jhelum	2772	749	270
4. Gujrat	2264	1326	586
5. Sargodha	4775	1468	307
6. Mianwali	5403	747	138
7. Lyallpur	3516	2684	763
8. Jhang	3401	1079	317
9. Lahore	2216	2480	1119
10. Gujranwala	2312	1292	559

APPENDIX I [contd.]

Districts	Area (sq.miles)	Population (thousands)	Density (persons/ sq.m.)
Punjab [contd.]			
11.Sheikhupura	2312	1081	467
12.Sialkot	2067	1596	772
13.Dera Ghazi Khan	9359	777	83
14.Muzaffargarh	5613	990	176
15.Multan	5630	2702	480
16.Sahiwal	4224	2134	505
17.Bahawalpur	9587	736	77
18.Bahawalnagar	3428	823	240
19.Rahimyar Khan	4493	1016	226
Sind	58471	8469	145
1.Jacobabad	2982	529	177
2.Sukkur	5531	837	151
3.Larkana	2866	604	211
4.Nawahshah	2896	692	239
5.Khairpur	6018	472	78
6.Hyderabad	4969	1286	259
7.Dadu	7342	485	66
8.Tharparkar	13435	728	54
9.Sanghar	4142	430	104
10.Thatta	6933	362	52
11.Karachi	1357	2044	1506
Baluchistan	133107	1252	9
1.Quetta*	5314	267	50
2.Sibi	10446	123	12
3.Loralai	7364	111	15
4.Zhob	10475	88	8
5.Chagai	19516	41	2
6.Kalat	30931	341	11
7.Mekran	23460	147	6
8.Kharan	18553	42	2
9.Lasbela	7048	91	13
Pakistan	365529	93721	256

(Source: Census, 1961)

*The official name of the district is Quetta/Pishin, but for convenience it has been referred to as simply Quetta throughout this study.

APPENDIX II

Distribution of Religions, 1951 and 1961 (000)

Province/ Division	1951					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Pakistan	72993	62317	4348	5422	539	367
East Pakistan	41932	32227	4187	5052	106	360
Rajshahi	9338	7413	598	1314	11	2
Khulna	8240	5959	764	1479	21	17
Dacca	12632	9967	1150	1434	62	10
Chittagong	11720	8879	1675	825	12	331
West Pakistan	31061	30090	161	370	433	7
Peshawar	2643	2639	-	1	3	-
D.I.Khan	579	578	-	-	-	-
Rawalpindi	3434	3427	-	-	6	-
Sargodha	4739	4664	-	1	74	-
Lahore	5339	5042	2	17	279	-
Multan	5302	5260	-	-	41	-
Bahawalpur	1823	1808	1	12	2	-
Khairpur	2388	2312	53	23	1	-
Hyderabad	2537	2146	88	301	2	-
Quetta	603	594	3	1	4	-
Kalat	476	468	8	-	-	-
Karachi	1198	1152	6	13	20	6

Province/ Division	1961					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Pakistan	93721	82557	4590	5411	733	430
East Pakistan	50840	4387	4993	4993	149	421
Rajshahi	11850	9755	713	1336	23	23
Khulna	10067	7617	867	1541	28	14
Dacca	15293	12669	1160	1370	78	16
Chittagong	13630	10849	1647	746	20	368
West Pakistan	42881	41666	204	418	584	9
Peshawar	6372	6365	0.4	0.8	6	0.2
D.I.Khan	1206	1205	0.2	-	1	-
Rawalpindi	3979	3960	0.1	0.6	18	-
Sargodha	5977	5867	-	0.9	108	0.6
Lahore	6449	6101	2	18	328	0.3
Multan	6603	6541	0.3	0.8	61	-
Bahawalpur	2574	2544	2	18	10	-
Khairpur	3134	3056	53	21	3	0.8
Hyderabad	3291	2808	125	350	7	0.8
Quetta	630	622	2	0.7	5	-
Kalat	531	524	7	0.1	0.1	-
Karachi	2135	2073	12	7	37	6

(Source: Census, 1951 and 1961)

1. Total Population
2. Muslims
4. Scheduled Castes
5. Christians

APPENDIX III

Religions in Cities of over 100,000 Population, 1951 and 1961

	1951				
Cities	1	2	3	4	5
Karachi	1020732	4605	12617	20308	6195
Lahore	817236	215	1545	30279	58
Dacca	291054	27726	16041	----1107----	
Hyderabad	234597	2501	4360	161	182
Lyallpur	173459	9	27	5632	-
Chittagong	245378	27622	13003	----3980----	
Multan	189480	3	73	565	1
Rawalpindi	233842	20	92	2921	2
Peshawar	149549	43	304	1536	3
Gujranwala	112719	11	-	1462	1
Sialkot	150191	137	297	5752	1
Narayanganj	48914	14396	4895	------ 168---	
Sargodha	76834	1	-	1612	-
Khulna	27535	7749	5480	---- 645----	
Quetta	79784	144	560	3330	74
Sukkur	75349	852	707	100	18

	1961				
Cities	1	2	3	4	5
Karachi	1853484	10897	6786	35165	6266
Lahore	1240247	79	725	55221	205
Dacca	503189	33970	16720	2558	275
Hyderabad	422786	3601	5882	1903	365
Lyallpur	410763	1	-	14482	2
Chittagong	307651	40349	10913	2781	2511
Multan	354991	67	284	2818	41
Rawalpindi	335030	52	156	4932	5
Peshawar	214116	178	405	3948	44
Gujranwala	191329	2	-	4822	1
Sialkot	157858	257	105	6125	1
Narayanganj	120079	99873	11919	170	13
Sargodha	123455	-	-	5855	1
Khulna	103019	14791	7855	2248	59
Quetta	102240	112	389	3807	85
Sukkur	100466	1439	770	484	57

(Source: Census, 1951 and 1961)

1. Muslims
2. Caste Hindus
3. Scheduled Castes
4. Christians
5. Others

APPENDIX IV

Classification of Languages

(based on Sir G. Grierson's 'Linguistic Survey of India')

A. Family	B. Main Languages	C. Dialects
I. Austric	1. Santhali and Khasi	Santhali and Khasi.
II. Dravidian	2. Brahui	Brahui.
	3. South Indian	Tamil, Malayalam, Telegu, Kanarese.
III. Indo-European		
(a) Dardic Branch	4. Kafir Tongues	Kalash (Black), Bashgali (Red).
	5. Kashmiri	Kashmiri.
	6. Khowar	Khowar, Chitrali, Arandri, Dandarik, Dameli, Jadri, Biyar, Malolo, Gididi, Kashkari.
	7. Kohistani	Kohistani, Giyari, Ajari, Torwati, Kalami.
(b) European Branch	8. English	English.
(c) Indo-European Branch	9. Assamese	Assamese.
	10. Bengali	Bengali, Chittagonian, Sylhetta, Chakma, Hajong.
	11. Gujarati	Gujarati.
	12. Hindi	Hindi, Hindustani, Bihari (non-Mus.).
	13. Marathi	Marathi, Thakri.
	14. Oriya	Oriya.
	15. Punjabi	Punjabi, Multani, Lahnda, Bahawalpuri, Derawali, Jafirki, Khetrani, Dogra, Pahari.
	16. Rajasthani	Rajasthani, Maiwati, Marwari, Jaipuri, Ajmeri, Bikaniri, Rajputani, Kathewari, Bhili.
	17. Sindhi	Sindhi, Jattki, Seraiki, Lassi, Thareli, Dhatki, Kachhi.
	18. Urdu	Urdu, Hindustani, Bihari (Mus.).

APPENDIX IV [contd.]

A. Family	B. Main Languages	C. Dialects
III. Indo-European [contd.]		
(d) Iranian Branch	19. Baluchi	Baluchi, Makrani, Makrani-Kechi.
	20. Persian	Persian, Dehwani, Yargha, Badakshani, Lorichini.
	21. Pushto	Pushto, Afghani, Kabuli, Pathani.
IV. Semitic	22. Arabic	Arabic.
V. Tibeto-Chinese	23. Arakenese	Arakenese, Maghi, Murung.
	24. Burmese	Burmese.
	25. Other Assam-Burman Tongues	Manipuri, Garo, Lushai, Tripuri.

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX V

Mother Tongues and Spoken Languages as Per Cent of the total Population of each District, 1961

(M.T.=Mother Tongue;
S.L.=Spoken Language)

Districts	Total Pop.	Bengali		Punjabi		Pushto		Sindhi	
		M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.
N.W.F.P.									
1.Hazara	1050374	0.03	0.10	86.30	88.60	9.16	12.00	-	-
2.Mardan	813840	-	-	1.98	3.20	97.29	98.30	-	-
3.Peshawar	1170183	0.10	0.20	11.17	13.60	86.30	89.30	-	-
4.Kohat	378304	0.06	0.06	7.51	9.70	90.53	92.30	-	-
5.D.I.Khan	352247	0.01	0.10	73.92	76.80	23.65	26.90	-	-
6.Bannu	375299	0.04	0.10	2.84	3.70	96.52	97.40	-	-
Punjab									
7.Campbellpur	766813	0.03	0.10	94.26	96.00	4.30	5.40	-	-
8.Rawalpindi	1137085	0.17	0.20	92.42	94.00	1.14	1.60	0.01	0.01
9.Jhelum	749229	0.07	0.10	97.22	98.60	0.35	0.50	-	-
10.Gujrat	1326012	0.03	0.04	96.97	97.60	0.18	0.20	-	-
11.Sargodah	1467621	0.03	0.04	93.13	94.30	0.44	0.50	-	-
12.Mianwali	746733	0.01	0.01	90.33	92.30	5.17	6.00	0.02	0.03
13.Lyallpur	2683838	0.01	0.02	98.22	98.50	0.17	0.20	-	-
14.Jhang	1078747	-	-	95.95	96.20	0.15	0.20	-	-
15.Lahore	2479687	0.05	0.10	89.08	91.70	0.77	0.90	0.01	0.02
16.Gujranwala	1291886	0.01	0.01	95.04	96.00	0.16	0.20	0.02	0.02
17.Sheikhupur	1080619	-	-	98.24	98.50	0.07	0.10	-	-
18.Sialkot	1596383	0.02	0.03	97.47	97.90	0.09	0.30	-	-
19.D.G.Khan	776620	0.01	0.01	94.52	96.00	0.32	0.40	0.02	0.03
20.M'garh	989878	-	-	95.32	98.60	0.17	0.20	0.01	0.02
21.Multan	2702354	0.02	0.03	90.16	90.90	0.44	0.50	0.01	0.02
22.Sahiwal	2134072	0.04	0.05	96.44	97.20	0.12	0.14	0.01	0.01
23.B'pur	735524	0.02	0.03	94.42	94.90	0.16	0.20	0.21	0.30
24.B'nagar	822827	-	-	96.22	96.70	0.27	0.30	-	-
25.R.Y.Khan	1015715	-	-	93.76	94.60	0.55	0.60	2.42	3.00
Sind									
26.Jacobabad	528709	0.09	0.10	1.76	2.30	0.74	1.20	56.42	76.40
27.Sukkur	836867	0.06	0.10	3.47	4.10	0.79	0.90	78.60	84.00
28.Larkana	604460	-	-	1.36	1.60	0.14	0.20	79.94	87.40
29.Nawabshah	691539	0.01	0.01	10.42	11.40	0.45	0.70	72.84	79.00
30.Khairpur	472137	0.02	0.02	10.16	10.80	0.51	0.60	79.71	84.00
31.Hyderabad	1285711	0.26	0.30	4.31	5.40	0.94	1.80	62.35	68.40
32.Dadu	485122	0.02	0.10	2.81	3.30	0.49	0.60	78.38	88.3
33.Tharp'ker	728300	0.31	0.40	5.10	5.70	0.63	0.80	71.85	82.10
34.Sanghar	430090	0.51	0.70	9.79	10.90	1.70	2.10	57.17	69.50
36.Karachi	2044044	1.27	1.40	12.76	15.00	5.16	5.90	8.55	10.40

APPENDIX V [contd.]

Districts	Total Pop.	Bengali		Punjabi		Pushto		Sindhi	
		M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.
Baluchistan									
37.Quetta	267400	0.43	0.50	17.74	20.40	61.35	65.60	0.46	1.90
38.Sibi	123049	0.05	0.10	4.85	5.90	21.96	24.20	3.12	5.90
39.Loralai	110720	0.01	0.01	26.39	27.00	61.08	64.30	1.93	2.90
40.Zhob	87686	0.01	0.01	2.87	3.40	95.79	97.10	0.05	0.30
41.Chagai	41263	0.01	0.01	2.10	2.70	2.13	4.90	0.33	1.20
42.Kalat	341420	-	-	0.92	1.40	1.79	3.10	24.74	33.80
43.Mekran	146990	-	-	0.14	0.20	0.47	0.60	0.37	0.50
44.Kharan	42483	-	-	0.22	0.40	0.12	0.60	0.21	1.50
45.Lasbela	90826	0.03	0.10	0.85	1.50	0.70	1.00	66.58	75.60
East Pakistan									
46.Dinajpur	1709917	94.93	96.70	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-	-
47.Rangpur	3796043	97.88	98.40	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.01	-	-
48.Bogra	1574105	98.19	98.80	-	-	0.01	0.01	-	-
49.Rajshahi	2810964	96.71	98.60	-	-	-	-	-	-
50.Pabna	1959060	99.73	99.80	-	-	-	-	-	-
51.Kushtia	1166262	99.44	99.60	-	-	-	-	-	-
52.Jessore	2190151	99.45	99.50	0.11	0.11	0.01	0.01	-	-
53.Khulna	2448720	99.08	99.60	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-	-
54.Bakerganj	4261767	99.66	99.80	-	-	-	-	-	-
55.Mymensingh	7018906	98.38	99.30	-	-	-	-	-	-
56.Dacca	5095745	97.48	98.30	0.07	0.10	0.02	0.03	-	-
57.Faridpur	3178945	99.83	99.90	-	-	-	-	-	-
58.Sylhet	3489589	96.64	97.10	-	-	-	-	-	-
59.Comilla	4388906	99.90	99.90	0.04	0.10	0.01	0.01	-	-
60.Noakhali	2383145	99.99	100.00	-	-	-	-	-	-
61.Chittagong	2982931	98.47	98.80	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	-	-
62.Chittagong Hill Tracts	385079	91.06	93.50	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	-	-

APPENDIX V [contd.]

Districts	Urdu		Baluchi		Brahui		English	
	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.
N.W.F.P.								
1.Hazara	4.39	8.60	-	-	-	-	-	0.80
2.Mardan	0.43	4.50	-	-	-	-	-	0.70
3.Peshawar	1.97	16.80	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.01	2.20
4.Kohat	1.88	7.80	-	-	-	-	-	1.60
5.D.I.Khan	2.26	6.80	-	-	-	-	-	0.70
6.Bannu	0.58	5.00	0.01	0.01	-	-	-	0.70
Punjab								
7.Campbellpur	1.15	6.60	-	-	-	-	0.01	1.10
8.Rawalpindi	5.11	16.10	-	-	0.01	0.01	0.04	3.80
9.Jhelum	1.43	9.50	-	-	-	-	-	1.40
10.Gujrat	2.03	7.00	-	-	-	-	-	1.10
11.Sargodah	6.37	11.10	-	-	-	-	-	1.30
12.Mianwali	4.46	10.20	-	-	-	-	-	1.40
13.Lyallpur	1.59	6.90	-	-	-	-	-	1.30
14.Jhang	3.89	8.20	-	-	-	-	-	0.90
15.Lahore	8.97	27.70	0.01	0.01	-	-	0.05	7.40
16.Gujranwala	4.52	15.40	-	-	0.01	0.01	-	3.10
17.Sheikhupur	1.61	11.60	-	-	-	-	-	2.80
18.Sialkot	1.89	11.30	-	-	-	-	-	2.50
19.D.G.Khan	2.83	4.70	2.32	5.90	-	-	-	0.20
20.M'garh	4.47	4.90	0.02	0.02	-	-	-	0.40
21.Multan	9.33	13.10	0.01	0.02	-	-	-	0.80
22.Sahiwal	3.36	6.60	0.03	0.03	-	-	-	0.50
23.B'pur	4.88	8.70	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	-	1.20
24.B'nagar	3.46	7.60	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-	0.60
25.R.Y.Khan	2.00	5.60	0.54	0.60	0.05	0.05	-	0.30
Sind								
26.Jacobabad	1.67	6.90	31.51	34.10	7.20	8.80	0.08	1.10
27.Sukkur	9.71	14.60	4.02	6.00	1.51	1.80	0.02	1.30
28.Larkana	4.41	7.60	7.83	9.30	6.01	6.50	0.01	0.80
29.Nawabshah	8.40	14.10	4.30	5.30	2.62	2.90	0.01	1.10
30.Khairpur	4.76	10.00	3.20	4.00	0.65	0.90	0.01	0.60
31.Hyderabad	24.14	30.80	2.29	2.80	0.46	0.60	0.17	3.60
32.Dadu	4.56	9.80	10.75	12.00	1.99	2.80	0.02	1.10
33.Tharparker	9.84	16.70	3.20	3.50	0.68	0.80	0.01	1.70
34.Sanghar	11.23	20.40	5.65	6.50	3.34	3.80	-	1.90
35.Thatta	1.53	4.90	1.82	2.10	0.85	1.00	-	0.70
36.Karachi	53.90	71.00	5.28	5.90	0.99	1.50	0.57	7.20

APPENDIX V [contd.]

Districts	Urdu		Baluchi		Brahui		English	
	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.	M.T.	S.L.
Baluchistan								
37.Quetta	6.00	28.50	2.24	5.50	7.81	11.00	0.07	4.70
38.Sibi	2.16	10.00	64.67	66.60	2.92	4.60	0.01	0.80
39.Loralai	0.61	6.30	8.12	12.60	1.52	1.80	-	0.50
40.Zhob	0.50	5.90	0.31	0.50	0.27	0.50	-	0.60
41.Chagai	0.76	11.50	60.27	71.20	31.17	43.10	0.01	0.50
42.Kalat	0.28	5.20	31.77	37.70	39.40	46.80	-	0.20
43.Mekran	0.14	0.60	93.59	93.70	5.19	5.50	-	-
44.Kharan	0.07	3.50	78.16	87.20	21.21	30.60	-	0.20
45.Lasbela	0.21	4.30	23.69	27.70	7.86	25.30	0.05	0.07
East Pakistan								
46.Dinajpur	2.00	2.70	-	-	-	-	-	0.50
47.Rangpur	1.60	2.10	-	-	-	-	-	0.50
48.Bogra	0.80	1.30	-	-	-	-	-	0.60
49.Rajshahi	0.31	0.90	-	-	-	-	-	0.60
50.Pabna	0.13	0.60	-	-	-	-	-	0.70
51.Kushtia	0.42	1.02	-	-	-	-	-	0.70
52.Jessore	0.38	1.00	-	-	-	-	-	0.60
53.Khulna	0.78	1.50	-	-	-	-	-	0.90
54.Bakerganj	0.02	0.30	-	-	-	-	-	0.50
55.Mymensingh	0.15	0.50	-	-	-	-	-	0.60
56.Dacca	2.17	4.20	-	-	-	-	0.02	2.04
57.Faridpur	0.10	0.30	-	-	-	-	-	0.40
58.Sylhet	0.03	0.80	-	-	-	-	0.01	1.10
59.Comilla	0.03	0.60	-	-	-	-	-	0.70
60.Noakhali	-	0.90	-	-	-	-	-	0.80
61.Chittagong	1.03	2.70	-	-	-	-	0.04	1.60
62.Chittagong Hill Tracts	0.35	2.10	-	-	-	-	-	0.90

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX VI

Spoken Languages in Cities with over 50,000 population (as Per Cent of the Total Population of Each City), 1961

Cities	Pop.	Beng.	Punj.	Push.	Sind.	Urdu	Balu.	Brah.	Engl.
N.W.F.P.									
1.Peshawar	218691	0.40	24.90	80.80	0.30	16.10	-	-	3.50
2.Mardan	77932	0.10	12.20	91.30	0.20	14.20	0.20	-	1.10
3.Kohat	49854	3.10	26.40	69.00	0.10	24.30	0.10	-	6.20
Punjab									
4.Lahore	1296477	0.10	89.40	1.60	-	36.60	-	-	10.40
5.Lyallpur	425248	-	94.40	0.90	-	16.40	-	-	3.30
6.Multan	358201	0.10	75.10	0.80	0.10	37.40	0.10	-	4.10
7.Rawalpin.	340175	0.50	84.30	4.10	0.10	33.00	-	-	8.70
8.Gujr'ala	196154	-	94.90	0.20	-	27.50	-	-	7.30
9.Sialkot	164346	0.10	90.70	0.30	-	24.30	0.10	-	8.20
10.Sargodah	129291	0.30	70.80	2.00	-	46.10	-	-	5.90
11.Jhang	94971	-	76.50	0.20	-	34.80	0.10	-	2.70
12.Bah'pur	84377	0.10	76.40	0.50	2.20	37.70	0.10	-	8.10
13.Sahiwal	68299	1.00	92.10	0.20	-	16.80	0.10	-	2.50
14.Kasur	74546	-	98.00	0.10	-	31.90	-	-	11.70
15.Okara	68299	-	86.10	0.50	0.20	24.50	0.50	-	1.30
16.Gujrat	59608	-	93.80	-	-	21.90	-	-	6.40
17.Jhelum	52585	1.00	89.20	3.70	0.10	33.00	-	-	6.80
Sind									
18.Hyd'abad	434537	0.40	7.80	2.60	28.50	72.20	1.10	0.70	6.80
19.Sukkur	103216	0.40	16.90	4.00	44.30	53.80	2.20	0.80	5.90
20.Mirpurkhas	60861	-	11.30	1.50	36.80	66.70	4.60	0.30	8.20
21.Shikarpur	53910	0.50	6.80	0.90	73.10	28.50	2.20	1.60	1.70
22.Karachi	1912598	1.40	15.70	6.10	7.70	72.80	5.10	1.20	8.10
Baluchistan									
23.Quetta	106633	1.10	47.00	31.00	3.50	56.70	7.50	10.10	11.00
East Pakistan									
24.Dacca	556712	87.40	1.10	0.30	0.40	29.40	-	-	11.60
25.Chit'gong	364205	91.00	0.30	0.10	0.10	16.60	-	-	6.60
26.Nara'ganj	162054	96.10	0.20	0.10	0.30	13.80	-	-	6.30
27.Khulna	127970	87.80	0.20	0.10	0.30	22.60	-	-	5.80
28.Barisal	69936	99.20	-	-	0.20	3.40	-	-	7.90
29.Saidpur	60628	43.60	-	-	-	69.80	-	-	3.10
30.Rajshahi	56884	95.70	-	-	-	2.60	-	-	7.30
31.Comilla	54504	96.90	0.80	0.10	-	8.20	-	-	9.20
32.Mymensingh	53256	92.70	0.20	0.10	-	10.40	-	-	6.80

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX VII

Literacy Rates, 1961

Division/ District	Literacy Rate
N.W.F.P.	
1. Hazara	11.7
2. Mardan	9.8
3. Pehawar	15.7
4. Kohat	14.5
5. D.I. Khan	10.6
6. Bannu	10.8
Punjab	
7. Campbellpur	15.2
8. Rawalpindi	32.4
9. Jhelum	24.8
10. Gujrat	18.1
11. Sargodha	16.0
12. Mianwali	14.8
13. Lyallpur	18.1
14. Jhang	14.1
15. Lahore	25.0
16. Gujranwala	17.2
17. Sheikhupura	12.2
18. Sialkot	17.1
19. D.G. Khan	8.1
20. Muzaffargarh	9.9
21. Multan	11.4
22. Sahiwal	11.1
23. Bahawalpur	11.5
24. Bahawalnagar	10.8
25. R.Y. Khan	10.4
Sind	
26. Jacobabad	9.2
27. Sukkur	17.2
28. Larkana	14.2
29. Nawabshah	14.4
30. Khairpur	11.9
31. Hyderabad	16.2
Sind [contd.]	
32. Dadu	15.5
33. Tharparkar	9.7
34. Sanghar	12.1
35. Thatta	10.2
36. Karachi	38.1
37. Quetta	22.9
38. Sibi	5.8
39. Loralai	4.9
40. Zhob	6.8
41. Chaghai	7.7
42. Kalat	3.9
43. Mekran	4.1
44. Kharan	3.5
45. Las-bela	3.4
East Pakistan	
46. Dinajpur	25.9
47. Rangpur	18.9
48. Bogra	23.0
49. Rajshahi	20.0
50. Pabna	17.1
51. Kushtia	15.4
52. Jessore	20.8
53. Khulna	27.2
54. Bakerganj	24.8
55. Mymensingh	17.3
56. Dacca	23.0
57. Faridpur	17.8
58. Sylhet	20.0
59. Comilla	24.8
60. Noakhali	24.7
61. Chittagong	26.4
62. Chittagong Hill Tracts	15.3

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX VIII

Literacy Rates in Some Selected Cities, 1961

Cities	Literacy Rates	Cities	Literacy Rates
N.W.F.P.		**Baluchistan**	
1. Mardan	23.8	22. Quetta	42.9
2. Peshawar	31.3		
3. Kohat	39.3	**East Pakistan**	
		23. Saidpur	41.8
Punjab		24. Rajshahi	48.9
4. Rawalpindi	49.9	25. Khulna	46.1
5. Jhelum	53.1	26. Barisal	49.3
6. Gujrat	41.9	27. Mymensingh	59.3
7. Sargodha	33.4	28. Dacca	46.9
8. Lyallpur	30.7	29. Narayanganj	41.5
9. Jhang	28.9	30. Comilla	49.9
10. Lahore	38.7	31. Chittagong	48.0
11. Kasur	22.1		
12. Gujranwala	33.5		
13. Sialkot	40.7		
14. Multan	25.5		
15. Sahiwal	29.9		
16. Bahawalpur	32.5		
Sind			
17. Sukkur	30.6		
18. Shikarpur	29.7		
19. Hyderabad	24.6		
20. Mirpur Khas	24.7		
21. Karachi	39.3		

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX IX

Educational Institutions, Enrolment and Teachers, East and West Pakistan, 1947-66

	Primary Schools				Secondary Schools			
	Number		Enrolment		Number		Enrolment	
Year	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	E.Pak.	E.Pak.	E.P.	W.P.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.
1947-48	29633	8413	2021702	544360	3481	2598	526020	508041
1948-49	28977	9073	2531324	592444	3551	2585	548616	516631
1949-50	26989	9411	2322669	667091	3552	2603	517802	572063
1950-51	26352	10377	2292760	779314	3510	2667	514512	626168
1951-52	26153	11176	2474917	935142	3338	2576	479857	644354
1952-53	26260	12670	2654765	1149637	3143	2018	453441	621578
1953-54	26227	13683	2653285	1209427	3102	2166	442499	659059
1954-55	26000	14162	2604369	1274099	3079	2264	457297	722822
1955-56	26220	15841	2646256	1384919	3105	2566	473120	798679
1956-57	26281	16437	2711770	1418082	3084	2672	497599	828715
1957-58	26579	16930	2794915	1431921	3030	2816	491045	837499
1958-59	26688	17536	2985258	1484232	3061	2969	495035	853110
1959-60	26583	17901	3180367	1547910	3053	3043	530485	912383
1960-61	26665	20909	3330582	1705962	3140	2970	532902	960606
1961-62	26747	24930	3423232	1907058	3254	3311	574867	982290
1962-63	27154	28338	3636497	2086228	3374	3586	659345	1101149
1963-64	27562	30950	3852322	2299738	3579	3838	755617	1239961
1964-65	27649	32589	4044179	2532324	3834	4323	848512	1369416
1965-66	27736	34313	4236036	2763670	3964	4472	949486	1481094

APPENDIX IX [contd.]

Year	Number of Teachers				Teachers Training Insts.			
	Primary		Secondary		Primary and Secondary		Enrolment	
	E.Pak.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	W.Pak.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.
1947-48	75624	17820	24362	18848	Data not available			
1948-49	70403	17839	24597	19033				
1949-50	66821	19891	24047	20095				
1950-51	64815	22832	23690	21296	84	36	3081	3734
1951-52	61954	26144	23100	21700	85	37	2769	3839
1952-53	67088	29881	21921	20782	81	43	3661	5085
1953-54	71888	33119	21638	22229	73	39	3972	4461
1954-55	71477	35477	22289	23349	61	41	3526	5630
1955-56	71974	36062	22768	27368	58	42	3421	6197
1956-57	71238	37464	23160	31458	59	43	2908	6650
1957-58	74725	42230	22909	30685	57	48	2904	6702
1958-59	77113	44306	22796	30807	48	48	3274	6642
1959-60	78462	44848	23571	31355	47	55	3305	6200
1960-61	80524	50021	24454	34361	48	56	3571	6999
1961-62	82477	54833	25318	38176	48	50	3799	11089
1962-63	86613	63550	27510	41716	49	51	4193	12464
1963-64	92447	69844	32579	44587	58	61	4850	12789
1964-65	94530	75960	33670	49828	59	86	9719	13284
1965-66	96634	83442	35655	55876	59	87	14547	13374

APPENDIX IX [contd.]

Year	Number of Colleges		Number of Universities		Enrolment in Universities	
	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.	E.Pak.	W.Pak.
1947-48	Data not available		1	2	1620	654
1948-49			1	2	1985	690
1949-50			1	2	2290	737
1950-51			1	3	2083	969
1951-52			1	4	2391	1558
1952-53			1	4	2304	1686
1953-54	77	85	2	4	2431	1521
1954-55	75	96	2	4	2858	1998
1955-56	76	99	2	4	3349	2649
1956-57	73	109	2	4	3125	3106
1957-58	89	120	2	4	3450	3136
1958-59	89	141	2	4	3962	3482
1959-60	93	159	2	4	3766	4092
1960-61	92	165	2	4	3970	5084
1961-62	97	176	4	6	5817	7214
1962-63	108	191	4	6	7140	9464
1963-64	122	223	4	6	7664	10078
1964-65	157	261	4	6	9714	14381
1965-66	181	300	4	6	8831	18708

(Source: Twenty Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

APPENDIX X

Expenditure on Education

(in million rupees)

Year	Pakistan		East Pakistan		West Pakistan	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
1948-49	647.0	2.8	160.5	19.5	301.3	35.4
1949-50	856.0	6.1	178.6	21.2	307.0	37.7
1950-51	1266.2	6.0	190.3	20.9	329.7	42.9
1951-52	1442.3	10.0	227.5	21.5	376.4	49.2
1952-53	1320.1	12.3	258.3	26.0	411.0	60.7
1953-54	1108.7	10.4	260.2	20.5	447.0	70.5
1954-55	1172.6	19.6	284.7	23.1	435.3	74.8
1955-56	1433.4	18.1	285.1	26.5	477.3	84.6
1956-57	1330.7	21.5	338.5	22.5	548.1	100.6
1957-58	1521.8	26.1	276.3	39.9	614.7	102.8
1958-59	1956.5	29.8	521.0	34.4	878.3	136.6
1959-60	1846.5	36.4	377.0	25.2	654.3	115.7
1960-61	1894.2	35.8	437.0	61.9	700.4	121.6
1961-62	1986.8	17.9	499.1	67.2	803.1	155.7
1962-63	1795.3	11.8	672.5	76.5	1105.7	203.4
1963-64	2337.2	13.5	1013.5	88.3	1483.1	229.1
1964-65	1736.2	16.6	1091.2	95.4	1488.4	264.5
1965-66	4326.2	10.4	1140.8	121.8	1617.3	282.0
1966-67	3714.0	17.2	1311.4	138.0	1606.0	288.0
1967-68	3802.3	19.4	1611.6	159.0	1933.8	314.3

(Source: 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)

(a) Total budget expenditure
(b) Expenditure on Education

APPENDIX XI

Educational Levels of Literates, 1961

Province/ Division	Literates					
	No formal education	Educated	Matric & over	Inter-mediate & over	Degree	Higher Degree
West Pakistan	568384	4703156	473135	100032	54632	23780
Peshawar	115598	346970	39105	7581	4847	1424
D.I. Khan	1862	61298	5959	885	580	181
Rawalpindi	54492	713788	58804	11358	6484	2149
Sargodha	123302	690350	61626	10829	4941	1997
Lahore	98132	937076	105788	24625	13605	5256
Multan	85609	492511	44641	8424	4085	1665
Bahawalpur	25208	203010	18362	3181	1523	455
Khairpur	22079	323786	13024	3372	1373	1133
Hyderabad	27495	320201	19378	6080	1697	1714
Quetta	7408	60383	8888	1394	835	276
Kalat	3893	12576	916	177	96	34
Karachi	103306	541207	96644	22126	15057	7496
East Pakistan	1131320	5489106	188223	40762	24216	6034
Rajshahi	263581	1304511	36153	7560	4260	964
Khulna	182524	1141621	33254	6094	3297	835
Dacca	405779	1393198	59178	15178	8822	2473
Chittagong	279436	1649776	59638	11930	7837	1762

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX XII

Languages of Literacy

Province/ Division	Literates*	Literates in Each Language					
		Bengali		Punjabi		Pushto	
		a	b	a	b	a	b
West Pakistan	4754519	0.25	+300.0	1.28	+17.3	1.22	+190.0
N.W.F.P.	394626	0.30	-	1.52	-	11.65	-
Peshawar	335657	0.36	n	1.27	-16.7	12.20	+173.3
D.I. Khan	58969	0.02	n	1.69	+42.9	8.47	+3470.4
Punjab	2934562	0.03	-	1.02	-	0.09	-
Rawalpindi	660464	0.08	n	0.76	-66.7	0.15	-33.3
Sargodha	259741	0.04	n	0.90	-53.8	0.06	+52.3
Lahore	902242	0.01	n	0.55	+150.0	0.03	+1500.0
Multan	514211	0.04	n	0.78	-20.0	0.08	+289.8
Bahawalpur	184348	0.01	n	5.43	+9500.0	0.22	+136.0
Sind	708907	0.20	-	1.27	-	0.49	-
Khairpur	344300	0.17	n	1.63	+1766.6	0.17	+500.0
Hyderabad	364607	0.22	n	0.99	+350.0	0.74	+1250.0
Karachi	631057	1.27	+230.0	2.22	+180.0	0.73	+254.0
Baluchistan**	85267	0.61	-	1.14	-	1.93	-
Quetta	67333	0.74	+265.2	1.19	-70.9	2.29	+25.0
Kalat	15857	n	n	0.74	-10.0	0.60	+86.3
East Pakistan	8277867	97.60	+35.9	0.12	+343.9	0.04	+144.4
Rajshahi	1738540	95.90	+34.5	0.06	n	0.02	n
Khulna	1764416	97.80	+33.7	0.04	n	0.02	n
Dacca	2243792	98.7	+39.0	0.06	n	0.03	n
Chittagong	2531119	97.7	+35.5	0.28	n	0.07	n

a = percentage of the total literates.
b = variation in the actual number between 1951 and 1961.
n = negligible or not available.

* Literates here mean those able to read and write.

** Includes Lasbela district which is at present part of Karachi division; figures for Karachi are for the district.

APPENDIX XII [contd.]

Province/ Division	Literates in Each Language							
	Sindhi		Urdu		Baluchi		Persian	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
West Pakistan	11.82	+77.8	86.43	+101.1	0.20	+350	6.37	+88.2
N.W.F.P.	0.08	-	96.20	-	n	-	13.92	-
Peshawar	0.06	n	96.13	+127.5	n	-	13.69	+172.0
D.I. Khan	0.15	n	96.61	+111.1	n	-	15.25	+100.0
Punjab	0.06	-	97.90	-	0.02	-	6.90	-
Rawalpindi	0.06	n	99.55	+130.5	0.01	n	7.12	+95.8
Sargodha	0.04	n	99.26	+135.2	0.01	n	7.88	+231.0
Lahore	0.02	n	97.23	+60.3	0.01	n	6.76	+65.0
Multan	0.08	n	98.83	+64.4	0.03	n	7.00	+71.4
Bahawalpur	0.22	n	90.22	+86.5	0.11	n	4.89	+80.0
Sind	74.47	-	35.54	-	0.85	-	1.83	-
Khairpur	80.23	+62.4	29.07	+85.2	1.45	n	1.74	+1.8
Hyderabad	69.04	+95.3	41.64	+176.4	0.25	n	2.08	+58.3
Karachi	4.90	+100.0	82.88	+275.0	0.57	+140	2.69	-
Baluchistan	1.84	-	91.61	-	1.32	-	14.42	-
Quetta	0.58	-55.7	91.91	+55.0	0.84	+485	11.63	+5.4
Kalat	5.11	+46.1	91.46	+275.0	3.40	+670	26.97	+100.0
East Pakistan	0.07	+559.2	5.40	+45.8	0.06	+1799	0.40	-19.4
Rajshahi	0.07	n	7.10	+68.8	n	-	0.32	-91.1
Khulna	0.04	n	3.90	-6.8	n	-	0.27	-33.8
Dacca	0.04	n	5.00	+16.5	n	-	0.36	-50.9
Chittagong	0.10	n	5.70	+130.2	n	-	0.75	+35.7

APPENDIX XII [contd.]

Province/ Division	Literates in Each Language					
	Arabic		English		Brahui	
	a	b	a	b	a	b
West Pakistan	3.34	+468	20.95	+58	0.08	-
N.W.F.P.	1.77	-	24.05	-	n	-
Peshawar	1.70	-25.0	24.70	+97	n	-
D.I.Khan	1.69	+233	20.34	+177	n	-
Punjab	4.26	-	21.94	-	n	-
Rawalpindi	3.79	+525	21.82	+118	n	-
Sargodha	2.82	+905	20.80	+130	n	-
Lahore	5.10	+475	25.83	+15.3	n	-
Multan	4.47	+475	18.10	+19	n	-
Bahawalpur	5.98	+3600	17.39	+46	n	-
Sind	1.69	-	10.16	-	0.20	-
Khairpur	1.74	+550	8.72	+50	0.25	-
Hyderabad	1.87	+1033	11.51	+75	0,14	-
Karachi	1.58	+1187	25.67	+69	0.16	-
Baluchistan	6.14	-	26.97	-	0,76	-
Quetta	4.96	+1000	29.70	+54	0,28	-
Kalat	11.77	+5388	16.52	+384	2.90	-
East Pakistan	3.17	+83.9	17.00	+6,4	n	-
Rajshahi	3.80	+154	16.27	+14	n	-
Khulna	2.27	+8.1	15.40	+3.8	n	-
Dacca	2.63	+25.5	18.85	+1.0	n	-
Chittagong	3.87	+197	16.48	+6.9	n	-

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX XIII

Languages of Literacy in Some Selected Cities, 1961

Cities	Literates*	Percentage of Literates				
		Bengali	Punjabi	Pushto	Sindhi	Urdu
East Pakistan						
1. Saidpur	Data not available					
2. Rajshahi						
3. Khulna	49656	88.7	0.1	0.1	0.2	16.8
4. Barisal	29227	99.4	0.2	n	n	7.6
5. Mymensingh	24851	89.3	0.2	n	0.5	13.8
6. Dacca	217587	87.5	0.4	0.1	0.2	19.6
7. Narayanganj	56748	91.3	0.1	n	n	13.0
8. Comilla	23118	89.3	8.4	5.2	2.2	17.1
9. Chittagong	147074	84.5	0.5	0.1	0.1	17.1
West Pakistan						
10. Mardan	14499	1.2	1.3	28.4	0.1	98.2
11. Peshawar	56223	0.5	1.7	4.4	0.1	95.8
12. Kohat	15790	2.7	1.8	3.1	0.4	98.8
13. Rawalpindi	131371	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.1	99.9
14. Jhelum	20543	0.2	0.5	0.2	n	98.5**
15. Gujrat	18844	n	0.1	0.1	n	97.4**
16. Sargodha	32793	0.9	1.7	0.2	0.1	99.2
17. Lyallpur	99475	n	0.4	0.1	n	99.4
18. Jhang	21291	n	2.3	n	n	99.5
19. Lahore	384447	0.1	0.5	n	0.1	98.9
20. Kasur	12230	0.1	0.3	n	n	96.3
21. Gujranwala	46654	n	0.1	n	n	99.3
22. Sialkot	49832	n	0.1	0.1	n	99.1
23. Multan	72843	0.1	1.3	0.2	0.2	99.2
24. Sahiwal	18494	n	0.4	0.1	0.1	95.8
25. Okara	12948	n	n	n	n	100.0
26. Bahawalpur	21191	n	0.3	n	0.1	99.4
27. Sukkur	20262	1.3	17.0	1.1	56.8	53.8
28. Shikarpur	13507	n	0.3	0.2	73.2	43.5
29. Hyderabad	89224	0.1	1.6	0.2	37.0	77.2
30. Mirpur Khas	12521	n	0.3	0.2	41.0	71.3
31. Karachi	608740	1.3	2.3	0.7	4.1	83.2
32. Quetta	38637	1.3	1.0	0.9	0.3	99.5**

n = less than 0.1%

* Persons able to read and write.

** Data not reliable.

APPENDIX XIII

Cities	Percentage of Literates				
	Baluchi	Persian	Arabic	English	Brahui
East Pakistan					
1. Saidpur	Data not available				
2. Rajshahi					
3. Khulna	0.1	0.4	2.5	33.3	n
4. Barisal	n	n	11.1	37.1	n
5. Mymensingh	n	0.3	2.7	61.7	n
6. Dacca	n	1.2	2.2	32.8	n
7. Narayanganj	n	0.2	3.4	19.5	n
8. Comilla	0.1	2.3	9.6	69.7	n
9. Chittagong	n	1.0	2.6	34.4	n
West Pakistan					
10. Mardan	n	10.3	1.4	35.7	n
11. Peshawar	0.1	13.1	1.2	36.3	0.1
12. Kohat	n	13.5	1.4	35.8	n
13. Rawalpindi	n	7.2	5.7	36.2	0.2
14. Jhelum	n	11.1	5.8	42.1	n
15. Gujrat	n	7.0	2.8	32.3	n
16. Sargodha	n	6.9	2.8	37.3	n
17. Lyallpur	n	7.1	2.7	29.3	n
18. Jhang	n	6.3	2.5	21.5	n
19. Lahore	n	6.7	5.7	33.0	0.1
20. Kasur	n	8.5	4.8	26.2	n
21. Gujranwala	n	4.4	6.7	29.3	n
22. Sialkot	n	4.7	4.1	30.0	n
23. Multan	n	7.7	5.3	30.9	n
24. Sahiwal	n	7.6	3.8	35.6	n
25. Okara	n	5.0	2.1	21.9	n
26. Bahawalpur	n	6.5	2.6	42.8	n
27. Sukkur	10.1	1.7	1.2	17.6	1.3
28. Shikarpur	0.1	2.4	1.2	14.4	n
29. Hyderabad	n	2.2	1.6	20.1	0.1
30. Mirpur Khas	0.1	1.7	1.1	25.8	n
31. Karachi	0.6	2.7	1.6	25.6	0.1
32. Quetta	0.2	8.3	1.8	38.1	0.1

(Source: Census, 1961)

n = less than 0.1%

APPENDIX XIV

Urban and Rural Population, 1951 and 1961

	Rural				
	1951		1961		
District	No. (000)	% of total	No. (000)	% of total	% change
N.W.F.P.					
Hazara	851	93.6	977	93.0	+ 30.4
Mardan	583	92.2	708	87.0	+ 22.0
Peshawar	649	71.9	788	67.3	+ 21.3
Kohat	247	82.2	307	81.1	+ 24.2
D.I. Khan	235	80.9	284	80.6	+ 20.5
Bannu	271	88.2	334	89.1	+ 23.3
Punjab					
Campbellpur	633	91.8	689	89.8	+ 8.8
Rawalpindi	620	68.3	730	64.2	+ 17.8
Jhelum	605	89.1	644	85.9	+ 6.4
Gujrat	1027	88.7	1158	87.3	+ 12.7
Sargodha	949	81.7	1183	80.6	+ 24.6
Mianwali	492	89.6	605	81.0	+ 22.8
Lyallpur	1870	86.9	2111	78.6	+ 12.9
Jhang	741	84.7	906	84.0	+ 22.2
Lahore	914	48.3	1015	40.9	+ 11.0
Gujranwala	796	76.0	947	73.3	+ 19.0
Sheikhupura	841	91.1	944	87.4	+ 12.3
Sialkot	1254	85.1	1342	84.1	+ 7.1
D.G. Khan	556	88.6	679	87.5	+ 22.2
Muzaffargarh	697	92.8	917	92.6	+ 31.6
Multan	1766	83.8	2125	78.6	+ 20.3
Sahiwal	1661	91.5	1895	88.8	+ 14.1
Bahawalpur	437	82.9	597	81.2	+ 36.5
Bahawalnagar	577	91.5	718	87.2	+ 24.5
R.Y. Khan	615	92.5	902	88.8	+ 46.7
Sind					
Jacobabad	401	94.2	470	89.0	+ 17.4
Sukkur	586	80.0	623	74.5	+ 6.4
Larkana	444	88.5	507	83.8	+ 14.1
Nawabshah	456	93.0	602	87.1	+ 32.0
Khairpur	298	93.1	426	90.2	+ 43.1
Hyderabad	601	67.4	771	60.0	+ 28.3
Dadu	384	92.2	430	88.7	+ 12.1
Tharparkar	559	92.5	635	87.1	+ 13.5
Sanghar	286	88.7	360	83.6	+ 12.6
Thatta	281	96.7	341	94.2	+ 21.5
Karachi	69	6.1	131	6.4	+ 89.9

APPENDIX XIV [contd.]

District	Rural				
	1951		1961		
	No. (000)	% of total	No. (000)	% of total	% change
Baluchistan					
Quetta	118	56.5	146	54.4	+ 23.0
Sibi	109	91.2	107	86.7	- 1.8
Loralai	93	95.4	103	92.9	+ 10.5
Zhob	59	92.7	77	87.6	+ 30.5
Chagai	35	94.2	36	86.1	+ 2.9
Kalat	283	97.4	315	92.3	+ 11.3
Mekran	128	92.5	122	82.9	- 4.7
Kharan	52	95.3	36	85.1	- 30.8
Lasbela	73	96.0	88	96.5	+ 20.5
East Pakistan					
Dinajpur	1278	94.4	1638	95.8	+ 28.2
Rangpur	2789	95.6	3637	95.8	+ 30.4
Bogra	1214	97.2	1527	97.0	+ 25.8
Rajshahi	2120	96.2	2691	95.7	+ 26.9
Pabna	1515	95.6	1860	94.9	+ 22.8
Kushtia	844	95.4	1103	94.6	+ 30.7
Jessore	1601	97.7	2115	96.6	+ 32.1
Khulna	2007	96.7	2276	92.9	+ 13.4
Bakerganj	3510	96.4	4142	97.2	+ 18.0
Mymensingh	5603	96.9	6778	96.6	+ 21.0
Dacca	3661	89.9	4342	85.2	+ 18.6
Faridpur	2717	97.9	3100	97.5	+ 14.1
Sylhet	2998	98.0	3419	98.0	+ 14.0
Comilla	3676	96.9	4250	96.8	+ 15.6
Noakhali	2050	99.0	2349	98.6	+ 14.6
Chittagong	2216	88.3	2610	87.5	+ 17.8
C.H. Tracts	287	100 .0	362	94.1	+ 26.1

APPENDIX XIV [contd.]

District	Urban 1951 No. (000)	Urban 1951 % of total	Urban 1961 No. (000)	Urban 1961 % of total	% change
N.W.F.P.					
Hazara	58	6.4	74	7.0	+ 26.1
Mardan	49	7.8	106	13.0	+116.5
Peshawar	254	28.1	382	32.7	+ 50.6
Kohat	54	17.8	71	18.9	+ 33.2
D.I. Khan	56	19.1	68	19.4	+ 23.2
Bannu	36	11.8	41	10.9	+ 13.3
Punjab					
Campbellpur	57	8.3	78	10.2	+ 36.5
Rawalpindi	288	31.7	407	35.8	+ 41.2
Jhelum	77	11.4	106	14.1	+ 36.6
Gujrat	131	11.3	168	12.7	+ 28.1
Sargodha	214	18.4	284	19.4	+ 33.1
Mianwali	58	10.6	142	19.0	+144.3
Lyallpur	283	13.1	573	21.4	+102.5
Jhang	135	15.3	173	16.0	+ 27.7
Lahore	981	51.7	1465	59.1	+ 49.4
Gujranwala	251	24.0	345	26.7	+ 37.4
Sheikhupura	83	8.9	137	12.6	+ 65.4
Sialkot	220	14.9	255	15.9	+ 15.5
D.G. Khan	75	11.4	97	12.5	+ 29.9
Muzaffargarh	54	7.2	73	7.4	+ 34.2
Multan	341	16.2	577	21.4	+ 69.1
Sahiwal	155	8.5	239	11.2	+ 54.6
Bahawalpur	90	17.1	138	18.8	+ 52.9
Bahawalnagar	54	8.5	105	12.8	+ 94.4
R.Y. Khan	50	7.5	114	11.2	+127.4
Sind					
Jacobabad	25	5.8	58	11.0	+133.6
Sukkur	147	20.0	213	25.5	+ 45.1
Larkana	58	11.5	98	16.2	+ 68.7
Nawabshah	34	7.0	89	12.9	+161.0
Khairpur	22	6.9	46	9.8	+110.7
Hyderabad	291	32.6	514	40.0	+ 76.5
Dadu	33	7.8	55	11.3	+ 67.6
Tharparkar	46	7.5	94	12.9	+105.9
Sanghar	37	11.4	70	16.4	+ 92.2
Thatta	10	3.3	21	5.8	+110.0
Karachi	1068	93.9	1913	93.6	+ 79.1

APPENDIX XIV [contd.]

District	Urban 1951 No. (000)	Urban 1951 % of total	Urban 1961 No. (000)	Urban 1961 % of total	% change
Baluchistan					
Quetta	95	28.8	122	45.6	+ 28.8
Sibi	12	9.9	16	13.3	+ 38.1
Loralai	4	4.6	8	7.1	+100.0
Zhob	6	7.3	11	12.4	+ 83.3
Chagai	2	5.8	6	13.9	+200.0
Kalat	8	2.6	26	7.7	+225.0
Mekran	10	7.5	25	17.1	+150.0
Kharan	3	4.7	6	14.9	+100.0
Lasbela	3	4.0	3	3.5	-
East Pakistan					
Dinajpur	77	5.6	72	4.2	- 6.5
Rangpur	128	4.4	159	4.2	+ 24.2
Bogra	36	2.8	47	3.0	+ 30.6
Rajshahi	85	3.8	120	4.3	+ 41.2
Pabna	69	4.4	100	5.1	+ 44.9
Kushtia	41	4.6	63	5.4	+ 53.7
Jessore	37	2.3	75	3.4	+102.7
Khulna	69	3.3	172	7.1	+149.3
Bakerganj	132	3.6	119	2.8	- 9.8
Mymensingh	182	3.1	240	3.4	+ 31.9
Dacca	411	10.1	754	14.8	+ 83.5
Faridpur	58	2.1	79	2.5	+ 36.2
Sylhet	61	2.0	71	2.0	+ 16.4
Comilla	117	3.1	139	3.2	+ 18.8
Noakhali	22	1.0	34	1.4	+ 54.5
Chittagong	296	11.7	373	12.5	+ 26.0
C.H. Tracts	-	-	23	5.9	+100.0

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX XV

Population by Birth Places, 1951 and 1961, by Divisions

(a = 1951; b = 1961)

Places of Birth	Pakistan[1]		East Pakistan	
	a	b	a	b
All places	72993118	90282674	41932329	50840235
Pakistan	65387182	83730300	41075181	50205808
East Pakistan	41071827	50223856	41065863	50189972
Rajshahi Div.		11377155	8844439	11373655
Khulna Div.		9753770	7999241	9750891
Dacca Div.		15316336	12509532	15299960
Chittagong Div.		13776595	11712651	13765466
West Pakistan	24315355	33506444	9318	15836
Peshawar Div.	3223861	3214482	1768	3421
D.I. Khan Div.		981550		204
Rawalpindi Div.		3974754		4247
Sargodha Div.		4903543		702
Lahore Div.	15344535	5271489	6954	3558
Multan Div.		5341276		304
Bahawalpur Div.		1911107		56
Khairpur Div.	4270148	2865806	171	41
Hyderabad Div.		2785153		168
Quetta Div.	1157771	601302	67	291
Kalat Div.		555128		174
Karachi Div.	319040	984610	358	2670
Frontier Regions[2]	116244	-	-	-
Kashmir[3]	-	273758	-	457
Other parts of the sub-continent	7555191	6223528	848539	627389
Muslim countries in Asia	34811	39635	286	316
Other countries in Asia	11890	11019	7913	5808
Other Muslim countries	163	246	5	79
Other countries	3881	4188	405	378

1. Figures do not include data for Frontier States and Tribal Agencies. For 1951 detailed figures for divisions not available.

2. 1951 figures not available.

3. Included in the figures for the rest of the sub-continent in 1951 census.

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	Rajshahi Div.		Khulna Div.	
	a	b	a	b
All places	9338453	11850089	8304869	10066900
Pakistan	8953288	11576382	8071229	9896725
East Pakistan	8952711	11575150	8069864	9893195
Rajshahi Div.	8804457	11293884	7374	20310
Khulna Div.	16784	20224	7931902	9642334
Dacca Div.	97900	196427	81437	122450
Chittagong Div.	33570	64615	49151	108111
West Pakistan	577	1232	1365	3530
Peshawar Div.	176	397	106	845
D.I. Khan Div.		38		43
Rawalpindi Div.		331		1625
Sargodha Div.		80		231
Lahore Div.	368	188	1231	410
Multan Div.		17		34
Bahawalpur Div.		3		29
Khairpur Div.	29	6	14	15
Hyderabad Div.		17		5
Quetta Div.	4	26	9	66
Kalat Div.		8		123
Karachi	-	121	5	104
Frontier Regions	-	-	-	-
Kashmir	-	24	-	241
Other parts of the sub-continent	384985	273587	233406	169787
Muslim countries in Asia	77	17	51	25
Other countries in Asia	68	49	114	99
Other Muslim countries	-	-	-	-
Other countries	35	30	69	23

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	Dacca Div.		Chittagong Div.	
	a	b	a	b
All places	12567237	15293596	11721770	13629650
Pakistan	12412729	15171167	11627935	13561534
East Pakistan	12409044	15164854	11634244	13556773
Rajshahi Div.	28631	46660	3977	12801
Khulna Div.	35091	56888	15464	31455
Dacca Div.	12260758	14871434	69437	109649
Chittagong Div.	84564	189872	11545366	13402868
West Pakistan	3685	6313	3691	4761
Peshawar Div.	983	1094	503	1085
D.I. Khan Div.		70		53
Rawalpindi Div.		1406		885
Sargodha Div.		277		114
Lahore Div.	2516	1659	2839	1301
Multan Div.		75		178
Bahawalpur Div.		14		10
Khairpur Div.		17		3
Hyderabad Div.	92	66	36	80
Quetta Div.		114		85
Kalat Div.	35	10	23	33
Karachi Div.	59	1511	290	934
Frontier Regions	-	-	-	-
Kashmir	-	189	-	3
Other parts of the sub-continent	153809	121320	76339	62695
Muslim countries in Asia	38	91	120	183
Other countries in Asia	586	649	7145	5011
Other Muslim countries	3	-	2	70
Other countries	72	180	229	145

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	West Pakistan		Peshawar Div.	
	a	b	a	b
All places	31060789	39442439	2643155	3412701
Pakistan	24312001	33524492	2591453	3373405
East Pakistan	5964	33884	882	3396
Rajshahi Div.	-	3500	-	393
Khulna Div.	-	2879	-	981
Dacca Div.	-	16376	-	1462
Chittagong Div.	-	11129	-	560
West Pakistan	24306037	33490608	2590571	3370009
Peshawar Div.	3222093	3211061	2488694	2960841
D.I. Khan Div.		981346	7012	259047
Rawalpindi Div.		3970507		50833
Sargodha Div.		4902841		7561
Lahore Div.	15337581	5267931	50833	15640
Multan Div.		5340972		2970
Bahawalpur Div.		1911051		176
Khairpur Div.	4269977	2865765	830	106
Hyderabad Div.		2784985		756
Quetta Div.	1157704	601011	2189	580
Kalat Div.		554954		19
Karachi	318682	981940	164	1739
Frontier Regions	-	116244	-	86377
Kashmir	-	273301	-	7868
Other parts of the sub-continent	6706652	5596139	41184	22547
Muslim countries in Asia	34525	39319	9820	8362
Other countries in Asia	3977	5211	414	335
Other Muslim countries	158	167	-	12
Other countries	3476	3810	284	172

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	D.I. Khan Div.		Rawalpindi Div.	
	a	b	a	b
All places	579017	727546	3434155	3979139
Pakistan	562262	720010	3084972	3764807
East Pakistan	75	154	742	3476
Rajshahi Div.	-	32	-	364
Khulna Div.	-	13	-	357
Dacca Div.	-	90	-	1860
Chittagong Div.	-	29	-	895
West Pakistan	562187	719856	3084232	3761331
Peshawar Div.	7846	6544	31903	38389
D.I. Khan Div.	534334	699982		1733
Rawalpindi Div.		2889	3002628	3639758
Sargodha Div.		2682	17589	22287
Lahore Div.	16717	1087	25178	43304
Multan Div.		443	2221	5489
Bahawalpur Div.		60	2759	624
Khairpur Div.	148	33	742	267
Hyderabad Div.		26		710
Quetta Div.	52	121	638	1564
Kalat Div.		-		24
Karachi Div.	-	1680	579	5863
Frontier Regions	-	4309	-	1319
Kashmir	-	330	-	58874
Other parts of the sub-continent	16422	6558	346975	153134
Muslim countries in Asia	305	643	670	1166
Other countries in Asia	7	5	835	506
Other Muslim countries	-	-	4	-
Other countries	21	0	697	652

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	Sargodha Div.		Lahore Div.	
	a	b	a	b
All places	1738868	5976939	5339271	6448575
Pakistan	3369633	4828670	3567853	5005853
East Pakistan	122	640	500	1530
Rajshahi Div.	-	111	-	56
Khulna Div.	-	40	-	22
Dacca Div.	-	401	-	1218
Chittagong Div.	-	88	-	234
West Pakistan	3369511	4828030	3567353	5004323
Peshawar Div.	10117	15683	19182	33623
D.I. Khan Div.		6963		1950
Rawalpindi Div.	50729	75898	63281	70676
Sargodha Div.	5212815	4575660	40316	56300
Lahore Div.	63355	103895	3423890	4802581
Multan Div.	24574	39707	14952	24161
Bahawalpur Div.	4518	4608	1531	3800
Khairpur Div.	2701	866	1343	821
Hyderabad		947		1512
Quetta Div.	521	1449	1696	3032
Kalat Div.		6		14
Karachi Div.	181	1993	1162	5840
Frontier Regions	-	355	-	13
Kashmir	-	12035	-	170414
Other parts of the sub-continent	1367533	1128568	1768008	1268581
Muslim countries in Asia	1288	7132	2176	1970
Other countries in Asia	157	239	739	555
Other Muslim countries	1	31	19	7
Other countries	256	264	476	1195

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	Multan Div.		Bahawalpur Div.	
	a	b	a	b
All places	5301907	6602924	1822501	2574066
Pakistan	3813538	5414083	1397622	2155983
East Pakistan	52	329	28	242
Rajshahi Div.	-	40	-	63
Khulna Div.	-	3	-	2
Dacca Div.	-	224	-	132
Chittagong Div.	-	62	-	45
West Pakistan	3813486	5413754	1397595	2155741
Peshawar Div.	6337	7956	3041	4689
D.I. Khan Div.		3870		1536
Rawalpindi Div.	28790	39218	13597	17831
Sargodha Div.	60554	81215	50988	98330
Lahore Div.	67566	106756	42194	78813
Multan Div.	3640881	5152120	31618	76611
Bahawalpur Div.	6970	16732	1253919	1869662
Khairpur Div.	876	1100	1608	4874
Hyderabad Div.		961		1109
Quetta Div.	1306	1900	488	1107
Kalat Div.		24		32
Karachi Div.	206	1439	141	898
Frontier Regions	-	463	-	249
Kashmir	-	3054	-	1184
Other parts of the sub-continent	1487004	1183449	423788	415007
Muslim countries in Asia	1217	1916	988	1706
Other countries in Asia	79	249	43	89
Other Muslim countries	-	10	-	6
Other countries	69	163	60	91

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	Khairpur Div.		Hyderabad Div.	
	a	b	a	b
All places	2584389	3133712	2340953	3290956
Pakistan	2345083	2961864	2005383	2890570
East Pakistan	34	136	216	2759
Rajshahi Div.	-	3	-	32
Khulna Div.	-	20	-	8
Dacca Div.	-	99	-	2356
Chittagong Div.	-	14	-	363
West Pakistan	2345049	2961728	2005167	2887811
Peshawar Div.	2926	11161	6411	18294
D.I. Khan Div.		425		971
Rawalpindi Div.		9544		13548
Sargodha Div.		22455		12476
Lahore Div.	28565	25479	17103	21794
Multan Div.		17613		9754
Bahawalpur Div.		9705		3838
Khairpur Div.	2266496	2817286	13957	33745
Hyderabad Div.	16652	17199	1947808	2742651
Quetta Div.	28233	14853	12999	9820
Kalat Div.		10576		6318
Karachi Div.	2177	4076	6889	12161
Frontier Regions	-	1356	-	2434
Kashmir	-	685	-	2584
Other parts of the sub-continent	237444	10084	333673	391337
Muslim countries in Asia	1839	997	1867	6239
Other countries in Asia	12	74	13	137
Other Muslim countries	-	-	-	-
Other countries	11	8	17	125

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	Quetta Div.		Kalat Div.	
	a	b	a	b
All places	602588	630118	475810	530893
Pakistan	563878	606417	474417	528203
East Pakistan	467	1141	1	22
Rajshahi Div.	-	118	-	-
Khulna Div.	-	127	-	2
Dacca Div.	-	452	-	19
Chittagong Div.	-	444	-	1
West Pakistan	563411	605276	474416	528181
Peshawar Div.	12286	13820	98	1143
D.I. Khan Div.		1579		202
Rawalpindi Div.		13194		516
Sargodha Div.		2916		169
Lahore Div.	22417	6981	240	327
Multan Div.		2899		207
Bahawalpur Div.		289		21
Khairpur Div.	2184	875	57	522
Hyderabad Div.		445		85
Quetta Div.	514172	553733	696	4407
Kalat Div.	12124	5782	473292	519187
Karachi Div.	288	955	33	310
Frontier Regions	-	1808	-	1085
Kashmir	-	3231	-	193
Other parts of the sub-continent	28373	7111	352	1090
Muslim countries in Asia	10161	1964	1038	1369
Other countries in Asia	96	178	1	35
Other Muslim countries	-	-	-	-
Other countries	80	217	2	3

APPENDIX XV [contd.]

Places of Birth	Karachi Div. a	Karachi Div. b
All places	1198175	2134870
Pakistan	535905	1274627
East Pakistan	2845	20059
Rajshahi Div.	-	2298
Khulna Div.	-	1304
Dacca Div.	-	8063
Chittagong Div.	-	8394
West Pakistan	533060	1254568
Peshawar Div.	4967	98918
D.I. Khan Div.		3088
Rawalpindi Div.		53238
Sargodha Div.		20790
Lahore Div.	54298	61274
Multan Div.		8998
Bahawalpur Div.		1536
Khairpur Div.	14575	5270
Hyderabad Div.		18584
Quetta Div.	34109	8445
Kalat Div.		12972
Karachi Div.	382111	944979
Frontier Regions	-	16476
Kashmir	-	12885
Other parts of the sub-continent	655896	838673
Muslim countries in Asia	3156	4855
Other countries in Asia	1581	2809
Other Muslim countries	134	101
Other countries	1503	920

(Source: Census, 1951 and 1961)

APPENDIX XVI

Composition of Population in the Districts by Birth, 1961

(thousands)

I = Total born in the district.
II = Total population of the district.
III = Born and living in the district.
IV = Born in but living out of the district.
V = Born outside and living in the district.

Districts	I	II	III	IV	V
East Pakistan					
Dinajpur	1557	1710	1538	19	172
Rangpur	3568	3796	3528	40	268
Bogra	1570	1574	1509	61	65
Rajshai	2654	2811	2613	41	198
Pabna	2024	1959	1913	111	46
Kushtia	1071	1166	1032	39	134
Jessore	2033	2190	1984	89	206
Khulna	2336	2449	2284	52	165
Bakerganj	4311	4262	4206	105	56
Mymensingh	7121	7019	6891	230	128
Dacca	4942	5096	4732	210	364
Faridpur	3237	3179	3080	157	99
Sylhet	3367	3490	3331	36	159
Comilla	4571	4389	4304	267	85
Noakhali	2585	2383	2348	237	35
Chittagong	2897	2983	2843	54	140
C.H. Tracts	346	385	344	2	41
West Pakistan					
N.W.F.P.					
Hazara	1144	1050	1029	115	94
Mardan	812	814	758	54	56
Peshawar	849	1170	771	78	399
Kohat	406	378	357	49	21
D.I. Khan	351	352	333	18	19
Bannu	630	375	363	267	12
Punjab					
Campbellpur	819	767	745	74	22
Rawalpindi	1030	1137	937	93	200
Jhelum	802	749	700	102	49
Gujrat	1320	1326	1184	136	142
Sargodha	1277	1468	1200	77	268
Mianwali	700	747	657	43	90
Lyallpur	1917	2684	1700	217	984
Jhang	1009	1079	943	66	136
Lahore	1819	2480	1619	200	861

APPENDIX XVI [contd.]

Districts	I	II	III	IV	V
Punjab [contd.]					
Gujranwala	1045	1292	941	104	351
Sheikhupura	895	1681	771	124	910
Sialkot	1510	1596	1275	235	321
D.G. Khan	778	777	748	30	29
Muzaffargarh	892	990	886	26	134
Multan	2111	2702	2019	92	683
Sahiwal	1560	2134	1464	96	670
Bahawalpur	606	736	566	40	170
Bahawalnagar	522	823	505	17	318
R.Y. Khan	783	1016	774	9	242
Sind					
Jacobabad	506	529	493	13	36
Sukkur	762	837	735	27	102
Larkana	576	604	559	17	45
Nawabshah	597	692	576	21	116
Khairpur	425	472	415	10	57
Hyderabad	982	1286	941	41	345
Dadu	464	485	443	21	42
Tharparkar	660	728	627	33	101
Sanghar	324	430	318	6	112
Thatta	356	362	347	9	15
Karachi	895	2044	853	42	1191
Baluchistan					
Quetta	255	267	214	41	53
Sibi	114	123	108	6	15
Loralai	105	111	100	5	11
Zhob	85	88	82	3	6
Chagai	42	41	39	3	2
Kalat	349	341	331	18	10
Mekran	162	147	145	17	2
Kharan	44	42	42	2	0
Lasbela	87	91	81	6	10

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX XVII

Ranking of Districts, 1961

I = multilingualism.
II = linguistic heterogeneity.
III = literacy.
IV = urbanization.
V = in-migration.
VI = Urdu as additional language.
VII = Urdu as mother tongue.
VIII = English as additional language.

Districts	Rankings							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
West Pakistan								
N.W.F.P.								
Hazara	28	19	24	43	43	41	21	27
Mardan	34	42	34	25	31	34	41	29
Peshawar	10	21	13	6	5	4	28	9
Kohat	25	24	17	14	35	28	30	12
D.I. Khan	26	13	30	12	36	32	24	30
Bannu	35	39	29	37	40	30	39	32
Punjab								
Campbellpur	30	30	15	38	42	18	36	22
Rawalpindi	17	25	2	5	34	5	11	4
Jhelum	27	41	4	22	17	11	35	14
Gujrat	37	40	6	29	26	25	26	21
Sargodha	32	26	12	11	16	27	9	16
Mianwali	29	23	16	13	25	16	17	13
Lyallpur	36	44	7	10	3	20	33	15
Jhang	40	36	20	19	20	29	19	24
Lahore	8	20	3	2	4	2	7	1
Gujranwala	19	33	8	7	8	6	15	6
Sheikhupura	21	45	21	30	7	7	32	7
Sialkot	23	43	10	20	15	9	29	8
D.G. Khan	33	32	37	31	39	43	23	42
Muzaffargarh	44	34	33	41	21	45	16	41
Multan	41	22	26	9	11	37	6	26
Sahiwal	43	38	27	35	6	39	22	38
Bahawalpur	39	31	25	15	13	36	12	18
Bahawalnagar	42	37	28	28	2	33	20	36
R.Y. Khan	38	29	31	34	12	35	27	39
Sind								
Jacobabad	6	3	36	36	33	23	31	23
Sukkur	22	16	9	8	24	26	5	17
Larkana	20	17	19	18	30	40	18	28
Nawabshah	18	12	18	27	18	15	8	19
Khairpur	24	18	23	39	23	21	13	34
Hyderabad	13	8	11	9	9	14	2	5
Dadu	14	15	14	33	29	22	14	20
Tharparkar	11	11	35	26	19	13	4	11
Sanghar	7	4	22	17	10	10	3	10
Thatta	12	27	32	44	38	38	34	33
Karachi	5	2	1	1	1	3	1	2

APPENDIX XVII [contd.]

Districts	Rankings							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
Baluchistan								
Quetta	2	7	5	3	14	1	10	3
Sibi	15	9	40	24	22	12	25	25
Loralai	16	6	41	42	28	17	38	37
Zhob	31	35	39	32	32	19	40	35
Chagai	3	5	38	23	37	8	37	40
Kalat	1	1	43	40	41	24	42	43
Mekran	45	28	42	16	44	44	44	45
Kharan	9	14	44	21	45	42	45	44
Lasbela	4	10	45	45	27	31	43	31
East Pakistan								
Dinajpur	4	2	3	9	3	6	2	14
Ranghpur	15	6	12	8	6	10	3	17
Bogra	8	7	7	13	11	11	5	12
Rajshahi	5	4	11	7	7	13	10	10
Pabna	14	14	14	6	13	12	12	8
Kushtia	12	11	16	5	2	14	7	9
Jessore	13	12	9	10	4	9	8	11
Khulna	7	10	1	3	8	4	6	5
Bakerganj	16	13	5	14	17	15	16	15
Mymensingh	9	8	15	11	12	16	11	13
Dacca	2	5	8	1	5	1	1	1
Faridpur	17	15	13	15	15	17	13	16
Sylhet	6	3	10	16	10	7	15	3
Comilla	11	16	4	12	14	8	14	7
Noakhali	10	17	6	17	16	5	17	6
Chittagong	3	9	2	2	9	3	4	2
C.H. Tracts	1	1	17	4	1	2	9	4

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX XVIII

Agricultural Labour Force and Man/Land Ratios

Districts	Agricultural Labour as % of Total Labour 1961	1951	Per capita cultivated acres	Cultivated acres per cultivator
East Pakistan				
Dinajpur	90.8	87.2	0.64	2.06
Rangpur	92.4	88.6	0.39	1.29
Bogra	89.2	87.7	0.50	1.93
Rajshahi	87.9	85.8	0.57	2.17
Pabna	79.7	75.6	0.50	2.26
Kushtia	76.9	78.7	0.53	2.20
Jessore	84.5	82.9	0.51	2.03
Khulna	79.7	83.6	0.40	1.86
Bakerganj	87.3	83.6	0.46	1.86
Mymensingh	91.2	89.5	0.29	0.83
Dacca	62.1	70.3	0.23	1.26
Faridpur	87.3	84.6	0.40	1.56
Sylhet	89.4	88.1	0.49	1.58
Comilla	92.9	87.3	0.31	0.71
Noakhali	90.4	84.7	0.37	1.12
Chittagong	66.9	95.0	0.25	1.00
C.H. Tracts	88.1	93.4	0.33	0.66
West Pakistan				
N.W.F.P.				
Hazara	79.8	81.8	0.38	1.92
Mardan	71.1	65.7	0.62	3.04
Peshawar	50.1	52.6	0.45	3.19
Kohat	71.3	66.4	0.50	4.10
D.I. Khan	65.1	70.2	1.31	7.60
Bannu	70.1	75.4	1.12	6.50
Punjab				
Campbellpur	71.7	72.6	1.37	5.52
Rawalpindi	47.2	69.0	0.58	4.49
Jhelum	61.0	66.8	0.96	5.72
Gujrat	61.7	62.3	0.88	4.68
Sargodha	59.2	68.2	1.22	6.27
Mianwali	67.2	74.9	1.79	8.51
Lyallpur	53.8	65.2	0.74	4.47
Jhang	58.6	63.2	1.26	6.61
Lahore	36.6	48.6	0.43	4.10
Gujranwala	49.0	62.3	0.79	5.48
Sheikhupura	65.0	66.2	0.89	4.42
Sialkot	59.7	62.5	0.70	4.03
D.G. Khan	73.6	76.4	0.86	3.44
Muzaffargarh	70.5	75.7	1.00	4.41

APPENDIX XVIII [contd.]

Districts	Agricultural Labour as % of Total Labour 1961	1951	Per capita cultivated acres	Cultivated acres per cultivator
Punjab [contd.]				
Multan	53.7	66.1	0.99	5.95
Sahiwal	62.3	70.5	1.04	5.45
Bahawalpur	71.4	70.2	1.05	4.97
Bahawalnagar	71.7	70.5	1.50	6.90
Rahinmyar Khan	78.4	82.0	1.18	4.84
Sind				
Jacobabad	82.8	80.5	1.54	4.31
Sukkur	67.5	67.3	1.06	4.86
Larkana	79.8	69.3	1.39	4.66
Nawabshah	75.0	78.3	1.30	5.54
Khairpur	75.7	78.5	1.02	4.42
Hyderabad	52.9	58.7	1.03	4.30
Dadu	71.2	75.1	1.38	5.99
Tharparker	80.5	75.3	1.47	6.13
Sanghar	73.3	72.4	1.53	6.52
Thatta	71.7	75.1	1.12	4.35
Karachi	2.4	1.3	0.02	2.82
Baluchistan				
Quetta	35.3	39.0	0.46	4.85
Sibi	76.0	82.9	0.89	3.90
Loralai	83.6	86.6	0.87	3.79
Zhob	73.7	74.1	0.77	4.17
Chagai	53.0	58.9	0.81	8.28
Kalat	78.7	85.2	0.78	2.68
Mekran	61.8	78.4	0.24	0.71
Kharan	83.1	85.8	0.13	0.68
Lasbela	69.5	71.3	0.28	1.55

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX XIX

Owners of Land by Religion, 1961

I = Total owners as % of total population.
II = Non-Muslim owners as % of total owners.

Districts	I	II
East Pakistan		
Dinajpur	22.3	29.7
Rangpur	19.8	16.4
Bogra	7.2	11.9
Rajshahi	21.3	14.5
Pabna	16.4	12.0
Kushtia	18.7	5.5
Jessore	21.9	24.7
Khulna	18.2	35.3
Bakerganj	18.2	16.2
Mymensingh	20.9	11.0
Dacca	16.7	15.1
Faridpur	17.2	25.1
Sylhet	15.3	22.3
Comilla	17.9	12.8
Noakhali	16.4	13.3
Chittagong	15.3	17.2
C.H. Tracts	10.1	81.7
N.W.F.P.		
Hazara	14.0	-
Mardan	9.6	0.02
Peshawar	5.1	0.05
Kohat	8.1	-
D.I. Khan	8.9	0.05
Bannu	9.7	-
Punjab		
Campbellpur	14.7	-
Rawalpindi	13.3	0.06
Jhelum	16.9	-
Gujrat	13.8	0.01
Sargodha	10.5	0.21
Mianwali	13.4	0.11
Lyallpur	9.5	0.28
Jhang	8.9	0.09

Districts	I	II
Punjab [contd.]		
Lahore	6.13	0.62
Gujranwala	8.11	0.12
Sheikhupura	8.30	1.10
Sialkot	9.9	0.30
D.G. Khan	10.1	-
Muzaffargarh	13.5	0.04
Multan	8.1	0.30
Sahiwal	9.5	0.57
Bahawalpur	11.4	0.03
Bahawalnagar	7.2	0.02
Rahimyar Khan	10.0	0.10
Sind		
Jacobabad	4.1	3.20
Sukkur	5.0	2.38
Larkana	4.7	1.23
Nawabshah	4.9	0.65
Khairpur	8.2	0.36
Hyderabad	3.3	3.19
Dadu	6.0	9.63
Tharparkar	5.6	32.14
Sanghar	3.8	13.67
Thatta	4.2	1.13
Karachi	2.2	0.34
Baluchistan		
Quetta	24.0	0.04
Sibi	9.9	0.11
Loralai	12.2	-
Zhob	18.1	-
Chagai	3.7	0.80
Kalat	10.2	0.12
Mekran	11.0	-
Kharan	10.0	-
Lasbela	5.8	2.62

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX XX

Land Tenure, 1961
(as % of agricultural labour force)

1 = non-cultivating agriculturists. 2 = owning all land tilled. 3 = owning part and renting part. 4 = owning part, renting part and working for hire. 5 = renting all land tilled and sharecropping; 6 = renting all land and working for hire. 7 = unpaid family help. 8 = landless agricultural labourers.

Districts	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
East Pakistan								
Dinajpur	1.1	28.1	0.2	21.1	9.2	-	24.1	17.1
Rangpur	1.7	30.5	-	17.5	6.1	-	29.5	14.7
Bogra	2.3	44.9	3.1	5.2	6.0	2.8	19.8	15.9
Rajshahi	2.0	44.8	1.8	0.8	7.4	0.1	20.8	22.5
Pabna	2.1	37.5	5.5	0.4	9.5	0.9	23.7	20.6
Kushtia	1.0	23.0	1.1	20.5	3.7	0.2	30.6	19.9
Jessore	1.6	32.7	1.1	20.5	3.6	0.4	25.8	12.9
Khulna	12.1	19.7	1.9	19.8	4.8	0.3	22.7	18.7
Bakerganj	0.1	41.3	2.9	0.8	4.9	0.8	17.9	31.3
Mymensingh	0.3	36.8	6.0	3.0	2.8	0.1	35.7	15.3
Dacca	0.8	50.2	0.3	8.0	1.9	-	21.4	17.4
Faridpur	-	47.3	1.6	0.6	2.8	0.1	22.6	25.0
Sylhet	6.4	32.1	2.6	2.1	2.4	0.5	41.1	12.8
Comilla	-	29.4	2.3	2.9	1.4	0.2	54.0	9.8
Noakhali	1.7	28.2	3.8	3.8	5.2	2.3	38.8	16.2
Chittagong	2.8	25.1	5.5	3.1	6.4	1.7	36.3	19.0
C.H. Tracts	0.2	20.8	3.2	1.9	9.6	1.8	45.2	17.3
West Pakistan								
N.W.F.P.								
Hazara	1.0	45.7	3.2	0.6	14.0	0.8	31.4	3.3
Mardan	2.3	9.7	4.0	0.1	15.2	0.9	13.4	54.7
Peshawar	4.2	26.4	7.4	0.6	20.8	1.8	20.7	18.1
Kohat	2.5	29.6	9.5	0.2	8.7	0.5	46.3	2.8
D.I. Khan	4.0	25.3	14.8	0.6	28.8	1.3	20.4	4.7
Bannu	1.4	28.7	18.1	0.3	21.4	0.6	24.7	4.8
Punjab								
Campbellpur	4.0	27.0	12.2	1.9	15.6	0.9	36.4	2.2
Rawalpindi	8.1	51.1	6.4	1.1	5.2	0.5	26.5	1.1
Jhelum	4.5	44.9	15.4	0.7	8.4	0.9	24.3	0.8
Gujrat	8.9	37.2	11.3	1.3	10.1	0.9	27.6	2.6
Sargodha	2.8	26.7	7.8	0.7	28.3	0.8	25.8	7.1
Mianwali	1.5	29.0	15.5	0.9	25.7	0.8	23.9	2.7
Lyallpur	3.1	33.3	6.2	0.2	20.3	0.5	27.8	8.6
Jhang	2.4	25.0	8.6	0.1	31.8	0.4	27.3	4.5
Lahore	3.9	24.0	7.5	0.8	23.2	1.8	23.5	15.2

APPENDIX XX [contd.]

Districts	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Punjab [contd.]								
Gujranwala	4.3	25.1	10.9	1.1	27.7	1.1	20.8	9.0
Sheikhupura	2.5	27.0	8.4	0.3	28.1	1.7	20.4	11.6
Sialkot	2.5	26.6	13.2	0.9	21.2	1.4	23.4	10.7
D.G. Khan	5.2	17.1	14.0	0.3	29.7	0.7	26.8	6.2
Muzaffargarh	4.3	31.7	14.5	0.2	21.5	0.3	24.4	3.2
Multan	4.5	25.9	7.8	0.1	37.2	0.6	20.2	4.0
Sahiwal	5.6	26.5	6.8	0.2	31.6	0.5	24.1	4.8
Bahawalpur	9.7	21.4	8.2	0.2	21.7	0.3	34.2	4.4
Bahawalnagar	7.4	17.1	4.8	0.2	29.3	0.3	36.0	5.0
Rahimyar Khan	8.8	17.9	9.2	0.2	31.5	0.8	28.8	2.8
Sind								
Jacobabad	2.1	4.4	2.6	0.8	30.0	0.7	39.9	19.5
Sukkur	4.5	10.1	10.3	0.3	33.1	2.3	36.4	3.0
Larkana	2.9	7.2	6.2	0.9	30.6	0.8	47.8	3.5
Nawabshah	4.4	10.1	5.9	0.2	49.3	0.4	28.1	1.7
Khairpur	6.2	14.9	10.3	5.1	30.3	2.1	30.5	0.6
Hyderabad	6.8	10.4	5.6	1.2	39.5	2.6	21.3	12.7
Dadu	5.0	11.1	9.0	0.1	38.9	0.8	34.6	0.6
Tharparkar	5.2	15.1	4.8	0.4	26.3	2.7	35.2	10.3
Sanghar	8.0	7.1	5.5	0.2	42.5	1.3	25.9	9.5
Thatta	7.2	9.8	6.1	0.3	41.7	1.0	19.0	15.0
Karachi	23.7	30.0	3.7	1.0	9.6	1.2	8.2	22.5
Baluchistan								
Quetta	9.4	47.8	2.0	-	9.7	0.1	25.9	5.0
Sibi	25.3	22.3	5.1	0.1	25.7	1.3	18.0	2.2
Loralai	14.4	46.6	3.0	0.1	13.2	0.6	21.4	0.7
Zhob	25.1	40.9	1.6	-	9.1	-	23.2	0.1
Chagai	33.4	30.5	0.7	-	10.9	-	22.9	1.6
Kalat	8.6	28.3	8.0	0.5	20.4	1.0	29.8	3.4
Mekran	19.1	31.2	3.0	0.6	7.3	0.3	9.7	28.7
Kharan	13.6	35.8	7.2	-	27.0	1.2	8.0	7.2
Lasbela	23.3	42.5	6.4	0.1	8.0	0.5	12.1	7.0

(Source: Census, 1961)

APPENDIX XXI

Pressure of Population and Agricultural Productivity, Index Values, 1961

1 = index of agricultural production based on average yields of wheat and rice.
2 = index of pressure of population on agricultural land.
3 = index of the relative productivity.

Districts	1	2	3	Districts	1	2	3
East Pakistan				Punjab [contd.]			
Dinajpur	3.3	312	6.8	Lahore	3.4	799	13.8
Rangpur	3.2	854	4.1	Gujranwala	3.3	215	18.0
Bogra	2.7	749	5.2	Sheikhupura	3.3	161	14.4
Rajshahi	3.0	452	6.5	Sialkot	2.6	429	10.6
Pabna	2.5	803	5.7	D.G. Khan	2.6	37	8.8
Kushtia	2.8	567	6.2	Muzaffargarh	2.9	61	12.9
Jessore	2.8	614	5.7	Multan	4.3	114	25.5
Khulna	3.4	376	6.3	Sahiwal	4.2	117	22.8
Bakerganj	3.4	628	6.3	Bahawalpur	3.2	23	15.8
Mymensingh	3.2	1226	2.7	Bahawalnagar	3.1	51	21.7
Dacca	3.1	2526	3.9	Rahimyar Khan	3.3	58	15.9
Faridpur	2.3	1311	3.6	Sind			
Sylhet	3.4	429	5.4	Jacobabad	2.3	51	9.9
Comilla	3.2	1639	2.3	Sukkur	2.7	52	13.2
Noakhali	3.3	1071	3.7	Larkana	2.4	62	11.3
Chittagong	4.4	1003	4.4	Nawabshah	2.8	66	15.2
C.H. Tracts	3.8	58	2.5	Khairpur	2.8	28	12.3
N.W.F.P.				Hyderabad	3.1	81	13.2
Hazara	2.1	275	4.1	Dadu	2.4	20	14.3
Mardan	2.9	373	8.9	Tharparker	2.9	13	17.5
Peshawar	3.0	526	9.7	Sanghar	3.0	22	19.8
Kohat	1.9	190	7.9	Thatta	1.7	27	7.3
D.I. Khan	1.9	34	14.1	Karachi	1.1	75300	3.0
Bannu	2.3	81	15.1	Baluchistan			
Punjab				Quetta	1.9	56	9.2
Campbellpur	2.0	69	10.8	Sibi	2.1	6	8.3
Rawalpindi	2.3	432	10.4	Loralai	2.3	8	8.5
Jhelum	2.4	117	13.7	Zhob	1.1	9	4.8
Gujrat	3.0	225	13.9	Chagai	1.1	2	9.4
Sargodha	3.6	70	22.4	Kalat	2.4	6	6.4
Mianwali	1.9	39	16.4	Mekran	1.0	25	0.7
Lyallpur	4.7	218	20.9	Kharan	1.9	10	1.3
Jhang	3.2	79	21.2	Lasbela	1.2	43	1.9

(Sources for column 1: Ahmad 1968 and Zaidi 1966; for column 2: Census 1961; column 3 is based on columns 1 and 2)

APPENDIX XXII

Index of Connectivity

Districts	Score	Districts	Score	Districts	Score
East Pakistan					
Dinajpur	2.50	Rangpur	1.83	Bogra	1.20
Rajshahi	0.67	Pabna	0.17	Kushtia	0.75
Jessore	1.50	Khulna	0.50	Bakerganj	0.13
Mymensingh	0.50	Dacca	0.75	Faridpur	0.14
Sylhet	1.25	Comilla	0.57	Noakhali	1.67
Chittagong	1.50	C.H. Tracts	1.00		
West Pakistan					
N.W.F.P.					
Hazara	1.13	Mardan	0.92	Peshawar	2.25
Kohat	0.71	D.I. Khan	0.79	Bannu	1.00
Punjab					
Campbellpur	1.50	Rawalpindi	2.67	Jhelum	2.50
Gujrat	1.50	Sargodha	2.58	Mianwali	1.19
Lyallpur	2.40	Jhang	2.50	Lahore	3.75
Gujranwala	1.75	Sheikhupura	2.33	Sialkot	1.00
D.G. Khan	0.50	Muzaffargarh	1.08	Multan	2.08
Sahiwal	2.10	Bahawalpur	2.25	Bahawalnagar	1.33
R.Y. Khan	1.13				
Sind					
Jacobabad	1.80	Sukkur	1.50	Larkana	0.83
Nawabshah	1.00	Khairpur	1.25	Hyderabad	1.50
Dadu	0.43	Tharparkar	1.33	Sanghar	1.25
Thatta	1.50	Karachi	1.33		
Baluchistan					
Quetta	1.20	Sibi	1.00	Loralai	0.20
Zhob	1.00	Chagai	0.67	Kalat	0.78
Mekran	0.33	Kharan	0.33	Lasbela	0.50

(Source: based on the Survey of Pakistan, Road Map of West Pakistan, Third Edition, 1965; and Province Map of East Pakistan, Second Edition, 1962)

APPENDIX XXIII

Relative Levels of Economic Development (Districts), Index Values

Districts	Index Value	Districts	Index Value	Districts	Index Value
West Pakistan					
N.W.F.P.					
Hazara	2.75	Mardan	3.39	Peshawar	4.78
Kohat	3.57	D.I. Khan	4.24	Bannu	4.22
Punjab					
Campbellpur	4.54	Rawalpindi	7.40	Jhelum	6.71
Gujrat	5.74	Sargodha	6.82	Mianwali	5.46
Lyallpur	7.26	Jhang	6.81	Lahore	7.69
Gujranwala	6.92	Sheikhupura	5.13	Sialkot	5.33
D.G. Khan	2.92	Muzaffargarh	4.07	Multan	6.79
Sahiwal	6.19	Bahawalpur	4.18	Bahawalnagar	5.51
Rahimyar Khan	4.42				
Sind					
Jacobabad	3.14	Sukkur	5.11	Larkana	4.04
Nawabshah	4.74	Khairpur	4.12	Hyderabad	5.47
Dadu	4.61	Tharparkar	4.32	Sanghar	5.18
Thatta	2.99	Karachi	8.12		
Baluchistan					
Quetta	5.46	Sibi	2.49	Loralai	2.04
Zhob	1.90	Chagai	2.81	Kalat	1.76
Melran	1.11	Kharan	1.00	Lasbela	1.10
East Pakistan					
Dinajpur	5.07	Rangpur	3.60	Bogra	4.29
Rajshahi	4.06	Pabna	3.58	Kushtia	3.56
Jessore	4.19	Khulna	5.11	Bakerganj	4.58
Mymensingh	3.03	Dacca	4.58	Faridpur	3.24
Sylhet	3.92	Comilla	3.99	Noakhali	4.36
Chittagong	5.13	C.H. Tracts	2.83		

(Sources: Census, 1961; Zaidi 1966; Ahmad 1968; Survey of Pakistan, Maps, 1962 and 1965)

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